Facts:

The appellant, P. Chidambaram, was accused of irregularities in FIPB clearance. The CBI registered an FIR, and the Enforcement Directorate initiated a case under PMLA.

Issues:

The grant of anticipatory bail, perusal of materials during investigation, and the interference of the judiciary in the interrogation process.

Held:

The court held that it can peruse materials during investigation for various purposes, including considering bail applications. However, the court refrained from opening a sealed cover to avoid prejudice.

The court emphasized its power to peruse materials for the satisfaction of its conscience, especially during the consideration of bail applications.( Para 53)

The court clarified that the interrogation and determination of the adequacy of answers are within the domain of the investigating agency, and the court should not conduct a mini-trial.( Para 58)

Anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy and should be sparingly exercised, particularly in cases of economic offenses.( Para 67)

The court, considering the stage of investigation and materials collected, concluded that it was not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.( Para 76, 77, 81)

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the refusal of anticipatory bail.

FACTS:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, and its applicability to the appointment of arbitrators.

ISSUES:

The scope of the court's examination under Section 11(6A) and whether the court could go beyond determining the existence of an arbitration agreement at the stage of a Section 11(6) application.

HELD:

The court held that Section 11(6A) limited the court's examination to the existence of an arbitration agreement and left other preliminary issues to be decided by the arbitrator. The judgment overruled a previous decision in United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Antique Art Exports Private Limited (2019) 5 SCC 362, stating that it did not correctly interpret the law as amended by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.

The court, after considering the arguments of both parties, decided not to interfere with the impugned decision of 12.03.2019, citing no necessity to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.( Para 4)

The court highlighted the legislative changes, specifically the omission of Section 11(6A) by the amendment Act of 2019, and clarified that the law now requires institutional appointment of arbitrators, removing the need for the court to appoint arbitrators and determine the existence of an arbitration agreement.( Para 6)

The judgment overruled the decision in United India Insurance Company Limited (2019) 5 SCC 362, stating that it did not correctly interpret the law as amended by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.( Para 11)

REFERRED CASES:

Duro Felguera. S.A. vs. Gangavaram Port Limited, (2017) 9 SCC 729

Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. vs. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engineering Ltd.. (2019 SCC OnLine SC

Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. vs. Mehul Construction Co., (2000) 7 SCC 201

Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. vs. Rani Construction (P) Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 388

National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 267

ONGC Mangalore Petrochemicals Limited vs. ANS Constructions Limited and another, (2018) 3 SCC 373

SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 618

Shin Etsu Chemicals Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre, (2005) 7 SCC 234

United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Antique Art Exports Private Limited, (2019) 5 SCC 362

Facts:

The petitioner, Dr. Ashwani Kumar, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a legislative framework against custodial torture based on the UN Convention. The petitioner argued that custodial torture is a crime against humanity and violates Art.21.

Issues:

Whether the court should invoke jurisdiction under Arts.141, 142 for the protection and advancement of human dignity in the context of custodial torture.

Held:

The court acknowledged its authority to lay down general rules/guidelines in extraordinary cases of human rights violations. However, the court emphasized that a mere allegation of human rights violation or environmental concerns is not a sufficient basis for judicial intervention. It argued that directions should be issued with great care and circumspection.

The court stated that issuing directions when a matter is already pending consideration with the executive or Parliament would be inappropriate, as it might be interpreted as judicial participation in the legislative process. It asserted that any direction at this stage would undermine the role assigned to the judiciary under the Constitution.

The judgment emphasized the importance of respecting the constitutional separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It discussed the powers and functions of each branch and highlighted the need for interdependence and coordination for effective governance.

The court concluded that the judiciary should not encroach upon the fields reserved for the legislature and the executive. It clarified that judges, while interpreting statutes and exercising judicial review, do not legislate but ensure the legality and validity of legislation and governmental actions.

Facts:

The appellant is the Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore.

The respondent is M/S Motorola India Ltd., a leading manufacturer of pagers.

The case involves an appeal from the order of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the violation of conditions in a customs exemption notification.

The exemption notification (Notification No. 30/1997-Customs) exempted materials imported for manufacturing pagers from customs duty.

Issues:

Whether an appeal under Section 130 of the Customs Act lies before the High Court or Section 130E of the Customs Act.

Whether the respondent breached the conditions of the exemption notification by not utilizing imported materials for the declared final product.

Held:

The appeals should be considered under Section 130 of the Customs Act rather than Section 130E.

The issues do not involve questions related to the rate of duty, valuation of goods, classification of goods, or broader issues of general public importance.

The case is purely inter-se between the parties and should be adjudicated based on the available facts.

The appeals are allowed, and the orders of the High Court are set aside.

The appeals are remitted back to the High Court for de novo consideration on their own merits.

No order as to costs.

Facts:

Dispute arising from a partnership where an FIR was filed on 17.11.2017, alleging siphoning of funds and business improprieties.

Arbitration Petition filed by the appellant under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking appointment of an Arbitrator based on the partnership deed dated 30.01.2015.

High Court, relying on 'A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam and Others,' dismissed the Section 11 application, citing the nature of the dispute involving serious allegations of fraud as unsuitable for arbitration.

Issues:

Whether the nature of the dispute, with allegations of fraud, is fit for arbitration proceedings.

Applicability of the principles laid down in 'A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam and Others' to the present case.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarifies that the relevant law is in paragraph 25 of 'A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam and Others.' It emphasizes the distinction between serious allegations affecting the entire contract and "simple allegations" related to internal affairs. The court concludes that the disputes are arbitrable as they fall under "simple allegations," and the Section 11 application is maintainable.

The court holds that the disputes raised between the parties are arbitrable, and thus, a Section 11 application under the Arbitration Act is maintainable.( Paragraph 7)

The judgment under appeal is set aside, and with the consent of the parties, Justice Amareshwar Sahay is appointed as the sole arbitrator to resolve all disputes.( Paragraph 8)

The court emphasizes that nothing in the judgment will affect the ongoing investigation pursuant to the FIR.( Paragraph 9)

The appeal is disposed of.( Paragraph 10)

Facts:

The case involves land acquisition proceedings under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The High Court had issued a stay order on the acquisition proceedings concerning land from the same village, under the same notification and project.

Issues:

Whether the failure to declare an award under Section 11 within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 would attract Section 11A.

The impact of the stay order by the High Court on the computation of the statutory period for passing an award.

Held:

The scheme of the acquisition justifies the authorities in not proceeding with acquisition proceedings when an interim stay is granted in respect of one pocket of land, affecting other pockets as well.(Paragraphs: 7.5 (i), (ii), and (iii))

The extended meaning of "stay of the action or proceedings under Section 11A of the Act" includes any interim effective order passed by the court hindering authorities from proceeding further. The period of stay must be excluded in computing the statutory period of two years.( Paragraphs: 7.5 (iv) and (v))

The exclusion of the period of stay applies even when the award was declared, but certain lands were excluded. Any order of stay that prevents the state authorities from passing an award deserves exclusion in computing the statutory period.(Paragraph: 7.6)

There is no bar to having more than one declaration or award under Sections 6 and 11 for the same acquisition proceedings. However, if there is a court-ordered stay, it prevents authorities from completing the acquisition within the statutory period.( Paragraph: 7.7)

The High Court erred in quashing the acquisition proceedings based on the argument that the award was not declared within two years from the Section 6 declaration. The period of interim stay granted by the High Court should have been excluded.(Paragraph: 8)

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the acquisition proceedings are not considered lapsed. The High Court's decision to quash the acquisition proceedings is deemed erroneous.

Facts:

The case involves criminal proceedings under Sections 265, 267, 420, 34, 120B, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC, Sections 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, and Sections 12/30 of the Weights and Measures Act, 1976 and Legal Metrology Act, 2009.

Issues:

The applicability of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, in relation to offenses under the IPC.

The scope of Section 153 of the Cr.P.C. in cases involving weights and measures.

The jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

Held:

Applicability of Legal Metrology Act vs. IPC The Legal Metrology Act, 2009 is deemed a special Act vis-à-vis the IPC. Section 3 of the Act overrides provisions of Chapter XIII of IPC for offenses and penalties. Section 51 clarifies that IPC provisions related to weight and measures offenses do not apply to offenses punishable under the Act. Therefore, an accused cannot be charged for the same offense under Chapter XIII of IPC if the offense is established under the Legal Metrology Act (Para 31, 33, 34, and 36).

Scheme of the Act The Act primarily addresses non-standard weights and measures and tampering with standards. Offenses under IPC, such as cheating, and those under Sections 467, 468, 471, and 34, are not covered by the Act. Prosecution for such offenses is maintained as they are not inconsistent with the Act (Para 35).

Inapplicability of Section 153 of Cr.P.C. Section 153 of the Cr.P.C. is made inapplicable under the Act, as the power of search and seizure is vested in designated authorities. Therefore, the entire Cr.P.C. is inapplicable in prosecutions under the Act (Para 31).

Jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Directions of the High Court against the accused's interest and orders for disciplinary action against officials in a Section 482 petition exceed the High Court's jurisdiction and are quashed (Para 36).

Decision: Partly allowing the appeals, the Court held that offenses under Sections 265 and 267 of IPC are liable to be quashed. The High Court's directions against the accused and disciplinary action orders are beyond its jurisdiction and are quashed. The investigating agency has the authority to charge the accused for such offenses or any other offense through a supplementary report or during the trial (Para 36).

Facts:

The accused, Jagbir Singh, was charged with murdering his wife by setting her on fire with kerosene oil.

Contradictory statements were made by the victim, initially claiming accidental fire due to petrol leakage, but later accusing the accused of pouring kerosene oil.

Issues:

Reliability of dying declarations.

Admissibility and consistency of multiple dying declarations.

Absence of a medical certificate regarding the fitness of the person making the dying declaration.

Presence of kerosene and the alleged conspiracy against the accused.

Held:

Conviction Based on Dying Declaration: The court emphasized the admissibility and evidentiary value of a dying declaration.Conviction can be solely based on a dying declaration if it inspires confidence and lacks suspicion.

Multiple Dying Declarations: Acknowledged the possibility of multiple dying declarations with inconsistencies. Emphasized the need to examine the entirety of materials and circumstances surrounding the dying declarations to determine the truthful one.

Medical Certificate and Dying Declaration: Absence of a medical certificate is not fatal if the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.A certification by the doctor is a rule of caution, but its absence does not invalidate the dying declaration.

Dismissal of Conspiracy Claim: Dismissed the appellant's claim of a conspiracy to deprive him of the deceased's property.Highlighted that the appellant had no legal right to the property under the Hindu Succession Act.

Evidence of Kerosene Use: Overwhelming evidence indicating the use of kerosene, including its presence in the premises, forensic examination, and witness statements. Rejected the appellant's claim of an accidental fire caused by a motorcycle's petrol leakage.

Decision:

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the convictions based on the reliable dying declaration and supporting evidence.

Facts:

The appellant, Mohammed Fasrin, appealed against his conviction under various sections of the NDPS Act, particularly for offenses related to financing illicit traffic and harboring offenders. The case primarily relied on the appellant's alleged involvement in international smuggling of contraband substances.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to prove the appellant's involvement in the alleged offenses.

The admissibility and voluntariness of the confessions made by the co-accused and the appellant.

The strength and reliability of the evidence linking the appellant to the commission of the offense.

Held:

The court found that the prosecution failed to present substantial evidence against the appellant. The evidence relied upon was the statement of a co-accused, which lacked corroboration, and the appellant's alleged confession, which raised concerns about its voluntariness. The court, even if assuming the admissibility of the confession, held it to be insufficient as the prosecution did not establish its voluntary nature and failed to provide corroborative evidence. Therefore, both the trial court and the High Court were deemed to have wrongly convicted the accused. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of both lower courts was set aside. The accused, who was already on bail, had his bail bonds discharged.