Facts:

The case involves the provisional arrest of Marie-Emmanuelle Verhoeven based on a request from the Embassy of Chile through a Note Verbale dated September 22, 2015. The petitioner is accused of conspiracy in the assassination of a Chilean Senator.

Issues:

The applicability of the Extradition Act to a foreign state, the binding nature of the Extradition Treaty between India and Chile, the validity of the provisional arrest under Section 34-B of the Act, and the principle of reciprocity in extradition proceedings.

Held:

Establishes that the Government of India considered itself bound by the Extradition Treaty with Chile since 1897-1898. The Extradition Treaty remains in force and binding on both India and Chile.( Paragraph 95)

Confirm that a Red Notice is not a warrant of arrest but is issued to seek the provisional arrest of a wanted person. The absence of a Red Notice does not preclude the Government of India from arresting a fugitive criminal.( Paragraphs 121 and 122)

Dismisses the argument that the petitioner's arrest under Section 34-B could only be made on a request from the foreign State itself, emphasizing that a request from the Embassy of a foreign State is equivalent.( Paragraph 12)

Delve into the principle of reciprocity, stating that it can be invoked even without an extradition treaty. The court affirms that the petitioner could have been validly detained and placed under provisional arrest on a reciprocal basis, irrespective of an Extradition Treaty between India and Chile.( Paragraphs 124, 127, 128, and 129)

Reinforces that the decision on whether the Extradition Act is applicable to a foreign state is a political decision, not subject to judicial review.( Paragraph 130)

Directs the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to decide on the extradition of the petitioner based on the merits of the case and the evidence before him.( Paragraph 137)

Decision: The court dismisses the writ petition and appeal, upholding the validity of the provisional arrest and extradition proceedings against the petitioner.

Facts:

Search and seizure took place on June 22, 1998, in the business premises of the appellant companies.

Notices under Section 158BC(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 were issued in 1999.

The assessing officer issued a direction under Section 142(2A) for a special audit.

Appellants challenged the special audit order through a writ petition, and an interim stay was granted on August 24, 2000.

The High Court quashed the special audit direction but held that the period between August 24, 2000, and December 15, 2006, should be excluded in counting the limitation for block assessment.

Issues:

Calculation of the limitation period for block assessment - from the first search on June 22, 1998, or the last search on August 5, 1998?

Whether the interim stay on special audit (August 24, 2000, to December 15, 2006) should be excluded from the limitation period for block assessment?

The validity of subsequent searches and the requirement for fresh authorization.

Held:

Limitation Period for Block Assessment The court held that the limitation period for block assessment is to be counted from the last date of the search when the search operation was finally concluded, i.e., August 5, 1998. This interpretation is based on Explanation 2 to Section 158BE(2) of the Income Tax Act.

Stay of Assessment Proceedings The court held that the period between August 24, 2000, and December 15, 2006, during which the interim stay on special audit was in operation, should be excluded from the limitation period for block assessment. The special audit was considered an integral part of the assessment proceedings.

Validity of Subsequent Searches The court did not entertain the argument challenging the validity of subsequent searches, as the appellants did not raise this issue in their writ petition.

Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the decision of the High Court. The court determined that the limitation period for block assessment is to be counted from the last date of the search, and the period during the interim stay on special audit should be excluded from the calculation of the limitation period. The court did not entertain the challenge regarding the validity of subsequent searches due to the absence of such a challenge in the writ petition.

Facts:

The appellant, Ashok Kumar Giri, sought reservation under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995. The High Court of Patna, in its impugned order, had rejected the appellant's claim based on the number of vacancies at the time of notification. The issue revolved around the correct calculation of reservation for differently-abled persons.

Issues:

Whether the reservation for differently-abled persons should be computed based on the total vacancies of the cadre or only on the vacancies available in the identified post at the time of notification.

Held:

The Supreme Court, in reference to the case Union of India vs. National Federation of the Blind, clarified that the 3% reservation for differently-abled persons must be calculated based on the cadre strength, not just the vacancies available at the time of notification. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the case back for fresh consideration. The appeal stands disposed of.

Facts:

Balram Yadav filed a Civil Suit in the Family Court seeking a declaration that Fulmaniya Yadav is not his legally married wife.

The High Court held that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction for a negative declaration.

Issues:

Whether the Family Court has jurisdiction over a case seeking a declaration on the validity of marriage and matrimonial status.

The interpretation of Sections 7, 8, and 20 of the Family Courts Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that under Section 7(1) Explanation (b) of the Family Courts Act, the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over suits or proceedings for a declaration regarding the validity of marriage or matrimonial status.Para 7-8

The Court emphasized that it doesn't matter whether the relief sought is affirmative or negative; what's crucial is the declaration concerning matrimonial status.Para 7-8

Section 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, with its overriding effect on other laws, supports the exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts in such matters.Para 6

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The matter was remitted to the High Court to be decided on merits, with a request for expeditious disposal, preferably within six months.Para 8

Facts:

Jivibai, the deceased, was married to the appellant, Harijan Bhala Teja. She was found dead, allegedly murdered by the appellant. The prosecution contended that Teja buried her hastily without informing her family. No post-mortem examination was conducted initially.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's acquittal was justified.

If the view taken by the trial court was against the weight of evidence or perverse.

Whether the evidence proved the charge of murder under Section 302 IPC.

Application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act regarding the burden of proof.

Held:

The High Court, upon re-examining the evidence, found the trial court's order perverse. It concluded that the charge of murder under Section 302 IPC was proved, emphasizing the appellant's hasty burial of the body, lack of information to the police, and medical evidence supporting strangulation. The defense arguments were rejected, including the claim that the fracture of the hyoid bone could be explained by the burial. The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the conviction and life imprisonment.

FACTS:

The appellant, Amal Kumar Jha, was in-charge of Patthalgaon Hospital, District Raigad. The case arose from an incident on 1.1.1995, where an operation was conducted, and the patient subsequently died due to alleged negligence in shifting her to a District Hospital. Charges under section 304-A IPC were framed against the appellant.

ISSUES:

Whether the act of the appellant, in not providing a government vehicle for shifting the patient, was an act in discharge of his official duty.

Whether sanction for prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was required.

HELD:

The allegation against the appellant was of omission in providing a government vehicle for shifting the patient, an act connected to his official duty. The Court held that the refusal was directly and reasonably connected with his official duty, and sanction was required for prosecution under Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. The appellant could not have been prosecuted without sanction. The impugned orders were set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

REFERRED CASES:

Albert West Meads Vs. R., AIR 1948 PC 156

B. Saha Vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177

Baijnath Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1966 SC 220

Bhappa Singh Vs. Ram Pal Singh, 1981 Sup SCC 12

Hori Ram Singh Vs. Crown, 1939 FCR 159

K. Kalimuthu Vs. State by DSP, (2005) 4 SCC 512

Lieutenant Hector Thomas Huntley Vs. King Emperor, 1944 FCR 262

Manorama Tiwari Vs. Surendra Nath Rai, (2016) 1 SCC 594

Matajog Dobey Vs. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44

P. Arulswami Vs. State of Madras, (1967) 1 SCR 201

S.B. Saha Vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177

Sankaran Moitra Vs. Sadhna Das, (2006) 4 SCC 584

Sarjoo Prasad Vs. The King-Emperor, (1945) F.C.R. 227

Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli Vs. The State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 1177

State of H.P. Vs. M.P. Gupta, (2004) 2 SCC 349

State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Sheetla Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617

State of Maharashtra Vs. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao, (1993) 3 SCC 339

State of Orissa Vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC 40

Facts:

The assessee, LTC Limited in Gurgaon, was involved in the hotel business and collected tips from customers, which were then distributed to its employees without deducting taxes. The Assessing Officer treated these tips as income under the 'salary' head and imposed a liability to deduct tax at source under Section 192.

Issues:

Whether Section 192 of the Income Tax Act applied to the tips received by employees, considering that the income in question was chargeable under a head other than 'salaries.'

Held:

Section 192 applies to a person responsible for paying income chargeable under the head 'salaries.' In this case, the entity responsible for paying the employees was not the employer but a third party, i.e., the customer.

If an employee receives income chargeable under a head other than 'salaries,' Section 192 does not apply. Tips received from customers, being income from other sources, do not fall under the ambit of Section 192.

Section 15 distinguishes between salary 'due,' 'paid,' or 'allowed.' Tips, being purely voluntary, do not create a vested right in the employee to claim them from the employer. Section 15(b) is not applicable.

The expression 'allowed' in Section 15 must have reference to the contract of employment. However, tips paid by the employer have no connection with the employment contract.

Section 17 also requires payment by an employer, and the term 'employer' should be understood in the sense used in Section 15.

Decision: The court allowed the appeals of the assessee and dismissed the revenue's appeal, ruling that Section 192 did not apply to the tips received by employees.

Facts:

The appellant, a Private Limited Company, entered into a lease agreement with the respondent Cooperative Society in 1998.

Disputes led the appellant to file a suit in 2000 seeking recovery.

The respondent Cooperative Society was wound up in 2001, and the appellant sought leave to continue the suit under Section 112 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act.

Issues:

The controversy centers around the Registrar's refusal to grant permission based on Section 167, requiring notice before instituting a suit against a society.

Held:

The Registrar's decision to refuse leave based on Section 167 is without jurisdiction.

The nature and scope of the Registrar's powers under Section 112 are limited to considerations related to the winding up of the society.

The Registrar cannot decide on the merits or tenability of the suit; such matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

The question of whether Section 167 is attracted to a particular suit is judicial and must be determined by the Civil Court.

The Registrar is not empowered to hold a suit as untenable, and his role is confined to considerations germane to the grant or refusal of leave.

The order of the Registrar refusing leave on the grounds of lack of notice under Section 167 is set aside.

Facts:

CBI filed a charge sheet against 14 accused persons, including the respondent, under various sections of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The Trial Court deferred taking cognizance initially, believing that a sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act was required.

The Trial Court later, upon clarification from the Investigation Officer, took cognizance. The respondent challenged this as a review.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court's subsequent decision to take cognizance amounted to a review, and if the Special Judge had the power to do so.

Whether prior sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act was required.

Held:

The High Court held that the Trial Court's action amounted to a review, setting aside its order. The Supreme Court disagreed, citing Section 362 of the CrPC, stating that the Trial Court had not passed a final order disposing of the case when it deferred cognizance initially. The Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case back to consider the issue of whether prior sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act was necessary.