Facts:

The dispute revolves around a property situated at D-1090, New Friends Colony, New Delhi. The property was originally owned by late Sh. S. L. Sethi and was subsequently passed on to Smt. Krishna Sethi, the mother of the parties, through a will. A subsequent will dated 27.01.2005 specified the distribution of the property among the two sons, with ground and first floors allotted to each and an equal division of the second floor.

Issues:

Whether the respondent-plaintiff had the right to partition the second floor and terrace rights.

Whether the appellant-defendant had a claim over the common areas in the property, despite the suit being limited to the second floor and terrace rights.

Held:

The Court, after considering the pleadings and evidence, ruled as follows:

The appellant-defendant, despite the suit being limited to the second floor and terrace rights, had raised a dispute regarding common areas in the property.

The Trial Court framed relevant issues on the common areas due to the appellant's dispute.

The High Court, while acknowledging that a driveway on the ground floor would typically be a common area, considered the specific layout of the property.

The High Court found that the appellant's portion had a direct entrance from a side lane, reducing the need for access through the driveway.

The High Court ruled that the appellant had no right to use the driveway but could use the water pipes and booster pump/motor in the rear courtyard.

Additionally, the High Court allowed the respondent to use a part of the staircase landing on the second floor for specific access.

Facts:

The case concerned the issue of pension entitlement for employees under the State Bank of India Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) framed in 2000. The central question was whether employees completing 15 years of service were entitled to pension benefits as per the terms of the scheme.

Issues:

Whether the Central Board of Directors' acceptance of the memorandum for pension payment created a binding obligation on the State Bank of India (SBI) to provide pension benefits to employees completing 15 years of service?

Whether the SBI's reliance on its failure to amend the rules and its unilateral decision to deny pension benefits were valid arguments to invalidate its earlier decision?

Held:

The court held that once the Central Board of Directors of the SBI accepted the memorandum proposing pension payment to employees completing 15 years of service, the SBI was bound by a binding obligation to implement the pension scheme. The court criticized the SBI's attempt to invalidate its own decision by claiming a failure to amend the rules. The court emphasized that the SBI could not act unfairly or unreasonably based on misrepresentation.

The court interpreted the contractual nature of the scheme in the context of the facts and decisions made by the Board of Directors. There was no ambiguity regarding the admissibility of pension when considering the memorandum and the scheme together. In case of ambiguity, the court ruled in favor of employees, and any clarification denying pension benefits was deemed unenforceable, illegal, and contrary to the law.

The eligibility clause of the VRS scheme explicitly stated that employees with 15 years of pensionable service were entitled to benefits, including pension. The court rejected the SBI's claim that the draft scheme did not stipulate 15 years of service as eligibility. The court held that various documents and correspondence confirmed that the decision to grant pension benefits upon completion of 15 years of service was well-established.

Facts:

The Agriculture Department of the Government of Sikkim sought to acquire 8.36 acres of land for a regional center. The land was owned by Man Bahadur Basnett and the acquisition was disputed. Late Man Bahadur Basnett's property fell to the appellant, represented by his two sons, after his death. The appellant alleged wrongful encroachment and trespass by the respondents, claiming they used the land as an agricultural farm without proper acquisition proceedings. The suit was filed in 2002, challenging the acquisition process and seeking possession.

Issues:

Whether the acquisition process had been followed properly under the Sikkim Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1977?

Whether the respondents had acquired possession through adverse possession?

Whether the respondents had established proper acquisition and compensation procedures?

Whether the appellant was entitled to damages for wrongful use and occupation of the land?

Held:

Issue 1: Compliance with Acquisition Process The Court noted that no notification was produced showing intent to acquire the land under Section 4 of the Act. The respondents claimed that the acquisition process was followed and compensation paid, but lacked evidence. The Court emphasized that compliance with due process was essential, citing the importance of strict interpretation. The respondents failed to prove proper acquisition process or compensation, and the appellant's claim was supported.

Issue 2: Adverse Possession The respondents did not claim adverse possession. The Court did not consider this issue relevant and did not engage in a discussion on it.

Issue 3: Proper Acquisition and Compensation Procedures The Court highlighted the significance of evidence and primary/secondary proof for acquisition and compensation. The respondents failed to provide primary evidence of withdrawal of compensation or possession. The letter from the landowner consenting to acquisition did not negate the need for proper acquisition process and compensation proof. The Court held that the state must comply with the procedure for acquisition under Article 300A of the Constitution.

Issue 4: Damages for Wrongful Use and Occupation Citing LAO vs. M. Ramakrishna Reddy, the Court ruled that the owner can claim damages for wrongful use and possession of unacquired land. The respondents were found liable for damages for illegal use and occupation of the land.

Conclusion and Relief: The respondents failed to prove proper acquisition and compensation procedures. The appellant was entitled to possession of the land and damages for wrongful use and occupation. The respondents were given three months to decide whether to properly acquire the land or surrender possession. Mesne profits would be determined by a Court Commissioner.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to two Constitution Orders issued by the President on August 5, 2019, which applied the Constitution of India in its entirety to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, akin to other states in India.

Issues:

Whether the present matter needed to be referred to a larger Bench due to differing opinions from two different Constitution Benches in the cases of Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir. The conflict centered on the interpretation of Article 370.

Held:

The doctrine of precedents and stare decisis are integral to the legal system, ensuring certainty, stability, and continuity. A judgment comprises the ratio decidendi (essential legal reasoning) and obiter dictum (non-essential remarks), which must be understood in the context of the case's facts.

The decision in Prem Nath Kaul case dealt with the legislative competence of the Yuvaraj in passing an enactment before the formulation of the Constitution of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It indicated that decisions of the Constituent Assembly of the State under Article 370(2) were final, limited to decisions taken by the State Government before the Constituent Assembly's convening. It did not address the continuation or cessation of Article 370 after the Constituent Assembly's dissolution.

The rule of per incuriam (judgment passed in ignorance of relevant authorities) is an exception to the doctrine of precedents, applicable only to the ratio of the judgment. No conflict existed between the judgments in Prem Nath Kaul and Sampat Prakash cases. No reason was found to refer the present matter to a larger Bench.

Facts:

The appellant challenged a judgment passed by the High Court of Kerala in FAO (RO) No.229/2014. The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court in AS No.186/2011, and restoring the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in O.S. No.288/2009. The dispute involved property ownership and possession between the plaintiff (respondent) and the defendant (appellant).

Issues:

The property ownership, possession, and the appropriateness of remanding the case for further consideration, especially in the context of producing additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.

Held:

The lower appellate court's decision to remand the case for reconsideration by the trial court, allowing the defendant to produce additional evidence, was found to be appropriate. The High Court's focus solely on possession in a suit for perpetual injunction was deemed incorrect, as the nature of contentions raised in the suit and the issues framed by the trial court involved both ownership and possession aspects. Therefore, the conclusion of the lower appellate court was upheld, setting aside the judgment of the High Court.

Decision: The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the judgment of the lower appellate court was restored. The parties were to bear their own costs.

The judgment referred to the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. vs. Manjit Kaur & Ors. (2019) 8 SCC 729, which considered the relevance of possession in a suit for perpetual injunction, including adverse possession claims.

Facts:

The appellants (original accused nos. 2 to 5) were tried for the murder of Bal Kishan and convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. The prosecution relied on the sole eyewitness, PW8 - Mullo Bai, who stated that she saw the appellants and other accused with weapons near the crime scene around 4-5 a.m. The trial court convicted them, and the High Court confirmed the conviction.

Issues:

Whether the conviction of the appellants based on the sole eyewitness's testimony is sustainable?

Whether the contradictions and omissions in PW8's statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC and her deposition before the Court impact the reliability of her testimony?

Whether the statement under Section 161 CrPC can be relied upon to establish the presence of lathis with the accused?

Held:

The Court analyzed the contradictions and omissions in PW8's testimony. While she claimed to have identified the accused by their torchlight and voices, the circumstances of the dark night, the absence of torch recovery, and material discrepancies cast doubt on her identification. Her statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC indicated the accused carrying lathis, but the Court ruled such statements inadmissible for conviction. The High Court's error in relying on this statement to conclude the accused had lathis was highlighted.

Considering the discrepancies, omissions, and improvements in PW8's statement and her deposition, the Court found her evidence unreliable for convicting the appellants. The Court stressed that PW8's testimony is the only evidence against the appellants, and no other independent witness supported the prosecution's case. The enmity between the parties further increased the likelihood of false implication.

As the evidence failed to establish a common object or conspiracy among the accused, the Court concluded that the benefit of doubt must favor the appellants. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction of the appellants was set aside. They were acquitted of the charges under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, and it was ordered that they be released.

Facts:

The case revolves around allegations that a vehicle belonging to the father of the parties was sold after the father's death using forged signatures on relevant documents.

Issues:

Whether a second complaint is maintainable when the first complaint was dismissed on merits?

Whether the second complaint, filed with additional supporting material, is valid when the core allegations are the same as those in the first complaint?

Held:

The court laid down the principles established in earlier cases like Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, Jatinder Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur, and Poonam Chand Jain. These principles indicate that the maintainability of a second complaint depends on how the first complaint was dismissed.

If the first complaint was dismissed on merits, a second complaint on nearly identical facts may not be maintainable. However, if the dismissal of the first complaint was due to the complainant's absence, a second complaint could be filed on the same facts.

In the present case, the first complaint was rejected by the Judicial Magistrate on merits. The core allegations, involving forged signatures and the sale of a vehicle, remained unchanged. The complainant sought to withdraw the revision of the first complaint and file a fresh complaint.

The court referred to an order from the Revisional Court, which indicated that the complainant could present a new complaint without requiring permission from the court, if new facts emerged.

The second complaint included additional material, such as a credit note and Registration Certificate, in support of the core allegations. However, the court noted that these additional materials could have been obtained earlier with reasonable diligence.

Considering the principles established by previous judgments, the court concluded that the core allegations in both complaints were the same. As the first complaint was rejected on merits, the second complaint, filed with almost identical facts and additional material, was not maintainable.

The court held that the High Court's decision to deem the second complaint maintainable was not justified. Accordingly, the second complaint was dismissed as not being maintainable.

These cases provided the framework for assessing whether a second complaint on the same or similar facts is permissible based on how the first complaint was disposed of.

Appeal is allowed.

FACTS:

On 10.04.2004, ASI-PW7 and other police officials noticed the appellant and another accused carrying a bag in a suspicious manner.

The accused turned back upon seeing the police and started walking briskly, arousing suspicion.

The ASI intercepted them and suspected the bag to contain narcotic items.

The accused were informed about their right to have the search witnessed by a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate.

The appellant chose a search by a Gazetted Officer, and the DSP arrived at the spot.

The bag was found to contain 6 kilograms 300 grams of opium.

Samples were taken, and formal FIR was registered. The charge-sheet was filed after completing the investigation.

The appellant denied the allegations during questioning under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUES:

Discrepancy in the timing of DSP's presence and its impact on the prosecution's case.

Non-production of the seized contraband before the court.

Compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act in relation to personal search.

Non-association of independent witnesses with the investigation.

HELD:

Issue 1: Discrepancy in DSP's Presence The appellant raised a discrepancy in the DSP's timing of presence at the spot. However, the Court found no merit in this argument, highlighting the lapse of time from the incident to witness examination and the possibility of discrepancies in the evidence due to such lapse. The Court relied on the testimony of the DSP and ASI to confirm the DSP's presence during the search.

Issue 2: Non-Production of Seized Contraband The appellant contended that non-production of the seized contraband violated her conviction. The Court referred to earlier judgments on this matter and noted that while non-production could be fatal in some cases, it was not sufficient singularly to grant acquittal. Since the samples were produced, there was no tampering with the seals, and the appellant did not raise this issue in lower courts, the Court rejected this contention.

Issue 3: Compliance with Section 50 The appellant argued that personal search required compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The Court referred to previous judgments and found that when contraband is recovered from a bag, compliance with Section 50 is not necessary. As there was no recovery from the appellant's person and only from the bag, the requirement for Section 50 compliance was not applicable.

Issue 4: Non-Association of Independent Witnesses The appellant contended that independent witnesses were not associated with the investigation. The Court referred to the ASI's testimony and found that efforts were made to involve independent witnesses, but they were reluctant to cooperate. The Court upheld the confidence placed by lower courts in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

Facts:

The appellant, the Superintendent of Post Office, Bolangir Division, Bolangir, Odisha, appealed against a decision of the National Commission. The case involved a complaint filed by the respondent, Jambu Kumar Jain and others, who claimed that 88 IVPs purchased by his father were lost in 2001. They requested payment of maturity value, alleging deficiency in service by the Post Office.

Issues:

Whether, according to the Indira Vikas Patra Rules, 1986, the lost or stolen IVPs were eligible for replacement by the Post Office.

Held:

The court referred to the relevant provisions of the Indira Vikas Patra Rules, 1986. It noted that according to Rule 5, IVPs could be purchased using various modes including cash, and no formal application was required. Rule 6 governed the issuance of certificates, and Rule 7 addressed replacement of certificates. It emphasized that Rule 7(2) clearly stated that certificates lost, stolen, mutilated, defaced, or destroyed beyond recognition would not be replaced by any Post Office.

The court held that the refusal of the Department to entertain requests for maturity sum in cases where IVPs were lost or stolen was justified. The absence of registered identity for cash-purchased IVPs meant that there was no way to establish the identity of the purchaser. The court compared IVPs to currency notes, emphasizing that a lost currency note cannot be replaced, and thus, the same principle applied to IVPs.

The court concluded that if the Department refused to encash certificates upon presentation or made short payments, there could be a grievance about service deficiency. However, in cases where the certificates themselves were lost and the initial holder's identity could not be established, the Department was well within its rights to deny the return of maturity sum.

The court referred to the case of Central Government of India and others vs. Krishnaji Parvetesh Kulkarni, (2006) 4 SCC 275. In that case, it was ruled that an IVP is similar to a currency note and a lost IVP cannot be replaced, in line with the rules.

The Appeal is Allowed.