Facts:

Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. was involved in the execution of a foreign decree from a reciprocating country in India. The question before the court was related to the period of limitation for executing such a foreign decree and the interpretation of Section 44A of the CPC.

Issues:

Does Section 44A of the CPC only provide for the manner of execution of foreign decrees or does it also indicate the period of limitation for filing execution proceedings?

What is the period of limitation for executing a foreign decree passed by a court from a reciprocating country in India?

From which date does the period of limitation start running for executing a foreign decree passed in a reciprocating country and sought to be executed in India?

Held:

Issue 1 - Section 44A of the CPC: The court concluded that Section 44A of the CPC is only an enabling provision empowering the District Court to execute a foreign decree as if it were an Indian decree. It does not deal with the period of limitation. Section 44A empowers the District Court to execute the foreign decree and provides that Section 47 of the CPC applies from the date of filing the certified copy of the decree. The section sets the procedure for execution but does not indicate the period of limitation for filing an execution petition. [Para 19, 20, 21]

Issue 2 - Limitation for Executing Foreign Decree: The court held that the limitation period for executing a foreign decree passed by a court from a reciprocating country in India would be as prescribed in the reciprocating foreign country. This is subject to the decree being executable under Section 13 of the CPC. The court emphasized that the law of limitation is substantive and not merely procedural, and the foreign decree's limitation law should apply. [Para 31, 33, 34, 35]

Issue 3 - Starting Date of Limitation: The court explained two situations: if the decree-holder doesn't take steps to execute the decree in the cause country within the prescribed limitation period there, they cannot execute the decree in India later. The period of limitation starts from the date the decree was passed in the cause country. However, if the decree-holder initiates execution proceedings in the cause country, the right to apply under Section 44A accrues only after those proceedings are finalized. In such cases, the decree-holder can file a petition for execution in India within three years from the completion of execution proceedings in the cause country. [Para 40, 41, 42, 43]

Facts:

The Bengaluru Development Authority (BDA) sought environmental clearance for its Peripheral Ring Road (PRR) Project. The National Green Tribunal (NGT) invalidated the environmental clearance, citing outdated data in the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) report, which was based on primary data collected more than three years before submission to the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority.

Issues:

Whether the process leading to the environmental clearance for the PRR Project suffered from due process failures.

Whether the State Expert Appraisal Committee (SEAC) failed in its role and function during the evaluation of the project's environmental impact.

Held:

The court noted a failure of due process in the environmental clearance process, starting from the issuance of outdated Terms of Reference (ToR) for the project. The appellant (BDA) relied on expired ToR and prepared the EIA report using outdated primary data. Additionally, contradictions regarding forest land and tree felling numbers were observed in the clearance process. The SEAC's reliance solely on the appellant's submissions and non-compliance with Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MOEF-CC) guidelines were criticized.

The protection of the environment is rooted in robust institutional frameworks, responsive decision-making, and the rule of law. Environmental governance aligns with constitutional values and the right to life under Article 21. The court emphasized the balance between development and environment.

Due process failure occurred from ToR issuance to the grant of environmental clearance. Reliance on expired ToR and outdated data for the EIA report, along with contradictions in the clearance process, were noted.

SEAC abdicated its role by relying solely on appellant's submissions and not adhering to MOEF-CC guidelines. Inadequate reasoning for recommending environmental clearance was a failure to fulfill its duty under the 2006 Notification.

Balancing infrastructure development and environmental concerns is essential. The appeal, filed in 2015 and concluded in 2019, highlighted the need for timely proceedings.

Directions under Article 142 of the Constitution were issued, including the appellant conducting a fresh rapid EIA with an accredited consultant, addressing deficiencies, obtaining necessary clearances, SEAC assessment, and ensuring no damage to petroleum pipelines.

The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involves appeals by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (Appellant) and Anil Padegaonkar (Respondent) against a common order in a writ appeal. The Corporation is aggrieved by the order setting aside the punishment due to issues related to the issuance of the charge-sheet. The employee is aggrieved by the grant of liberty for a fresh charge-sheet and denial of back wages upon reinstatement, especially since the employee had reached the age of superannuation.

Issues:

Whether the charge-sheet was issued by the appropriate disciplinary authority.

Whether the term "Competent Authority" includes a disciplinary authority authorized by the delegation of authority manual.

Whether the punishment of the employee was dismissal or discharge.

Held:

The court examined the definitions of various terms within the rules, such as "Functional Manager," "Disciplinary Authority," and "Competent Authority." The court concluded that the term "Competent Authority" could include a disciplinary authority authorized by the delegation of authority manual. The court held that the charge-sheet had been issued by an authority competent to do so, upholding the order of discharge. The direction to issue a fresh charge-sheet was set aside, rendering the question of reinstatement and back wages under the second charge-sheet academic and irrelevant.

The Corporation's appeal was allowed, while the employee's appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute concerning the interpretation of Section 37 of the Architects Act, 1972. The primary issue was whether individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture were prohibited from practicing architectural activities or merely from using the title "Architect." The case also examined whether government posts titled as "Architect" or similar titles could be held by individuals not registered as architects.

Issues:

The scope and extent of the prohibition imposed by Section 37 of the Architects Act on unregistered individuals regarding the use of the title "Architect" and their engagement in architectural activities.

Involved assessing whether individuals not registered as architects could occupy government posts with titles that incorporate the term "Architect" or similar styles.

Held:

Issue 1: The Court observed that Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibits individuals from using the title and style of "Architect." However, a distinction was drawn between the use of the title and actual architectural practice. The legislative intent was to protect the title "Architect" while allowing non-registered individuals to undertake architectural activities without using the title. The Court referred to the legislative history, including the Statement of Objects and Reasons, to support this interpretation. (Para 26-30)

Issue 2: The Court ruled that if an individual holds a government post with a title such as "Associate Architect" or "Architect," it implies the use of the title "Architect." Such a person would likely be assumed to be registered under the Architects Act and possessing a recognized architectural degree. Promoting individuals without the required qualifications to such posts using the title "Architect" would violate the prohibition outlined in Section 37. (Para 36-37)

Delegated Legislation and Primary Legislation: The Court highlighted the principle that when there is a conflict between primary legislation (Architects Act) and delegated legislation (Promotion Policy 2005), the provisions of the primary legislation prevail. (Para 38)

Facts:

The State of Rajasthan established welfare schemes for building and construction workers under the 1996 Act. One such scheme provided financial assistance for the marriage of beneficiaries' daughters. Kesar Lal, the respondent, applied for this financial aid but faced rejection.

Issues:

Whether the definition of "consumer" includes beneficiaries of a statutory welfare scheme.

Whether the functions of the Welfare Board fall within the definition of "service" under the Consumer Protection Act.

Held:

The court analyzed the definitions of "consumer" and "service" under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It observed that the first component of the definition of "consumer" includes any person who hires or avails of a service for consideration, while the second component includes beneficiaries of the service approved by the person availing the service. The term "beneficiary" was defined in the 1996 Act, and "fund" referred to the Welfare Fund established by the Board. The court ruled that workers registered under the Act are beneficiaries of the service provided by the Board and that the services were not rendered free of charge, making them amenable to redressal under the Consumer Protection Act.

The court held that the functions of the Welfare Board fell within the definition of "service" as provided by the Consumer Protection Act. The court emphasized the importance of public accountability for public authorities providing welfare services and underscored that registered workers contributed to the Welfare Fund, making the services non-free of charge.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the NCDRC's decision to award the claim to the respondent, with certain modifications to the rate of interest.

Facts:

The dispute arises from a practice in Punjab where government agencies allocate paddy for custom milling to rice mills, which then supply processed rice to FCI. Quality issues led to an investigation by the CBI, resulting in blacklisting and recommendations for banning defaulting rice millers from the allocation process. In response, the defaulting millers allegedly leased their mills to new entities to evade the ban. These lease agreements were unregistered.

Issues:

Whether the new lessees of blacklisted rice mills are entitled to allocation of paddy for custom milling, given the unregistered lease agreements and the attempt to evade blacklisting.

Held:

The Supreme Court rules that the unregistered lease agreements do not satisfy the requirements of Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908, and therefore cannot be accepted as evidence of a valid transfer of possessory rights. The Court acknowledges the FCI's argument that these agreements were likely executed to escape liabilities and, while the question of intent is a factual one, the High Court should not have opined on the legal sufficiency of the lease deeds. The Court holds that even if a proprietorship/partnership firm takes over a defaulting mill, it cannot claim allocation of paddy without settling the previous liabilities. Consequently, the Court sets aside the High Court's decision and dismisses the writ petitions filed by the respondent-lessees. However, it grants them the liberty to pay dues with penalty/interest of the original rice millers and seek allocation of paddy after obtaining a 'No Dues Certificate' from the original millers.

Facts:

The deceased employee was driving a truck for his employer from Ambala to Meerut. On a hot day, he went to a canal to fetch water and bathe, but tragically slipped into the canal and died. The deceased's legal heirs claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

Issues:

Whether the death of the deceased employee occurred during the course of his employment and whether it arose out of the employment.

Held:

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court analyzed the concept of "notional extension" of the employer's premises, which includes the area a worker passes through while traveling to and leaving the workplace. The Court referred to precedent cases like Manju Sarkar & Ors. vs. Mabish Miah & Ors. and Daya Kishan Joshi & Anr. vs. Dynemech Systems Pvt. Ltd. to emphasize the application of the theory of notional extension.

The Court held that in extreme heat, the deceased's actions of going to the canal to fetch water and refresh himself were incidental to his employment. Given the need to keep the truck cool, ensure a safe journey, and protect his own life by staying fresh, the Court deemed the actions to fall within the scope of notional extension. Therefore, the death was held to have arisen out of and during the course of employment.

Decision: The High Court's decision was set aside, and the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was restored. The Court directed that the compensation payments be made to the deceased's legal heirs within six weeks. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur, and M/S Universal Ferro & Allied Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. The respondent is a 100% EOU engaged in the manufacture/processing of Ferro Manganese and Silicon Manganese. The Revenue alleged that the respondent engaged in job work converting raw materials supplied by TISCO. A show cause notice was issued, claiming violations of Circulars related to job work permissions.

Issues:

Whether the transactions between the respondent and TISCO can be classified as "sales" and whether they violate the provisions of the EXIM Policy.

Whether the duty exemptions applicable to goods produced by EOUs apply to the present case.

Held:

Issue 1: Classification as "Sales" and Compliance with EXIM Policy The court examined the definition of "sale" and "purchase" under the Central Excise Act and ruled that these terms should be construed more broadly in the context of the Act than under the Sale of Goods Act. The court rejected the argument that the transactions were not "sales" due to the absence of property transfer. It found that the transactions met the criteria of transfer of possession for valuable consideration, thus qualifying as "sales" under the Act.

The court also analyzed the relevant provisions of the EXIM Policy, including paragraphs 9.9(b), 9.17(b), and 9.20. It concluded that the respondent was entitled to undertake job work for TISCO as per the permission from the Development Commissioner. The circulars issued by the Board, including the one dated 22.5.2000, supported the respondent's eligibility for job work under the applicable exemptions.

Issue 2: Applicability of Duty Exemptions to EOUs The court discussed the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Central Excise Act and the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 5A. It clarified that while the latter provision limited the Central Government's power to grant exemptions to EOUs, the amendments did not render the relevant exemption notifications invalid. The court concluded that the exemption notification (No.21/97-C.E.) specifically applied to goods produced by EOUs and sold in India as per EXIM Policy provisions.

Conclusion: The court held that the respondent was entitled to carry out job work for TISCO and avail of duty exemptions. It rejected the Revenue's arguments and upheld the decision of the CESTAT that dismissed the Revenue's appeal.

Facts:

The appellant (Amyra Dwivedi's mother) filed a petition for custody of her child. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, dismissed the custody petition but granted the appellant visitation rights under specific conditions.

Issues:

Whether the granted visitation rights were in the best interest of the child's welfare.

The adequacy and appropriateness of the conditions under which the visitation was allowed.

Held:

The Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the granted visitation rights. The Court reiterated the principle that the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration in custody matters, as established in the case of Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan, (2020) AIR SC 577 (Para 4).

The Court emphasized that visitation rights should facilitate a comfortable and natural interaction between the child and the visiting parent. It noted that such an atmosphere could not be created in the office of the District Legal Services Authority, where the visitation was initially directed to take place (Para 5).

Based on the child's circumstances and needs, the Court issued revised directions for visitation and contact rights. These included specific timings, weekends, festivals, summer vacations, and provisions for school functions.The Court granted the appellant the right to attend school functions and participate in the child's education. The school was instructed to recognize her as the child's parent and afford her the same privileges as other parents (Para 6).

The Court acknowledged the appellant's right to seek custody under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and allowed for potential adjustments in visitation rights during the custody petition's pendency (Para 7).