Facts:

The case involves a civil appeal regarding the amendment of pay scales for employees, specifically within the Prosecution Department. The respondent, Vijay Shankar Dubey, was initially appointed as an Assistant Public Officer and was later promoted to the position of Joint Director, Prosecution. The Fifth Pay Commission recommended revised pay scales, and the pay scale for the post of Joint Director, Prosecution, was increased from Rs. 3700-5000 to Rs. 12000-16500.

Issues:

Whether the cut-off date of April 1, 2001, for the amendment of pay scales was rational and valid.

Whether the respondent, who retired on January 31, 1997, was entitled to the benefit of the higher pay scale from January 1, 1996.

Held:

The Supreme Court considered arguments from both sides and concluded that the decision to fix the cut-off date for the benefit of amended pay scales was rational. The decision was based on the analogy of the CBI organization's pay scales. The Court held that when a benefit is extended for the first time, the State can set a reasonable cut-off date. The Court found that it was not obligatory for the State to extend the benefit based on the Fifth Pay Commission's recommendations, dated January 1, 1996. As the respondent was not covered by the Government order dated 02.02.2007 and had retired before the implementation date, the Court held that he was not entitled to the benefit of the amendment in the pay scale.

Facts:

The appellant, Ex-Gunner Virender Prasad, was found guilty of murdering Gunner-Sushil Kumar while posted in a sensitive area during a time of heightened terrorist threats. The appellant claimed he had shot the deceased under the belief of a militant attack.

Issues:

Whether Section 433-A of the CrPC applies to a case tried under Section 69 of the Army Act, regarding the minimum imprisonment term before release for a life convict.

To determine an appropriate sentence for the appellant considering factors such as the nature of the offence, circumstances, prior criminal record, age of the offender, rehabilitation prospects, and community needs.

Held:

The Court confirmed the appellant's guilt but focused on the sentence.

The Court referred to previous cases, such as Santa Singh v. The State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190, which established that a proper sentence involves considering multiple factors.

The Court acknowledged that Section 433-A of the CrPC, which mandates a minimum imprisonment term before release for life convicts, applies to cases under Section 69 of the Army Act. However, the appellant had already served over 16 years and 6 months in prison, exceeding the 14-year requirement.

Taking into account the appellant's conduct, the circumstances, and the time served, the Court found that the sentence served was proportionate to the offence. As a result, the Court ordered the appellant's immediate release.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's release was directed.

Facts:

On 21st April, 2007, during a marriage ceremony, the appellant fired celebratory gunshots that resulted in injuries to five individuals, leading to the deaths of two. The appellant's defense was accidental firing caused by a ball hitting the gun. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's act constituted 'culpable homicide' or 'murder'?

Whether celebratory firing with unintended consequences falls under Section 304 Part-2 of the IPC?

Held:

The appellant's act of firing towards the roof during the marriage ceremony, although unintentional, was found to be an act of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 of the IPC, punishable under Section 304 Part-2. The appellant carried a loaded gun in a crowded event, aiming towards the roof, which resulted in injuries and fatalities. While he may not have intended to kill, his actions invited risk and likely consequences. The sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC was reduced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment, and the conviction under Section 307 IPC was altered to Section 308 IPC. The fine remained unchanged.

The Court referred to the case of Kunwar Pal vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2014) 12 SCC 434, wherein the intention to kill was not proven, and the accused was given the benefit of doubt, resulting in a lesser conviction.

Facts:

A notice inviting tender was issued by the appellant, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (BCCL), for hiring Heavy Earth Moving Machinery (HEMM) for coal extraction and transportation. The bidding was conducted online, and technical issues led to connectivity problems during the auction. The last bid by respondent No. 1 went unresponded for thirty minutes, resulting in the auction's automatic closure. The auction was later restarted due to technical issues and communicated to all bidders. Respondent No. 6 was ultimately declared the successful bidder.

Issues:

The scope of judicial review in tender matters.

Allegations of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.

Whether larger public interest was affected by the auction process.

The existence of technical problems and connectivity issues during the auction.

Interpretation of contractual terms and authority's decision-making process.

Held:

The scope of judicial review in tenders has been extensively discussed. Courts are concerned with lawfulness, not soundness, of decisions. Allegations of illegality and procedural impropriety warrant judicial intervention. The decision-making process is subject to scrutiny, but not the end result.

Writs are appropriate remedies when a constitutional right is infringed, such as treating all equally or challenging actions in contravention to trade and commerce freedom. Writs are impermissible when allegations concern contractual rights or duties.

The Division Bench of the High Court failed to evaluate whether larger public interest was affected. Respondent No. 1's interest was private and monetary, not a public law right.

After an inquiry report by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), it was clear that BCCL and others acted bona fide. Technical issues and connectivity problems were established, and no fraudulent decisions were proven .

The Division Bench erred in holding no technical difficulties existed, contrary to the findings of various entities. Multiple bids were received after the resumption of the auction process, indicating technical issues

The uniform communication about the extension of the auction time placed all bidders on equal footing. Respondent No. 1's interpretation was moot since they did not object to the email's wording during the resumed auction .

Courts must defer to the authority's interpretation of contractual terms unless it is patently perverse or mala fide. BCCL's interpretation was plausible, and mere differences in interpretation are not grounds for finding illegality.

FACTS:

The appellant, Jeetendra, had been in custody since January 5, 2019, under charges related to Sections 420, 177, 181, 193, 200, and 120-B of the IPC.

An earlier case was filed by the appellant's wife, which led to his arrest. He was released on bail after the matrimonial dispute was resolved.

A new complaint was filed alleging forgery of documents submitted as personal bond for the appellant's release in the previous case.

A closure report was filed, but further investigation was ordered by a Judicial Magistrate after five years.

ISSUES:

The appellant's bail application was rejected by the High Court based on the pending acceptance of the closure report.

The appellant contended that bail should be granted as per the principles of "Bail is rule and jail is exception."

HELD:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the grant or rejection of bail should not be mechanical as it concerns an individual's liberty. In this specific case, where a closure report had been filed twice and the examination of witnesses was linked to the fate of the report, the High Court's denial of bail was not appropriate. (Paragraph 7)

The Court reiterated the principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and, considering the nature of the allegations and the time spent in custody, the appellant deserved to be released on bail. (Paragraph 7)

The High Court's order was set aside, and the interim bail granted earlier was made absolute. The appellant was to be released on regular bail, based on the bail bonds already furnished. The appeal is allowed. (Paragraph 8)

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1, a judicial officer, was appointed as Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate. During the probationary period, allegations of misdemeanour and corruption in discharge of judicial functions were received. The Registrar (Vigilance) of the Rajasthan High Court submitted a report detailing these allegations. The Full Court evaluated probationary judges' suitability, based on integrity, knowledge, conduct, and behaviour. Respondent No. 1's services were not confirmed based on overall assessment.

ISSUES:

• Whether the termination during the probationary period was punitive or due to unsatisfactory performance?

• Whether specific allegations or overall performance were the basis for the termination?

• Whether principles of natural justice apply in this case of non-confirmation?

HELD:

The purpose of probation is to evaluate suitability for a position, and probationers do not have an indefeasible right to continue in employment.

The High Court's role in judicial review of administrative decisions is cautious and should not substitute for an appellate role.

Termination based on overall performance during probation, rather than specific misconduct, may not be treated as punitive.

In this case, the termination was based on an overall assessment of performance, not specific misconduct.

The Court can consider overall suitability and relevant factors when assessing probationers' performance.

DECISION:

The appeals are allowed. The High Court's judgment is set aside, and the order of discharge of Respondent No. 1's services during probation is approved.

FACTS:

The case involved the West Bengal Small Industries Development Corporation Ltd. as the appellant and M/S. Sona Promoters Pvt. Ltd. as the respondent.

The dispute centered around whether the eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against the respondent were valid under the West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976.

The Corporation leased out three plots of land to the respondent, which did not have any structures on them.

The issue was whether these leased plots of land constituted "Government premises" under the Act and whether the eviction proceedings were legally justified.

ISSUES:

Whether the leased plots of land without any structures were considered "Government premises" as defined by the West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976.

Whether the eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against the respondent were valid under the Act.

HELD:

The Corporation is a government undertaking as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act.

However, the leased plots of land without any structures do not meet the criteria for "Government premises" as defined in Section 2(a) read with Section 2(c) of the Act.

The Act's definition of "premises" includes various structures, and since the leased plots were bare land without any structures, they do not fall under the category of "Government premises."

Consequently, the eviction proceedings initiated by the Corporation against the respondent under the Act were without jurisdiction.

The Court suggests that the Corporation should pursue eviction under the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1962.

The appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute concerning the interpretation of Section 37 of the Architects Act, 1972. The primary issue was whether individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture were prohibited from practicing architectural activities or merely from using the title "Architect." The case also examined whether government posts titled as "Architect" or similar titles could be held by individuals not registered as architects.

Issues:

The scope and extent of the prohibition imposed by Section 37 of the Architects Act on unregistered individuals regarding the use of the title "Architect" and their engagement in architectural activities.

Involved assessing whether individuals not registered as architects could occupy government posts with titles that incorporate the term "Architect" or similar styles.

Held:

Issue 1: The Court observed that Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibits individuals from using the title and style of "Architect." However, a distinction was drawn between the use of the title and actual architectural practice. The legislative intent was to protect the title "Architect" while allowing non-registered individuals to undertake architectural activities without using the title. The Court referred to the legislative history, including the Statement of Objects and Reasons, to support this interpretation. (Para 26-30)

Issue 2: The Court ruled that if an individual holds a government post with a title such as "Associate Architect" or "Architect," it implies the use of the title "Architect." Such a person would likely be assumed to be registered under the Architects Act and possessing a recognized architectural degree. Promoting individuals without the required qualifications to such posts using the title "Architect" would violate the prohibition outlined in Section 37. (Para 36-37)

Delegated Legislation and Primary Legislation: The Court highlighted the principle that when there is a conflict between primary legislation (Architects Act) and delegated legislation (Promotion Policy 2005), the provisions of the primary legislation prevail. (Para 38)

Facts:

The Bengaluru Development Authority (BDA) sought environmental clearance for its Peripheral Ring Road (PRR) Project. The National Green Tribunal (NGT) invalidated the environmental clearance, citing outdated data in the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) report, which was based on primary data collected more than three years before submission to the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority.

Issues:

Whether the process leading to the environmental clearance for the PRR Project suffered from due process failures.

Whether the State Expert Appraisal Committee (SEAC) failed in its role and function during the evaluation of the project's environmental impact.

Held:

The court noted a failure of due process in the environmental clearance process, starting from the issuance of outdated Terms of Reference (ToR) for the project. The appellant (BDA) relied on expired ToR and prepared the EIA report using outdated primary data. Additionally, contradictions regarding forest land and tree felling numbers were observed in the clearance process. The SEAC's reliance solely on the appellant's submissions and non-compliance with Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MOEF-CC) guidelines were criticized.

The protection of the environment is rooted in robust institutional frameworks, responsive decision-making, and the rule of law. Environmental governance aligns with constitutional values and the right to life under Article 21. The court emphasized the balance between development and environment.

Due process failure occurred from ToR issuance to the grant of environmental clearance. Reliance on expired ToR and outdated data for the EIA report, along with contradictions in the clearance process, were noted.

SEAC abdicated its role by relying solely on appellant's submissions and not adhering to MOEF-CC guidelines. Inadequate reasoning for recommending environmental clearance was a failure to fulfill its duty under the 2006 Notification.

Balancing infrastructure development and environmental concerns is essential. The appeal, filed in 2015 and concluded in 2019, highlighted the need for timely proceedings.

Directions under Article 142 of the Constitution were issued, including the appellant conducting a fresh rapid EIA with an accredited consultant, addressing deficiencies, obtaining necessary clearances, SEAC assessment, and ensuring no damage to petroleum pipelines.

The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.