Facts:

The case involved an incident where the deceased, Raghumani, was found lying in a pool of blood after being attacked on November 15, 1995.

The prosecution alleged involvement of six accused, including the appellant, Gupteswar Behera, who were charged with offenses under Sections 148, 149, and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Various witnesses, including PW1 Pradeep and PW15, the Investigating Officer, provided testimony, along with medical evidence presented through PW13 and PW14 regarding the injuries sustained by the deceased.

Issues:

The credibility of the eye-witness accounts and the reliance on dying declarations made by the deceased were the main issues in question.

Whether the deceased survived long enough for the witnesses to hear his statements was a crucial point of contention.

Held:

The Court found doubt regarding whether the deceased survived long enough for the witnesses to hear his statements. Considering the time it would take for witnesses to reach the scene and the severity of the injuries, the Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments and orders of both the Sessions Court and the High Court. Gupteswar Behera was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be set at liberty unless required in connection with any other case.

Facts:

The appellant, Hukum Chandra, was a tenant in a shop located in Madhya Pradesh.

The respondent, Nemi Chand Jain, filed a suit for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, claiming a bona fide requirement of the shop for his son, Rajendra Kumar Jain, to start or continue his business.

The trial court initially dismissed the suit for eviction, but the first appellate court overturned this decision, finding that the requirement of the shop for Rajendra Kumar's business was genuine.

Issues:

Whether the requirement for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act was bona fide and genuine.

Whether subsequent events, such as the landlord obtaining possession of an adjacent shop, affected the bona fide requirement for eviction.

Held:

Outlines the requirements for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, emphasizing the need for a bona fide requirement by the landlord or his family member and the absence of other reasonably suitable accommodation.

Discusses the evidence presented regarding the tenant's son, Rajendra Kumar's, involvement in a utensils business at the time of filing the eviction petition. The trial court had initially found that Rajendra Kumar was already engaged in business, questioning the bona fide requirement for eviction.

Address the contention regarding subsequent events, particularly the landlord obtaining possession of an adjacent shop. The Court found that this adjacent shop was meant for another son of the landlord, not Rajendra Kumar, thus not affecting the bona fide requirement for eviction.

Confirms the decision of the High Court to uphold the eviction, noting that the landlord's other son, Rajesh Kumar Jain, occupied the adjacent shop. Therefore, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the lower courts.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was granted three months to vacate the premises.

Facts:

H.K. Singla, the appellant, was the Secretary of the Chandigarh State Bank of Patiala Employees Co-operative USE Thrift & Credit Society.

Avtar Singh Saini & Ors, the respondents, filed a complaint alleging non-payment of maturity amount along with interest by the society.

The District Forum directed the society to pay the amount along with additional compensation, but the society failed to comply.

Singla was sentenced to imprisonment and fined by the District Forum under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Issues:

Whether Singla, as Secretary of the society, could be held personally liable for the society's default.

Interpretation of Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 regarding penalties.

Held:

The Court suspended the order of imprisonment against Singla during the pendency of the appeal before the State Commission. The Court expressed doubt about the legality of imprisoning Singla for the default committed by the society, especially in the absence of any order directly implicating him.

Therefore, it was deemed appropriate to suspend the imprisonment order until the State Commission determines whether Singla could be imprisoned without any personal liability imposed by the District Forum. The Court urged the State Commission to expedite the appeal process.

Additionally, the first respondent was allowed to take necessary legal steps to recover the amount owed by the society, considering it was in liquidation.

Facts:

The plaintiff sought a declaration that the mortgage and sale deeds regarding a house were void, alternatively seeking redemption of the mortgage. The plaintiff claimed the property was orally gifted to him by his father, with mention in a will executed in favor of the plaintiff's stepmother. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court decreed it. The High Court affirmed the decree for redemption, leading to the appeal.

Issues:

The validity of the mortgage and sale deeds, the alleged undue influence, the validity of the oral gift under Mohammedan Law, the statute of limitations, and procedural irregularities in the redemption of mortgage proceedings.

Held:

The defendants proved the execution of the mortgage and sale deeds in accordance with the law. The burden of proof lay on the plaintiff to challenge their validity, which they failed to discharge.

The plaintiff failed to establish that the documents were executed under undue influence or fraud.

The plaintiff failed to prove the essential conditions required for a valid oral gift under Mohammedan Law. The court found no evidence of possession or fulfillment of necessary conditions.

The suit challenging the documents was filed beyond the limitation period, rendering it barred by limitation under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The High Court erred in treating the suit as a simple redemption of mortgage case and failing to follow the procedure laid down in Order 34 Rules 7 and 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment due to its procedural irregularities and errors in legal interpretation.

Facts:

Prakash Chand Daga (Appellant) sold a Santro Car to Saveta Sharma (First Respondent).

An accident occurred involving the car, and a claim was lodged by Rakesh Kumar (Second Respondent).

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal assessed compensation, holding both the driver and the first respondent liable.

The appellant challenged the decision in the High Court, which upheld the decision based on Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, despite transferring ownership of the vehicle, remains liable for the accident.

Held:

The liability of the registered owner, as per the records of the Registering Authority, persists until the transfer is duly registered. Even though there might have been a transfer of ownership in law, the liability of the registered owner endures until the transfer is properly recorded. The purpose of the law is to ensure that victims of motor accidents are not burdened with tracing successive transfers. Therefore, the appellant remained liable for the accident, despite having sold the vehicle (para. 9).

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision, and holding that the appellant was liable for the compensation (para. 10).

Facts:

The appellant, V. Ravi Kumar, operated a business of cotton ginning and yarn conversion in Salem, Tamil Nadu.

Transactions were conducted between the appellant and Sri Rajendran Mills Ltd., involving the supply of cotton lint for conversion into yarn.

Allegations arose when the respondents, officials of the Mill, were accused of selling the entrusted cotton lint without completing the conversion process.

The appellant filed a complaint under Sections 420 and 409 IPC, leading to the initiation of criminal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents?

Whether the appellant's withdrawal of an earlier complaint without assigning reasons was a valid ground for quashing a second complaint?

Whether the allegations arising from commercial transactions were sufficient to constitute offences under Sections 420 and 409 IPC?

Held:

The High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings without adequate justification. The correctness of the allegations should be determined during trial, and it was not the role of the High Court to delve into the merits of the case at the stage of quashing the FIR.

The mere withdrawal of an earlier complaint without assigning reasons is not a ground to quash a second complaint. The law permits filing a second complaint on the same allegations under exceptional circumstances.

The distinction between breach of contract and cheating lies in fraudulent or dishonest intention, which needs to be established during trial. Therefore, the allegations arising from commercial transactions should not automatically result in the quashing of criminal proceedings.

Facts:

The respondent-plaintiff filed a civil suit for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell dated 13.03.1992 regarding a property.

The defendants filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation.

The trial court allowed the application and rejected the plaint, holding that the suit was barred by limitation.

The High Court overturned the trial court's decision, stating that based on the averments in the plaint, it couldn't be concluded that the suit was time-barred.

Issues:

Whether a plaint can be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(d) solely on the ground of limitation?

What is the interpretation of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 regarding suits for specific performance?

Whether the rejection of the plaint solely based on limitation is appropriate at the initial stage?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. While it can be a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the CPC, only the averments in the plaint should be considered at this stage.

The court clarified that under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, if a date is fixed for performance, the limitation period is three years from that date. If no date is fixed, the period is three years from when the plaintiff has notice of refusal. The court emphasized that whether a suit is barred by limitation should be determined after trial, based on evidence.

Therefore, rejection of a plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(d) solely on the ground of limitation is not appropriate at the initial stage. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, stating that the plaint could not be rejected solely based on the ground of limitation. It directed the trial court to dispose of the suit expeditiously, considering all issues, including limitation, on their merits.

Facts:

The case pertains to challenges arising from urban development and slum rehabilitation schemes in Mumbai, focusing on the utilization of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) and Floor Space Index (FSI). The Maharashtra government implemented schemes such as the slum rehabilitation scheme and utilized TDR as an incentive for developers.

Issues:

The legality and application of TDR and FSI in specific areas, challenges to the discretionary powers of the Municipal Commissioner, and concerns regarding infrastructure and open spaces.

Held:

The Court, after considering the arguments and examining the details of the case, upheld the decision of the High Court. The Court emphasized the role of elected governments in policymaking and the limitations of judicial interference in matters of policy formulation unless they violate constitutional principles.

The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the High Court had adequately addressed the issues raised and issued appropriate directions. Each party was directed to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 6 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1994, regarding the tax liability of manufacturers or dealers of motor vehicles.

Issues:

Whether the Bihar Act, enacted under Entry 57 of List II of the Constitution, is within the legislative competence.

Whether manufacturers or dealers are liable to pay tax under Section 6 of the Bihar Act.

Whether the imposition of penalties for non-payment of tax is valid under Section 23 of the Act.

Held:

The High Court determined that the Bihar Act falls under the legislative competence granted by Entry 57 of List II of the Constitution, empowering the State Legislature to impose tax on vehicles based on possession.

Section 6 of the Bihar Act imposes tax liability on manufacturers or dealers when they possess motor vehicles during their business activities.

The constitutional validity of Section 6 was upheld previously, confirming that the tax liability under this section is tied to the possession of vehicles by manufacturers or dealers during their business operations.

Sections 5 and 6 of the Act operate in different contexts. While Section 5 deals with tax payable upon registration by the owner, Section 6 addresses tax liability before possession by the manufacturer or dealer. The intent of Section 6 is to specify the tax payable in place of that specified in Section 5.

Section 23 of the Act imposes penalties for non-payment of tax within the prescribed period. The court upheld the imposition of penalties, noting that the vires of Section 6 and the relevant rules have been challenged previously and repelled.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the rulings of the High Court regarding the liability of manufacturers or dealers to pay tax under Section 6 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1994, as well as the imposition of penalties for non-payment of tax.