Facts:

The appellants are trustees of Shree Maruti Deo Trust Pimpli Limtek, registered as a public trust.

The respondents claim to be tenants of the land and filed a writ petition challenging the exemption certificate granted to the Trust under Section 88B of the 1948 Act.

The Trust, claiming to own the land for religious worship, was registered under the Public Trusts Act on 8.8.1984.

The respondents became deemed purchasers on Tillers' Day, i.e., 1.4.1957, as per Section 32 of the 1948 Act.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent registration of the Trust under the Public Trusts Act can divest the respondents of their deemed purchaser rights under Section 32 of the 1948 Act?

The validity of Section 32 of the Public Trusts Act.

Held:

The High Court's decision to quash the exemption certificate was affirmed. The registration of the Trust under the Public Trusts Act was deemed prospective, and the respondents' rights as deemed purchasers on Tillers' Day were not affected by the subsequent registration of the Trust. Section 32 of the Public Trusts Act was not questioned.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended by Act 49 of 1969. The amendments introduced complications in the application of the provision, particularly concerning tenants' rights to purchase land from landlords who are minors, widows, or persons with mental or physical disabilities.

Issues:

The primary issues revolve around the interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a), the applicability of the amendments made in 1969, and the potential discriminatory nature of the classification of tenants based on the status of their landlords.

Held:

The court highlights the agrarian reform legislation's scheme, emphasizing that the landlord is divested of title on Tillers' Day, except in specific cases involving minor landlords, widows, or persons with disabilities. The court clarifies that the tenant's right to purchase is postponed only when the landlord applies for possession within the prescribed period.( Para 13)

The court references Section 32-G, indicating the necessity of notifying tenants to determine the purchase price of land. It points out that tenants are aware of their rights and obligations within the statutory framework.( Para 14)

Introduction of Section 32-F in 1956 aimed at agrarian reform. The court underscores that the disability of a landlord in the mentioned categories leads to a one-year postponement in the tenant's right to purchase.( Para 15)

The court acknowledges the potential hardship caused by a literal interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a) and the subsequent amendment in 1969.( Para 16 and 17)

The court explains the legislative intent behind the 1969 Amendment Act, emphasizing the need for landlords to inform tenants of the landlord attaining majority to enable meaningful exercise of the right to purchase.( Para 18 and 19)

An unintentional oversight in the drafting of the amendment is noted, which led to the exclusion of two other categories of landlords (widow or person with a disability) from the intimation requirement.( Para 20)

The court identifies the absurdity resulting from a literal reading of Section 32-F(1)(a), particularly in cases involving widows, where the tenant lacks knowledge of the landlord's death.( Para 21)

To eliminate discrimination, the court decides to strike down the words "of the fact that he has attained majority," making the provision applicable to tenants of all three categories of landlords.( Para 36)

The court justifies the elimination of discriminatory words to align Section 32-F(1)(a) with Article 14, ensuring equal treatment for tenants of all three categories of landlords.( Para 39, 40, 44)

The court dismisses submissions related to tenant's knowledge of landlord's death or the reverse situation, focusing on the specific facts of the case.( Para 49)

The High Court's judgment is set aside, allowing the tenant's intimation to be considered for determining the purchase price and fulfilling the postponed right to own the land.( Para 50)

Facts:

The case involves M/S Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. (formerly known as Tecnimont ICB Private Limited) versus the State of Punjab and Others. The matter concerns the validity of Section 62(5) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005, and the imposition of a 25% pre-deposit condition for hearing the first appeal.

Issues:

The validity of Section 62(5) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005, and the reasonableness of the 25% pre-deposit condition.

The power of the first appellate authority to grant relief against the pre-deposit requirement.

Held:

Validity of Section 62(5) and Pre-deposit Condition: The High Court rightly held Section 62(5) to be legal and valid. It determined that the 25% pre-deposit condition is not onerous, harsh, unreasonable, or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Power of Appellate Authority Regarding Pre-deposit: The first appellate authority does not possess inherent powers to grant interim protection against the pre-deposit condition. It cannot waive the pre-deposit condition, as doing so would render the statutory intent nugatory and make the provision unworkable.

Interpretation of Statutory Powers: Implied powers of the appellate authority under a statute cannot be used to override the statutory requirement of pre-deposit. The High Court's view that implied powers allow the authority to grant interim protection is set aside.

Interim Protection/Injunction in Cases of Undue Hardship: While the first appellate authority cannot grant relief against the pre-deposit condition, in genuine cases of hardship, recourse is available to the concerned person. However, it is clarified that the appellate authority itself cannot grant such relief.

Decision: The appeals filed by the assessees are dismissed, and those filed by the State are allowed.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Appellants, colleges and associations, contended that NGOs were not covered under the Act, and the Act intended to cover only government and its instrumentalities.

The key question was whether non-governmental organizations substantially financed by the appropriate government could be considered a 'public authority' under the Act.

Issues:

Whether NGOs substantially financed by the appropriate government fall within the definition of 'public authority' under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Held:

The Court analyzed Section 2(h) carefully, distinguishing between the first and second parts of the definition.The first part covers authorities, bodies, or institutions of self-government established or constituted in specific ways, while the second part includes bodies owned, controlled, or substantially financed by the appropriate government and non-governmental organizations substantially financed by the government.The inclusive clause in the second part expands the definition, indicating Parliament's intention to cover bodies beyond the four categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (d).( Para 16)

The Court held that an NGO substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by funds provided by the appropriate government would be a public authority under the Act.( Para 22)

'Substantial' was interpreted to mean a large portion, not necessarily more than 50%.The determination of substantial finance is a question of fact, considering both direct and indirect financing, evaluating the value of benefits such as land provided at discounted rates.( Para 27)

Whether an NGO is substantially financed is a factual question, considering if the organization can effectively carry out its activities without government financing.The Act's purpose is to bring transparency and probity in public dealings, justifying citizens' right to inquire about the use of government funds by NGOs.( Para 28)

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 9828 of 2013 was dismissed.Civil Appeal Nos. 9844-9845 of 2013, 9846-9857 of 2013, and 9860 of 2013 were remitted to the High Court for determining whether the institutions are substantially financed or not.High Court to consider writ petitions filed in 2013, giving priority to the matter.

Facts:

Employees of IFCI opted for the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS-2008).

Ex-employees sought enhanced pension based on subsequent pay-scale revisions after their retirement.

Issues:

Whether ex-employees are entitled to enhanced pension post-retirement due to pay-scale revisions.

Interpretation of the clauses within the VRS-2008 scheme.

Held:

VRS-2008 Clauses: The VRS-2008 clearly outlined a full and final settlement, explicitly stating no revision in voluntary retirement amount due to future pay revisions. The absence of such a clause in the 2001 Scheme was noted. (Para 13)

Standalone Scheme: A voluntary retirement scheme is a self-contained package, and clauses of the scheme must be strictly followed without reference to other schemes or regulations. (Para 21, 22)

Purpose of VRS: The purpose of VRS is to reduce surplus staff and bring in financial efficiency. Availing benefits under the scheme does not entitle individuals to future changes in monetary benefits. (Para 24)

Prohibitive Clauses: The VRS-2008 benefits, including pension, are part of a comprehensive financial package. Clauses 9.4 and 9.12 prohibit further compensation and revision in the retirement amount. (Para 25)

Scheme Specifics: Comparisons with other schemes are inappropriate; each scheme has a specific time frame, and VRS-2008 left no ambiguity regarding financial liabilities. (Para 28)

Pension Regulations: Pension regulations and VRS-2008 must be read harmoniously. Emoluments for pension are based on the last ten months of service. (Para 29)

Disparity with Other Retirees: Private respondents cannot claim parity with retirees who did not terminate their relationship and retired on the same date as those under VRS-2008. (Para 31)

Benefit for Past Services: Pension is for past services, but the private respondents' tenure was terminated by mutual consent. Granting retrospective pay-scale benefits for future pension is not justified. (Para 32)

Inappropriate Comparisons: Comparisons with serving employees who were not VRS optees are not valid. (Para 33)

Employee Planning: Employees opting for voluntary retirement plan for the future and are bound by the benefits mentioned in the scheme. (Para 34)

Delay in Claim: The delay in raising the issue was considered, and the plea was rejected. Private respondents failed on multiple grounds. (Para 35)

Rejection of Claim: Private respondents' claim for enhanced pension based on retrospective pay-scale revision was deemed a misadventure and rejected. The Division Bench's order was set aside. (Para 36, 37)

Facts:

The appellant, K. Arjun Das, sought permission for the sale of land belonging to a deity under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951.

The Commissioner Endowments granted permission, fixing the upset price at Rs. 10 lakhs per acre.

Appellant, being in possession, was given the first choice to purchase; if not, the land would be put to public auction.

Issues:

Validity of the permission granted for the sale of land.

Challenge by intervenors (respondent nos. 4 & 5) offering Rs. 25 lakhs per acre.

The subsequent appeal and revision against the Commissioner's order.

The nullification of the registered sale deed executed in favor of the appellant.

Held:

The Division Bench of the High Court set aside the single judge's decision, directing the Commissioner to auction the land at Rs. 25 lakhs per acre offered by respondent nos. 4 & 5.

The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench erred in not appreciating the concurrent findings and brushed aside the factual foundation.

The Court emphasized that intervenors should have questioned the sale deed through appropriate proceedings instead of making a stray offer.

The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside, reinstating the single judge's decision and allowing the sale deed executed in favor of the appellant.

The Court observed the offer made by respondent nos. 4 & 5 to pay Rs. 75 lakhs per acre for the total land, taking it into consideration for future actions.

Facts:

The appellant, Maheshwary Handling Agency Private Limited, challenged a circular issued on 31st August 1998 by the Traffic Manager of Kandla Port Trust. The circular restricted the storage of cargoes for more than two months and authorized the auction of such cargoes if they overstayed. The appellant argued that this circular was invalid as only the Tariff Authority, established by an amendment in 1997, had the power to fix tariffs.

Issues:

Validity of the circular issued by the Traffic Manager.

Authority to fix tariffs and regulate storage duration post the amendment in 1997.

Held:

The court examined the relevant regulations and found that the Traffic Manager had the authority to control and manage port operations, including the power to issue circulars related to the duration of cargo storage. The court noted that the Notification dated 4th November 1993 empowered the Traffic Manager to deal with the question of unauthorized occupation, including determining the time limits for storage.

The court held that the circular issued by the Traffic Manager was in conformity with the terms of the Notification and did not modify or amend it. The circular aimed to address congestion issues at the port and ensure uniformity in the use of storage facilities. The court rejected the appellant's arguments, including those related to the absence of data indicating congestion and the alleged violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Facts:The Municipal Council Neemuch invited tenders for the lease of a piece of land, and Mahadeo Real Estate emerged as the highest bidder. Objections were raised, leading the matter to the State Government for approval under Section 109 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipality Act, 1961.

Issues:

The Commissioner pointed out anomalies, including insufficient competition and the possibility of a bidder cartel.

The State Government re-examined the issue, authorized the Commissioner to make an appropriate decision, and directed the Municipal Council to invite fresh tenders.

Held:In the present case, the Commissioner acted rightly as a custodian of public property, pointing out anomalies and ensuring larger public interest. The State Government re-examined the issue and authorized the Commissioner appropriately.

The High Court's interference in the absence of illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety was improper. The Commissioner and State Government's actions were legal, proper, and in the public interest.

The decision set aside by the High Court was in larger public interest, ensuring the Municipal Council's higher revenue by enlarging competition. The State Government's authorization to the Commissioner was valid and legal.

The High Court failed to consider relevant material and wrongly concluded that the decision of the authorities was not in the public interest. The Supreme Court, finding no such parameters for interference, allowed the appeals and quashed the High Court orders.

Facts:

Smt. Chando and Sita Ram sold land to late N.D. Chaudhary through a registered sale deed dated 24th January 1973.

Late Kesho Ram exchanged his plots with the land sold to N.D. Chaudhary through a registered deed of exchange dated 2nd March 1974.

Legal proceedings were initiated during consolidation proceedings, challenging the validity of the sale deed and exchange deed.

Issues:

Validity of the registered sale deed dated 24th January 1973.

Legality of the exchange deed dated 2nd March 1974 concerning compliance with Section 161 of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that while the exchange deed was void due to non-compliance with Section 161, the consequences of the void transaction did not restore rights to the appellants. The registered sale deed executed on 24th January 1973 remained valid, and the appellants could not claim any rights over the land in question. The Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismisses the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision, and affirms that the consequences of the void exchange deed do not revive the appellants' original rights over the land.