Facts:

The case involves Gopal Prasad, an employee of the Bihar School Examination Board, who entered service at the age of 15 years and 6 months. The retirement age at the time of his entry was 58 years, which was later extended to 60 years. The minimum qualifying service for pension was 18 years.

Issues:

Whether an employee can be superannuated (retired) before reaching the age of 60 years solely because they have completed 42 years of qualifying service.

Held:

Justice Rastogi emphasizes that for a valid contract of service, an individual must attain the age of majority as defined in the Majority Act, 1875. He discusses that the appellant was a minor when he entered service and the Pension Rules, 1950, set the minimum age of qualifying service at 18 years. The judge concludes that the superannuation age specified in Rule 73 of the Bihar Service Code will apply for retirement, and an employee cannot continue beyond the completion of 42 years of service, considering the Pension Rules, 1950.

Justice Banerjee highlights that the age for appointment under the Bihar government was fixed at 18 years by a circular issued in 1998. She points out that the resolution of the Bihar School Examination Board in 2004 sought to ensure that employees who entered service before 18 years of age would not be deprived of pensionary benefits. However, she argues that the resolution was not meant to retire such employees before their actual retirement age prescribed in Rule 73. Justice Banerjee states that the Bihar Service Code does not have provisions to decrease the retirement age through resolutions, and that employees cannot be retired before reaching the age of 58 or 60, as per Rule 73.

Facts:

The respondent, an employee of Mahanadi Coalfields Limited, faced disciplinary proceedings initiated while he was in service. These proceedings continued after his superannuation. The employer withheld his gratuity pending the outcome of the proceedings. The employee challenged this action, leading to this appeal.

Issues:

Can an employer withhold gratuity during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings after an employee's superannuation?

Can the punishment of dismissal be imposed on an employee found guilty of misconduct after superannuation?

Held:

The employer has the right to withhold gratuity during the disciplinary proceedings, even after an employee's superannuation. The disciplinary authority can impose the penalty of dismissal or other major penalties after superannuation if the proceedings were initiated while the employee was in service. The Payment of Gratuity Act governs gratuity payment conditions, but it does not impede the employer's right to hold a departmental inquiry after retirement. The Act doesn't specify the punishment for inquiries continuing after superannuation. Rule 34.2 allows continuation of inquiry after superannuation and Rule 34.3 permits recovery of pecuniary loss from gratuity. Hence, the punishment of dismissal can be imposed, and recovery can be made from gratuity.

Gratuity is earned for long and dedicated service, not as a mere favor. Section 4(6) of the Act permits forfeiture of gratuity for misconduct. The Act's scheme doesn't negate disciplinary inquiries after superannuation. Rules 34.2 and 34.3 empower continuation of inquiry and recovery from gratuity. But substantive penalties, including dismissal, can't be applied retrospectively after superannuation. Gratuity forfeiture is the appropriate penalty if guilt is proven.

While M.R. Shah, J., held that the employer can withhold gratuity and impose dismissal after superannuation, Ajay Rastogi, J., partly dissented, suggesting that gratuity forfeiture is the appropriate penalty post-superannuation. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

NEEPCO filed applications under Section 34 challenging the arbitral awards.

The Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial) rejected NEEPCO's applications and upheld the awards.

NEEPCO appealed under Section 37 to the High Court, which set aside the Deputy Commissioner's judgment.

The petitioner, Patel Engineering Ltd., filed Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) in the Supreme Court, which were dismissed.

Subsequently, the petitioner filed review petitions before the High Court, claiming an error apparent on the face of the record.

The High Court dismissed the review petitions.

The present case involves an appeal against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in Associated Builders was correct.

Whether an arbitral award can be set aside under Section 34 if it is patently illegal or perverse.

Whether the interpretation of certain contract clauses by the arbitrator can be considered perverse.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the High Court's judgment dated 26.02.2019, which referred to the Associated Builders case extensively. The Court held that the High Court correctly concluded that an arbitral award can be set aside under Section 34 if it is patently illegal or perverse. The Court further agreed with the High Court's analysis of the interpretation of clauses in the contract and found that the arbitrator's view was not even a possible interpretation.

In light of the above, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of the review petitions, thereby affirming the correctness of the High Court's decision to set aside the arbitral awards.

Facts:

The petitioner, Arnab Ranjan Goswami, filed a writ petition seeking the quashing of several FIRs and complaints lodged against him across various states. These cases arose from his broadcast of a program on R Bharat. The allegations in these FIRs and complaints were similar and based on identical incidents.

Issues:

Whether subjecting a journalist to multiple proceedings in different jurisdictions for the same incident violates the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Whether the transfer of investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) should be ordered in this case.

Whether FIRs can be filed for defamation or whether only complaints can be filed under Section 199 of the CrPC.

Held:

The court recognized the significance of journalistic freedom and upheld the petitioner's exercise of his right to speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). However, this right is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). The court held that subjecting an individual to multiple proceedings in different jurisdictions for the same cause of action is not the least restrictive way to achieve the legitimate aim of prosecuting crimes. Therefore, except for one FIR, all other FIRs related to the same incident were quashed as an abuse of process. (Para 28, 31, 32, 33, 34)

The transfer of investigation to the CBI is an extraordinary power and must be used sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. Allegations against the police alone are insufficient to warrant a transfer. The court emphasized that the investigation agency has the discretion to decide the mode, manner, and line of interrogation. The petitioner's request to transfer the investigation to the CBI based on a perceived conflict of interest was not valid. (Para 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44)

The court clarified that in cases of criminal defamation, only a complaint can be filed by the aggrieved person under Section 199 of the CrPC. Therefore, FIRs for defamation are not maintainable. (Para 45, 46, 47)

The petitioner's subsequent writ petition regarding a specific FIR was deemed inappropriate since it lacked the jurisdictional basis present in the original petition. The court emphasized that remedies under the CrPC and High Court jurisdiction should be pursued for specific cases. (Para 52)

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Facts:

Workers employed as contract laborers sought regularization at the respondent-Corporation's depots. An understanding was recorded in a meeting on April 12, 1996. An Industrial Tribunal directed the workers' regularization, which was affirmed by higher courts, culminating in a Supreme Court decision.

Issues:

Whether the direction for regularization applied to the Departmental Labor System (DLS) or the Direct Payment System (DPS).

Held:

To establish civil contempt, willful and deliberate disobedience of the order with knowledge of consequences is required. The issue referred for adjudication was regularization, not a specific labor system. The Tribunal's award did not specify a labor system. The Corporation operates multiple labor systems, including DLS and DPS. The relevant policy at that time was to regularize under DPS. The Departmental Labor System was declining, and the policy was to regularize under DPS. The contempt petitions were dismissed as no case was made for contempt action against the Corporation.

Decision: The contempt petitions were dismissed as no willful disobedience was shown, and the direction did not specify a particular labor system.

Facts:

A will dated May 20, 2003, executed by the mother of the contesting parties, left her immovable property primarily to the appellant, one of her daughters. The testatrix passed away on May 21, 2006, leaving behind two daughters and a son. The appellant sought probate of the will, but the Trial Court and the High Court both declined the petition due to suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. The appellant appealed this decision.

Issues:

The validity of the will and whether it was executed with the testatrix's full understanding.

Unequal distribution of property and exclusion of certain heirs.

Active role played by the appellant in the execution of the will.

Whether the will accurately represented the testatrix's last wishes.

Held:

The judgment highlighted that while there was no question about the testatrix's mental capacity or handwriting, the courts found several suspicious circumstances that remained unexplained. These included the active role played by the appellant in executing the will, the exclusion of other children, unclear clauses in the will, and contradictions in the statements of witnesses. The cumulative effect of these circumstances raised doubts about whether the testatrix truly understood and intended the contents of the will.

The court emphasized that each individual suspicious circumstance might not be decisive, but their cumulative impact on the authenticity of the will should be considered. A single factor might not invalidate the will, but if the overall impression was that the testatrix's intentions were not clear, the will could be rejected.

The court addressed the suspicious circumstance of excluding the elder daughter (respondent No. 1) from the execution process. The appellant's active role in the process, coupled with respondent No. 1's exclusion, was noted as a confounding factor.

The appellant's attempt to portray innocence by suggesting that the testatrix did not discuss the will with her raised further suspicion. Contradictions in the appellant's statements about when she knew of the will added to the doubts.

The formal and legal expressions used in the handwritten portions of the will raised questions about whether the testatrix herself could have composed them, considering her layperson status.

The court referred to Section 81 of the Succession Act, stating that any ambiguity or deficiency on the face of a will could not be explained by extrinsic evidence.

The court concluded that the will was surrounded by various unexplained suspicious circumstances that prevented the conclusion that the testatrix understood and intended its contents.

The appellant's equivocal stand on the existence of a disputed third page of the will further complicated the matter.

The court noted that the appellant's denial of the third page's existence and her subsequent attempt to rely on it undermined her case.

The appellant's vacillating stand regarding the third page added to the suspicious circumstances and weakened her case.

The court affirmed the material findings of the Trial Court and the High Court, stating that the will was not executed with a clear understanding of its contents.

Facts:

The case revolves around the development of an Integrated Infrastructure Corridor and Finance Project (IICFP) between Bangalore and Mysore in Karnataka. The project involved residential, industrial, and commercial facilities. The dispute arose when the Project Proponents submitted a modified development plan for permission to set up a group housing scheme at a location different from those specified for Townships in the Framework Agreement (FWA) and Infrastructure Corridor Project Technical Report (PTR). The Planning Authority rejected the modified plan, and the High Court directed the Planning Authority to issue a Commencement Certificate to the Project Proponents. The High Court's decision was appealed.

Issues:

Whether the Project Proponents had the authority to deviate from the stipulations and specifications of the FWA by proposing a standalone group housing scheme at a location other than the designated Townships' demarcated areas.

Whether the Planning Authority's rejection of the modified proposal was justified.

Held:

The court examined the Framework Agreement (FWA) and the Infrastructure Corridor Project Technical Report (PTR). The FWA specified the construction of five self-sustaining Townships at designated locations. The PTR demarcated these locations and set forth the specifications for the Townships. The court noted that the FWA obliges the Project Proponents to construct Townships within the stipulated locations and areas. The FWA defines "Townships" as an integral component of the Infrastructure Corridor Project. The court determined that the Project Proponents cannot deviate from the FWA stipulations without prior written approval from the State. (Para: 41-44, 47, 52)

The court examined whether the Planning Authority was justified in rejecting the modified proposal for a standalone group housing scheme. The court emphasized that the Project Proponents were required to obtain prior approval from the State for any deviations from the FWA. The court observed that the Project Proponents did not submit their proposal for approval to the State and instead directly approached the Planning Authority. The court held that the Planning Authority's rejection was valid since the proposal deviated from the FWA stipulations without prior State approval. (Para: 45-47, 51, 52)

The court rejected the argument of acquiescence or waiver based on the Planning Authority's earlier assurance and the State's involvement in previous litigation. The court held that these factors do not negate the State's authority to enforce FWA stipulations. (Para: 54-55)

Decision: The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Project Proponents were directed to approach the State for prior permission to deviate from the FWA stipulations. The court emphasized that any development must be in accordance with the FWA, PTR, and relevant regulations. The Planning Authority's decision was upheld as valid. (Para: 60, 62, 66-68)

FACTS:

In 1976, Food Corporation of India (FCI) invited offers for construction of godowns, followed by possession on lease. The appellants' offer was accepted, leading to an agreement on 16.12.1976. Disputes arose regarding possession, completion, and rent payment for the godowns. The trial court decreed in favor of appellants, which was challenged by FCI in the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the agreement dated 16.12.1976 qualifies as a lease under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act or an agreement for lease; and the entitlement of appellants to damages.

HELD:

The distinction between a lease and an agreement to lease under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was highlighted. For an agreement to be considered a lease, there must be an actual demise of property at the time of the agreement.( Para 17)

Citing precedents, including Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi vs. Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd. (AIR 1919 PC 79), the Court reiterated that an agreement to lease must effect an actual demise and create a present and immediate interest in the property.( Para 20-21)

Analyzing the terms of the agreement dated 16.12.1976, the Court held that it was not a lease but an agreement to enter into a lease. The execution of the lease was contingent upon completion of construction and approval by FCI.( Para 25)

The Court discussed Clause 6 of the agreement, emphasizing the requirement of obtaining a completion certificate from FCI before execution of the lease agreement. The possession of godowns was subject to the final inspection and approval of FCI officials.( Para 26-27)

The Court dismissed appellants' reliance on a letter dated 15.05.1979 as evidence of possession, noting its questionable authenticity and the misconduct of FCI officials involved.( Para 28)

Appellants' claim for rent prior to 08.02.1978 was rejected, as rent was payable only after actual possession as per Clause 8 of the agreement.( Para 29)

The Court addressed the claim for enhanced rent and held that the agreement did not stipulate any provision for enhanced rent after possession was taken over.( Para 30)

Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing appellants' claims for damages based on the terms and conditions of the agreement.( Para 31)

REFERRED CASES:

Hemanta Kumari Debi vs. Midnapur Zamindari Co. Ltd., AIR 1919 PC 79

Panchanan Bose vs. Chandra Charan Misra (ILR (1910) 37 Cal 808 :14 CWN 874

Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi vs. Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd, AIR 1919 PC 79

State of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. Atur India Pvt. Ltd. (1994) 2 SCC 497

Tiruvenibai vs. Lilabai, 1959 Supp 2 SCR 107: AIR 1959 SC 620

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit seeking declaration of ownership of land and alleging that certain mutations were based on a forged will. They sought permission to prove a copy of the will through secondary evidence, as the original will was handed over for mutation but could not be retrieved. The Trial Court allowed the application, but the High Court set aside the order.

Issues:

Whether secondary evidence of a will can be admitted without proving the existence of the original will.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that for secondary evidence to be admissible, foundational evidence must establish reasons for the non-production of the original document. Section 65 of the Evidence Act permits secondary evidence when the original is not in possession of the party against whom it is sought to be proved. The Court emphasized that while admission of secondary evidence does not automatically establish authenticity, truthfulness, or genuineness, those aspects must be established during trial.

The High Court erred in not allowing the appellants to lead secondary evidence and in denying the opportunity to prove the existence of the will. The Court allowed the appeal and granted the appellants the opportunity to provide secondary evidence, while clarifying that authenticity must be established during trial.