Facts:

Employees of IFCI opted for the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS-2008).

Ex-employees sought enhanced pension based on subsequent pay-scale revisions after their retirement.

Issues:

Whether ex-employees are entitled to enhanced pension post-retirement due to pay-scale revisions.

Interpretation of the clauses within the VRS-2008 scheme.

Held:

VRS-2008 Clauses: The VRS-2008 clearly outlined a full and final settlement, explicitly stating no revision in voluntary retirement amount due to future pay revisions. The absence of such a clause in the 2001 Scheme was noted. (Para 13)

Standalone Scheme: A voluntary retirement scheme is a self-contained package, and clauses of the scheme must be strictly followed without reference to other schemes or regulations. (Para 21, 22)

Purpose of VRS: The purpose of VRS is to reduce surplus staff and bring in financial efficiency. Availing benefits under the scheme does not entitle individuals to future changes in monetary benefits. (Para 24)

Prohibitive Clauses: The VRS-2008 benefits, including pension, are part of a comprehensive financial package. Clauses 9.4 and 9.12 prohibit further compensation and revision in the retirement amount. (Para 25)

Scheme Specifics: Comparisons with other schemes are inappropriate; each scheme has a specific time frame, and VRS-2008 left no ambiguity regarding financial liabilities. (Para 28)

Pension Regulations: Pension regulations and VRS-2008 must be read harmoniously. Emoluments for pension are based on the last ten months of service. (Para 29)

Disparity with Other Retirees: Private respondents cannot claim parity with retirees who did not terminate their relationship and retired on the same date as those under VRS-2008. (Para 31)

Benefit for Past Services: Pension is for past services, but the private respondents' tenure was terminated by mutual consent. Granting retrospective pay-scale benefits for future pension is not justified. (Para 32)

Inappropriate Comparisons: Comparisons with serving employees who were not VRS optees are not valid. (Para 33)

Employee Planning: Employees opting for voluntary retirement plan for the future and are bound by the benefits mentioned in the scheme. (Para 34)

Delay in Claim: The delay in raising the issue was considered, and the plea was rejected. Private respondents failed on multiple grounds. (Para 35)

Rejection of Claim: Private respondents' claim for enhanced pension based on retrospective pay-scale revision was deemed a misadventure and rejected. The Division Bench's order was set aside. (Para 36, 37)

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Appellants, colleges and associations, contended that NGOs were not covered under the Act, and the Act intended to cover only government and its instrumentalities.

The key question was whether non-governmental organizations substantially financed by the appropriate government could be considered a 'public authority' under the Act.

Issues:

Whether NGOs substantially financed by the appropriate government fall within the definition of 'public authority' under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Held:

The Court analyzed Section 2(h) carefully, distinguishing between the first and second parts of the definition.The first part covers authorities, bodies, or institutions of self-government established or constituted in specific ways, while the second part includes bodies owned, controlled, or substantially financed by the appropriate government and non-governmental organizations substantially financed by the government.The inclusive clause in the second part expands the definition, indicating Parliament's intention to cover bodies beyond the four categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (d).( Para 16)

The Court held that an NGO substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by funds provided by the appropriate government would be a public authority under the Act.( Para 22)

'Substantial' was interpreted to mean a large portion, not necessarily more than 50%.The determination of substantial finance is a question of fact, considering both direct and indirect financing, evaluating the value of benefits such as land provided at discounted rates.( Para 27)

Whether an NGO is substantially financed is a factual question, considering if the organization can effectively carry out its activities without government financing.The Act's purpose is to bring transparency and probity in public dealings, justifying citizens' right to inquire about the use of government funds by NGOs.( Para 28)

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 9828 of 2013 was dismissed.Civil Appeal Nos. 9844-9845 of 2013, 9846-9857 of 2013, and 9860 of 2013 were remitted to the High Court for determining whether the institutions are substantially financed or not.High Court to consider writ petitions filed in 2013, giving priority to the matter.

Facts:

Appellant, a Judicial Officer, dismissed for passing orders favoring a lady lawyer and her clients due to a proximate relationship.

Suspension on 08.02.2001, dismissal on 15.01.2004.

Appellant challenges dismissal in writ petition, dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the penalty imposed on the appellant.

Interpretation of the term 'gratification' under Rule 5 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979.

Held:

The court emphasizes the first proviso of Rule 5, which mandates the penalty of removal or dismissal for accepting gratification other than legal remuneration.

Integrity is deemed crucial for judicial officers, and their behavior both inside and outside the court must adhere to high standards.

The officer's proximate relationship with a lady lawyer led to biased judicial orders, constituting a different form of gratification.

Judges must maintain impeccable integrity, and deviation from this standard warrants severe consequences.

The appeal is dismissed, upholding the officer's dismissal from service.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the imposition of "composition fee" and "extension fee" by the Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority (GLADA).

The reference arises from the doubt expressed by a two-Judge Bench regarding the correctness of the judgment in HUDA vs. Sunita (2005) 2 SCC 479.

Issues:

Whether the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) has jurisdiction to adjudicate the legality behind the demand for "composition fee" and "extension fee" by a developmental authority.

The validity of the interpretation provided in HUDA vs. Sunita (2005) 2 SCC 479.

Held:

The court holds that the interpretation in HUDA vs. Sunita (2005) 2 SCC 479 is overruled, and NCDRC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of statutory dues arising from a deficiency in service.( Paragraph 14)

The court acknowledges the confusion and emphasizes that non-fulfillment of conditions or standards required amounts to 'deficiency in services' under the Consumer Protection Act.( Paragraph 15)

The court notes that while statutory authorities have the power to levy fees, it does not prohibit consumer forums from evaluating the legality of such exactions or fulfillment of conditions.( Paragraph 16)

The court clarifies that not all statutory dues/exactions are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum, only those exacted for a service rendered.( Paragraph 20)

The court concludes that the determination of disputes concerning the validity of the imposition of a statutory due arising from a deficiency in service can be undertaken by consumer forums. The decision in HUDA vs. Sunita is overruled.( Paragraph 22)

Facts:

The case involves the claim for grant-in-aid benefits by employees under the Orissa (Non–Government Colleges, Junior Colleges, and Higher Secondary Schools) Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994, following its repeal in 2004 and subsequent orders.

Issues:

Whether grant-in-aid can be claimed as a matter of right after the completion of the prescribed period.

The effect of the repeal of the Order of 1994 by the Order of 2004.

The constitutional implications under Article 14 concerning equality.

Held:

Grant-in-aid cannot be claimed as a matter of right but depends on fulfillment of various conditions. The Director has the authority to examine cases concerning posts filled up before June 1, 1994, and availing the benefit of grant-in-aid is discretionary for institutions.( Para 8)

The Order of 2004 repealed the Order of 1994, saving only the block grant for posts sanctioned before the repeal. Private institutions receiving grant-in-aid continue to receive it, but those not receiving it are entitled to block grant under specific conditions.( Para 21)

The repeal of a statute does not save a mere hope or expectation. Only rights acquired or accrued are unaffected. The right to obtain relief under a repealed act is not saved unless explicitly provided.( Para 24)

There is no concept of negative equality under Article 14. If a person does not have a right, they cannot claim equal treatment. The judgment rejects the argument for parity based on orders passed for other persons.( Para 30)

The provisions in the Order of 2004 make it clear that only the block grant is saved for institutions receiving grant-in-aid before the repeal. Orders in favor of employees based on the Order of 1994 are not sustainable.( Para 32)

Facts:

The case involves the deputation of the 71 Armoured Regiment for T-90 Tanks conversion training at Pokhran Firing Range.

Two pistols were reported missing at the conclusion of the conversion exercise, leading to charges of theft against the accused.

Confessional statements played a pivotal role in the prosecution's case.

Issues:

The admissibility of confessional statements made by the accused.

The validity of the retraction of the confessional statements.

Interpretation of Army Order No. 256 of 1972.

Compliance with Rule 58 of the Army Rules, 1954.

Exercise of jurisdiction by the Armed Forces Tribunal.

Held:

Confessional Statements and Misinterpretation (Para 1-3): The Tribunal misread Army Order No. 256 of 1972, erroneously holding that confessional statements made to the Army were inadmissible. The court clarified that statements made before an Army Officer are not hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Confessions were made orally before Squadron Commander (PW-1) and Second-in-Command (PW-6), with written confessions recorded and supported by video evidence.

Retraction of Confessional Statements and Rule 58 (Para 4-5): The accused's retraction, citing coercion, beatings, and threats, was deemed of no consequence as prosecution witnesses were not cross-examined regarding these allegations. Rule 58, providing an opportunity for the accused to explain incriminating circumstances, was discussed, emphasizing that such statements are not evidence unless confronted during cross-examination.

Power of the Tribunal and Exercise of Jurisdiction (Para 6): Section 15 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act grants wide powers but does not confer jurisdiction to reverse findings based on a different view. The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the order of conviction without legal grounds.

Decision: Criminal appeals filed by the Union of India were allowed, and those filed by the accused were dismissed. The sentence imposed on the accused was reduced to the extent already undergone.

Facts:

The Bihar State Housing Board (appellant) advertised the allotment of a health center plot and invited applications.

The respondent applied but was not allotted a plot initially.

Legal proceedings ensued, leading to discussions on alternative plots and issues surrounding the allotment process.

Issues:

The right of the respondent to plot allotment.

The legality of offering alternative plots without fresh advertisement.

The acceptance and subsequent dispute of the allotment price by the respondent.

Held:

The court emphasized the lack of inherent right to allotment based on prior application.( Paragraph 26)

The court observed the irregularity of allotting alternative plots without a fresh advertisement but acknowledged the operational hospital on the allotted plots.( Paragraph 27)

The court held that, despite the irregularities, the respondent, having accepted the offer and paid initial amounts, is estopped from disputing the allotment price.( Paragraph 28)

The court exercised Article 142 powers, allowing the respondent to avoid interest if the entire balance sale consideration is paid within six months.( Paragraph 32)

Facts:

The Portuguese Civil Code, originating from foreign law, became applicable to the domiciles of Goa through the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Ordinance, 1962, and the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962.

Issues:

The status of the Portuguese Civil Code in Goa, the applicability of principles of private international law, and the scope of inheritance laws for Goan domiciles, especially in properties located outside Goa.

Held:

The Civil Code, while of Portuguese origin, is deemed an Indian law after the conquest and annexation of Goa. It is enforced in Goa through an Act of the Indian Parliament, making it an integral part of Indian laws. [Para 14-18]

The Portuguese Civil Code applies to properties of Goan domiciles wherever situated in India, and the Indian Succession Act or other laws are not applicable to such Goan domiciles. [Para 25-31]

Grant of probate by the High Court in Bombay, Goa, is limited to determining the genuineness of the will and does not affect inheritance rights governed by the Portuguese Civil Code. [Para 32-34]

The Portuguese Civil Code prevails over general laws of succession, being both a special and local law, and governs all properties of Goan domiciles within or outside Goa. [Para 30-31]

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the decision of the Single Judge of the High Court, and the order of the Court of Comarca Judge in Inventory Proceedings is restored. [Para 35]

Facts:

During the proceedings, NMR workers claimed that they were coerced into signing papers related to a VSS, leading to their alleged wrongful termination. The Labour Court ordered their reinstatement, but the employer appealed.

Issues:

The allegations of fraud and undue influence in the implementation of the VSS. The adequacy of pleading and evidence related to these allegations were pivotal.

Held:

The Court emphasized that an erroneous decision within the authority of the Tribunal does not warrant a writ of Certiorari unless it relates to a collateral matter affecting jurisdiction. [Para 21 and 29]

The Court clarified that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory, intended to correct jurisdictional excesses, and cannot be used as an appellate remedy. [Para 29]

The judgment distinguished between fraud and misrepresentation, emphasizing the need for specific pleadings and evidence in cases involving serious allegations. [Para 44]

Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, while not directly applicable, was considered relevant for its salutary principles in guiding the pleading requirements. [Para 46]

The Court held that the NMR workers failed to provide sufficient pleadings regarding fraud and undue influence, rendering the Labour Court's award infirm. [Para 78]

Documentary evidence presented by the employer was deemed substantial, indicating voluntary participation of the workers in the VSS. [Para 83]

The Labour Court's finding of the VSS being thrust upon the workers was deemed unsupported by evidence, and no case was established for invoking Section 33A r/w Section 33. [Para 81]

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Labour Court's award. It concluded that the employer had presented ample evidence, and the workers failed to prove their case, rendering the Labour Court's decision infirm.