Facts:

Between 1999 and 2001, ONGC appointed about 800 persons on a term basis for four years. The appointments were made after interviews, but without public advertisement. The appellant-Employees Union demanded regular appointments for 577 term-based employees appointed by ONGC between 1991 and 2001. An industrial dispute arose, and the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal.

Issues:

The determination of the date from which the concerned workmen should be treated as regularized employees.

Held:

The Supreme Court noted that the employees' union sought full regularization from the date of initial appointment, while the High Court had granted regularization from a later date. The Court distinguished relevant judgments. It held that the concerned workmen, including those who were already regularized, should be treated as regular employees from the date on which the industrial dispute was referred (21.12.2004). The Court ordered all actual benefits to be granted from that date until 01.04.2013. The other directions given by the Single Judge were upheld. The appeal was allowed accordingly.

Facts:

Padma Mishra filed a writ petition to quash an FIR accusing them of gang-related activities under the Gangsters Act. The FIR alleged violent actions, threats, and coercion to disrupt public order and intimidate witnesses.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition that sought to quash the FIR based on the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986.

Held:

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court, consisting of Indira Banerjee and Aniruddha Bose, JJ., considered the appellant's appeal against the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition. The Court analyzed the definitions of "gang" and "gangster" as provided in Sections 2(b) and 2(c) of the Gangsters Act. It noted that a "gangster" includes a member, leader, or organizer of a gang involved in anti-social activities that disturb public order or seek undue advantage.

The Court emphasized that in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court's role is not to determine the accuracy of allegations in an FIR but to intervene only in exceptional cases where the allegations do not disclose any offense. The Court referred to the FIR's allegations of violent and coercive activities, which included threats and physical violence to silence witnesses. These activities were categorized as falling under the definition of "gangster" as per the Gangsters Act.

The Court clarified that the High Court had correctly refused to quash the FIR under Article 226 of the Constitution and had rightly dismissed the writ petition. It held that since the allegations in the FIR ex facie disclosed acts warranting penalization under the Gangsters Act, the appeal was dismissed.

Final Result : Dismissed

Facts:The case pertains to the interpretation and application of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, and the subsequent amendment introduced by Act 45 of 2009. The amendment sought to remove the deeming provision that had previously capped monthly wages at Rs. 4,000 for compensation purposes. The question before the court was whether the benefits of the 2009 amendment should apply to accidents occurring prior to its enactment on January 18, 2010.

Issues:

Whether the benefits of Act 45 of 2009, removing the deeming cap on monthly wages for compensation, apply to accidents that occurred prior to its enactment.

Whether the objective of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, and its subsequent amendment, Act 45 of 2009, support the extension of the amendment's benefits to pre-amendment accidents.

Held:

Issue 1: The court observed that the objective of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, was to provide relief to economically disadvantaged employees facing work-related risks. The amendment introduced by Act 45 of 2009 aimed to eliminate the deeming cap on monthly wages for compensation, ensuring that employees receive compensation based on their actual wages. However, the court held that there was no indication in Act 45 of 2009, either express or implied, that the legislature intended to apply its benefits retroactively to accidents occurring before its enactment. Therefore, the court concluded that the benefits of Act 45 of 2009 do not extend to accidents that occurred prior to its coming into force. (Para 25, 26)

Issue 2: The court emphasized that while amendments enhancing compensation benefit employees, they correspondingly impose a burden on employers to pay higher compensation rates. The court reiterated that the relevant date for determining compensation remains the date of the accident. In the present case, where the accident occurred on January 31, 2008, the court held that the High Court's extension of Act 45 of 2009's benefits was incorrect. (Para 28, 32, 33)

The court upheld the award of compensation ordered by the High Court since the employer had provided evidence of the deceased employee's monthly wage, and no appeal had been filed by the respondents against the High Court's compensation enhancement. The court emphasized that this decision was made under its inherent jurisdiction in accordance with Article 142 of the Constitution. (Para 34)

Facts:

Usha Ananthasubramanian, the former MD & CEO of Punjab National Bank, appealed against an order issued by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The issue pertained to the freezing of her assets based on allegations of misconduct and fraudulent conduct in connection with her role in the bank.

Issues:

The scope of the powers granted under Sections 241, 241(2), 337, and 339 of the Companies Act, 2013. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether these powers could be extended to freeze assets and take actions against an individual in relation to their association with another organization.

Held:

In a judgment authored by Justice R.F. Nariman, the Supreme Court examined the relevant sections of the Companies Act, 2013. The court pointed out that Section 241(2) allows the Central Government to apply to the Tribunal for orders when the affairs of a company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest. The court noted that Sections 337 and 339 provide penalties and liabilities for fraudulent conduct within the company being mismanaged, and these sections cannot be applied to individuals associated with other entities.

The court emphasized that the powers under Sections 337 and 339 are limited to the business of the specific company that is being mismanaged and cannot be used to target individuals associated with other organizations. As such, the freezing of assets and actions taken against the appellant, Usha Ananthasubramanian, under Section 241 were deemed to be without jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the orders issued by both the NCLAT and NCLT. The appeal was allowed on these grounds.

Facts:

Balwant Singh and Dungar Singh, real brothers, had disputes over the partition of family properties after their father's death. They opted for arbitration, appointing close relatives as arbitrators. The arbitrators passed an award on 23-11-1981, which the District Judge initially dismissed due to concerns about the arbitration process. The High Court later declared the award valid and enforceable.

Issues:

Was the arbitration award valid and enforceable despite objections raised?

Did the subsequent settlement modify the terms of the original award?

Held:

The arbitration award, though passed on the same day, was valid since it was unanimous and based on mutual consent. The arbitrators' close relationship with the parties did not invalidate the award, and no misconduct was established.

The High Court's decision to uphold the arbitration award was justifiable, given that no misconduct was proven, and the arbitrators' decision was based on the parties' claims and due deliberation.

The subsequent settlement, reached with the consent of both parties, modified the terms of the original award. The modified settlement included the payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- to one party in lieu of jewelry and the continuation of litigation over specific land.

Decision: Based on the parties' consent and the modified settlement, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeal. A decree reflecting the modified settlement's terms was ordered.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 30.03.2000. The agreement stipulated execution within three years, subject to certain conditions. Defendant No.1 admitted the execution of the agreement but claimed the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiff wasn't ready and willing to perform.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff proved the execution of the agreement and receipt of earnest money?

Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform?

Whether the suit was barred by limitation?

What order or decree should be passed?

Held:

The trial court held the suit barred by time and that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform. This decision was affirmed by the High Court in appeal. The Supreme Court stressed the importance of a first appeal as a re-hearing of questions of law and fact. The High Court's decision was found lacking in compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC, which requires the appellate court to state points for determination, record decisions, give reasons, and provide relief.

The Supreme Court found that the High Court failed to reevaluate evidence, address key issues, and follow proper procedures. The Court emphasized the appellant's right to a re-hearing and the need for the High Court to properly analyze disputed questions of law and fact. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for fresh consideration.

Facts:

The respondent-complainant, a Collateral Management Company, stored commodities pledged by various entities in its warehouses. In the case of any loss, it was liable to compensate the lending banks. The company had a Fidelity Guarantee Insurance Policy with the appellant-opposite party. Alleging unauthorized removal and substitution of pledged commodities, the respondent lodged a claim under the policy.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's employees were involved in the unauthorized activities.

Whether the delay in lodging the claim violated the insurance policy's terms.

Held:

The Court examined the evidence and found indications of employee involvement in unauthorized activities. The survey report pointed to the employees' complicity in removing and substituting commodities. This fulfilled the conditions of the Fidelity Guarantee Insurance Policy, which covered losses arising from breaches of honesty, integrity, or fidelity of employees. (Paragraphs 9-11)

The Court considered the timeline and circumstances. Since the respondent discovered the unauthorized activities only after the completion of 100% sampling and laboratory reports, the delay in lodging the claim was not unreasonable. Thus, there was no breach of condition no. 1 of the policy regarding claim submission. (Paragraphs 12-13)

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the Court upheld the National Commission's decision to direct the insurance company to pay the claimed amount.

Facts:

The Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) emphasized the archaeological significance of Virupapura Gaddi, leading to a 1988 notification declaring it a 'protected area' under the 1961 Act. Certain parties constructed huts, buildings, and structures in these areas for commercial purposes like hotels and restaurants.

Issues:

Whether the 1988 notification declaring Virupapura Gaddi as a 'protected area' under Section 19(3) of the 1961 Act is valid.

Whether the constructions made by the appellants violate Section 20(1) of the 1961 Act.

Whether the HWHAMA has authority to demolish the illegal constructions.

Held:

Issue 1 - Validity of Notification (Para 13 to 14.3): The 1988 notification issued under Section 19(3) declaring Virupapura Gaddi a 'protected area' is valid. The ASI's observations and the government's consideration of the area's historical importance support this notification. Section 19(4) confirms the status of Virupapura Gaddi as a protected area.

Issue 2 - Construction Violations (Para 15 to 16): The constructions made by the appellants in Virupapura Gaddi violate Section 20(1) of the 1961 Act. Since the entire area was declared a protected zone, the appellants could only use it for cultivation after the notification. However, their constructions were for commercial purposes and thus, in violation of the Act.

Issue 3 - HWHAMA's Authority (Para 21 to 25.2): The HWHAMA has authority to take action against illegal constructions. The Hampi Act and the 1961 Act share a common objective of heritage preservation, and they should be interpreted to further this objective. The HWHAMA's actions were lawful under Section 11 of the Hampi Act, given the need to protect Hampi's cultural heritage. The Master Plan 2021 and Zonal Regulations fulfill the requirement of Section 14(1).

Conclusion (Para 26): The constructions by the appellants were illegal, and the HWHAMA had authority to proceed with their demolition. The impugned judgment of the High Court of Karnataka stands valid.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal where the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Goa, was the appellant, and M/S Adani Exports Ltd. was the respondent. The matter was related to customs and excise issues.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 130A(1) and (4) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Determination of the discretionary authority of the High Court in calling for a statement from the Tribunal when deciding an application for reference of a question of law.

Held:

Paragraph 3 of the judgment clarifies the interpretation of Section 130A(1) and (4) of the Customs Act, 1962. It emphasizes that the High Court has discretion, as indicated by the use of "if" in Section 130A(4), to decide whether to call for a statement from the Tribunal before deciding on the application for reference.

Decision: The Supreme Court, in accordance with the interpretation provided in paragraph 3, overruled the previous judgment in Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore v. Central Manufacturing Tech. Institute (2002) 146 ELT 27. The Court emphasized that the High Court has the discretion under Section 130A(4) to determine whether it should call for a statement from the Tribunal when deciding on an application for reference.