Motor Accident – Compensation – Future Economic Loss – Deceased was a 21-year-old student – Tribunal assessed future economic loss at Rs.15,000 per month; High Court reduced it to Rs.5,000 – Supreme Court held the income should be considered at Rs.10,000 per month, with a 40% addition for future prospects – Multiplier of 18 applied based on deceased’s age, not parents’ age – Claimants entitled to Rs.15,12,000 for future economic loss, plus Rs.15,000 for loss of estate, Rs.15,000 for funeral expenses, and Rs.40,000 for loss of love and affection – Total compensation awarded at Rs.15,82,000 with 7% interest per annum from the date of claim petition till realization [Paras 1-12].

Legal Principle – Future Prospects – Even if the deceased was not earning at the time of death, their legal heirs are entitled to future prospects by adding future rise in income as per Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 – Standardisation principle applied to ensure just compensation under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act [Paras 10-11].

Decision – Appeal partly allowed – Compensation enhanced to Rs.15,82,000 with interest at 7% per annum – Enhanced amount to be deposited with MACT and invested in fixed deposit for parents with periodic interest entitlement [Paras 13-15].

Pension – Social Security Measure – Coal Mines Pension Scheme, 1998, framed under Section 3-E of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 – Pension considered deferred compensation for long service – Employee opted for 90% pension during lifetime – Widow entitled to lump sum payment equal to 100 times the full monthly pension on employee’s death – High Court dismissed petition citing lack of territorial jurisdiction – Supreme Court directed computation and disbursement of due pension amount to appellant [Paras 1-14].

Territorial Jurisdiction – High Court's Error – High Court dismissed writ petition and LPA on grounds of territorial jurisdiction without considering entitlement on merits – Supreme Court found employment of appellant’s husband with respondent employer undisputed – Appellant litigating for over a decade to secure pension benefits [Paras 6, 12-13].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Sum due under Pension Scheme to be computed and disbursed to appellant – Amount earlier refunded to be adjusted during remittance process – Respondent to comply within 8 weeks [Paras 13-14].

Compassionate Appointment – Policy Applicability – Deceased employee died on 08.10.2015 while serving as a work charge employee – Policy at the time provided Rs. 2 lakhs compensatory amount but no compassionate appointment – Subsequent policy dated 31.08.2016 allowed compassionate appointments for work charge employees – Supreme Court held the claim must be decided based on the policy in force at the time of the employee's death – Subsequent policy not applicable – Appeal allowed, High Court’s order quashed [Paras 1-4].

Policy Interpretation – Precedent – Court emphasized adherence to policy in effect at the time of death for compassionate appointments – Subsequent amendments cannot be retroactively applied – Referenced Indian Bank and Ors. Vs. Promila and Anr., (2020) 2 SCC 729; State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Amit Shrivas, (2020) 10 SCC 496 [Paras 4.1-4.2].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s direction for appointment under subsequent policy quashed – Respondent not entitled to compassionate appointment under policy dated 31.08.2016 – Compensatory amount of Rs. 2 lakhs, if refunded, to be paid to the respondent [Paras 5].

Sexual Assault – Definition and Interpretation – High Court's interpretation of Section 7 of the POCSO Act requiring "skin-to-skin" contact for sexual assault is incorrect – Supreme Court held the most important ingredient for constituting the offence of sexual assault under Section 7 is the "sexual intent" and not the "skin-to-skin" contact – Words "touch" and "physical contact" used interchangeably in the statute – Act of touching sexual parts of the body or any other act involving physical contact with sexual intent amounts to "sexual assault" – High Court's narrow interpretation defeats the object of the Act [Paras 1-13, 28-38].

Legal Principles – Rule of Construction – The construction of a rule should give effect to the rule rather than destroy it – Principle of "ejusdem generis" should not be applied to defeat legislative intent – Interpretation should suppress the mischief and advance the remedy [Paras 28-38].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court's judgments quashed and set aside – Accused convicted under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and relevant sections of the IPC – No separate sentences imposed for other IPC offences due to conviction for major offence under POCSO Act – Accused directed to surrender within four weeks [Paras 44-47].

Education – Affiliation and Admission – High Court directed JNTU to proceed with the notification of institutions for the second phase of counselling despite JNTU awaiting State Government approval – Supreme Court held that JNTU’s regulations require prior permission from the State Government for starting new programs or increasing intake capacity – High Court's interim directions issued without State Government’s NOC and completion of JNTU's affiliation process were inappropriate and likely to prejudice students – Interim direction stayed [Paras 1-14].

Role of State Government – JNTU’s regulations mandate State Government’s approval for new courses and increased intake capacity – The importance of the State Government's role in ensuring educational needs and preventing mushrooming of substandard institutions emphasized – Supreme Court reiterated that affiliation by JNTU must be conducted with scrupulous care to protect students' interests [Paras 9-13].

Decision – Appeals allowed – JNTU to complete affiliation process within ten days following State Government's NOC – Interim direction of the High Court stayed pending completion of the affiliation process – High Court to make final orders based on JNTU’s decisions post-affiliation process [Paras 15-19].

Compassionate Appointment – Delay and Laches – Appointment on compassionate grounds is an exception to the general rule of public appointments based on merit – If the family has survived for a substantial period after the death of the breadwinner, there is no justification for compassionate appointment at the cost of others’ interests – Application for appointment made after 18 years is unsustainable – Respondent’s son not entitled to compassionate appointment [Paras 1-6].

Judicial Principles – Delay and Laches – Supreme Court emphasized that delay in making claims for compassionate appointment militates against the purpose of providing immediate relief to the family – Cited precedents affirming the necessity of timely applications for such appointments to ensure immediate amelioration to the family [Paras 5.2-5.3].

Decision – Appeal allowed – High Court’s and Central Administrative Tribunal’s judgments set aside – Second son of the respondent not entitled to appointment on compassionate grounds due to delay – No order as to costs [Paras 6].

Arbitration – Interest Award – Arbitrator awarded pendente lite and future interest despite Clause 16(2) of GCC barring such interest – Supreme Court held that as per Clause 16(2), no interest shall be payable on earnest money, security deposit, or amounts payable to the contractor under the contract – Arbitrator and High Court erred in awarding interest contrary to the contractual terms – Award quashed [Paras 1-14].

Contractual Interpretation – Specific Bar on Interest – Clause 16(2) of GCC explicitly bars interest on any amounts payable under the contract – Principle of "ejusdem generis" not applicable as the clause uses "or" to cover different situations – Parties bound by their contractual agreement prohibiting interest [Paras 10-11].

Decision – Appeal allowed – High Court’s judgment and arbitral award set aside – Contractor not entitled to any pendente lite or future interest on amounts due under the contract – No order as to costs [Paras 14-15].

Rent Control – NRI Landlords – Right to Eviction – NRI purchasers of property can invoke summary jurisdiction under Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act after five years of ownership, irrespective of who initially let out the premises – Distinction between 'landlord' and 'owner' critical – High Court order upheld, confirming eviction – Appeal dismissed [Paras 1-19].

Legal Interpretation – Distinction in Terms – 'Landlord' vs 'Owner' – Provisions for NRIs under Section 13-B crafted to recognize ownership status and differentiate from general landlord-tenant relationships – Requirement to wait five years from ownership acquisition before invoking eviction rights ensures balance and compliance with legislative intent [Paras 12-15].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – NRI owners required to wait five years from ownership acquisition before invoking eviction rights under Section 13-B – Tenant granted six months to vacate premises upon providing undertaking within two weeks – No order as to costs [Paras 18-19].

Jurisdiction – Civil Court – Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act – Whether the bar on jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, applies even when the landlord-tenant relationship is disputed in a proceeding under Section 14A of the Act – Supreme Court held that the validity of orders under Section 14A is open to scrutiny in a Civil Court when the tenant disputes the landlord-tenant relationship – Mere plea by the tenant should not render authorities powerless if found frivolous [Paras 1-54].

Landlord-Tenant Relationship – Dispute – Civil Court Jurisdiction – Bar under Section 25 of the Act does not prevent civil courts from adjudicating the existence of landlord-tenant relationship when disputed – Authorities under the Act lack power to conclusively determine landlord-tenant relationship if genuinely contested [Paras 47-53].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Contention raised by the appellants found meritless – Civil courts retain jurisdiction to scrutinize orders when the landlord-tenant relationship is disputed – Parties to bear their own costs [Paras 54-55].