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by sayum
03 July 2026 7:23 AM
"Statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. cannot be said to be a confessional statement in strict sense as it appears to be exculpatory in nature. Moreover, his statement was recorded without providing any opportunity to the accused to make a confessional statement after considering its effect in a cool mind." Jharkhand High Court, in a significant judgment dated July 1, 2026, set aside the conviction of former MLA Paulus Surin and co-accused Jetha Kachhap, observing that a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC without following mandatory procedural safeguards cannot form the basis of a conviction.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Rongon Mukhopadhyay and Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava held that the trial court committed a serious error of law by treating an exculpatory statement—recorded years after the incident without a "cooling-off" period—as a voluntary confession of guilt.
The case originated from the 2013 murder of Bhushan Singh and Ram Govind Singh in Karra, Khunti, allegedly carried out by members of the extremist group PLFI. The prosecution alleged that Paulus Surin, then a sitting MLA, had hatched a conspiracy with the extremists to eliminate Bhushan Singh due to personal enmity and a prior rape case registered against the deceased. The trial court had previously sentenced both appellants to life imprisonment, primarily relying on the Section 164 CrPC statement of Jetha Kachhap and the testimony of the deceased's family members.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether a statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC can be treated as a confession if it is exculpatory in nature and recorded without adhering to the procedural safeguards intended to ensure voluntariness. The court was also called upon to determine if the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC could be sustained in the absence of evidence showing a meeting of minds between the alleged conspirators.
Statement Under Section 164 CrPC Must Be Inculpatory To Qualify As Confession
The High Court observed that the learned trial court erred in admitting the statement of Jetha Kachhap as an admission of guilt. The bench noted that for a statement to be considered a "confession," it must be self-inculpatory, meaning the maker must admit to the essential ingredients of the crime. In this case, the court found that the appellant’s statement was exculpatory, as it did not involve him in the actual firing but merely placed him near the scene or attributed threats to others.
Court Highlights Mandatory Nature Of Procedural Safeguards Under Section 164 CrPC
The bench emphasized that Section 164 of the CrPC provides specific procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the accused, including the duty of the Magistrate to explain that the person is not bound to make a confession and that any such statement could be used against them. The court found that the Magistrate failed to follow these safeguards in letter and spirit, thereby vitiating the evidentiary value of the statement.
Absence Of 'Cooling-Off' Period Before Recording Statement Fatal To Prosecution Case
A critical lapse identified by the High Court was the lack of time given to the accused to reflect on the consequences of making a confession. The court noted that Jetha Kachhap was brought by the police and his statement was recorded on the very same day without providing any opportunity to consider his decision in a "cool mind." The bench observed that the absence of such a reflection period strongly suggested that the statement was not made voluntarily.
"Statement neither can be used as evidence against the maker of the confession nor against any other co-accused."
Significant Delay In Recording Statement Raises Doubts On Voluntariness
The court took strong exception to the fact that while the occurrence took place in May 2013, the alleged confessional statement was only recorded in June 2017. Furthermore, the court observed that there was no prior application by the accused expressing a voluntary desire to confess. Such a delayed recording, conducted four years after the crime while the accused was in custody for another case, further weakened the prosecution's reliance on the document.
Conspiracy Charges Under Section 120B Cannot Rest On Mere Suspicion
Regarding the allegations against MLA Paulus Surin, the court held that the prosecution failed to prove any conspiracy or previous threatening. The bench noted that the "threatening letter" produced by the prosecution was from 2011, making it a "stale" piece of evidence with no causal connection to the 2013 murder. Since the alleged co-conspirators had already been acquitted by the trial court, the bench ruled that the appellant alone could not be attributed to entering into a conspiracy with himself.
Ocular Testimony Found Unreliable Due To Material Improvements
The court further discredited the testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-4, who claimed to be eyewitnesses. Upon perusing the cross-examination, the bench found that these witnesses were actually inside their house during the firing and only reached the spot after the miscreants had fled. The court observed that their claims of identifying the appellants were based on "material improvements" and "exaggerations" that did not inspire confidence.
"The claim of identification of the present appellants as perpetrator in the alleged crime has also not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt."
In its conclusion, the High Court held that the trial court's judgment was based on conjectures and surmises rather than solid evidence. The bench found that the prosecution had failed to establish the identity of the appellants as the perpetrators beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction and order of sentence, directing the immediate release of Paulus Surin and Jetha Kachhap from jail custody.
Date of Decision: 01 July 2026