Facts:

The appellant was accused of dowry death under Sections 498(A) and 302 of IPC.

The Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant, finding insufficient evidence of dowry demand.

The High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting the appellant based on prosecution evidence.

The deceased's family alleged ill-treatment, dowry demands, and accused the appellant of setting her on fire.

Issues:

Whether the evidence supported charges under Sections 498(A) and 302 IPC.

Whether the High Court correctly reversed the Sessions Judge's acquittal.

Held:

The High Court rightly convicted the appellant under Sections 498(A) and 302 IPC.

The evidence, including testimonies of the deceased's family, established dowry demands, ill-treatment, and the appellant's culpability.

The appellant's actions leading to the death were deemed homicidal, not accidental.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

Appellant (Kamal Kumar) filed a civil suit for specific performance against the respondents (Premlata Joshi and Others) regarding the suit land.

Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the High Court affirmed the decision in the first appeal.

Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 136.

Issues:

Whether a valid and concluded contract existed between the parties.

Whether the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

Whether the appellant was entitled to specific performance or any alternative relief.

Held:

The grant of specific performance is discretionary and equitable.

The two Courts below held that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness, a crucial factor for specific performance.

Concurring findings of facts by the lower Courts are binding, and no perversity or illegality was identified.

The material questions for specific performance, as per Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the Specific Relief Act, were duly considered by the lower Courts.

The appellant did not establish readiness and willingness, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

Facts:

The appellant was granted permission under Rule 11C of the Cable Television Network (Amendment) Rules, 2012, to operate as an MSO in the DAS notified areas.

The permission was revoked on 03.09.2014, citing denial of "security clearance" by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The appellant challenged the cancellation through a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the cancellation of permission was justified based on the denial of "security clearance"?

Whether the principles of natural justice were violated by not providing prior notice before the cancellation?

Held:

The cancellation order was passed in conformity with Rule 11C of the Rules, as security clearance was a mandatory requirement for permission.

The principles of natural justice were not violated, and the appellant was not entitled to claim prior notice before the cancellation.

The appeal was found devoid of merit and dismissed. The appellant was given the liberty to apply for fresh permission in accordance with the law.

Facts:

The respondent worked as a daily wager in the R & B Department of the State for approximately 18 years.

The State terminated the respondent's services without following the due procedure prescribed in law.

The respondent raised a dispute almost 15 years after his alleged termination before the Labour Court.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the daily-wage worker was illegal, and if so, what relief is appropriate, considering the nature of the employment and the circumstances surrounding the termination.

Held:

After hearing counsels, the court is inclined to allow the appeal in part and modify the impugned order.( Paragraph 8)

The court determines that the case falls within the parameters set by previous decisions in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs Bhurumal and District Development Officer vs. Satish Kantilal Amerelia.( Paragraph 9)

The court quotes the rationale from Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, emphasizing that automatic reinstatement with back wages is not applicable when the termination is due to procedural defects, such as the violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 10)

Highlights reasons for the decision: respondent worked as a daily wager for a few years, had no right to claim regularization, no right to continue as a daily wager, and raised the dispute after a significant gap.( Paragraph 11)

Concludes that lump sum monetary compensation is just, proper, and reasonable in full and final satisfaction of the claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.( Paragraph 13)

Specifies the amount of compensation as Rs. 1,00,000/- to be paid by the appellant (State) to the respondent within three months.( Paragraph 14)

The appeal succeeds, and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The Labour Court's Award is modified accordingly.( Paragraph 15)

Facts:

Birla Institute of Technology (BIT) is the appellant, and the State of Jharkhand and Others are the respondents.

Respondent No.4, a teacher, claimed gratuity from BIT under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The controlling authority ordered BIT to pay gratuity to respondent No.4.

BIT appealed, but both the appellate authority and the High Court upheld the order.

Issues:

Whether the appellant (BIT) is liable to pay gratuity to a teacher under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Held:

The Supreme Court relied on the precedent set in Ahmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (2004) 1 SCC 755, which held that teachers are not employees under Section 2(e) of the Act.

The High Court erred in distinguishing the precedent on the grounds of applicability to primary teachers only. The Supreme Court clarified that the distinction is not valid, emphasizing that teachers, in general, are not intended to be covered by the Act.

The Court reiterated that the definition of "employee" under the Act does not include teachers, irrespective of the type of educational institution they work in.

The High Court's decision was set aside, and the appeal by BIT was allowed.

The application made by respondent No.4 before the controlling authority under the Act was dismissed as not maintainable.

Facts:

A complaint was lodged in 1983, and the case was put on trial under various sections of IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

After the investigation, charges were filed against the appellant and others.

The prosecution filed a petition to examine handwriting expert Mr. H.S. Tuteja in 2004, but his attendance for examination has been a persistent challenge.

Issues:

Whether the summoning of Mr. H.S. Tuteja, as sought by the prosecution, is justified.

The impact of repeated failures to secure the witness's attendance on the trial proceedings.

Held:

The court refers to Section 311 of CrPC, granting discretionary authority to summon witnesses. Emphasizes that such power should be exercised cautiously and only for strong and valid reasons.

Despite multiple opportunities given to the prosecution, they have been unable to ensure the presence of Mr. H.S. Tuteja.

The High Court's orders allowing the summoning of the witness are quashed. The appeal is allowed, and the application for summoning Mr. H.S. Tuteja is dismissed.

Decision: The orders of the High Court dated 04.05.2017, as well as of the Trial Court dated 05.12.2014, are hereby quashed, and the application filed by the Prosecutor for summoning Mr. H.S. Tuteja is dismissed.

Facts:

U.P. Jal Nigam Construction Division (Jal Nigam) retrenched workmen engaged in various categories.

The Writ Petition challenging the retrenchment was decided in 2009, directing preference to the petitioners in future selections.

Subsequent disputes arose leading to a series of contempt petitions.

Issues:

Whether the circular dated 07.04.2015 complied with the court's directions?

Did the order of the court mandate reinstatement or grant of regular pay scale?

Can the petitioners claim reinstatement without a specific court order to that effect?

Held:

The circular dated 07.04.2015 complied with the court's directions under Section 6Q of the Act.

Contempt cannot be invoked without a specific direction for reinstatement or regular pay scale.

The court's order did not mandate reinstatement; hence, petitioners cannot claim such relief.

The Group D posts available were subject to regular recruitment rules, not for direct appointment of retrenched workers.

Contempt petitions dismissed; the services of already engaged workmen remain unaffected.

Facts:

The appellant, Madhav Hari Joshi, applied for a Jeevan Aastha Plan with LIC in 2009.

An extra premium of Rs. 10,000 was disputed, although the appellant had paid Rs. 1,75,000 against the regular premium of Rs. 1,65,000.

LIC retained the appellant's money for nearly five years without issuing a policy or initiating a refund.

Issues:

Dispute over the extra premium.

Delay in processing the proposal by LIC.

Non-issuance of the policy and failure to refund the appellant's money.

Held:

The appellant had paid the disputed extra premium as part of the total payment.

LIC failed to fulfill the remaining formalities promptly, leading to an unjustified delay.

The appellant's investment was linked to the equity market, and the delay deprived him of the benefits of market escalation.

A deficiency of service was established.

The National Commission's order was modified, and an additional amount of Rs. 2,00,000 was directed to be paid, in addition to the sum ordered by the National Commission.

Facts:

Late Smt. Shyal Devi purchased land in 1958.

Title Suit filed in 1992 due to alleged interference by Bihar State Road Transport Corporation.

Previous litigation established possession but not title.

Electricity Sub-station construction initiated in 2015 on disputed land.

Smt. Shyal Devi passed away in 2014, and her sons (Respondent Nos. 1 to 3) filed Title Suit No. 45/2015 seeking an injunction.

Issues:

Validity of Writ Petition challenging orders of Civil Courts.

Prima facie case for granting interim injunction.

Ownership and possession of disputed suit property.

Public interest vs. Private interest in constructing Electricity Sub-station.

Held:

The court does not unsettle the judgement of the High Court on the ground of maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 227 due to procedural reasons.

Respondents failed to establish a prima facie case justifying the grant of an interim injunction. The previous finding of possession did not confer title, and the Plaintiffs did not specify the area under dispute.

The court emphasized that the findings of previous litigation were against the Plaintiffs, and the refusal to grant a Temporary Injunction was justified. The Electricity Sub-station construction was on land registered in the name of the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation.

The balance of convenience favored the Electricity Board due to the completion of the Sub-station, ready to benefit around 1 lakh people. Respondents could be compensated if entitled under Section 67 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The judgement of the High Court directing status quo was set aside. The court stated that these findings were prima facie in nature and would not influence the trial of the case.