Facts:

The appellant, Narain Singh, was enrolled in the Indian Army as a Driver on 15.10.1980.

Promoted to ALD and granted the rank of Lance Dafedar.

Suffered four red ink entries between 7.6.1993 and 3.5.1994.

Discharged from service under Rule 13(3)(III)(v) of the Army Rules solely based on the four red ink entries.

Challenged the order of discharge before the Armed Forces Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the nature of the offenses leading to red ink entries justifies the discharge from service.

Whether the discharge was mechanically and solely based on the red ink entries.

Whether the relevant factors, including long service, were considered before the discharge.

Held:

The court held that the discharge based on four red ink entries, considering the nature of the offenses and the appellant's long service, was unjustified.

The court emphasized that the authority must consider all relevant factors before discharging an individual from service, as stated in Veerendra Kumar Dubey vs. Chief of Army Staff and Others (2016) 2 SCC 627.

The Commanding Officer failed to consider the appellant's long service, the nature of the offenses, and other relevant aspects while passing the order of discharge.

The order of discharge was set aside, and the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits, including pension.

The court directed the release of monetary benefits expeditiously, not later than four months from the date of the order.

Facts:

Raman Aithan Ashari executed a deed of gift in favor of Chuzhali Bhagavathi Dharmadeva Bhandaram (donee). The appellant contested the acceptance of the gift, and subsequent events included a cancellation deed and a transfer of the property. The respondents filed a suit challenging the validity of these documents.

Issues:

Acceptance of the gift deed and the burden of proof.

Competency of the donor to execute the cancellation deed and transfer.

Applicability of Article 59 of the Limitation Act.

Substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the CPC.

Held:

The High Court rightly observed that the recital of possession in the deed of gift creates a presumption of acceptance, and the burden of proof lies on the party asserting non-acceptance.( Para 20)

The High Court declined to accept the findings of the lower courts regarding non-acceptance of the gift, emphasizing the wrong assumption of law made by those courts.( Para 26)

Article 59 of the Limitation Act was held inapplicable to the deed of gift, as the donor had no authority to revoke it, rendering subsequent documents null and void.( Para 31)

The Second Appeal was rightly allowed by the High Court, setting aside lower court decisions and declaring the suit property to belong to the Bhandaram. The deed of assignment was declared null and void, allowing the respondents to recover possession.( Para 34)

FACTS:

The property, admeasuring 1053.5 square meters, was acquired by the Union of India in 1994.

Multiple attempts were made to sell the property through auctions starting in 1994, but all efforts failed.

The appellant made an offer to purchase the property for Rs.32.11 crores, but it was not accepted by the CBDT.

Subsequent auctions were conducted, and a fresh valuation report was obtained.

The appellant was the highest bidder at Rs.30.21 crores in one auction, but the proceedings were kept in abeyance.

ISSUES:

Validity of the cancellation of the auction without providing a reason.

Applicability of the appellant's offer of Rs.32.11 crores.

Arbitrariness in the auction process.

HELD:

The reason for keeping the auction in abeyance was not found to be arbitrary.Public interest justified seeking the highest possible price for the property.( Paragraph 14)

Valuation reports were submitted at every stage, and there was no reason to doubt the Fair Market Value.( Paragraph 15)

The appellant had opportunities to bid in the fresh auction but chose not to participate.( Paragraph 16)

Dismissal of the appeal.Acceptance of the respondent's counsel's offer to pay Rs.35 crores within 12 weeks, with a deduction equivalent to 9% interest on the amount of Rs.7.78 crores.( Paragraph 20)

REFERRED CASES:

Formerly known as Financial Technologies India Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 7 SCALE 50

Michigan Rubber India Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2012) 8 SCC 216

Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405

PRP Exports and Ors. vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (2014) 13 SCC 692

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that Smt. Gargi, along with her brothers, was involved in the murder of her husband. The case rested on circumstantial evidence, highlighting strained family relations and a motive stemming from property disputes. Witnesses PW-7 and PW-8 testified in support of the prosecution's case.

Issues:

The reliability of witness testimonies, the significance of the property dispute, and the prosecution's failure to establish a direct link between the appellant and the crime. The last seen theory, gaps in the timeline, and subsequent conduct were also pivotal issues.

Held:

A combined look at the testimony of PW-7 and PW-8 highlights the significance of the property dispute and the strained family relations. The court observes that the Trial Court and the High Court overlooked crucial factors surrounding the sale of the ancestral house and subsequent financial failures.( Para 24)

The lack of direct and cogent evidence regarding the appellant's involvement in illicit relations or pressuring the deceased to transfer property is emphasized. Doubts about the reliability of statements made by PW-7 and PW-8 are raised. The court questions the validity of treating the alleged statement made to PW-7 as a 'dying declaration.'(Para 25)

The last seen theory is scrutinized, noting discrepancies in the timeline. The court emphasizes the gap between the last sighting and the discovery of the deceased's body, raising doubts about the probability of the appellant being the sole author of the crime.( Para 28)

The subsequent conduct of the appellant is considered, highlighting her attendance at the office and the lack of abnormal behavior during the relevant period. The court rejects unsubstantiated claims regarding the appellant's demeanor.( Para 29)

The acquittal of the appellant's brothers is deemed crucial. The court asserts that the prosecution's case against the appellant is weakened, and doubts surrounding the prosecution story intensify.( Para 31.1)

The court concludes that the prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. Homicidal nature of death is acknowledged, but strained relations, illicit affairs, and imminent danger to the deceased's life are not conclusively proven.( Para 32)

Facts:

The appellant, Union of India, initially granted exemptions from excise duty on specific goods through a notification dated 09.09.2003. Subsequently, a notification dated 25.04.2007 amended these exemptions, excluding pan masala, tobacco, manufactured tobacco substitutes, and plastic carry bags of less than 20 microns.

Issues:

The court was the validity of withdrawing the excise duty exemptions and whether the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel could be invoked by the respondents.

Held:

The court established that even when a notification specifies a particular period for exemptions, the State can withdraw it in the larger public interest. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot prevent the State from resiling if it is in the public interest (Paras 12, 19, and 25).

Scientific research findings on pan masala and substitutes revealed their hazardous impact on health, particularly the increased risk of oral cancer among teenagers. The court emphasized that the withdrawal of the exemption was in the larger public interest (Paras 26 and 31).

The legislative policy, as reflected in Section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003, demonstrated a clear intent to withdraw exemptions for products like pan masala with tobacco. The court found the High Court's conclusion to the contrary shocking (Para 35).

The court held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be invoked in this matter, and the larger public interest would outweigh any individual loss. The appeals were allowed, and the judgments of the Gauhati High Court were set aside (Para 39).

Facts:

The National Highways Act, 1956, did not initially include provisions for land acquisition; acquisitions were made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The 1997 Amendment Act aimed to streamline the land acquisition process for national highways, removing the offer stage and introducing a declaration-based process.

The Amendment Act excluded the award of solatium and made changes to the compensation determination process.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of the 1997 Amendment Act, specifically in relation to the exclusion of solatium and interest.

Whether the Amendment Act is in line with Article 14, Article 31-C, and the Directive Principles contained in Article 39(b).

Held:

The National Highways Act, 1956, before the 1997 Amendment, relied on the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for land acquisitions, which included solatium and interest.( Para 6)

The 1997 Amendment streamlined the acquisition process, eliminating the award stage and introducing immediate vesting upon declaration. Solatium was not provided for under Section 3G(7), and interest was awarded at 9% under Section 3H(5).( Para 9)

Solatium is considered an integral part of compensation for compulsory land acquisition, and its exclusion violates Article 14.( Para 10)

Post the Land Acquisition Act's repeal, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act, 2013, came into force, ensuring solatium and interest. A notification extended these provisions to acquisitions under the National Highways Act.( Para 11)

The assumption is made that Article 31-C, as originally enacted, continues to exist, and private property is considered part of the "material resources of the community."( Para 13)

For protection under Article 31-C, a direct and rational nexus with the principles contained in Article 39(b) is required.( Para 16)

The objects of the 1997 Amendment Act do not align with the Directive Principle in Article 39(b). Even if considered to fulfill Article 39(b), removing solatium and interest is not essentially necessary and infringes Article 14.( Para 18)

The Amendment Act's classification between different landowners for national highways acquisitions is irrational and violates Article 14.( Para 22)

Reference is made to the second proviso of Article 31-A, but it is deemed irrelevant to the present case.( Para 26)

Easementary rights under the Land Acquisition Act and the National Highways Act are compared, emphasizing that the payment of solatium and interest is a separate issue.( Para 37)

The Notification of 2015 under the 2013 Act extends solatium and interest to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, acknowledging the principle of Nagpur Improvement Trust case.( Para 38)

The court declares that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act regarding solatium and interest will apply to acquisitions under the National Highways Act. Section 3J of the Amendment Act is declared unconstitutional to the extent that it violates Article 14.( Para 41)

Facts:

The appellants are trustees of Shree Maruti Deo Trust Pimpli Limtek, registered as a public trust.

The respondents claim to be tenants of the land and filed a writ petition challenging the exemption certificate granted to the Trust under Section 88B of the 1948 Act.

The Trust, claiming to own the land for religious worship, was registered under the Public Trusts Act on 8.8.1984.

The respondents became deemed purchasers on Tillers' Day, i.e., 1.4.1957, as per Section 32 of the 1948 Act.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent registration of the Trust under the Public Trusts Act can divest the respondents of their deemed purchaser rights under Section 32 of the 1948 Act?

The validity of Section 32 of the Public Trusts Act.

Held:

The High Court's decision to quash the exemption certificate was affirmed. The registration of the Trust under the Public Trusts Act was deemed prospective, and the respondents' rights as deemed purchasers on Tillers' Day were not affected by the subsequent registration of the Trust. Section 32 of the Public Trusts Act was not questioned.

FACTS:

The respondents filed a suit seeking the framing of a scheme for the proper management of a Gurudwara.

Appellant claimed the Gurudwara as private property, denying public access.

Allegations of mismanagement after the death of the appellant's father, who was the Mohtmim of the Gurudwara.

The Committee proposed the framing of a scheme under Section 92 of the CPC for Gurudwara management.

ISSUES:

Whether the suit under Section 92 is maintainable.

Lack of orders on the application for leave under Section 92.

HELD:

The court emphasizes that leave of the court is a necessary prerequisite for filing a suit under Section 92 of the CPC. It cites legal precedents and notes that, normally, notice should be issued to the other side before granting leave. However, it acknowledges that in emergent situations, the court can grant leave without notice, but the respondent has the right to file an application for revocation of the leave granted.( Paragraph 6)

Despite acknowledging the legal requirement of obtaining leave, the court notes the unusual situation where the appellant did not raise the lack of leave during the trial. Both sides presented evidence, and the appellant submitted to the jurisdiction without objection. The court, considering the peculiar facts, decides to dismiss the appeal.( Paragraph 8)

The court specifies that the decision is based on the unique facts and circumstances of the case and should not be treated as a precedent. The dismissal of the appeal is stated, taking into account both the legal requirement of leave and the appellant's actions during the trial.( Paragraph 10,11)

REFERRED CASES:

R.M. Narayana Chettiar & Another v. L. Lakshmanan Chettiar & Others. (1991) 1 SCC 48

Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R. & Ors. (2008) 4 SCC 11

Facts:

ITC Limited, a paper manufacturer, initially availed complete exemption from duty on paper cleared from its factory but later realized the mistake. They started paying duty on waste paper and filed a refund claim for the specified period.

Issues:

Validity of the refund claim by ITC Limited.

Interpretation of provisions in Sections 2(2), 17, and 27 of the Customs Act, pre and post-amendment.

Held:

The amended definition in Section 2(2) includes self-assessment as a form of assessment (Para 23).

Assessment procedures were discussed, both before and after the 2011 amendment, emphasizing the inclusion of self-assessment (Para 32).

The provisions of Section 17(1) allow for self-assessment, with verification powers granted to the proper officer (Para 33).

Section 18 deals with provisional assessment of duty (Para 34).

Section 27, both before and after the 2011 amendment, provides for the refund procedure (Para 35).

Various conditions and limitations for claiming a refund under Section 27 were explained (Para 36).

The nature of self-assessment and the limited scope of refund proceedings were clarified (Para 37, 38, 41).

The order of self-assessment is appealable under Section 128, and an appeal can be made by any person, whether the revenue or the assessee (Para 43).

Provisions under Section 27 cannot be invoked without modifying the order of assessment or self-assessment (Para 44).

The court emphasized that refund proceedings do not permit re-assessment and cannot adjudicate on exemption conditions (Para 44).

Decision: The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that a claim for a refund cannot be entertained unless the order of assessment or self-assessment is modified through appropriate proceedings. Applications for a refund in this case were deemed not maintainable (Para 47, 48).