Facts:

Laxman was given in adoption to Saraswati on 2nd November, 1935. At the time of his adoption, he had three sons, Gangadhar, Dattatraya, and Manohar. After adoption, Laxman and his wife, Padmavati, joined Saraswati's family along with their three sons. A daughter, Kalindi, was born to Laxman and Padmavati in 1938. Laxman was excluded from the partition of his natural family's property in 1948. After Laxman's death in 1987, his daughter Kalindi applied to include herself and her mother Padmavati as owners in the village revenue record. This was granted in 1987.

Issues:

Whether Laxman's sons, born before his adoption, had the right to inherit his property in the adoptive family after his death, especially in contrast to his daughter Kalindi, who was born after his adoption.

Held:

The judgment upholds the rights of all the children, both those born before and after the adoption, to inherit the property of their natural father and mother in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Act doesn't make any distinction between sons born before or after the father's adoption, and there is no provision barring natural-born sons from inheriting their father's property.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the decision of the Bombay High Court.

Facts:

The respondent occupied the 16th floor of a building since February 1, 2012, without paying any lease rent, maintenance charges, electricity charges, or other dues.

The appellant claimed lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019, which the respondent did not seriously dispute.

Disputes arose over the maintenance charges, with the respondent arguing that they should not be liable to pay due to the absence of air-conditioning.

The appellant also claimed electricity charges, including minimum demand charges and additional fees, which the respondent disputed, asserting they only used minimal electricity and were not provided with invoices.

The respondent did not make any payments despite occupying the premises for over seven years.

Issues:

Whether the respondent is liable to pay lease rent and maintenance charges.

How to calculate maintenance charges in the absence of air-conditioning.

Whether the respondent is liable to pay electricity charges.

How to determine the electricity charges owed by the respondent.

Whether the electricity disconnection was justified due to non-payment by the respondent.

Held:

The respondent is liable to pay the appellant:

Lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019.

Maintenance charges of Rs. 2,11,20,000 at a rate of Rs. 7.50 per sq. ft. per month from February 1, 2012, to January 31, 2020.

Minimum electricity charges of Rs. 1,10,000 per month from February 1, 2012, to January 31, 2020.

The respondent is required to pay Rs. 1,00,00,000 within one month, with the remaining amount in three equal installments.

The appellant must restore electricity within three days of receiving the initial payment.

Monthly bills for lease rent, electricity charges, maintenance charges, and other charges must be sent by the appellant to the respondent. Payment must be made by a specified date each month, with a portion to be paid even in case of a dispute.

If any of the conditions set by the court are violated, the appellant has the right to disconnect electricity.

Facts:

The appellants in this case were appointed under the Adult Education and Non-Formal Education Project, a government project sponsored by both the Central Government and the State Government in the undivided state of Bihar between 1978 and 1990. Following the bifurcation of the state into Jharkhand and Bihar, the Central Government closed the project. The Government of Jharkhand declared these project employees as surplus, and in 2007, they were absorbed into various departments. A notification accompanying the absorption stated that these employees would be considered new appointees, and their past service would not be counted for seniority or pay protection.

Issues:

Whether the services rendered by the appellants under the Adult Education and Non-Formal Education Project could be counted towards pensionary benefits under the relevant rules.

Held:

The High Court of Jharkhand, in its order, concluded that the services rendered under the project did not qualify as government service under the relevant rules. Therefore, the employees were not entitled to pension benefits based on their past service. The High Court also referred to Rule 59 of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, which empowers the State Government to declare certain services as qualifying for pension. However, the notification for absorption did not include such a provision, and the Circular dated 12th August 1969, which applied to temporary government servants, did not apply to these project employees.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the employees appointed under the project could not claim pension benefits for their past service, as they were treated as fresh appointees without seniority or pay protection under the government's policy.

Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd., filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, seeking various reliefs related to the classification of their sugar factory for price determination under the Sugar (Price Determination for 1984-85 Production) Order, 1984, and Sugar (Price Determination for 1985-86 Production) Order, 1985. The appellant argued that their sugar mill should have been placed in the eastern zone for price fixation, similar to other sugar factories in the same district (Sitapur). The High Court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the classification decision was a policy decision made by the Central Government, and there was no evidence of arbitrariness or hostile discrimination.

Issues:

Whether the classification of the appellant's sugar mill for price determination under the Sugar Control Orders was arbitrary or discriminatory.

Whether Section 3(2)(f) and Section 3(3c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, were ultra vires of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The price of levy sugar was fixed for different zones with the intention of ensuring a reasonable return for sugar manufacturers, provided their units were running economically and efficiently. Sugar was a controlled commodity during the relevant time, covered by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The price of levy sugar was determined based on Control Orders, and the Central Government considered various factors, including expert recommendations and cost schedules. The Court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate invidious discrimination or statutory violation. The policy decisions regarding classification were made based on expert reports and were not discriminatory or unreasonable. (Para 7)

The Court concluded that there was no merit in the appeals and dismissed them. The appellant had made deposits and provided bank guarantees as per interim orders, and the Court allowed the respondent-Government to withdraw the deposited amount and accrued interest. (Para 8)

These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between C.S. Venkatesh (the appellant) and A.S.C. Murthy (the plaintiff), who filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of reconveyance concerning a property in Bangalore. The plaintiff also sought a declaration that a sale deed executed by him in favor of the defendants was null and void. The plaintiff's claim was based on the contention that the sale deed served as security for a loan advanced by the defendants, and there was an agreement of reconveyance.

Issues:

• Is the sale deed nominal or an outright sale?
• Has the plaintiff demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act?

Held:

The sale deed was not nominal but constituted an outright sale. The language and recitals within the deed indicated an unequivocal intention to transfer ownership. (Para 12)

To establish readiness and willingness for specific performance, the plaintiff must demonstrate continuous preparedness to fulfill the contractual obligations throughout the relevant period. Mere pleadings are insufficient; proof of the plaintiff's ability to generate the necessary consideration is required. In this case, the plaintiff's pleadings were not substantiated by evidence, and the plaintiff's financial situation did not support the claim of readiness and willingness. (Para 15-20)

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and reinstated the trial court's decision in favor of the defendant, C.S. Venkatesh.

Facts:

The case pertains to a claim filed by the respondent, Priya Paul, following an aviation accident resulting in her son's death. The appellant-insurer, Bharti AXA General Insurance, rejected the claim, arguing that the deceased was flying in a motorized glider for sightseeing, which they believed was not covered by the insurance policy.

Issues:

• Whether the motorized glider involved in the accident should be considered an "aircraft" under the policy?
• Whether the glider in question qualifies as a "standard type of aircraft"?
• Whether the glider was duly licensed?
• Whether the entity operating the glider, Pemberton Soaring Centre, qualifies as an "air charter company"?
• Whether the deceased was a fare-paying passenger on the glider?

Held:

Issue 1: Glider as an Aircraft: The fact that the glider had a motor does not preclude it from being considered an "aircraft." The policy did not provide specific definitions for "aircraft" or "glider," and the Transport Safety Board of Canada (TSBC) Report repeatedly referred to the glider as an "aircraft." Thus, the glider is deemed an aircraft under the policy.

Issue 2: Standard Type of Aircraft: The policy did not define "standard type of aircraft," and the 1937 Rules did not categorize aircraft as "standard" or "non-standard." The insurer could not reject the claim based on this argument.

Issue 3: Licensing of the Glider: The glider was found to be duly licensed and compliant with existing regulations and procedures, including the certification of the pilot. It was rightly held that the aircraft was duly licensed.

 Issue 4: Air Charter Company: The Pemberton Soaring Centre, which operated the glider, offered sightseeing services for a fixed fee, essentially chartering the entire aircraft for the duration of the aerial journey. This practice may constitute an own-use charter. The policy did not provide a clear definition of an "air charter company," so the ambiguity favored the claimant's position.

 Issue 5: Fare-Paying Passenger: The argument that the deceased was not a fare-paying passenger because the journey started and ended at the same location was rejected. The purpose of the journey was sightseeing, similar to how a sightseeing bus operates, and passengers should be considered as such.

Facts:

The respondent occupied the 16th floor of a building since February 1, 2012, without paying any lease rent, maintenance charges, electricity charges, or other dues.

The appellant claimed lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019, which the respondent did not seriously dispute.

Disputes arose over the maintenance charges, with the respondent arguing that they should not be liable to pay due to the absence of air-conditioning.

The appellant also claimed electricity charges, including minimum demand charges and additional fees, which the respondent disputed, asserting they only used minimal electricity and were not provided with invoices.

The respondent did not make any payments despite occupying the premises for over seven years.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent is liable to pay lease rent and maintenance charges.
• How to calculate maintenance charges in the absence of air-conditioning.
• Whether the respondent is liable to pay electricity charges.
• How to determine the electricity charges owed by the respondent.
• Whether the electricity disconnection was justified due to non-payment by the respondent.

Held:

The respondent is liable to pay the appellant:

• • Lease rent of Rs. 7,29,240 from February 1, 2012, to December 2, 2019.
  • Maintenance charges of Rs. 2,11,20,000 at a rate of Rs. 7.50 per sq. ft. per month from February 1, 2012, to January 31, 2020.
  • Minimum electricity charges of Rs. 1,10,000 per month from February 1, 2012, to January 31, 2020.

The respondent is required to pay Rs. 1,00,00,000 within one month, with the remaining amount in three equal installments.

The appellant must restore electricity within three days of receiving the initial payment.

Monthly bills for lease rent, electricity charges, maintenance charges, and other charges must be sent by the appellant to the respondent. Payment must be made by a specified date each month, with a portion to be paid even in case of a dispute.

If any of the conditions set by the court are violated, the appellant has the right to disconnect electricity.

Facts:

The case revolves around a dispute concerning a marine insurance claim for cargo. The insurer denied the insurance claim, leading to a consumer complaint alleging deficiency in service.

Issues:

Whether the breach of the Institute Classification Clause (ICC) occurred.

Whether the insurer had waived the breach of warranty.

Whether the insurer was justified in repudiating the insurance claim.

Held:

The Marine Cargo Cover Note and Marine Insurance Policy explicitly stated that the Institute Classification Clause (ICC) was one of the warranties/terms of insurance. The ICC sets standards for the seaworthiness of the vessel carrying the cargo, and compliance with it is crucial for determining the issuance of the policy and the premium.

The ICC 01/01/2001 version imposes two main requirements: classification with a recognized Classification Society and compliance with age limitations for the insured vessel.

In this case, neither was the subject vessel in compliance with the ICC, nor did the insured provide prompt notification to the insurer about the non-compliance. The appellant's contention regarding the vessel's classification was not sustained.

The appellant's notification regarding the vessel's classification did not constitute "prompt notification," and the insurer only learned of the breach later. No evidence of the vessel's classification was provided to the insurer.

The breach of the warranty occurred when the appellant informed the insurer about the vessel's classification. Even if the vessel was classed with the International Register of Shipping, it did not meet the ICC requirements, and the appellant was aware of this non-compliance.

Section 35(3) of the Marine Insurance Act makes it clear that a breach of warranty needs to be complied with, leading to the automatic discharge of the insurer's liability. Section 36(3) allows the insurer to waive the breach of warranty under certain conditions.

The issuance of the General Average Guarantee did not constitute a waiver because it was based on incorrect information provided by the insured, and the insurer withdrew the Guarantee upon discovering the breach.

The insurer's conduct and representations did not demonstrate an intent to waive the breach of warranty. Therefore, the insurer was justified in repudiating the insurance claim.

The impugned judgement of the NCDRC stands confirmed, and the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between C.S. Venkatesh (the appellant) and A.S.C. Murthy (the plaintiff), who filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of reconveyance concerning a property in Bangalore. The plaintiff also sought a declaration that a sale deed executed by him in favor of the defendants was null and void. The plaintiff's claim was based on the contention that the sale deed served as security for a loan advanced by the defendants, and there was an agreement of reconveyance.

Issues:

Is the sale deed nominal or an outright sale?

Has the plaintiff demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act?

Held:

The sale deed was not nominal but constituted an outright sale. The language and recitals within the deed indicated an unequivocal intention to transfer ownership. (Para 12)

To establish readiness and willingness for specific performance, the plaintiff must demonstrate continuous preparedness to fulfill the contractual obligations throughout the relevant period. Mere pleadings are insufficient; proof of the plaintiff's ability to generate the necessary consideration is required. In this case, the plaintiff's pleadings were not substantiated by evidence, and the plaintiff's financial situation did not support the claim of readiness and willingness. (Para 15-20)

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and reinstated the trial court's decision in favor of the defendant, C.S. Venkatesh.