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by sayum
04 July 2026 5:27 AM
"The Act of 1991 is not a shield against acquisition by the State for public purpose or welfare. The purport of the Act of 1991 is not to place beyond the pale of authority of the State’s right as the owner paramount of all lands in the territory of India and to acquire and use it for any public purpose." Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling dated July 02, 2026, held that the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, does not bar the State from acquiring religious properties for public purposes under its power of eminent domain.
A bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Arun Kumar observed that the 1991 Act is intended solely to prevent the conversion of a place of worship from one religion to another, but it does not derogate from the State's sovereign power to acquire land for infrastructure projects like road widening.
The case arose from a writ petition filed by six tenants and shopkeepers of the Dalmandi Market in Varanasi. They challenged the State's decision to widen and beautify Dalmandi Street as part of the Kashi Vishwanath Dham Corridor development. The petitioners sought to protect their possession of the shops and prevent the demolition of six ancient mosques, which they claimed were protected under the Places of Worship Act, 1991, as they existed prior to August 15, 1947.
The primary question before the court was whether the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, prohibits the State from acquiring a mosque for a public purpose. The court was also called upon to determine if tenants have the locus standi to challenge a road-widening project when the actual owners of the buildings have not come forward to contest the acquisition.
Court Distinguishes Between 'Conversion' And 'Acquisition'
The court examined the scope of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1991, which mandate that the religious character of a place of worship as it existed on Independence Day shall continue. The bench noted that while the Act prohibits "conversion"—defined as the alteration or change of a place of worship from one religious denomination to another—it does not prohibit the State from taking over the land for secular public purposes.
State's Power Of Eminent Domain Remains Paramount
The bench clarified that the Act of 1991 was never intended to strip the State of its authority as the "owner paramount" of all lands. The court observed that the doctrine of eminent domain allow the State to acquire any property, including religious sites, for building roads, highways, or public infrastructure, provided that fair compensation and rehabilitation are granted to the affected parties.
"The Act of 1991 is not meant to derogate from that right of the State."
Mosques Not Immune From Acquisition For Public Purpose
Relying on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, the High Court reiterated that a mosque does not enjoy any unique status in India that makes it immune from acquisition. The court noted that while a mosque is a place of worship, it is essentially an immovable property subject to the State's sovereign power, and namaz can be offered anywhere, even in the open.
"A mosque is not an essential part of the practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer) by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open. Accordingly, its acquisition is not prohibited by the provisions in the Constitution of India."
Tenants Have Limited Rights To Question Acquisition
Addressing the grievances of the shopkeepers, the court held that as tenants, their rights are limited to their tenancies and do not extend to proprietary rights. The bench remarked that when property is acquired under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, it is the title holder who has the locus to object or negotiate. Once the property vests in the State, it is free from all encumbrances.
Mandamus Refused Due To Lack Of Formal Demand For Justice
The court also found a procedural flaw in the petition, noting that the petitioners had not submitted any formal representation or "demand for justice" to the authorities before approaching the High Court. Citing precedents like Saraswati Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India, the bench emphasized that a writ of mandamus cannot be granted unless the petitioner has first made a distinct demand which the authority has refused to oblige.
Harmony Between Waqf Act and Land Acquisition Laws
The petitioners had also invoked Section 51 of the Waqf Act, 1995, arguing that Waqf properties cannot be acquired in contravention of the Act of 1991. However, the court pointed out that the second proviso to Section 51 (as amended in 2025) explicitly states that nothing shall affect the acquisition of Waqf properties for a public purpose under the Act of 2013, provided the acquisition is made in consultation with the Waqf Board.
"We are of opinion that they [the petitioners] have no right to any of the reliefs that they seek."
The High Court concluded that the petitioners had mixed up their limited tenancy rights with a multifarious cause of action concerning religious properties. Finding no illegality in the State's project for the beautification of the Kashi Vishwanath Dham area, the court dismissed the petition.
Date of Decision: July 02, 2026