Facts:

The prosecution's case revolved around the complainant's report of his three minor children going missing. The accused was seen with the children near their school. The accused was subsequently found missing from his house and village. His location was traced using mobile phone records, leading to his discovery in the house of another individual. The accused eventually led the police to the recovery of the deceased bodies and their school bags.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution successfully proved the involvement of the accused in the murder of the three minor children based on circumstantial evidence?

Whether the sentencing of the accused to death was appropriate given the circumstances of the case?

Held:

Issue 1: The court found that the prosecution effectively established the accused's enmity with the father of the deceased children through witness testimonies. The accused was last seen with the children before they went missing, and the recovery of the bodies based on information provided by the accused further implicated him. (Para 16, 18, 19, 20)

Issue 2: The court considered both aggravating and mitigating circumstances for sentencing. Mitigating factors included the accused's emotional disturbance due to personal issues, lack of criminal antecedents, and family circumstances. The only aggravating circumstance pointed out was the brutal nature of the crime. The court decided to convert the death sentence into life imprisonment, considering the accused's mental state at the time of the crime and the overall balance of circumstances. The court also directed that there should be no remission of the sentence until the accused completes 25 years of imprisonment. The present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. (Para 24, 25.4, 25.5, 25.6, 26)

Facts:

The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Mankastu Impex Private Limited (Appellant) and AirVisual Limited (Respondent). The MOU pertained to the sale and distribution of air quality monitoring products. The arbitration clause in the MOU stated that disputes would be resolved through arbitration administered in Hong Kong.

Issues:

Whether the parties' choice of Hong Kong as the place of arbitration also signified the seat of arbitration?

Whether the laws of India or Hong Kong would govern the arbitration proceedings and judicial review of the award?

Held:

The Court delved into the interpretation of the arbitration clause and the related clauses in the MOU. It noted that the arbitration clause stated that disputes would be "referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered in Hong Kong." This phrase indicated the parties' agreement that the arbitration proceedings would be seated in Hong Kong, and the laws of Hong Kong would apply.

The Court emphasized the distinction between the "place of arbitration" and the "governing law" in the MOU. While the MOU was governed by Indian laws, the arbitration proceedings were seated in Hong Kong as explicitly mentioned in the arbitration clause.

The Court further referenced the importance of the seat of arbitration, which determines applicable laws, arbitration procedure, and judicial review. It noted that the term "place of arbitration" was used to indicate the seat, which indicated the intention of the parties to have Hong Kong as the seat of arbitration.

The Court addressed the argument that Clause 17.1 of the MOU specified the laws of India and New Delhi courts having jurisdiction. It held that this did not affect the application of Hong Kong law to the arbitration proceedings since the parties had chosen Hong Kong as the seat.

As per the Court's interpretation, Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not applicable in this case, as the seat of arbitration was in Hong Kong. The Indian courts lacked jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6).

FACTS:

The erstwhile partnership firm, M/s. Chetak Enterprises, had an agreement with the Government of Rajasthan for road construction and toll collection. The firm was converted into a private limited company under Part IX of the Companies Act before the commencement of the relevant assessment year. The partnership firm had communicated its intention of conversion to the Chief Engineer, and the agreement with the government was executed with this understanding. The company was granted registration, and its properties were vested in it as per Section 575 of the Companies Act.

ISSUES:

• Whether the conversion of the partnership firm into a company met the conditions set by Section 80-IA, including:

• Whether the assessee fulfilled the condition of sub-Section (4)(i)(a) of Section 80-IA regarding ownership by a registered company.

• Whether the assessee fulfilled the condition of sub-Section (4)(i)(b) of Section 80-IA regarding entering into an agreement with the government.

HELD:

The Court analyzed the legal implications of the conversion of the partnership firm into a private limited company and the effect of the agreement with the government. It observed that the company's memorandum of association clearly indicated its intent to continue the partnership business and acquired its assets, movables, immovables, rights, debts, and liabilities. The agreement executed with the government was effectively transferred to the company after conversion. The Court concluded that the conditions of sub-Section (4)(i)(a) and (b) of Section 80-IA were met, as the company was owned by a registered company and had a valid agreement with the government for developing and maintaining the infrastructure facility.

In view of the above, the appeal stands dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant challenged the grant of moderation/grace marks to certain candidates appointed on March 30, 2009, in the context of filling up six posts in the Higher Judicial Service through direct recruitment. The appellant sought his own appointment as a District Judge. The High Court set aside the moderation marks, leading to the recasting of the select list. The appellant was ultimately appointed as a District Judge.

Issues:

The appellant's claim for notional seniority and whether he should be granted seniority from the date of appointment of other candidates who were appointed through the same selection process.

Held:

The appellant was entitled to be appointed along with other candidates. The appellant was excluded from the original appointment due to certain circumstances. As the select list was revised, the appellant was deemed to be part of the appointment along with other candidates.The actual date of the appellant's appointment was recognized as February 24, 2011. Although the appellant couldn't be treated as appointed on March 30, 2009, he was entitled to notional appointment from that earlier date and consequential seniority.( Para 36)

The delay in deciding the seniority claim by the High Court could not defeat the appellant's right to claim seniority from the date other candidates in the same selection process were appointed.( Para 41)

The interpretation of rules and quotas for appointments and seniority was discussed. The Full Bench judgment clarified that there is a quota for in-service candidates, contrary to the High Court's erroneous interpretation.( Para 43)

The argument that some candidates were granted selection grades earlier than the appellant did not confer better legal or equitable rights. Appointments made beyond the prescribed quota meant for appointment by transfer were not protected.( Para 44)

The appeals are allowed

Facts:

Respondent No. 2, not a party to certain court proceedings, filed an RTI application seeking information and certified copies of relevant documents. The Public Information Officer of the Gujarat High Court informed respondent No. 2 that, according to Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, an affidavit stating the grounds for requiring the certified copies was necessary. The Appellate Authority upheld this decision.

In a second appeal, the Chief Information Commissioner directed the Public Information Officer to provide the requested information. Respondent No. 1 (High Court) challenged this order, leading to conflicting decisions between the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench held that when valid rules govern a particular field, applying fresh rules under the RTI Act would create confusion.

Issues:

Can a third party seek information and certified copies of documents from the Gujarat High Court under the RTI Act?

Is Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act?

Held:

The Court held that Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules does not obstruct a third party from obtaining copies of documents from court proceedings. The Rule simply provides a different procedure for obtaining information, requiring the third party to file an application/affidavit stating reasons for the request. This is to ensure that the information is sought for genuine reasons or public interest. (Para 27)

The Court emphasized that the RTI Act recognizes the need to protect institutional interests and confidentiality of sensitive information. It found that the procedure to obtain certified copies under the High Court Rules is not cumbersome and serves to prevent misuse of court processes and information. (Para 28)

The Court clarified that the High Court Rules' mechanism for obtaining information is not inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act. Instead, they complement each other. The information/certified copies on the judicial side should be obtained through the mechanism provided under the High Court Rules, rather than invoking the provisions of the RTI Act. (Para 38)

Facts:The case involves an appeal arising from a writ petition challenging the change of land use in the Indira Nagar development from commercial to residential. The Madhya Pradesh Housing and Infrastructure Development Board, the appellant, sought the modification based on town planning considerations. The modification was initially rejected by authorities but was subsequently approved by the Deputy Director, Town and Country Planning, and the State Government.

Issues:

Whether the modification of the layout plan from commercial to residential was legally valid and followed proper procedures under the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam.

Whether the High Court's application of the principle of promissory estoppel was appropriate in this case.

Whether the delay in filing the writ petition and the creation of third-party rights impacted the outcome of the case.

Held:

The Court discusses the legal framework and distinguishes between the development plan, zonal plan, and town planning scheme under the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam. It emphasizes the importance of adhering to these plans and the legality of modifications that conform to development norms.( Para 6)

The Court notes that the area earmarked for a shopping complex remained undeveloped for over 20 years and analyzes the arguments presented by both parties. It highlights the distinction between changing land use from commercial to residential (which is the case here) and the more common situation of changing land use to commercial or industrial.( Para 7)

The Court discusses the delay in filing the writ petition, the change in position, and the creation of third-party rights due to this delay. It cites relevant case law to emphasize that the courts usually do not assist tardy petitioners, especially when third-party rights are involved.( Para 8)

The Court observes that the Ujjain Municipal Corporation was not made a party to the case and that their stand was not considered. It notes that the State Government and authorities supported the modification. The Court underscores the need for reasonable grounds for opposing the modification.( Para 9)

The Court directs that the appellant-board and authorities should ensure that areas earmarked for a primary school and park/garden are not converted into residential plots. It also instructs that unsold residential plots should be used for public amenities, not allocated for sale.( Para 10)

Facts:

The appellant, a State Cooperative body, serves as the apex body of Cooperative Banks in Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank. The dispute centers around the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the appellant had no role in CEO appointments, and such power lay with the Registrar only after the District Central Cooperative Bank's failure to make the appointment within a specified period.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had the authority to appoint the CEO of the first respondent?

Whether the amendments brought about by the 2016 Amending Act altered the provisions of CEO appointments for Cooperative Banks?

How should the conflict between the provisions of Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) be resolved?

Held:

Section 54 deals with the appointment of Managers, Secretaries, and officers of societies. Sub-section (1) empowers societies to make appointments based on qualifications. Sub-section (2) requires Apex and Central Societies to maintain a cadre of officers as directed by the State Government.

Section 49-E pertains to CEO appointments under specific circumstances. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 49-E override contrary provisions and apply when the State Government has contributed to share capital, given loans, etc. CEO appointments are covered under this provision.

Central Societies under Section 49-E(2) appoint CEOs from the cadre if created under Section 54.

Section 54(3) empowers the State Government to specify societies for cadre officers' appointment by Apex or Central Societies. The notified class must appoint cadre officers as deputed.

The 2016 Amending Act inserted clauses (a) and (b) into Section 54(3), specifying CEO eligibility and the Registrar's appointment authority. Clauses (a) and (b) apply solely to Cooperative Banks, and their introduction does not negate Section 49-E.

Section 49-E(2) stipulates CEO appointment from cadre officers of Section 54 if applicable.

Notification under Section 54(3) operates regulatory control over Central Societies under Section 49-E(2), specifying CEO appointment sources.

Courts must harmonize conflicting provisions; both Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) must be upheld. Section 54(3) notifications grant State Government regulatory power.

The State Government can specify Cooperative Banks' CEO appointments from Apex Society's cadre. Notified Apex Society provides a panel; RBI eligibility criteria apply. CEO appointment from cadre is mandatory under Section 49-E(2).

First respondent is a Central Society under Section 49-E(2). Notification obligates Cooperative Banks to appoint CEOs from cadre created by State Cooperative Bank. The appointment of CEO by the appellant was ratified by the Registrar and BoD, aligning with Section 54(3).

FACTS:

The appellants had been granted compassionate appointments, but their appointments were canceled upon the discovery that they were made in contravention of the Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1996, as amended from 01.04.1999. The amendments introduced a stipulation that a minor dependent of a deceased government employee must apply within one year from the date of death and must have attained the age of eighteen on the day of application. Prior to the amendment, a minor could apply within one year of attaining majority.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants' appointments were valid under the unamended provisions of Rule 5.

Whether the amended provisions of Rule 5 were applicable to the appellants' cases.

Whether the appellants' claims could be considered under the transitory provision of Rule 9(3).

Whether the norms prevailing on the date of consideration or on the date of the government employee's death should apply to compassionate appointments.

Whether the appellants were entitled to continuation of their appointments.

HELD:

The Court considered the contentions of the parties and the relevant legal principles in making its decision. The Court held:

The appellants' claims could not be considered under the unamended provisions of Rule 5 as they applied for compassionate appointments well beyond one year from the date of their respective parents' deaths, and the amended provisions had become operational.

The norms applicable on the date of consideration of the application should be the basis for compassionate appointment, and a dependent cannot demand consideration based on the norms prevailing on the date of the government employee's death.

The transitory provision of Rule 9(3) did not cover the appellants' cases as their applications were filed in contravention of Rule 5 as amended in 1999.

Compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right, and the criteria laid down in the rules must be satisfied by all aspirants.

The appellants were ineligible for compassionate appointment under the amended provisions of Rule 5, and their appointments were justifiably canceled.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the classification of a specific parcel of land described as 'Shamlat Patti Dhera & Khubi'. The appellant, Patram, argued that the land, though described as 'shamilat' land, was actually a patti owned by his ancestors for over a century. The land was not being utilized for common village purposes, and thus, according to him, it should not be categorized as 'shamilat deh' under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the land in question qualifies as 'shamilat deh' under the definition provided in Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Held:

The court analyzed the definitions and provisions in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, particularly focusing on Section 2(g) which defines 'shamilat deh'. The court noted that terms like 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola' represent different divisions within a village based on caste, religion, occupation, etc. The court discussed the absence of a comma after the word 'shamilat' in a specific section and concluded that this was likely a typographical error. The court interpreted that 'shamilat deh' should be read along with 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola'. A land could only be considered 'shamilat deh' if it met one of these conditions. If the term 'shamilat' was missing from any of these descriptions, the land could not be categorized as 'shamilat deh'.

Based on the evidence presented, including historical records and the fact that the land was not utilized for the common benefit of the village community, the court held that the land in question did not qualify as 'shamilat deh' under the Act. As a result, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside previous judgments, and ordered that the appellant's name be entered in the ownership column with the entry 'shamlat patti'.