Facts:

The case involved three establishments seeking exemption under Section 16(1)(d) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner denied the exemption, asserting that the establishments were effectively part of the same parent establishment.

Issues:

Whether the three establishments were entitled to exemption under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act, considering the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's rejection based on their functional integrality.

Held:

Civil Appeal No. 4475/2010 pertained to BCCL, Jaipur, considered a branch office of BCCL, Mumbai. The appeal was dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/-.

Civil Appeal No. 4476/2010 involved an agreement dated 25.7.1986 between the parties. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's decision.

It was conceded that BCCL, Jaipur was part of BCCL, Mumbai. The connection of the other two establishments with BCCL, Mumbai or BCCL, Jaipur did not invalidate the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's order.

In the given factual situation, the test applied was one of functional integrality or general unity of purpose rather than direct unity of ownership, management, and control.

Functional dependence between the companies, common office space, and shared staff were emphasized. The agreement between BCCL, Mumbai, and TPHL demonstrated their functional integrality.

SVPL, though a separate legal entity, showed functional integrality with BCCL, Mumbai. The appeal by SVPL was dismissed.

The nature of communications and orders suggested that all three establishments were working towards a common objective, meeting the functional integrality test.

The distinction between BCCL, Mumbai, and BCCL, Jaipur was not significant. The nature of working of SVPL and the other two entities demonstrated functional integrality.

The Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, being a beneficial legislation, aimed to exclude the infancy period to provide new establishments a period to establish their business.

The findings affirmed the functional integrality and general unity of purpose test in the facts of the case.

The liability of each establishment was deemed co-extensive with BCCL, Mumbai. Varying costs were imposed on the three appellants.

Facts:

The suit property was a three-storeyed structure in Almora, Uttarakhand.

Dispute originated around 1872 when three brothers owned the property, and subsequent transactions led to the plaintiff's claim of full ownership.

The defendants, claiming to be tenants, contested the suit, denying the plaintiff's ownership and asserting that defendant no.3 was the mortgagee.

Issues:

Dispute over ownership and possession of the property.

Maintainability of the appeal filed by tenant-defendants challenging the finding of the trial court on ownership when the mortgagee-defendant no.3 did not contest the decree.

Held:

The court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the trial court's decree in favor of the appellants (plaintiffs). The key holdings are as follows:

The trial court correctly decreed in favor of the plaintiff, holding that full ownership of the property was acquired by the plaintiff's predecessor.

The High Court erred in allowing the appeal by tenant-defendants, holding that their appeal was not maintainable when the alleged mortgagee-defendant no.3 had not challenged the decree.

Tenants cannot challenge the finding of ownership when the mortgagee has not contested it. The appeal filed by tenant-defendants was deemed not maintainable on the issue of ownership.

Facts:

During the proceedings, NMR workers claimed that they were coerced into signing papers related to a VSS, leading to their alleged wrongful termination. The Labour Court ordered their reinstatement, but the employer appealed.

Issues:

The allegations of fraud and undue influence in the implementation of the VSS. The adequacy of pleading and evidence related to these allegations were pivotal.

Held:

The Court emphasized that an erroneous decision within the authority of the Tribunal does not warrant a writ of Certiorari unless it relates to a collateral matter affecting jurisdiction. [Para 21 and 29]

The Court clarified that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory, intended to correct jurisdictional excesses, and cannot be used as an appellate remedy. [Para 29]

The judgment distinguished between fraud and misrepresentation, emphasizing the need for specific pleadings and evidence in cases involving serious allegations. [Para 44]

Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, while not directly applicable, was considered relevant for its salutary principles in guiding the pleading requirements. [Para 46]

The Court held that the NMR workers failed to provide sufficient pleadings regarding fraud and undue influence, rendering the Labour Court's award infirm. [Para 78]

Documentary evidence presented by the employer was deemed substantial, indicating voluntary participation of the workers in the VSS. [Para 83]

The Labour Court's finding of the VSS being thrust upon the workers was deemed unsupported by evidence, and no case was established for invoking Section 33A r/w Section 33. [Para 81]

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Labour Court's award. It concluded that the employer had presented ample evidence, and the workers failed to prove their case, rendering the Labour Court's decision infirm.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of built-up area as defined in Item No. 8 of the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification dated 14.09.2006.

Issues:

Whether the non-consideration of a judgment in the "NOIDA Park case" led to incorrect conclusions by the court regarding the interpretation of built-up area in the EIA Notification.

Held:

The court clarified that the observations in the NOIDA Park case were made in a different context, and the main dispute in that case did not involve the issue of covered construction being treated as built-up area. The court in the present case held that all covered construction should be deemed as built-up area, and municipal laws regarding Floor Space Index (FSI) or Floor Area Ratio (FAR) are not relevant. The earlier judgment in the NOIDA Park case was deemed to have no impact on the present case, and the application was dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant no. 2 are brothers.

Plaintiff alleges that the defendants obtained a sale deed fraudulently from their father, who was old, infirm, and living with the defendants.

The suit was initially dismissed, but the appellate court allowed the appeal.

The High Court reversed the order of the first appellate court, restoring the dismissal of the suit.

Issues:

Whether the deceased's physical and mental condition allowed him to execute the sale deed.

Whether undue influence was exerted by the defendants in obtaining the sale deed.

Held:

The deceased, although old and infirm, was not completely physically and mentally incapacitated.

The plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for undue influence, as there were no specific details or circumstances pleaded.

The onus for rebuttal lay on the plaintiff, and the evidence presented was insufficient.

Mere allegations of undue influence due to family care were considered extreme, and no reverse burden of proof was inferred.

The court emphasized the need for proper pleading and relevant evidence to establish elements of undue influence.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts, and there was no interference with the decision.

Facts:

An agreement for the sale of land was entered into on May 13, 1964, between Mohinder Kaur and Bahadur Singh.

Possession was handed over on the same day, and the sale deed was contingent on the resolution of a pending appeal.

The agreement included a clause (Clause 3) stating that if the appeal decision took more than a year, the buyer (Bahadur Singh) would pay customary rent for the land.

The appeal was decided on January 17, 1977, approximately 13 years later.

Issues:

Whether the promise to pay rent was reciprocal or an independent promise?

Whether the failure to pay rent affected the right to claim specific performance?

The discretionary nature of specific performance under Sections 16(c) and 20 of The Specific Relief Act.

Held:

The promise to pay rent was considered reciprocal and an essential part of the agreement.

Bahadur Singh failed to pay rent for 13 years and denied liability in 1978, causing undue hardship.

Equity was against Bahadur Singh, and he forfeited the right to claim specific performance.

The court exercised its discretionary power, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness.

The appeals were allowed, the lower court judgments were set aside, and the suit for specific performance was dismissed.

No relief was granted for the alternative plea of refund.

Facts:

The borrower/landlord had mortgaged a secured asset to the bank to secure a credit facility. Due to the borrower's failure to repay, SARFAESI Act proceedings were initiated, leading to a magistrate's order for the bank to take possession of the secured asset. Subsequently, a tenant, claiming tenancy rights, sought a stay on the possession order.

Issues:

The validity of the tenant's tenancy claim during SARFAESI Act proceedings. Key questions included the existence and timing of the tenancy, compliance with legal requirements for tenancy protection, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting the tenant's claim.

Held:

SARFAESI Act Objective and Mechanism: The court emphasized the SARFAESI Act's objective of efficient debt recovery, highlighting its self-executory mechanism for banks. Section 13, as a pivotal provision, involves a notice triggering the recovery process, with consequences for the borrower's ability to create further encumbrances.

Reconciliation of Acts: The judgment outlines the reconciliation between SARFAESI Act, Transfer of Property Act, and Rent Act. It establishes conditions for protecting tenancy rights based on the timing and validity of the tenancy in relation to the creation of the mortgage.

Doubtful Tenancy Claim: The court expressed doubts about the tenant's bona fide tenancy claim due to insufficient evidence, including uncertainties regarding the date of creation of tenancy and discrepancies in the stated period of tenancy.

Lack of Conclusive Evidence: Emphasis was placed on the lack of conclusive evidence supporting the tenant's claim, such as a registered lease deed or relevant documents like tax receipts.

Timing of Tenancy Claim: The court noted that the tenant raised the issue of tenancy only after SARFAESI Act proceedings were initiated, suggesting a potential attempt to defeat the bank's rights.

Tenant-in-Sufferance: It was held that, in the absence of a valid tenancy, the tenant could be treated as a 'tenant-in-sufferance,' with no legal rights akin to trespassers.

Non-extension of Rent Act: The court concluded that the operation of the Rent Act cannot be extended to a 'tenant-in-sufferance' vis–a–vis the SARFAESI Act due to the operation of Section 13(2) read with Section 13(13).

Final Decision: The court dismissed the tenant's appeal, directing the tenant to hand over possession of the secured asset to the bank within a stipulated time due to the lapse of seven years from the deadline date.

Facts:

The dispute involves sharing of rent for leased spaces between the owners and developers.

Appellants filed petitions under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking arbitration in accordance with Clause 19 of the Addendum.

The lower courts dismissed the applications, stating that the disputes under Section 23 of the Societies Registration Act were not covered by Clause 19.

Issues:

Whether the dispute related to the sharing of rent falls within the scope of Clause 19 of the Addendum.

Whether the lower courts erred in not referring the dispute to arbitration.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the dispute, involving the sharing of rent, is related to the agreements and Addendum.

Clause 19 of the Addendum, which provides for arbitration, is applicable to the dispute.

The lower courts committed a grave error in not referring the dispute to arbitration.

The appeals were allowed, and the applications under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act were granted.

Facts:

The petitioner retired as the Acting Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court.

He sought pensionary benefits applicable to a retired Chief Justice.

Dispute arose regarding the calculation of pension under the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner, having served as the Acting Chief Justice, is entitled to pension benefits equivalent to those of a Chief Justice?

The interpretation of Rule 7 of Part I of the First Schedule of the 1954 Act.

Held:

Section 14 of the 1954 Act provides for pension payable to Judges. Rule 7 of Part I of the First Schedule is crucial for computing the pension, treating service as an Acting Chief Justice as if it were service rendered as Chief Justice.( Para 5.2)

Rule 2 of Part I of the First Schedule outlines the pension computation. The court emphasizes that for the 14 months of service rendered as Acting Chief Justice, the pension is to be calculated as if the petitioner served as Chief Justice.( Para 6)

The court distinguishes between a Chief Justice appointed under Article 217 and an Acting Chief Justice appointed under Article 223, stating that the latter is not equated with the former except for the limited purpose of salary computation.( Para 6.3)

The court concludes that the petitioner is not entitled to pensionary benefits, including the ceiling applicable to a retired Chief Justice, except for the period of service rendered as Acting Chief Justice.( Para 7)