FACTS:
The case involves the appointment of respondent No.1 as a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) Group C in the Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India. Initially appointed on a deputation basis, respondent No.1 sought permanent absorption on a transfer basis, which was eventually approved. The terms of absorption specified that he would be treated as a fresh appointee in the Eastern Regional Office, and his seniority in the cadre would be counted from the date of absorption.

ISSUES:

• Whether the terms and conditions of respondent No.1's absorption should affect his seniority in the cadre?
• Does the O.M. dated 29.05.1986, which mentions that seniority may not be available in cases not strictly in public interest, apply to this case?

HELD:

The appellant argues that respondent No.1 accepted the terms and conditions of absorption, including the stipulation that his seniority would rank below others, and thus, he cannot now contest these terms. The High Court's observation that the O.M. dated 29.05.1986 and 27.03.2001 would prevail in assessing seniority is disputed.

The Court notes that the O.M. dated 29.05.1986 contains a crucial aspect stating that seniority may not be available in cases not strictly in public interest. The department initially wanted respondent No.1 to return to his parent cadre, indicating that his absorption was not "strictly in public interest." However, it was respondent No.1's repeated representations that led to his absorption on the terms and conditions specified in the office order dated 13.11.1996.

The Court concludes that the O.M. clause related to "not strictly in public interest" is applicable in this case. Therefore, the department's insistence on respondent No.1's return to his parent cadre and his eventual absorption cannot be said to be "strictly in public interest."

The appellant cites the judgment in Mrigank Johri & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 8 SCC 256, which supports the principle that past service should be reckoned for seniority purposes. In this case, the terms and conditions of absorption explicitly stated that seniority would be counted from the date of absorption, and respondent No.1 accepted these terms without objection.

The argument that respondent No.1's appointment was on a transfer basis is dismissed, as the case pertains to deputation. Therefore, the terms and conditions of absorption must apply, including the seniority clause.

The Court notes that while seniority will be maintained, respondent No.1 should not be demoted as he has earned promotions during the litigation period. An ex-cadre/supernumerary post should be created to retain him in the same position without affecting the seniority list.

The Court expresses concern about the Union of India's changing stance in its affidavits, emphasizing the need for careful wording in affidavits and a closer scrutiny of such matters by the department.

The Court acknowledges that respondent No.1's promotions were subject to the result of the proceedings, and demoting him would be harsh. Therefore, seniority will be maintained, and an ex-cadre/supernumerary post will be created to retain him in the same position.

The appeals are allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Facts:

In this case, a minor victim was traveling on a tractor with her parents when it was hit by a truck. The victim sustained serious injuries, including damage to her brain, resulting in a 100% disability. The disability certificate indicated a severe impairment, with an I.Q. less than 20% of a child of her age and a social age equivalent to that of a 9-month-old child.

Issues:

• The assessment of just compensation for the victim's injuries.
• The court also had to determine the appropriate amount for various components of compensation, including medical expenses, loss of earnings, attendant charges, pain, suffering, and loss of amenities, among others.
• Additionally, the court needed to address the issue of interest on the compensation amount.

Held:

Injuries sustained by a claimant in an accident cause deprivation to the body, entitling the claimant to claim damages. The compensation should neither be assessed very conservatively nor too liberally. It should be just and consider the degree of deprivation and the loss caused by such deprivation. The compensation should be substantial to compensate the injured for the deprivation suffered throughout their life.

Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, etc., were awarded an amount of Rs. 2,50,000, considering the long period of treatment and hospitalization of the victim.

Loss of earnings was assessed based on minimum wages payable to a skilled worker, with an additional 40% for future prospects. The total compensation for loss of earnings amounted to Rs. 14,66,000.

Attendant charges for the victim's lifetime were assessed at Rs. 21,60,000.

An amount of Rs. 15,00,000 was awarded for pain, suffering, and loss of amenities, taking into account the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

The compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 awarded for the loss of marriage prospects was upheld.

An additional Rs. 5,00,000 was awarded for future medical expenses, considering the victim's young age and potential future needs.

The court reiterated guidelines for the investment of compensation, emphasizing the importance of protecting the rights of minors, claimants with disabilities, and other vulnerable individuals.

Interest on the compensation amount should normally be granted from the date of filing of the petition. Exceptional cases may warrant interest from a later date, but reasons for this decision must be provided.

The total compensation awarded to the claimant amounted to Rs. 62,27,000, with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until payment/deposit of the amount. The insurance company was entitled to adjust the amount already paid and recover the remaining amount from the owner.

The appeal is disposed of.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over a compromise decree dated October 4, 1985, concerning a piece of land.

The trial court held that this compromise decree was not admissible in evidence due to a lack of registration.

The High Court upheld the trial court's decision.

Issues:

• Whether the compromise decree dated 04.10.1985 was required to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.

Held:

The compromise decree in question related to the same property that was the subject matter of the suit, falling within the exception provided in Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, which exempts any decree or order of a court from registration if it pertains to immovable property connected with the subject matter of the suit.

The judgment in Gurdwara Sahib vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and Another was overruled.

It was clarified that once a person has completed 12 years of adverse possession, the owner's right to eject them is lost, and the possessory owner acquires the right, title, and interest of the property.

Therefore, the compromise decree did not require registration as it was a decree of the court related to the same property involved in the suit.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, the lower court's order was set aside, and the compromise decree was directed to be exhibited as evidence in the trial court.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over a compromise decree dated October 4, 1985, concerning a piece of land.

The trial court held that this compromise decree was not admissible in evidence due to a lack of registration.

The High Court upheld the trial court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the compromise decree dated 04.10.1985 was required to be registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.

Held:

The compromise decree in question related to the same property that was the subject matter of the suit, falling within the exception provided in Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, which exempts any decree or order of a court from registration if it pertains to immovable property connected with the subject matter of the suit.

The judgment in Gurdwara Sahib vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and Another was overruled.

It was clarified that once a person has completed 12 years of adverse possession, the owner's right to eject them is lost, and the possessory owner acquires the right, title, and interest of the property.

Therefore, the compromise decree did not require registration as it was a decree of the court related to the same property involved in the suit.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, the lower court's order was set aside, and the compromise decree was directed to be exhibited as evidence in the trial court.

Facts:

In this case, a minor victim was traveling on a tractor with her parents when it was hit by a truck. The victim sustained serious injuries, including damage to her brain, resulting in a 100% disability. The disability certificate indicated a severe impairment, with an I.Q. less than 20% of a child of her age and a social age equivalent to that of a 9-month-old child.

Issues:

The assessment of just compensation for the victim's injuries.

The court also had to determine the appropriate amount for various components of compensation, including medical expenses, loss of earnings, attendant charges, pain, suffering, and loss of amenities, among others.

Additionally, the court needed to address the issue of interest on the compensation amount.

Held:

Injuries sustained by a claimant in an accident cause deprivation to the body, entitling the claimant to claim damages. The compensation should neither be assessed very conservatively nor too liberally. It should be just and consider the degree of deprivation and the loss caused by such deprivation. The compensation should be substantial to compensate the injured for the deprivation suffered throughout their life.

Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, etc., were awarded an amount of Rs. 2,50,000, considering the long period of treatment and hospitalization of the victim.

Loss of earnings was assessed based on minimum wages payable to a skilled worker, with an additional 40% for future prospects. The total compensation for loss of earnings amounted to Rs. 14,66,000.

Attendant charges for the victim's lifetime were assessed at Rs. 21,60,000.

An amount of Rs. 15,00,000 was awarded for pain, suffering, and loss of amenities, taking into account the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

The compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 awarded for the loss of marriage prospects was upheld.

An additional Rs. 5,00,000 was awarded for future medical expenses, considering the victim's young age and potential future needs.

The court reiterated guidelines for the investment of compensation, emphasizing the importance of protecting the rights of minors, claimants with disabilities, and other vulnerable individuals.

Interest on the compensation amount should normally be granted from the date of filing of the petition. Exceptional cases may warrant interest from a later date, but reasons for this decision must be provided.

The total compensation awarded to the claimant amounted to Rs. 62,27,000, with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until payment/deposit of the amount. The insurance company was entitled to adjust the amount already paid and recover the remaining amount from the owner.

The appeal is disposed of.

FACTS:The case involves the appointment of respondent No.1 as a Lower Division Clerk (LDC) Group C in the Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India. Initially appointed on a deputation basis, respondent No.1 sought permanent absorption on a transfer basis, which was eventually approved. The terms of absorption specified that he would be treated as a fresh appointee in the Eastern Regional Office, and his seniority in the cadre would be counted from the date of absorption.

ISSUES:

Whether the terms and conditions of respondent No.1's absorption should affect his seniority in the cadre?

Does the O.M. dated 29.05.1986, which mentions that seniority may not be available in cases not strictly in public interest, apply to this case?

HELD:

The appellant argues that respondent No.1 accepted the terms and conditions of absorption, including the stipulation that his seniority would rank below others, and thus, he cannot now contest these terms. The High Court's observation that the O.M. dated 29.05.1986 and 27.03.2001 would prevail in assessing seniority is disputed.

The Court notes that the O.M. dated 29.05.1986 contains a crucial aspect stating that seniority may not be available in cases not strictly in public interest. The department initially wanted respondent No.1 to return to his parent cadre, indicating that his absorption was not "strictly in public interest." However, it was respondent No.1's repeated representations that led to his absorption on the terms and conditions specified in the office order dated 13.11.1996.

The Court concludes that the O.M. clause related to "not strictly in public interest" is applicable in this case. Therefore, the department's insistence on respondent No.1's return to his parent cadre and his eventual absorption cannot be said to be "strictly in public interest."

The appellant cites the judgment in Mrigank Johri & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 8 SCC 256, which supports the principle that past service should be reckoned for seniority purposes. In this case, the terms and conditions of absorption explicitly stated that seniority would be counted from the date of absorption, and respondent No.1 accepted these terms without objection.

The argument that respondent No.1's appointment was on a transfer basis is dismissed, as the case pertains to deputation. Therefore, the terms and conditions of absorption must apply, including the seniority clause.

The Court notes that while seniority will be maintained, respondent No.1 should not be demoted as he has earned promotions during the litigation period. An ex-cadre/supernumerary post should be created to retain him in the same position without affecting the seniority list.

The Court expresses concern about the Union of India's changing stance in its affidavits, emphasizing the need for careful wording in affidavits and a closer scrutiny of such matters by the department.

The Court acknowledges that respondent No.1's promotions were subject to the result of the proceedings, and demoting him would be harsh. Therefore, seniority will be maintained, and an ex-cadre/supernumerary post will be created to retain him in the same position.

The appeals are allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

REFERRED CASES:

Mrigank Johri & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 8 SCC 256

Sub-Inspector Rooplal & Anr. vs. Lt. Governor Through Chief Secretary, Delhi & Ors., (2000) 1 SCC 644

Facts:

The respondent was employed by Bharat Coking Coal Limited.

The date of birth in the respondent's service record was recorded as March 4, 1950.

The respondent indicated the same date of birth in various official forms.

In 2009, just before retirement, the respondent requested a change in his date of birth in the service records.

The appellant company verified the date of birth with the Bihar School Examination Board, which confirmed a different date of birth in the school records.

Issues:

Whether the respondent's request to change the date of birth in the service records is valid.

Whether the delay in making the request is justifiable.

Held:

The Court held that changing the date of birth in the service records after a delay of over 30 years, especially at the end of one's service, is not sustainable.

The Court cited previous decisions emphasizing that such corrections should not be entertained late in one's career unless there is irrefutable proof and a real injustice has occurred.

The Court also noted that the respondent had multiple opportunities to correct the date of birth earlier but did not avail those opportunities.

The High Court's order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The Government of India requisitioned land for defense purposes in 1943 under Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939.

A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued in 1975 to acquire the same land.

The landowners challenged the acquisition, claiming that there was no due publication of the Section 4 notification, which they argued was a mandatory requirement.

A previous case, Kulsum R. Nadiadwala vs. State of Maharashtra (2012), had quashed a similar Section 4 notification on the grounds of non-compliance with mandatory requirements.

Issues:

• Whether the delay in challenging the Section 4 notification should be a bar to the petition.
• Whether the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala judgment was applicable to the present case, given the delay and other circumstances.
• Whether the Section 4 notification was valid, considering the historical requisition of the land for defense purposes.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged the previous Kulsum R. Nadiadwala judgment's applicability to the present case, given the similar facts.

It was clarified that the delay in challenging the acquisition, which was filed in 2002, should not be a bar to the petition, as the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case had not considered the delay as a decisive factor.

The "per incuriam" argument regarding the 1984 Amendment Act was rejected, as the requirement of public notice was always present under the Land Acquisition Act.

The court upheld the principles established in the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case, emphasizing the mandatory requirements of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

It reiterated the distinction between a declaration of law binding future cases and an order made in the facts of a specific case.

Given the similar facts and the defense project nature of the land acquisition, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the Union of India, upholding the findings of the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case.

Facts:

The Government of India requisitioned land for defense purposes in 1943 under Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939.

A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued in 1975 to acquire the same land.

The landowners challenged the acquisition, claiming that there was no due publication of the Section 4 notification, which they argued was a mandatory requirement.

A previous case, Kulsum R. Nadiadwala vs. State of Maharashtra (2012), had quashed a similar Section 4 notification on the grounds of non-compliance with mandatory requirements.

Issues:

Whether the delay in challenging the Section 4 notification should be a bar to the petition.

Whether the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala judgment was applicable to the present case, given the delay and other circumstances.

Whether the Section 4 notification was valid, considering the historical requisition of the land for defense purposes.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged the previous Kulsum R. Nadiadwala judgment's applicability to the present case, given the similar facts.

It was clarified that the delay in challenging the acquisition, which was filed in 2002, should not be a bar to the petition, as the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case had not considered the delay as a decisive factor.

The "per incuriam" argument regarding the 1984 Amendment Act was rejected, as the requirement of public notice was always present under the Land Acquisition Act.

The court upheld the principles established in the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case, emphasizing the mandatory requirements of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.

It reiterated the distinction between a declaration of law binding future cases and an order made in the facts of a specific case.

Given the similar facts and the defense project nature of the land acquisition, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the Union of India, upholding the findings of the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala case.