Facts:

The case involved the sale of secured assets by a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act.

The auction sale was challenged on the grounds that the consideration money did not reflect the correct value of the secured assets.

Issues:

Whether the sale of secured assets by a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act can be controlled by the company court or the official liquidator.

Whether the auction sale was conducted fairly and whether the consideration money reflected the correct value of the secured assets.

Held:

The SARFAESI Act is a complete code in itself and does not require supplementation from the Companies Act. The necessary provisions from the Companies Act have already been incorporated into the SARFAESI Act to harmonize the two legislations.

The involvement of the official liquidator in the sale process is mandated by express provisions of the SARFAESI Act and Rules, not to supply any omission in the SARFAESI Act but because of explicit provisions therein.

The Parliament's clear intention expressed in Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act is that a secured creditor has the right to enforce its security interest without court intervention. However, the Act provides mechanisms for redressal of grievances by borrowers, including companies under liquidation.

The sale confirmed in favor of the auction purchaser was upheld as valid. No illegality or irregularity was established against the conduct of the auction. The offer made during the auction was fair, and the sale was conducted in a competitive and transparent manner.

Fluctuations in property prices do not warrant reopening a confirmed sale unless there are compelling reasons to do so. Once a sale is confirmed and possession is delivered to the purchaser, it should not be disturbed without valid cause.

Decision: The appeals were disposed of, affirming the validity of the auction sale conducted under the SARFAESI Act.

Facts:

The appellant, Pramod, challenged the denial of his appointment to the post of Principal in a private Polytechnic Institution administered by Shri Shiva Ji Education Society.

The core issue revolved around whether the appellant, as the senior-most lecturer, was entitled to be considered for appointment to the post of Principal as required by Rule 3 of the MEPS Rules.

The appellant had been working at the institution since 1977 and fulfilled the qualifications for the post. Despite this, he was denied promotion to the Principal's position, leading to legal proceedings.

The High Court ruled against the appellant, stating that appointment to the post of Principal could also be made by nomination or direct recruitment, not solely by promotion. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the senior-most lecturer, was entitled to be considered for appointment to the post of Principal by promotion in accordance with Rule 3 of the MEPS Rules.

The applicability of the Government Rules 2012 to private polytechnics like the respondent institution.

The determination of the appellant's superannuation age and its impact on the case.

Held:

The Court held that the MEPS Rules, being statutory, could not be ignored, and Rule 3(3) mandated the appointment of the senior-most member of the teaching staff as Principal. The Court emphasized that the Government Rules 2012 did not apply to private polytechnics like the respondent institution.

The Court addressed the issue of the appellant's superannuation age, noting discrepancies and lack of clarity in the applicable regulations. Despite this, the Court ordered the immediate reinstatement of the appellant within two weeks and directed his appointment as Principal by promotion within four weeks.

The appellant was deemed to have been appointed Principal from December 1, 2012, and entitled to all consequential benefits. Additionally, the Court awarded costs of Rs. 50,000 to the appellant, payable by the respondent society.

Facts:

The state of Kerala aimed to achieve a liquor-free environment through various measures, including control over manufacture, wholesale and retail supply, and consumption. The policy included restrictions on public consumption of alcohol.

Issues:

Whether the exclusion of five-star hotels from the ban on serving alcohol in their bars is constitutionally valid under Article 14 and Article 47.

Held

The state's policy consists of three elements: control over manufacture, wholesale and retail supply, and consumption of alcohol. The policy is aimed at curbing alcohol consumption, which is disproportionately high in Kerala compared to other states.

Article 14 allows for reasonable classifications, and Article 47 imposes a responsibility on state governments to contain or curtail alcohol consumption. The policy to ban public consumption of alcohol except in five-star hotels is encouraged by the court.

The court found the classification of hotels based on star ratings reasonable and not arbitrary. The exemption for five-star hotels from the ban on public consumption of alcohol is justified, particularly considering tourism considerations.

Judicial review of state policy should only occur if it is arbitrary, unfair, or violates fundamental rights. Courts should give reasonable time for state policies to be effective.

The state should review its policy if there is an increase in alcohol consumption or laxity in enforcement. The court also noted the socio-economic impact of the policy, including job losses in the bar industry.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, upholding the state's policy on alcohol consumption, including the exemption for five-star hotels.

Facts:

The case pertains to the issuance of Government Order (G.O.) No. 118 dated May 23, 2006, by the Tamil Nadu government, which stated that any Hindu possessing the required qualifications and training could be appointed as an Archaka in Hindu temples.

Issues:

The primary issue before the court was the validity of G.O. No. 118 dated May 23, 2006, and whether appointments of Archakas should be made in accordance with the Agamas, subject to conformity with constitutional mandates and principles.

Held:

The court held that appointments of Archakas should be made in accordance with the Agamas, subject to their due identification and conformity with constitutional mandates and principles.

The rights guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution are circumscribed and to be enjoyed within constitutionally permissible parameters. The court clarified that it is within its duty as the Constitutional arbiter to determine whether a belief or practice claimed is a fundamental part of religious practice.

The validity of the G.O. depends on whether the prescriptions under a particular Agama or Agamas are contrary to any constitutional mandate. The court highlighted that the blanket fiat of the G.O. allowing any Hindu possessing the requisite qualification to be appointed as an Archaka may potentially violate constitutional principles.

The court rejected the argument that the writ petitions were not maintainable, stating that the institution of a writ proceeding does not need to await actual prejudice. The issue raised concerns religious faith and practice, which is of public interest.

Facts:

The informant alleged that her father-in-law and husband were murdered at their house by several assailants.

Charges were filed against multiple accused under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and Arms Act.

The Trial Court convicted the accused, while the High Court acquitted one and upheld the conviction of the others.

Appeals were filed challenging the High Court's judgment.

Issues:

Whether the convictions and sentences imposed by the Trial Court were justified.

Whether the acquittal of one accused and the convictions of the others by the High Court were proper.

Whether there were procedural irregularities in the filing of the FIR and inquest report.

Held:

The Court, after thorough examination, upheld the High Court's judgment and dismissed the appeals. It found that while there were discrepancies in the initial statements regarding one of the accused, the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the guilt of the others.

The Court also addressed arguments for enhancement of sentences but declined to intervene, considering the principles of criminal jurisprudence and the circumstances of the case.

Facts:

The appellant, Gautam Kundu, filed a bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. while facing prosecution under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Simultaneously, proceedings under Section 24 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act) were pending.

Issues:

Whether the conditions for grant of bail specified in Section 45 of PMLA override the provisions of Section 439 Cr.P.C., especially when there are pending proceedings under SEBI Act.

Held:

The court held that PMLA is a special statute enacted by the Parliament to address the offence of money laundering, and its provisions prevail over the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as per Section 5 of Cr.P.C..

Section 45 of PMLA, starting with a non-obstante clause, mandates two conditions for granting bail in cases where the accused faces imprisonment for more than three years under Part-A of the Schedule of PMLA. These conditions include giving the prosecutor an opportunity to oppose bail and satisfying the court that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and will not commit an offence while on bail.

The court emphasized that the conditions specified under Section 45 of PMLA are mandatory and must be complied with, as reinforced by other provisions like Sections 65 and 71 of PMLA. Even if the bail application is made under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., these conditions apply.

Additionally, Section 24 of the SEBI Act presumes that proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering unless proved otherwise, shifting the burden of proof onto the appellant.

The court affirmed that the conditions laid down under Section 45 of PMLA bind the High Court, even when considering bail applications under Section 439 Cr.P.C..

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the High Court to refuse bail, considering the circumstances and the mandatory conditions specified under Section 45 of PMLA.

Facts:

The case involved the acquisition of land in Vijayashreepura village under the Mysore Improvement Act, 1903. The acquisition and subsequent allotment of land to respondent No. 28 were challenged by the appellant.

Issues:

The legality and validity of the acquisition process, including procedural irregularities and the legality of the land allotment to respondent No. 28.

Held:

The Court held that the mandatory requirement of having a development scheme in place before the publication of a preliminary notification under Section 16(1) of the Mysore Improvement Act, 1903, was not followed.

Furthermore, there was a clear infringement of the mandatory requirement under Section 18 of the Act, as the acquisition process did not obtain the necessary sanction from the government.

The Court found that the sequence of events demonstrated state action that did not conform to the requirements of the law.

Despite procedural irregularities, a substantial development, including an academic campus, had taken place on the allotted land. Therefore, the Court balanced the equities by directing respondent No. 28 to surrender a minimum of 15 acres of land to MUDA.

Compensation for the remaining 40 acres of allotted land was to be determined based on the Land Acquisition Act, with the compensation date set as the midway point between relevant dates.

The Court emphasized that delay in approaching the court should not prevent the adjudication of a writ petition on its merits. The High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not bound by strict rules of limitation.

Facts:

The accused confessed to killing his wife and daughter.

The Trial Court convicted him based on evidence including eyewitness testimonies and recovery of weapons.

The High Court acquitted the accused, finding the prosecution's case lacking.

Issues:

Motive: The prosecution claimed the accused had a motive to kill his wife and daughter, but the evidence presented was deemed insufficient and hearsay.

Eyewitness Testimonies: The credibility of eyewitnesses, particularly PW1 and PW4, was questioned due to inconsistencies and contradictions in their testimonies.

Ante-timed FIR: The timing and circumstances of the FIR lodged by PW1 were questioned, raising doubts about its authenticity.

Confessional FIR: The accused claimed the FIR was coerced and ante-timed, casting doubt on its reliability as evidence.

Held:

In a detailed analysis of the issues, the Court found flaws in the prosecution's case. It highlighted inconsistencies in testimonies, lack of corroborative evidence, and procedural irregularities.

The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Upholding the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the acquittal of the accused.

The judgment emphasizes the importance of evidence and procedural integrity in criminal cases, thus reiterating the principle that guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts:

The Supreme Court issued directives on 9th October 2015 aimed at reducing pollution levels in Delhi. These directives included diversion of commercial traffic, imposition of ECC, and restrictions on the entry of vehicles not bound for Delhi. However, despite these measures, pollution levels remained high.

Issues:

The ineffective enforcement of directives aimed at diverting non-Delhi bound vehicles and reducing pollution levels in Delhi.

Additionally, there were concerns regarding the compliance of vehicles with pollution control standards and the management of construction activities and solid waste disposal contributing to pollution.

Held:

The court clarified that vehicles not bound for Delhi should be diverted through alternative routes and should not be allowed to enter Delhi, especially from National Highway-8 and National Highway-1 entry points. Vehicles bound for Delhi were subject to ECC, with loaded vehicles paying twice the prescribed ECC. Older vehicles not compliant with pollution standards were prohibited from entering Delhi. The court also banned the registration of private cars and SUVs with diesel engines of 2000 cc and above until March 31, 2016. Taxis operating in Delhi were directed to transition to CNG by March 1, 2016.

The government was tasked with road maintenance, pavement repair, and procurement of vacuum cleaning vehicles. Strict enforcement of CPCB rules for construction activities and waste management was mandated. These measures were deemed necessary to address the severe pollution crisis in Delhi.