Facts:

Balwant Singh and Dungar Singh, real brothers, had disputes over the partition of family properties after their father's death. They opted for arbitration, appointing close relatives as arbitrators. The arbitrators passed an award on 23-11-1981, which the District Judge initially dismissed due to concerns about the arbitration process. The High Court later declared the award valid and enforceable.

Issues:

Was the arbitration award valid and enforceable despite objections raised?

Did the subsequent settlement modify the terms of the original award?

Held:

The arbitration award, though passed on the same day, was valid since it was unanimous and based on mutual consent. The arbitrators' close relationship with the parties did not invalidate the award, and no misconduct was established.

The High Court's decision to uphold the arbitration award was justifiable, given that no misconduct was proven, and the arbitrators' decision was based on the parties' claims and due deliberation.

The subsequent settlement, reached with the consent of both parties, modified the terms of the original award. The modified settlement included the payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- to one party in lieu of jewelry and the continuation of litigation over specific land.

Decision: Based on the parties' consent and the modified settlement, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeal. A decree reflecting the modified settlement's terms was ordered.

Facts:

The respondent-complainant, a Collateral Management Company, stored commodities pledged by various entities in its warehouses. In the case of any loss, it was liable to compensate the lending banks. The company had a Fidelity Guarantee Insurance Policy with the appellant-opposite party. Alleging unauthorized removal and substitution of pledged commodities, the respondent lodged a claim under the policy.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's employees were involved in the unauthorized activities.

Whether the delay in lodging the claim violated the insurance policy's terms.

Held:

The Court examined the evidence and found indications of employee involvement in unauthorized activities. The survey report pointed to the employees' complicity in removing and substituting commodities. This fulfilled the conditions of the Fidelity Guarantee Insurance Policy, which covered losses arising from breaches of honesty, integrity, or fidelity of employees. (Paragraphs 9-11)

The Court considered the timeline and circumstances. Since the respondent discovered the unauthorized activities only after the completion of 100% sampling and laboratory reports, the delay in lodging the claim was not unreasonable. Thus, there was no breach of condition no. 1 of the policy regarding claim submission. (Paragraphs 12-13)

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the Court upheld the National Commission's decision to direct the insurance company to pay the claimed amount.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 30.03.2000. The agreement stipulated execution within three years, subject to certain conditions. Defendant No.1 admitted the execution of the agreement but claimed the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiff wasn't ready and willing to perform.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff proved the execution of the agreement and receipt of earnest money?

Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform?

Whether the suit was barred by limitation?

What order or decree should be passed?

Held:

The trial court held the suit barred by time and that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform. This decision was affirmed by the High Court in appeal. The Supreme Court stressed the importance of a first appeal as a re-hearing of questions of law and fact. The High Court's decision was found lacking in compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC, which requires the appellate court to state points for determination, record decisions, give reasons, and provide relief.

The Supreme Court found that the High Court failed to reevaluate evidence, address key issues, and follow proper procedures. The Court emphasized the appellant's right to a re-hearing and the need for the High Court to properly analyze disputed questions of law and fact. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for fresh consideration.

Facts:

Usha Ananthasubramanian, the former MD & CEO of Punjab National Bank, appealed against an order issued by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The issue pertained to the freezing of her assets based on allegations of misconduct and fraudulent conduct in connection with her role in the bank.

Issues:

The scope of the powers granted under Sections 241, 241(2), 337, and 339 of the Companies Act, 2013. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether these powers could be extended to freeze assets and take actions against an individual in relation to their association with another organization.

Held:

In a judgment authored by Justice R.F. Nariman, the Supreme Court examined the relevant sections of the Companies Act, 2013. The court pointed out that Section 241(2) allows the Central Government to apply to the Tribunal for orders when the affairs of a company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest. The court noted that Sections 337 and 339 provide penalties and liabilities for fraudulent conduct within the company being mismanaged, and these sections cannot be applied to individuals associated with other entities.

The court emphasized that the powers under Sections 337 and 339 are limited to the business of the specific company that is being mismanaged and cannot be used to target individuals associated with other organizations. As such, the freezing of assets and actions taken against the appellant, Usha Ananthasubramanian, under Section 241 were deemed to be without jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the orders issued by both the NCLAT and NCLT. The appeal was allowed on these grounds.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal where the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Goa, was the appellant, and M/S Adani Exports Ltd. was the respondent. The matter was related to customs and excise issues.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 130A(1) and (4) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Determination of the discretionary authority of the High Court in calling for a statement from the Tribunal when deciding an application for reference of a question of law.

Held:

Paragraph 3 of the judgment clarifies the interpretation of Section 130A(1) and (4) of the Customs Act, 1962. It emphasizes that the High Court has discretion, as indicated by the use of "if" in Section 130A(4), to decide whether to call for a statement from the Tribunal before deciding on the application for reference.

Decision: The Supreme Court, in accordance with the interpretation provided in paragraph 3, overruled the previous judgment in Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore v. Central Manufacturing Tech. Institute (2002) 146 ELT 27. The Court emphasized that the High Court has the discretion under Section 130A(4) to determine whether it should call for a statement from the Tribunal when deciding on an application for reference.

FACTS:

The case involves a dispute over a gift deed that transferred immovable property from a grandfather (Shri Muniswamappa) to his grandson (N. Revanna), who was a minor at the time (five years old). The gift deed contained a condition that prohibited the donee (N. Revanna) and his younger brothers, who might be born in the future, from alienating (selling, gifting, mortgaging, etc.) the property.

ISSUES:

Whether the condition in the gift deed, preventing the donee from alienating the property, is valid under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, specifically Section 10.

Whether the gift deed violates Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which deals with transfers for the benefit of unborn persons.

HELD:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that the condition preventing the donee (N. Revanna) from alienating the property was void under Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to Section 10, conditions that restrain alienation are generally not valid.

The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the gift deed violated Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with transfers for the benefit of unborn persons. In this case, the gift was made in favor of a living person (N. Revanna), who was a minor at the time, and the condition referred to his younger brothers who might be born in the future. Section 13, which applies to unborn beneficiaries, was deemed not applicable.

DECISION: Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. The condition preventing the donee from alienating the property was declared invalid under Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the plaintiffs were entitled to receive the consideration received by the donee from the sale of the property.

REFERRED CASES:

Ali Hasan vs. Dhirja : (1882) ILR 4 All 518

Anantha vs. Nagamuthu (1882) ILR 4 Mad 200

Bhairo vs. Parmeshri: (1885) ILR 7 All 516

Brij Devi vs. Shiva Nanda Prasad and others, AIR 1939 Allahabad 221

F.M. Devaru Ganapathi Bhat vs. Prabhakar Ganapathi Bhat, (2004) 2 SCC 504

Giani Ram vs. Balmakand :(1956) 58 Punj LR 114 : AIR 1956 Punj 255

Gorachand Mukherji vs. Smt. Malabika Dutta: AIR 2002 Cal 26

Jagdeo Sharma vs. Nandan Mahto: AIR 1982 Pat. 32

Muthukamara vs. Anthony (1915) ILR 38 Mad 867, 24 IC 120

Nabob Amiruddaula vs. Nateri (1876) 6 Mad HC 356

Narayanan vs. Kannan (1884) 7 Mad 315

Prem Kali vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Sitapur and others, 2016(116) ALR 794

Ramasamy and ors. vs. Wilson Machine Works AIR 1994 Madras 222 (NOC)

Re Dugdale (1888) 38 Ch D 176

Facts:

The Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) emphasized the archaeological significance of Virupapura Gaddi, leading to a 1988 notification declaring it a 'protected area' under the 1961 Act. Certain parties constructed huts, buildings, and structures in these areas for commercial purposes like hotels and restaurants.

Issues:

Whether the 1988 notification declaring Virupapura Gaddi as a 'protected area' under Section 19(3) of the 1961 Act is valid.

Whether the constructions made by the appellants violate Section 20(1) of the 1961 Act.

Whether the HWHAMA has authority to demolish the illegal constructions.

Held:

Issue 1 - Validity of Notification (Para 13 to 14.3): The 1988 notification issued under Section 19(3) declaring Virupapura Gaddi a 'protected area' is valid. The ASI's observations and the government's consideration of the area's historical importance support this notification. Section 19(4) confirms the status of Virupapura Gaddi as a protected area.

Issue 2 - Construction Violations (Para 15 to 16): The constructions made by the appellants in Virupapura Gaddi violate Section 20(1) of the 1961 Act. Since the entire area was declared a protected zone, the appellants could only use it for cultivation after the notification. However, their constructions were for commercial purposes and thus, in violation of the Act.

Issue 3 - HWHAMA's Authority (Para 21 to 25.2): The HWHAMA has authority to take action against illegal constructions. The Hampi Act and the 1961 Act share a common objective of heritage preservation, and they should be interpreted to further this objective. The HWHAMA's actions were lawful under Section 11 of the Hampi Act, given the need to protect Hampi's cultural heritage. The Master Plan 2021 and Zonal Regulations fulfill the requirement of Section 14(1).

Conclusion (Para 26): The constructions by the appellants were illegal, and the HWHAMA had authority to proceed with their demolition. The impugned judgment of the High Court of Karnataka stands valid.

Facts:

After the liberation of Goa in 1961, the State of Goa framed the Goa Freedom Fighter's Welfare Rules, 1988. These rules provided for the grant of a State pension to freedom fighters. A list of eligible persons for the State pension was approved on 26.12.2007, and respondent no. 1 was included in this list.

The Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980, was extended by the Central Government to participants of the Goa Liberation Movement, Phase-II, by a government order dated 17.02.2003. However, the scheme specified a cut-off date of 01.08.2002 for those who were eligible to receive this Central pension.

Issues:

The eligibility of respondent no. 1 for the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980,

Whether the cut-off date of 01.08.2002 for eligibility was reasonable and in line with the scheme's object.

Held:

The Court noted that the object of the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980, was to grant Freedom Fighters Central Pension to those who fulfilled the eligibility criteria specified in the scheme. The eligibility for the State pension under the Goa Freedom Fighter's Welfare Rules, 1988, was different from the eligibility under the Central scheme. The Court emphasized that the Central Government had deliberated on the issue of the cut-off date (01.08.2002) and consciously fixed it for extending the benefit of the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme to participants of Goa Liberation Movement, Phase-II. This decision was based on due deliberation and consideration of relevant facts. (Para 23)

The Court clarified that the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980, had its own eligibility criteria, and the mere fact that someone was eligible for a State pension did not automatically make them eligible for the Central pension scheme. (Para 25)

The Court concluded that the scheme dated 17.02.2003 had intelligible differentia and a nexus with its object. By relaxing the scheme for a limited category, the object of the main scheme was not lost, and those who did not meet the relaxed conditions could not claim the right to the grant of the Central pension. (Para 26)

Therefore, the Court upheld the rejection of respondent no. 1's claim for the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980. (Para 32)

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The Respondent, a member of the Khasi Scheduled Tribe, was facing charges for murder and causing the disappearance of evidence of the offense under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The case was initially being tried before the Sessions Judge in Nongstoin, West Khasi Hills District.

Issues:

Whether the criminal case against the Respondent fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Council Court under the provisions of the 6th Schedule to the Indian Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the term "cases" in paragraph 4 of the 6th Schedule encompasses both civil and criminal cases involving parties belonging to Scheduled Tribes. This includes criminal cases where the State is the de jure complainant, provided both the accused and the victim belong to the same Scheduled Tribe. The Court emphasized that paragraph 4 should be read in conjunction with paragraph 5, which allows the Governor to confer powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) to District or Regional Councils or their courts for the trial of certain suits, cases, and offenses, including those punishable under the IPC with a minimum sentence of five years.

The judgment upheld the High Court's decision to transfer the case to the District Council Court in Shillong based on the specific notification issued by the Governor, conferring powers on that court under the Cr.P.C. for certain criminal offenses.

The Supreme Court directed the District Council Court to proceed with the trial, issue fresh summons to the accused if necessary, and complete the trial within one year from the date of the judgment.