Facts:

The respondent was granted a lease of a plot in 1981.

The State government formulated a scheme in 2003 for the conversion of residential leasehold plots to freehold.

The respondent applied for conversion in 2003, but issues arose due to alleged encroachment on government land.

Various communications and inspections took place over the years, addressing the encroachment concerns.

The State eventually granted permission for conversion in 2014, conditional on a specified payment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was correct in directing the State to recompute the conversion charges based on the rate applicable in 2003.

The relevance of encroachment on government land in the conversion process.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court was in error in directing the State to recompute the conversion charges based on the rate applicable in 2003. The Court emphasized that the application for conversion must comply with the governing provisions of the policy set by the State government, and compliance is necessary for the right to claim conversion. The respondent was directed to pay the conversion charges on the date when a final decision was taken, considering the absence of encroachment.

Facts:

The review petitions stem from a legal dispute involving M/S SHANTI CONDUCTORS (P) LTD. and ASSAM STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD. The petitioner contends errors in the original judgment concerning the bar of time in a money suit related to interest on the principal amount.

Issues:

Whether there is an apparent error in the original judgment regarding the bar of time in the suit.

Whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act.

Whether the Interest on Delayed Payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, is applicable.

Held:

The Court emphasized the importance of specific pleadings for claiming exemption from the law of limitation. The petitioner failed to plead for the benefit of Section 19, and the proviso of Order VII Rule 6 cannot rescue the plaintiff. The Court rejected the claim for the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, stating that the writ petition filed by the Association was by a different entity. The scope of review is limited, and the petitioner cannot reargue previously addressed questions.

The Court rejected the submission that there is an error apparent on the face of the record regarding the date of bill for payment and the enforcement of the Interest on Delayed Payment to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993.

The Court clarified that the grounds on which the petitioner sought review were not proved, and the High Court did not grant interest under Act, 1993. The maintainability of the appeal was considered and found against the petitioner.

Decision: The review petitions (C) Nos. 786–787 of 2019 were dismissed, and review petition (C) No.789 of 2019 was rejected. The Court upheld the judgment dated 23.01.2019.

FACTS:

'H' applied for a two-room accommodation.

'H' passed away, and his wife was issued an allotment letter for the tenement.

'H's wife also passed away, leaving four children: two daughters ('R' and 'P') and two sons ('S' and 'M').

'R' filed a suit for partition, claiming 1/4th share in the tenement for each sibling.

'S' contested the suit, presenting a registered Will dated 02.01.1992, bequeathing the tenement to him absolutely.

ISSUES:

Validity and proof of the registered Will presented by 'S.'

Ownership rights and partition of the tenement among the siblings.

HELD:

The Trial Court passed a preliminary decree, ruling that 'S' failed to prove the Will, as he did not examine any attesting witnesses.

The High Court set aside the Trial Court's judgment, relying on the registration of the Will as proof under s. 71 of the Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the Will was attested by two witnesses, namely 'RK' (husband of 'R') and 'MN' (Advocate).

The Court emphasized that s.71 of the Evidence Act comes into play only if all attesting witnesses deny or do not recollect the execution of the document.

Since 'RK' was not summoned and examined, s.71 could not be invoked, making the High Court's finding unacceptable.

'S' had not referred to the Will in his reply to a legal notice, and the defense of the Will was raised for the first time in his written statement.

The Court observed doubts about the execution of the Will, given that the testator was illiterate, and 'other evidence' suggested a lack of understanding by the family members.

Execution of the Will was not proved by "other evidence" as required by Section 71 of the Evidence Act.

REFERRED CASES :

Benga Behera and Anr. v. Braja Kishore Nanda and Ors. (2007) 9 SCC 728

Dharam Singh v. Aso and Anr. 1990 Suppl SCC 684

H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Ors. AIR 1959 SC 443

Jagdish Chand Sharma v. Narain Singh Saini (Dead) Through L.Rs. and Ors. (2015) 8 SCC 615

Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam (2003) 2 SCC 91

Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur and Ors. (1977) 1 SCC 369

M.B. Ramesh (Dead) by L.Rs. v. K.M. Veeraje Urs. (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. (2013) 7 SCC 490

Mt. Manki Kaur v. Hansraj Singh and Ors. AIR 1938 Pat 301

Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Anr. v. Panchanan Banerjee (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 459

Surendra Pal and Ors. v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora and Anr. (1974) 2 SCC 600

Vishnu Ramkrishna v. Nathu Vithal and Ors. AIR 1949 Bom 266

Facts:

Marriage solemnized in 2000, parties engaged in legal battles for almost two decades.

Appellant alleges cruelty, abandonment, and mental torture by the respondent.

Respondent claims efforts for immigration, accuses appellant of abandonment, physical assault, and extra-marital affairs.

Various legal proceedings initiated by both families.

Issues:

Cruelty as a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia).

Irretrievable breakdown of marriage not recognized as a ground under the current divorce law.

Examination of the High Court's reversal of the trial court's decree of divorce.

Held:

The marriage found to be emotionally dead, beyond salvage, and irretrievably broken.

Recognition of the futility of continuing a failed marriage only on paper.

Exercise of powers under Article 142 to grant divorce.

The insistence of the respondent to stay together seen as an attempt to frustrate the divorce decree.

Both parties observed to be bitter and cynical about the relationship, no willingness to live together.

The judgment refers to the absence of legislation on irretrievable breakdown but acknowledges judicial precedents exercising powers under Article 142.

Maintenance of Rs. 7,500 per month ordered to be continued for the respondent.

Hope expressed that the end of legal proceedings would allow the parties to move on separately.

Facts:

Plaintiff no.1, M/s Genentech Inc., claimed to be the innovators of the monoclonal antibody drug Trastuzumab, marketed in India by plaintiff no.2 under the brand names HERCEPTIN, HERCLON, and BICELTIS. The appellants sought to restrain respondent No.3, Reliance Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd., from launching the biosimilar version of their drug. The suit challenged the approval granted by the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI) to Reliance. The appellants' patent for the drug had lapsed, but they contested the biosimilarity of Reliance's product, alleging non-compliance with regulatory norms.

Issues:

Whether respondent No.3 complied with applicable laws in launching the biosimilar drug?

Is the appellants' suit an abuse of process, filed to stifle competition?

Should the conditions imposed on Reliance's product by the learned Single Judge be upheld?

Held:

The Division Bench set aside the learned Single Judge's order, allowing Reliance to market their product without biosimilarity claims. The Court acknowledged DCGI approval but doubted proper testing. The Division Bench erred by not considering analogous appeals and interim applications as directed by the Supreme Court. The interim order from the Single Judge, imposing conditions, was reinstated, and the High Court was urged to expedite the final decision on the suit within 12 months.

Facts:

The Chandigarh Housing Board (CHB) invited bids for a project, awarded it to M/S. Parasvanath Developers Pvt. Ltd.

Disputes arose regarding the construction timeline, leading to a complaint by a flat buyer.

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (National Commission) directed CHB and the Developer to pay compensation to the buyer.

Issues:

Whether the National Commission erred in fixing liability on CHB for mental harassment and litigation costs.

Whether the increase in the interest rate from 9% to 10% was justified.

Held:

The Court upheld the National Commission's order on the division of liability between CHB and the Developer in a 70:30 ratio.

The Court found that Clause 9(c) of the Tripartite Agreement (compensation clause) did not apply to the case as conditions under Clause 9(a) were not fulfilled.

The Court affirmed the National Commission's decision on mental harassment and litigation costs, stating they were not covered under Clause 9(c) and upheld the 70:30 split.

The increase in the interest rate from 9% to 10% was upheld by the Court as within the National Commission's discretionary power.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the National Commission's order on liability division, rejecting the argument of the inapplicability of Clause 9(c) and affirming the interest rate increase.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from a railway electrification contract. The appointment of an arbitrator becomes a contentious issue, leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

The appropriate procedure for appointing an arbitrator as per the modified Clause 64 of the General Conditions of Contract and the relevance of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The modified Clause 64(3)(a)(i) applies when the total value of claims does not exceed one crore rupees, necessitating the appointment of a sole arbitrator, as specified in the Railway contract.

Clause 64(3)(a)(ii) deals with cases exceeding the specified value, outlining the procedure for appointing an arbitrator from a panel of three retired railway officers.

The court emphasizes that the High Court erred in appointing an independent sole arbitrator, deviating from the agreed-upon clauses in the General Conditions of Contract.

The respondent's request for a sole arbitrator contradicts the contract terms, which mandate the appointment of a panel of three arbitrators for disputes exceeding the specified value.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the High Court's appointment of an independent sole arbitrator is set aside. The court directs adherence to the procedure outlined in Clause 64(3)(b) of the General Conditions of Contract for the appointment of three arbitrators.

Facts:

The appellant, Manju, was accused of murdering her newborn baby girl through strangulation. The prosecution alleged that the act occurred in the maternity ward of Lady Hardinge Medical College Hospital. The post-mortem report indicated the cause of death as asphyxia due to ante-mortem strangulation.

Issues:

Establishing a complete chain of circumstances based on circumstantial evidence to warrant the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC.

Held:

The court emphasized that the conviction was solely based on circumstantial evidence. The testimonies of staff nurses (PW-8 and PW-9) were crucial, stating that the baby girl was handed over to the mother around 4:30 p.m. and found dead by 6:30 p.m.( Paragraph 9)

The court analyzed the evidence, including the post-mortem report, and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish a motive for the appellant to commit the alleged murder. It highlighted the lack of concrete evidence and the unnatural aspect of the appellant killing her own child.( Paragraph 10)

The court held that, considering the totality of the evidence, it was not safe to convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The benefit of doubt was extended, leading to the acquittal of the appellant.( Paragraph 11)

Facts:

The appellant challenged a clause in the advertisement for the appointment of Medical Officers, mandating that only work experience in State Government hospitals would be considered for granting marks for 'Work Experience.' The appellant's work experience in an Army Hospital was not initially considered.

Issues:

Interpretation of the term 'Government hospital' in Bihar Health Service Rules.

Challenge to the selection process and the principle of estoppel.

Applicability of constitutional values in interpreting rules.

Held:

1. Estoppel: The principle of estoppel was discussed, emphasizing that it prevents a candidate from challenging the selection process after failing in it. However, it was differentiated in cases where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences. The appellant did not challenge the selection procedure but focused on the interpretation of 'work experience,' which the court deemed valid for consideration. Para 17-20

2. Interpretation of Statutes: The court emphasized the need for literal interpretation where the text is unambiguous but advocated for a purposive interpretation when there is ambiguity. It highlighted the importance of considering constitutional values and promoting equal opportunities. Para 21-29

3. Definition of 'Government Hospital': The term 'Government hospital' was analyzed, rejecting a strict application of Rule 2(a) and adopting an expansive interpretation. The court held that the experience gained in any hospital run by the State Government or its instrumentalities, Central Government, Municipalities, and Panchayati Raj Institutions within the territory of Bihar should be considered. Para 30-36

4. Held and Decision: Rules 5 and 6(iii) were construed to include the experience gained by a doctor in any hospital run by the Bihar Government or its instrumentalities, as well as any other non-private hospital within the territory of Bihar. The respondents were directed to rework the merit list accordingly. Para 37