Facts:

The appellant's husband owned a vehicle insured by the respondent. The vehicle was involved in an accident, leading to the death of the appellant's husband and daughter. The respondent rejected the claim, asserting that the driver did not possess a valid driving license. The appellant filed consumer complaints seeking compensation.

Issues:

Whether the insurance company's liability is absolved due to the driver's invalid/fake driving license.

What level of care/diligence is expected of the employer/insured when hiring a driver with a driving license.

Held:

The court referred to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specifically Section 149(2)(a)(ii), which addresses the conditions of driving licenses. The court discussed the extent of care an employer should exercise when hiring a driver, and whether the insurance company can avoid liability due to the driver's invalid license.

The court cited the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 and the case of Pepsu RTC vs. National Insurance Co., (2013) 10 SCC 217, emphasizing that the insurer cannot avoid liability merely on the ground of the driver's invalid license. The insurer must prove negligence or failure on the part of the insured to fulfill policy conditions regarding driver competence.

The court ruled that while hiring a driver, the employer must verify the driver's license and assess their competence. If the driver presents a seemingly genuine license, the employer need not further investigate its authenticity unless there's reason to doubt. The court deemed it unreasonable to place the onus on the insured to verify licenses with transport authorities across the country.

The court held that if the insurer proves that the insured was aware of the fake license but still allowed the person to drive, the insurer's liability ceases. In this case, the driver's license was purportedly issued by a licensing authority, but its authenticity couldn't be verified. The court found the insured had not been negligent and allowed the appeals, holding the insurer liable to indemnify the appellant.

REFERRED CASES:

National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733

Pepsu RTC vs. National Insurance Co., (2013) 10 SCC 217

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 641

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the classification of a specific parcel of land described as 'Shamlat Patti Dhera & Khubi'. The appellant, Patram, argued that the land, though described as 'shamilat' land, was actually a patti owned by his ancestors for over a century. The land was not being utilized for common village purposes, and thus, according to him, it should not be categorized as 'shamilat deh' under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the land in question qualifies as 'shamilat deh' under the definition provided in Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Held:

The court analyzed the definitions and provisions in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, particularly focusing on Section 2(g) which defines 'shamilat deh'. The court noted that terms like 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola' represent different divisions within a village based on caste, religion, occupation, etc. The court discussed the absence of a comma after the word 'shamilat' in a specific section and concluded that this was likely a typographical error. The court interpreted that 'shamilat deh' should be read along with 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola'. A land could only be considered 'shamilat deh' if it met one of these conditions. If the term 'shamilat' was missing from any of these descriptions, the land could not be categorized as 'shamilat deh'.

Based on the evidence presented, including historical records and the fact that the land was not utilized for the common benefit of the village community, the court held that the land in question did not qualify as 'shamilat deh' under the Act. As a result, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside previous judgments, and ordered that the appellant's name be entered in the ownership column with the entry 'shamlat patti'.

Facts:

The plaintiffs (respondents) filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of ownership over a property, survey entry No. 11/1 of a village, and the removal of the 'Forest department' name from the records. The State of Goa (defendants) opposed the claim, asserting that the property belonged to the Forest Department.

Issues:

Whether the recording of the plaintiffs' names alongside the Forest Department's in the survey entry was legally valid.

Whether the plaintiffs' failure to disclose the 1975 records correction proceedings in their suit affected their claim.

Whether the evidence presented by the State regarding the property's status as forest land was sufficient to support their counter-claim.

Held:

The Court observed that despite one of the plaintiffs withdrawing their claim in 1975, their names were recorded alongside the Forest Department's name, which was deemed illegal.

The plaintiffs' failure to disclose the relevant 1975 records correction proceedings in their suit was noted as a failure to justify the continuation of their claim.

The additional evidence presented by the State indicated that only the Forest Department's name was recorded regarding the property. The Court concluded that the counter-claim by the State was well-founded.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal by the State, directing the removal of the plaintiffs' names from the survey entry No. 11/1 of the village

Facts:

The case involves a writ petition challenging the detention orders issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The detention orders were made by a specially empowered officer. The detenues, represented by their counsel, contended that their right to representation against the detention orders had been violated.

Issues:

Whether the detenues had the right to make representations against the detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

Whether the Detaining Authority had the obligation to consider the representation independently or wait for the Advisory Board's report.

Whether the delay in considering the representation by the Detaining Authority violated the detenues' constitutional rights.

Held:

Majority Opinion (Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.):

The detenues have the right to make representations against detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. This right is in addition to the right to make representations to the State Government and the Central Government (Para 12).

The Detaining Authority is obliged to consider the representations without waiting for the opinion of the Central Advisory Board. The specially empowered officer has no statutory role to play at the stage when the Advisory Board's report is received. The report is meant for the appropriate Government's consumption, and confidentiality is mandated (Para 22-23).

In cases where the representation is received before or after the Advisory Board's reference, the Detaining Authority must consider the representation promptly. Inaction on the Detaining Authority's part to consider the representation causes prejudice to the detenues and violates their constitutional rights (Para 26-28).

Dissenting Opinion (Hemant Gupta, J.):

The Detaining Authority, whether the Central Government, State Government, or a specially empowered officer, has the jurisdiction to consider representations against detention orders independently of the Advisory Board's recommendation (Para 3).

The consideration for revocation of a detention order is distinct from the Advisory Board's assessment of sufficient cause for detention. The Detaining Authority should prudently defer the decision on the representation while the matter is being reviewed by the Advisory Board (Para 23).

Facts:

The appellant, Ramesh Singh, served as Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari and issued appointment letters for Assistant Teachers without adhering to the prescribed rules. Serious allegations of corruption were raised by the State of Uttar Pradesh, leading to disciplinary proceedings.

Issues:

The irregular appointments made by the appellant and whether the disciplinary proceedings adhered to the principles of natural justice.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to remit the matter for a fresh enquiry. It emphasized the importance of adhering to the principles of natural justice and ordered that the new enquiry be conducted by a disciplinary authority appointed by the Chief Secretary of the state. The Court clarified that its decision didn't express any opinion on the merits of the case.

Facts:

The respondents exchanged land with a Scheduled Tribe member using a registered exchange deed. The exchange involved the respondents giving 4½ Muthi of land in return for 12 Nali of agricultural land. The Assistant Collector declared the exchange void under Section 161(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as it violated the provisions of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the exchange violated Section 161(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Whether the land in question is an "agricultural land" as defined in Section 3(14) of the Act.

Whether the restrictions on land transfer in Sections 157-B and 157-A apply to the case.

Whether the exchange could be upheld based on grounds of equity.

Held:

The exchange between the respondents and the Scheduled Tribe member was executed in violation of Section 157-B of the Act, which prohibits transfer of land from a Scheduled Tribe member to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. As per Section 166 of the Act, transfers in contravention of its provisions are void. Thus, the exchange was held void, and the land was deemed to be vested in the State Government. The absence of a declaration as stipulated in Sections 143 and 144 meant the land remains "agricultural land" as per Section 3(14), and the Act's provisions are applicable.

Section 161 of the Act deals with land exchange and requires prior permission from an Assistant Collector. This permission is mandatory for valid exchanges. In this case, no such permission was sought, making the exchange void. The language in Sections 157-B and 157-A indicates a clear prohibition on transferring land in any manner from a Scheduled Tribe member to another person.

The contention that prior permission under Section 161 is unnecessary is unfounded. The requirement for calculating rental value clearly implies that permission is a prerequisite for a valid exchange.

The respondents failed to explain the drastic difference in land size exchanged, raising suspicions about the exchange's genuineness. The exchange deed also lacked mutuality in mutation, undermining its validity.

The U.P. ZA & LR Act is a beneficial legislation to safeguard rural interests. The exchange deed dated 16.03.1994 being in contravention to the Act is void. No justification exists to consider respondents' requests based on their hotel operations or equity. The High Court's interpretation is contrary to the Act and constitutional empowerment provisions, thus unsustainable.

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging breach of trust in a charitable medical trust created for public purposes. They claimed that the trust's objects were not being fulfilled, the trustees were mismanaging the trust, and the trust was being treated as a private family trust. The appellants sought various reliefs, including the framing of a proper scheme for administration and the appointment of qualified medical professionals as trustees.

Issues:

Whether the suit filed by the appellants falls within the ambit of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Whether the reliefs sought in the suit were for vindicating public rights or personal/private rights of the plaintiffs.

Held:

The Court examined the conditions of Section 92: (i) the trust must be created for public charitable or religious purposes; (ii) there must be a breach of trust or a need for court direction in the trust's administration; and (iii) the reliefs claimed must be those enumerated in the section. The Court noted that the trust was created for public charitable purposes and that the second condition was met as the appellants alleged mismanagement and breach of trust. The Court analyzed the reliefs sought and found that the principal relief sought the framing of a proper scheme of administration, involving trustees from the medical profession and the public. The Court held that this relief aimed to achieve the trust's charitable objectives and was not a vindication of personal rights.

The Court referred to the case of Sugra Bibi vs. Hazi Kummu Mia, wherein it was held that the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff indicate whether the suit is brought in a representative capacity on behalf of beneficiaries. Applying this principle, the Court concluded that the suit was indeed brought by the appellants in a representative capacity to protect the trust's public charitable objectives.

Facts:

The appellant-wife and respondent-husband were parties to the case. They had previously initiated proceedings against each other. The wife sought the restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, while the husband sought dissolution of their marriage under Section 13 of the Act. The Trial Court dismissed the husband's petition, and the First Appellate Court affirmed this decision. Subsequently, the High Court allowed the husband's Second Appeal and dissolved the marriage, primarily based on a criminal complaint filed by the wife.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's conclusion of mental cruelty based on the criminal case was justified.

Whether the lower courts' judgments dismissing the divorce petition were sustainable.

Whether the criminal prosecution's acquittal could form a basis for granting divorce.

Whether the lower courts' judgments were perverse.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court. It observed that the questions did not qualify as substantial questions of law as they essentially sought to re-appreciate the evidence. The Court emphasized that the husband's original petition for dissolution of marriage was not based on the criminal case, but rather on the wife's alleged intemperate behavior. The Court found that the High Court was not justified in granting divorce based on a different ground than what the husband initially presented. The Court restored the decisions of the lower courts, dismissing the husband's divorce petition and upholding the wife's petition for restitution of conjugal rights. The Court also noted that considering the parties' background, the minor child, and the nature of the differences, dissolution of marriage was not justified.

Facts:

The appellants were Deputy General Managers in Canara Bank, accused of causing wrongful loss to a complainant in a loan transaction. The complainant's loan was classified as a 'Non-Performing Asset' (NPA), leading to auction proceedings for a secured asset. The complainant alleged under-valuation of the property and challenged auction notices in various legal forums.

Issues:

Whether the complainant's allegations against the appellants merit a criminal complaint and investigation, given the recourse available under the SARFAESI Act for addressing grievances related to loan transactions and auction proceedings.

Held:

The Court, after reviewing the facts and legal provisions, observed that the SARFAESI Act is a comprehensive legal framework that regulates the actions of secured creditors like banks, including the process of auctioning secured assets. It notes that the Act provides remedies and forums for addressing disputes and grievances related to loan transactions and auctions. The Court also highlighted the principle that the power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases.

The Court refers to a previous writ petition filed by the complainant challenging an auction notice and highlights that the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court had considered the matter and rejected the complainant's contentions, while affirming the recourse available under the SARFAESI Act.( Para 10)

The Court further emphasizes that the SARFAESI Act is not immune to challenge or questioning, as it provides checks and balances. The Court cites a relevant decision that indicates the powers of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) to set aside actions taken by secured creditors, thereby validating the avenues for addressing disputes.( Para 17)

The Court observes that the present complaint and investigation initiated by the complainant appear to be an intimidatory tactic and an abuse of process, especially given that the complainant had previously pursued legal remedies and failed to diligently avail the available avenues under the SARFAESI Act.( Para 18)

Decision: The Court quashes the complaint, order, and FIR against the appellants, citing that the proceedings initiated are not justified in light of the available legal avenues for addressing the grievances. The Court allows the complainant to pursue remedies under the SARFAESI Act if desired and allows the appeal.