Facts:

Anil Bhardwaj applied for the position of District Judge (Entry Level) and disclosed the existence of a pending FIR against him. The FIR was filed under Sections 498A, 406, and 34 IPC and was registered based on a complaint filed by his wife.

On September 14, 2018, the Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee declared Anil Bhardwaj ineligible and removed his name from the select list for the said post.

In response, Anil Bhardwaj filed a writ petition challenging the committee's decision. However, he subsequently withdrew the petition after being acquitted in the criminal case on September 18, 2019.

Anil Bhardwaj then filed a fresh writ petition, incorporating the subsequent events and the acquittal order in his plea.

Issues:

Determine the validity of the Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee's decision to declare Anil Bhardwaj unsuitable for the post.

Whether Anil Bhardwaj's subsequent acquittal in the criminal case should have led to a reconsideration of his appointment.

The court also considered the applicability of the guidelines issued by the Government of Madhya Pradesh regarding character verification (Clause 6(viii)) to Anil Bhardwaj's case.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee's decision to declare Anil Bhardwaj unsuitable for the post was well within its jurisdiction and power. The decision was considered valid and sustainable, given the pending criminal case against him at the time of the committee's decision (Para 23).

The subsequent acquittal of Anil Bhardwaj, which occurred after more than a year from the rejection of his candidature, did not provide sufficient grounds for reconsideration of his appointment (Para 24).

The court clarified that the guidelines issued by the Government of Madhya Pradesh regarding character verification (Clause 6(viii)) could not be applied to Anil Bhardwaj's case since he had not been acquitted at the time of character verification or during the committee's consideration of his case (Para 26, 27).

Facts:

The case revolves around a suit for pre-emption filed on January 10, 1974, by the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 1. The suit sought a decree of pre-emption against the appellant and respondent Nos. 4 to 6, concerning a property situated in Ajmer. The plaintiff claimed the right of pre-emption based on a common portion within the property. Prior to the transaction in question, the property had been involved in three earlier sale transactions in 1945, 1946, and 1966. The plaintiff's contention was that the suit property was sold to respondent No. 4 on January 10, 1974, for a consideration of Rs. 4000, and subsequently, the same property was sold to the appellant on January 21, 1974, for the same amount. It was alleged that no notice as required under Section 8 of the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966 had been served. The main issue in the case was the bar of limitation as the plaintiff did not challenge the sale deed of 1966.

Issues:

Whether the right of pre-emption can be exercised repeatedly on subsequent transactions involving the same immovable property.

Whether the suit is barred by limitation due to the plaintiff's failure to challenge the sale deed executed in 1966.

Held:

The Court held that the right of pre-emption is a weak right and can only be exercised for the first time when the cause of such a right arises. Once the plaintiff chooses to waive the right after the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966 became operational, he cannot exercise the right of pre-emption on a subsequent transaction concerning the same immovable property. The loss of the right of pre-emption under Section 9 of the said Act is absolute and does not re-arise for a plaintiff who has waived the right in an earlier transaction (Paras 17, 23).

The Court rejected the interpretation that the right of pre-emption is a recurring right for every sale, even after the plaintiff has waived his right in an earlier transaction. Such an interpretation would create uncertainty and adversely affect subsequent purchasers, potentially impacting the price offered for the property due to the fear of a pre-emption claim arising at any time (Para 19).

Facts:

The Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Service Selection Commission issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post of Assistant Professors in various subjects, including Education. The candidature of one of the appellants, Mr. Anand Yadav, with an M.Ed. degree, was initially rejected as he did not fulfill the minimum criteria specified by the UGC. Later, a corrigendum was issued, which allowed candidates with M.Ed. degrees to be eligible for the post. However, this decision was challenged by one of the respondents, an applicant under both the original advertisement and the corrigendum.

Issues:

Whether an M.Ed. degree is equivalent to an M.A. (Education) degree.

Whether an M.Ed. degree can be considered a post-graduation in the relevant subject for the purpose of eligibility for the post of Assistant Professor in Education.

Held:

The Court expressed reservations about the manner in which the writ petition was filed and the decision taken by the High Court without calling upon the relevant authorities, such as the UGC and NCTE, to put forth their stand. The Court emphasized that decisions in the absence of concerned authorities could lead to confusion and affect the rights of affected candidates. (Para 26-28)

The UGC's stand was clear that M.Ed. degree is recognized as a master's degree in Education under the UGC Act. The NCTE opined that both M.Ed. and M.A. (Education) degrees are eligible for the post of Assistant Professor in Education. The Court noted that the employer, i.e., the selection commission, accepted the expert committee's recommendation in favor of the appellants, and it is not for the appellants or the contesting respondent to challenge the decision of experts. (Para 29-31)

The Court highlighted that the issue of equivalence was appropriately considered by the NCTE, and both M.Ed. and M.A. (Education) degree-holders were found eligible only for the post of Assistant Professor in Education. The Court emphasized that matters of education should be left to educationists and experts, subject to compliance with relevant statutes and regulations. (Para 32-34)

The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the challenge to the corrigendum was repelled. The Court stated that respondent No. 3, who had challenged the corrigendum, had already been selected for the post as per the final list. Hence, the result should be declared forthwith. (Para 35-37)

Facts:

A hand grenade was thrown on the stage of a public gathering, resulting in 22 serious injuries and 3 fatalities. An FIR was registered under the provisions of IPC, Arms Act, Explosive Substances Act, and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The appellant was apprehended and remanded to custody by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. After 90 days in custody, an application for default bail was made to the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, which was dismissed based on a time extension granted earlier. The Special Court allowed the revision petition, stating that only the Special designated Court had jurisdiction to pass an order on any application under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. A chargesheet was subsequently filed, and the Special Judge refused to grant default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code. Another application for default bail was filed and dismissed by the High Court, leading to the present appeal.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code?

Whether the High Court erred in its decision on default bail and jurisdiction?

Held:

The Court stated that as long as an application for default bail is made on the expiry of the 90-day period (even if it is not in writing) before a chargesheet is filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It does not matter if the court does not dispose of such an application before the chargesheet is filed or disposes of it wrongly before such chargesheet is filed. The right to default bail is an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2) and must be granted once the conditions are fulfilled (Para 28).

The High Court's assertion that the appellant is not entitled to default bail due to the presentation of the challan by the prosecution on a specific date was incorrect. The application for default bail was made before the stated date, and the chargesheet was filed after it. The earlier application for default bail was wrongly dismissed, and the subsequent application did not nullify the effect of the previous one. The right to default bail is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and not merely a statutory right (Para 29).

Facts:

The prosecution's case was based on the eyewitness account of PW-1, who witnessed the incident where the victim was attacked by three accused persons with hockey sticks and a knife. The victim's brothers, PW-1 and PW-11, attempted to rescue him but were threatened by the assailants not to intervene. The victim was later taken to the hospital and declared dead. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 34 and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

Issues:

whether the sole testimony of PW-1, the only remaining eyewitness, was sufficient to rely upon for the conviction of the accused.

Held:

The Court observed that PW-11 and PW-5 turned hostile, not supporting the prosecution's case. The conviction of the accused was based solely on the testimony of PW-1, the eyewitness. However, the Court found certain discrepancies and unnatural conduct in the case, casting doubt on the presence of PW-1 at the time of the incident. The Court noted that the assailants were armed only with hockey sticks and a knife, and it seemed unnatural that PW-1 and PW-11, being present on the spot, did not attempt to save their brother when threatened. Such conduct raised doubts about PW-1's presence as an eyewitness.

The Court also noted discrepancies between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence, as there were 15 injuries inflicted on the victim according to the medical report, and PW-1 stated that the entire incident lasted only 5 minutes. The Court deemed it practically impossible to inflict 15 injuries within such a short span, and the behavior of PW-1 and PW-11 further suggested that PW-1 was not an eyewitness to the incident.

Considering these factors, the Court held that the reasons given by the lower courts for convicting the accused were not convincing, and the appellants deserved the benefit of doubt. Therefore, the impugned orders of the lower courts were set aside, and the appeals were allowed.

Facts:

In 1980, an agreement to sell was entered into between Ferrodous Estates (Pvt.) Ltd. (the appellant) and the defendants (represented by the respondents).

The defendants failed to obtain necessary permissions from the competent authority under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the 1978 Act), which was later repealed by the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the 1999 Repeal Act).

The appellant filed a suit for specific performance, which was decreed by a Single Judge.

In the first appeal, the Division Bench referred the matter to a Full Bench on various questions related to the 1978 Act.

The Full Bench held that Section 6 of the 1978 Act prohibited even agreements to sell and declared the law inter-parties.

The matter returned to the Division Bench, which reversed the Single Judge's judgment based on the Full Bench decision.

Issues:

Whether the agreement to sell between the appellant and defendants was affected by the Full Bench judgment, considering the presence of a specific clause regarding obtaining permissions under the 1978 Act?

Whether the 1978 Act, which was repealed by the 1999 Repeal Act, would stand in the way of a decree for specific performance at the time of the appellate decree?

Whether the court can exercise its discretion to decree specific performance despite delay or laches by the plaintiff?

Held:

The appellant cannot challenge the Full Bench judgment as it is inter-parties and applies to the parties, resulting in res judicata on issues of law based on the same cause of action.(Para 14)

The Full Bench judgment's prohibition on agreements to sell under Section 6 of the 1978 Act does not affect the present agreement, which contains a specific clause regarding obtaining permissions. The agreement is not void ab initio, and the Division Bench judgment is flawed in this regard. (Para 17-19)

The ceiling limit on the appellant's entitlement to 500 sq. metres does not preclude a decree for specific performance, as conditional decrees have been upheld in similar cases. (Para 21)

The 1999 Repeal Act clearly repeals the 1978 Act, and the savings clause does not apply since no steps were taken under the 1978 Act. (Para 22)

The court's discretionary jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, is not arbitrary but must be exercised soundly and reasonably, guided by judicial principles. Mere escalation of land prices or delay by itself cannot be the sole ground to deny specific performance. (Para 24-25)

The suit for specific performance filed within limitation cannot be dismissed solely based on delay or laches. The exception is when time is of the essence in the contract and delay results from the plaintiff's default.( Para 29-30)

Given the conduct of the defendants in breaching the agreement and taking dishonest pleas, specific performance is granted, and the Division Bench judgment is set aside. The decree passed by the Single Judge is restored. (Para 31)

The appellant is directed to pay Rs. 1.25 crores to the respondents as part of the decree for specific performance. (Para 32)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between two groups in a Joint Venture (JV) Company - the Seth Group and the Mittal Group. The JV Company acquired land with the intent to develop it and obtained licenses. After agreeing to divide the development rights, both groups sold the development rights. Disputes arose over the payment of liabilities from the JV Company, leading to multiple litigations. The matter was referred to arbitration, and a MoS was executed on May 4, 2015, defining reciprocal obligations between the groups. The Writ Petition was disposed of based on the MoS. Subsequently, the Seth Group filed contempt petitions alleging that the Mittal Group willfully and intentionally failed to comply with their obligations under the MoS.

Issues:

The Mittal Group willfully and deliberately failed to fulfill their obligations under the MoS, rendering them liable for contempt of court.

Held:

The Court noted that the Mittal Group was directed to renew licenses, but they failed to do so. This non-renewal led to the Seth Group not paying the balance amount of External Development Charges (EDC) liability. Both groups sought to avail the One Time Settlement Scheme, "Samadhan Se Vikas," for resolving their EDC liabilities. The Court directed both groups to pay their respective license renewal fees liabilities within two weeks and to submit mutual consent opting for the benefit of the OTS scheme for the EDC liability. It clarified the liabilities of each group regarding the license renewal fees and EDC.

Decision: The Court ordered both groups to pay their respective license renewal fees liabilities within two weeks. It also directed them to submit mutual consent opting for the benefit of the OTS scheme for the EDC liability. The matter was scheduled to be listed again after three months for reporting compliance.

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to the change in the seat matrix for postgraduate medical and dental courses in colleges in Rajasthan for the academic year 2020-2021. The change eliminated the NRI Quota and merged it with the management quota. Two NRI candidates filed a petition challenging this change, claiming it was unfair and violated the mandate of a previous Supreme Court decision.

Issues:

Whether the elimination of the NRI Quota and its merger with the management quota was valid.

Whether the relief granted by the Single Judge of the High Court was appropriate.

Held:

The Court held that the NRI quota is not an unqualified and unalterable part of the admission process in post-graduate medical courses. Private colleges have the discretion to decide whether and to what extent they wish to offer NRI or management quotas. (Para 28)

However, the discretion of private managements should be tempered, and if the NRI quota is exercised, it should be revised or modified reasonably and within a reasonable time frame. (Para 30)

The Court recognized that the prevailing COVID-19 pandemic affected the admission calendar, leading to a policy change that disadvantaged NRI candidates who had committed themselves to NRI quota seats. (Para 31)

The Court clarified that the NRI quota is not sacrosanct and can be altered, but reasonable notice should be given to aspiring candidates to make informed decisions. (Para 33)

To do complete justice to all parties, the Court directed a special counseling session to be carried out for seats filled as a result of the Single Judge's judgment. These seats should be offered to NRI applicants solely on merit, and the vacated seats should be offered to beneficiaries of the Single Judge's orders. (Para 34)

The Court clarified that the directions given were specific to the circumstances of the present case and aimed to do complete justice to all parties involved. (Para 35)

Facts:

The appellants, three lady doctors pursuing PG medical courses, were suspended from their college and hospital after a junior student committed suicide. An FIR was filed against the appellants, and bail was granted with certain conditions, including the condition to not enter the college and hospital. The appellants sought relaxation of this condition.

Issues:

The suspension order was valid under Section 6(1) of the Maharashtra Prohibition of Ragging Act, and if the appellants could be allowed to continue their studies despite the pending criminal prosecution.

Held:

The Court considered the competing claims and the fundamental rights of the appellants. It noted that the order of suspension did not record any prima facie view or finding under Section 6(1) of the Maharashtra Prohibition of Ragging Act, 1999, which is a prerequisite for passing such an order. Moreover, the order was not based on the report of the Anti-Ragging Committee but solely on the registration of the FIR against the appellants. (Para 23)

The Court observed that the appellants were presumably innocent and entitled to all fundamental rights, including the right to pursue their course of study, provided it does not hinder the prosecution. (Para 24)

The Court found that the Order of Suspension was not based on the report of the Anti-Ragging Committee, and its effects were not contemplated under the relevant regulations. Therefore, it held that the order was not valid under Section 6(1) of the Maharashtra Prohibition of Ragging Act, 1999. (Para 25)

The Court emphasized that the appellants must be allowed to pursue their studies as their right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution could be affected if they were denied the opportunity. (Para 26)

Balancing the competing claims, the Court allowed the appellants to go back to the College and the Hospital to pursue their studies, regardless of the Order of Suspension, which lacked statutory basis. (Para 31)