Facts:

On 16 February 2019, the Union Government issued Notification 5/2019 under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, imposing enhanced customs duty on goods imported from Pakistan. The notification was published through e-gazette at 20:46:58 hours. Importers had already presented their bills of entry and completed the self-assessment process before the notification was uploaded. The question was whether the notification was applicable retrospectively and if the importers were liable to pay duty based on the enhanced rate.

Issues:

Whether Notification 5/2019 could be enforced with retrospective effect.

Whether importers were liable to pay duty based on the enhanced rate under the notification.

Held:

The court interprets the statute based on its provisions, purpose, and scheme. In this case, the court is interpreting a fiscal levy under the Customs Act and its relationship with the Customs Tariff Act. (PARA 34)

The court acknowledges the shift from analog to digital gazette publication and the importance of the precise time of e-gazette publication. The notification under Section 8A cannot operate retrospectively unless authorized by statute. The revised rate of import duty under Notification 5/2019 applies to bills of entry presented after its publication on the e-Gazette at 20:46:58 hours on 16 February 2019. (PARA 35)

A notification under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act is akin to delegated legislative power. It must come into operation with reference to the point of time when it was published on the e-gazette. (PARA 39)

Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act does not provide power for increasing duty with retrospective effect, and the notification must be treated as having come into force at the time of e-gazette publication. (PARA 58)

The power under Section 8A does not have retrospective effect as it is not accompanied by statutory entrustment of authority to exercise it retrospectively. (PARA 62)

Section 5(3) of the General Clauses Act, which makes a Central Act effective from the day preceding its commencement, does not apply to notifications, which are forms of delegated legislation. (PARA 68)

Once the notification is found to take effect from its publication, bills of entry presented before the publication will be subject to the rate of duty that prevailed at the time of deemed presentation. (PARA 78)

The power under Section 17(4) of the Customs Act cannot be used to alter the rate of duty at the time of self-assessment following deemed presentation of bills of entry. Para 80

Facts:

The Supreme Court, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, directed each State/Union Territory to form a High Powered Committee (HPC) to decide which class of prisoners could be released on parole or interim bail to reduce overcrowding in prisons. The HPC in Maharashtra categorized prisoners into three groups based on the nature of their offenses and the length of their sentences.

Issues:

The petitioners alleged discrimination in the categorization made by the HPC.

Held:

The HPC's categorization based on the nature of the crime and length of punishment is reasonable and not arbitrary (para 11).

The grant of interim bail is an additional benefit provided to prisoners due to the pandemic, and it does not create new legal rights for them (para 12).

The exclusion of certain categories from receiving interim bail is justified as the intention is to prevent the release of those charged with serious offenses affecting society (para 12).

If any modifications to the categories are necessary to achieve prison decongestion, the HPC has the authority to consider and apply such changes (para 14).

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the categorization made by the HPC and the High Court's decision to support it.

Facts:

The respondent no. 1 had constructed a flyover on a National Highway. After a year of use, it was found to be in a distressed condition with several cracks. The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways appointed the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) as an expert agency, which opined that the bridge could be repaired using a carbon fibre composite treatment. On the other hand, Dr. E. Sreedharan recommended the strengthening and replacement of RCC girders with PSC girders, necessitating demolition and reconstruction, with a guaranteed service life of 100 years. In light of this divergent opinion, the State government constituted a High Level Committee to consider the matter. The Committee accepted Dr. Sreedharan's proposal due to the assured 100-year guarantee. The State Government accepted the Committee's report.

Issues:

Whether the High Court correctly conducted a judicial review of the State Government's decision and whether the decision was arbitrary or violative of Article 14.

Held:

The High Court, instead of applying established parameters of judicial review and ascertaining whether the State Government's decision would vitiate Article 14, delved into the matter itself and directed a load test to be conducted. The Court held that the State Government's acceptance of the Expert Committee's report could not be deemed arbitrary. As a result, the order of the High Court was set aside.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, affirming the validity of the State Government's decision to accept the Expert Committee's report.

Facts:

The National Law School of India University, Bengaluru (NLSIU) was required to obtain a recommendation from the Academic Council before conducting the National Law Aptitude Test (NLAT) for admission to its five-year integrated B.A.LL.B (Hons.) Programme for the academic year 2020-21. However, NLSIU issued an admission notification for NLAT on September 3, 2020, without such a recommendation. This resulted in a delay in the conduct of the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT), which was eventually scheduled for September 28, 2020. The petitioners challenged the validity of the NLAT notification.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners have the locus to file the writ petition?

Whether NLSIU was required to obtain a recommendation from the Academic Council before issuing the NLAT notification?

Whether NLSIU, as a member of the Consortium of National Law Universities, was bound by its Bye-Laws and should have conducted admission through CLAT 2020?

Whether the online home-proctored examination proposed by NLSIU lacked transparency and violated the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution?

Whether the NLAT conducted on 12.09.2020 with a re-test on 14.09.2020 was marred by malpractices and should be set aside?

Held :

The petitioners have the locus to file the writ petition as they represent students aggrieved by the NLAT notification.

NLSIU was required to obtain a recommendation from the Academic Council before conducting NLAT. The admission notification dated 03.09.2020 issued without such recommendation is not in accordance with the National Law School of India Act, 1986.

NLSIU, as a member of the Consortium, was bound by its Bye-Laws, which required admissions to be conducted through CLAT. The obligation under the Bye-Laws is binding on the members, and NLSIU should not have proceeded with a separate admission test (NLAT).

The online home-proctored examination proposed by NLSIU lacked transparency and violated the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. A large number of students were denied the opportunity to appear in the test due to short notice and technical requirements.

The court did not express any opinion on the issue of malpractices in the NLAT conducted on 12.09.2020 and 14.09.2020, as it is a matter of scrutiny of facts and evidence.

Facts:

The vendor and vendee entered into an agreement for the sale of a 300 sq. yard land for a total consideration of Rs. 75,000.

The vendee paid Rs. 45,000 as part of the consideration, and the total amount was supposed to be paid within 45 days.

Subsequently, the vendor executed a registered deed of conveyance in favor of another party ('P') for 100 sq. yards of the land covered by the agreement.

The vendee filed a suit for specific performance against the vendor, seeking the remaining 200 sq. yards of the land.

Issues:

Whether the vendee was ready and willing to perform her obligations under the agreement.

Whether the agreement was subject to the condition that the vendee would negotiate with 'P' to get his earlier agreement with the vendor cancelled.

Whether specific performance can be granted in part for the remaining 200 sq. yards of land.

Whether the suits filed against 'P' for specific performance and declaration were barred by limitation and non-joinder of the vendor as a necessary party.

Held:

The trial court and the High Court found that the vendee was ready and willing to perform her obligations under the agreement (Para 57).

The vendor's contention that the agreement was subject to the condition of negotiating with 'P' was rejected for lack of evidence (Para 58).

The relief of specific performance is no longer discretionary after the amendment of Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, and the Court is obliged to enforce it subject to certain provisions (Para 70).

The Court has the power to direct specific performance of a contract in part, as per Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act (Para 73).

The vendee was entitled to specific performance of the remaining 200 sq. yards as she had performed her obligations and not caused the breach (Para 89).

The suits filed against 'P' were barred by limitation and non-joinder of the vendor as a necessary party (Paras 82 and 84).

Clubbing of suits is for convenience and does not convert the suits into one action (Para 91).

Decision: The appeals by both the vendor and the vendee were dismissed. The judgments of the trial court and the High Court were upheld, and the specific performance was granted in part for the remaining 200 sq. yards of land (Para 92).

Facts:

The appellants in this case filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the NCLT's order after a delay of more than 45 days. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal along with the application for condonation of delay. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court seeking to revive the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal beyond the prescribed 45-day period under Section 421(3) Proviso of the Companies Act, 1956?

Whether the order of the Supreme Court extending the limitation due to Covid-19 pandemic can be applied to condone the delay beyond the prescribed 45-day period?

Held:

Section 421(3) of the Companies Act prescribes a limitation period of 45 days for filing an appeal from the date of the NCLT's order. The starting date for limitation can be fixed based on the availability of a certified copy of the order. However, if the appellants chose to apply for the certified copy after a delay, they cannot rely on Section 421(3) to fix the starting date. (Para 13-14)

The appellants had 45 days from the date of receiving the certified copy to file the appeal, which expired on 02.02.2020. The Appellate Tribunal can condone the delay only up to this period, which expired even according to the appellants on 18.03.2020. The subsequent lockdown, imposed on 24.03.2020, does not alter this calculation. (Para 15-17)

The order of the Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020, which extended the limitation period due to the Covid-19 pandemic, only applies to the "period of limitation" and not the period for condonation of delay. The appellants cannot claim the benefit of this order to further condone the delay beyond the prescribed 45-day period. (Para 18-19, 25)

The expression "prescribed period" appearing in Section 4 of the Limitation Act refers to the period of limitation and not the period during which the Court or Tribunal can exercise discretion to allow proceedings. Any period beyond the prescribed limitation cannot be considered as part of the "prescribed period." (Para 20-23)

Cases Referred

Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 624

Facts:

The appellant, H.C. Dhandra Trust's Executors/Trustees, passed a resolution to transfer and vest immovable properties to beneficiaries through a Deed of Transfer. However, they later executed a Deed of Assent with stamp duty of Rs. 200, giving their assent to complete the title and vest it absolutely in favor of the beneficiaries. The Collector of Stamps treated this Deed of Assent as a "Gift Deed" and demanded a higher stamp duty of Rs. 1.28 lakhs and imposed a ten times penalty.

Issues:

Whether the imposition of the ten times penalty under Section 40(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, was valid and justifiable.

Held:

The court examined the statutory scheme of Section 40(1)(b) and emphasized that the discretion to impose a penalty not exceeding ten times the deficient stamp duty lies with the Collector. However, the imposition of such an extreme penalty cannot be automatic or mechanical. The Collector should exercise the discretion reasonably and fairly, in furtherance of the objectives of the enactment.

The court observed that the purpose of penalty is generally for deterrence, not retribution. When a public authority is given discretionary power, it must exercise it reasonably and not oppressively. The court clarified that the imposition of the extreme penalty should be based on relevant factors, such as fraud, deceit, or intent to deprive the Revenue.

In this case, the Collector justified the penalty based on the party's failure to mention the actual nature of the document to escape the duty. However, the court found no other reasons to justify the imposition of the maximum penalty. Additionally, the Collector did not establish dishonest or contumacious conduct on the part of the appellant.

Considering all facts and circumstances, the court decided to partly allow the appeals and reduce the penalty to five times the deficiency in the stamp duty.

Cases Referred

Gangtappa and another vs. Fakkirappa, 2019(3) SCC 788

Peteti Subba Rao vs. Anumala S. Narendra, 2002 (10) SCC 427.

Facts:

The appellant, a 20-year-old data entry operator, suffered a permanent disability of amputation of his right hand. The disability was initially assessed as 89%, but the Claims Tribunal and the High Court re-assessed it to be 45%. Compensation was awarded for loss of earning capacity, but future prospects were denied. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court seeking proper assessment of disability and compensation.

Issues:

Whether the disability was correctly assessed at 45% by the lower courts?

Whether compensation for future prospects should be awarded?

Whether the income of the appellant was correctly assessed by the lower courts?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the disability was incorrectly assessed at 45%. The severity of the loss of a limb should be judged in relation to the profession or vocation of the victim. The extent of the appellant's disability was reassessed at 65% (Para 13 and 20).

The Court held that compensation for loss of future prospects should be awarded. The appellant was entitled to compensation for loss of future prospects at 40% (Para 12 and 21).

The Court found that the lower courts wrongly disregarded the appellant's assertion of earning Rs. 12,000/- per month. Considering the evidence and future prospects, the Court determined the appellant's income at Rs. 14,000/- per month for the purpose of calculating compensation (Para 21).

The compensation was modified to Rs. 19,65,600/-, which includes compensation for the loss of earning capacity and future prospects. The assessment of amounts payable under other heads by the High Court was upheld (Para 23).

Facts:

M/S. MSD Real Estate LLP (the appellant) was involved in a property transaction where a deficit stamp duty demand and a penalty were imposed by the Collector of Stamps. The appellant contested the penalty amount, leading to litigation. The Supreme Court later modified the penalty, reducing it to half of the original amount. The appellant paid the reduced penalty and fulfilled the stamp duty requirement. Subsequently, the appellant sold the property to another purchaser who sought permission for construction and submitted post-dated cheques towards the outstanding penalty. However, the competent authority issued a notice demanding the remaining penalty and denied permission for construction. The High Court upheld the penalty demand and observed that the payment of penalty by post-dated cheques was not acceptable. The High Court also stated that the new purchaser could reapply for permission after paying the full penalty.

Issues:

The liability of the subsequent purchaser for depositing the outstanding penalty.

Compliance with the Supreme Court's order on the penalty amount.

Validity of the Municipal Corporation's denial of permission for construction.

Consideration of subsequent actions and orders by the Municipal Corporation and other State Authorities in the present appeal.

Held:

The High Court rightly upheld the demand for penalty, stating that the subsequent purchaser (the appellant) was liable to deposit the outstanding penalty amount against the property. The appellant's payment of penalty through post-dated cheques was not acceptable. The High Court did not interfere with the Addl. Tehsildar(Recovery)'s order dated 04.06.2020, demanding Rs. 8,80,97,025 as outstanding penalty.

The Supreme Court had previously modified the Collector's order dated 22.09.2008, reducing the penalty to half of the initial amount. All parties were directed to act in accordance with the Supreme Court's judgment on the penalty issue.

The High Court's direction to reconsider the application for building permission after the appellant's deposit of stamp duty and penalty adequately protected the appellant's rights. The appellant was free to apply for building permission as per the High Court's observation.

The subsequent orders and notices by the Municipal Corporation and other State Authorities were not part of the writ petition before the High Court and could not be considered in the present appeal. The parties were granted liberty to seek remedies for subsequent actions and orders as permissible by law.