International Arbitration – Conflicting Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses – Applicability of Indian Law – Arbitration in India Ordered – The petitioner sought appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, invoking Clauses 16.5 and 18 of the Distributor Agreement – The respondent contended that arbitration should take place in Colombia under the Conciliation and Arbitration Centre of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogotá – The Supreme Court held that Clause 16.5, which stipulates Indian law and exclusive jurisdiction of Gujarat courts, prevails over Clause 18, which designates Bogotá as the arbitration venue – Held: Indian courts have jurisdiction over the arbitration agreement, and an arbitrator was appointed to conduct the proceedings in India under Delhi International Arbitration Centre rules [Paras 25-36].

Conflict of Laws – Lex Arbitri, Lex Contractus, and Seat of Arbitration – Indian Law Governs Arbitration Agreement – The Supreme Court applied the three-step test from Sulamérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. v. Enesa Engenharia S.A., distinguishing between lex contractus (law governing the contract), lex arbitri (law governing arbitration), and seat of arbitration – The Court held that Indian law applies to the arbitration agreement, despite Bogotá being designated as the arbitration venue – The arbitration agreement’s validity, scope, and interpretation are governed by Indian law [Paras 13-16, 31].

Interpretation of Contracts – Harmonization of Conflicting Clauses – Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause Prevails – The Court emphasized that in cases of inconsistent contractual clauses, interpretation must strive to give effect to all provisions rather than rejecting any clause outright – Following Milford Capital Partners v. Digby and Arnold v. Britton, the Court held that Clause 16.5 (exclusive Indian jurisdiction) and Clause 18 (arbitration in Bogotá) can be harmonized by treating Bogotá as the arbitration venue while retaining the Gujarat courts’ supervisory jurisdiction [Paras 26-29].

Appointment of Arbitrator – Consensus of Parties – Arbitration to be Conducted in India – During proceedings, both parties consented to arbitration in India under an Indian arbitral institution – The Supreme Court appointed Justice S.P. Garg (Retd.) of Delhi High Court as the sole arbitrator, with the venue to be decided mutually by the parties – The arbitration will be conducted under the Delhi International Arbitration Centre rules, applying the fee schedule for international arbitrations [Paras 34-36].

Decision: Appeal Allowed – The Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement is governed by Indian law, and Indian courts have jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator – Justice S.P. Garg (Retd.) appointed as the sole arbitrator – Arbitration shall be conducted in India, with the venue to be mutually decided by the parties – Proceedings to be governed by the Delhi International Arbitration Centre rules, applying the international arbitration fee schedule.
 

Consumer Protection – Definition of Consumer – Commercial Purpose vs. Self-Employment – Complaint Dismissed - Petitioner purchased a laser cutting and bending machine for his business alleging manufacturing defects – State and National Commissions held that purchase was for commercial expansion and not self-employment – Supreme Court affirmed findings holding that petitioner was running a business using employed workers and not personally operating the machine – Hence, not entitled to protection under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act – Appeal dismissed.
Scope of Self-Employment Exception – Paramount Digital Case Distinguished – In Paramount Digital Colour Lab case, unemployed graduates directly used the machine themselves for livelihood qualifying as self-employment – Present petitioner was an existing business owner who expanded operations and employed others – Self-employment exception not applicable in present facts – Purchase amounted to commercial purpose.
Limitation – Liberty to Institute Civil Suit – Supreme Court granted liberty to petitioner to institute a civil suit and seek benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for exclusion of time spent before Consumer Forums – To be considered by Civil Court if suit filed within four weeks.
Final Decision – No Interference Warranted – SLP dismissed affirming concurrent findings of State and National Commissions that petitioner is not a consumer under the Act – Pending applications disposed of.
 

Criminal Law – Copyright Infringement – Expert Report – Appellant alleged that respondents copied the design of its bookbinding machine, leading to registration of FIR under Copyright Act, IPC, and IT Act – High Court initially ordered expert opinion by FSL with involvement of an engineer – FSL and IO submitted a report dated 21.03.2019 – Respondents dissatisfied and sought further directions [Paras 3-7].

Procedural Law – Maintainability – Application in Disposed Petition – Second application filed in disposed Special Criminal Application held improper – Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in entertaining the second application post disposal of the main petition and ordering additional expert opinion [Paras 8-14].

Investigation – Validity of Multiple Expert Opinions – Supreme Court held that once the High Court accepted the initial expert report, it was improper to direct IO to obtain a fresh expert opinion – The direction would prejudice the investigation and parties – Investigation should proceed on existing report subject to objections by the accused before the IO [Paras 13-16].

Investigation – Discretion of Investigating Officer – Supreme Court granted liberty to respondents to raise objections before IO regarding expert report – IO to exercise discretion whether further expert opinion is required under applicable laws without mandatory direction from High Court [Para 16].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s direction for additional expert opinion quashed – Liberty given to respondents to raise objections before IO – IO permitted to proceed as per law without compulsion to seek second opinion [Paras 16-17].

Criminal Law – Challenge Summoning under Section 319 CrPC – Duty to Consider Entire Evidence – Supplementary Report Ignored – Trial Court erred in not considering supplementary investigation report which exonerated the appellant and her father-in-law – Material collected post-application under Section 319 CrPC cannot be overlooked – Trial Court and High Court failed to apply settled principles of Section 319 – Orders liable to be set aside [Paras 15-22].

Distinction between Accused – Husband and Wife Treated Differently – Court found that unlike the appellant’s husband (absconding), there was a clear finding in the supplementary report absolving the appellant and her father-in-law – The absence of such findings regarding the husband distinguishes the appellant's case – Objection on maintainability rejected [Para 14].

Scope of Section 319 CrPC – Requirement of Stronger Evidence than Prima Facie Case – Reaffirmation of Hardeep Singh and Juhru Principles – The power under Section 319 is extraordinary and must not be invoked casually – The Court reiterated that evidence must disclose more than a mere probability to summon additional accused – Mere reliance on initial deposition without considering fresh material violates due process [Paras 17-19].

Procedural Safeguard – Supplementary Report Must Be Evaluated – Supplementary report under Section 173(8) CrPC is part of the record and must be considered before summoning – Trial Court’s omission to evaluate supplementary report held to be impermissible – Matter remanded for reconsideration [Paras 20-22].

Decision – Summoning Order Set Aside – Matter Remanded – Appeal Partly Allowed – The Trial Court and High Court orders were quashed – Trial Court directed to decide the Section 319 CrPC application afresh considering all materials on record – Trial to be expedited within two months [Paras 22-25].

Criminal Procedure – Applicability of Section 256 Cr. PC – Not every absence of complainant leads to acquittal – Restoration of complaint justified – The appellant’s complaint was dismissed for default by the Magistrate during the pandemic despite restrictions and interim stay from the High Court – The Sessions Judge correctly restored the complaint, noting absence of accused on the said date and violation of SoP – The High Court’s interference was erroneous as it misapplied Section 256 Cr. PC and wrongly treated the Sessions Court as sitting in appeal over the High Court – Held: Restoration of complaint proper, dismissal for default was unsustainable [Paras 14-22].

Section 256 Cr. PC – Purpose of date fixed is material – Only absence of complainant on a date fixed for appearance of accused triggers acquittal – Here, date was fixed only for show cause and not for appearance of accused – Respondents themselves were absent – Hence, Section 256 did not warrant acquittal – Observation of the High Court in CRR No.

2327/2018 was flawed – Sessions Judge’s order restoring the complaint was correct [Paras 18-20].

Judicial Discipline – Revisional Court not barred from setting aside order dismissing complaint – Earlier High Court observation was not binding as it was per incuriam – The Sessions Judge rightly exercised revisional jurisdiction – The High Court erred in quashing the Sessions Court order on the ground of judicial discipline [Paras 21-22].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Complaint restored – Order dated 15^th July, 2024 set aside – CRR No. 2327/2018 revived for fresh adjudication by High Court – Magistrate to proceed with complaint subject to outcome of CRR No. 2327/2018 [Paras 23-26].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Dishonour of Cheques – Moratorium under IBC – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Appeal Allowed – The appellant, a director of a corporate debtor, issued cheques that were dishonoured, leading to a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act – A moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC was imposed before the completion of the statutory 15-day period following the notice of dishonour – High Court dismissed appellant’s petition, relying on P. Mohan Raj v. M/S Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258 – Held: P. Mohan Raj was distinguishable as the cause of action in the present case arose after the imposition of the moratorium – Since the appellant, due to the moratorium and Section 17 of the IBC, was no longer in charge of the corporate debtor, he was incapable of fulfilling the demand – Proceedings under Section 138 NI Act against him were impermissible and should have been quashed [Paras 6-12].

IBC – Effect of Moratorium – Protection to Corporate Debtor and its Directors – Proceedings under NI Act Barred – Under Section 14(1)(a) of the IBC, a moratorium prohibits the institution or continuation of suits and proceedings against the corporate debtor – The moratorium extends to all legal actions affecting the corporate debtor, including criminal complaints under Section 138 NI Act if the cause of action arises post-moratorium – Since the appellant ceased to have control over the corporate debtor due to the appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP), he could not have complied with the demand notice – Held: The proceedings under Section 138 NI Act were barred and deserved to be quashed [Paras 7-11].

Criminal Procedure – Quashing under Section 482 CrPC – High Court’s Error – Quashing Justified – High Court failed to appreciate the distinction between a case where the cause of action under Section 138 NI Act arose before the moratorium and a case where it arose after – Given that the cause of action in this case was post-moratorium, the High Court erred in dismissing the appellant’s petition – Supreme Court invoked its power to quash the proceedings to prevent the abuse of the legal process [Paras 12-13].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Criminal Proceedings Quashed – Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and quashed the summoning order dated 07.09.2018 – Complaint Case No. 15580/2018 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, also quashed [Para 13].

Criminal Procedure – Registration of FIR – Preliminary Inquiry – Appeal Dismissed – The appellant, a retired IAS officer, challenged multiple FIRs registered against him regarding land allotment irregularities during his tenure as Collector – He sought a direction for a mandatory preliminary inquiry before the registration of further FIRs – High Court dismissed the plea, holding that registration of FIRs for cognizable offences is mandatory under Section 154 CrPC – Held: Preliminary inquiry is required only in limited cases, and not where cognizable offences such as corruption and abuse of office are alleged – Registration of successive FIRs is a matter for investigation and trial, and the appellant has adequate legal remedies, including quashing under Section 482 CrPC and seeking bail – Appeal dismissed [Paras 6-15].

Constitutional Law – Right to Liberty – Articles 14, 20, and 21 – No Blanket Protection Against FIRs – The appellant argued that multiple FIRs violated his right to liberty and were lodged to harass him – Held: Fundamental rights do not provide immunity from investigation if a cognizable offence is disclosed – A blanket order restraining future FIRs or mandating preliminary inquiry in every case would amount to judicial overreach – Courts cannot create procedural safeguards beyond what is provided in law [Paras 10-14].

Precedents – Application of Lalita Kumari Case – No Absolute Requirement for Preliminary Inquiry – The appellant relied on Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 to argue that a preliminary inquiry should have been conducted before registering FIRs – Held: Lalita Kumari only mandates preliminary inquiry in limited categories of cases such as medical negligence and family disputes – In corruption cases, where clear allegations of cognizable offences exist, FIRs must be registered without inquiry – Appellant’s reliance on Lalita Kumari misplaced [Paras 11-12].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – No Relief Granted – Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, dismissing the appellant’s plea – Clarified that the appellant is free to seek other legal remedies, including challenging specific FIRs through appropriate judicial forums [Para 15].

Environmental Law – Jurisdiction of NGT – Tribunal Exceeded Powers – Appeal Allowed – The NGT directed the appellant to prepare a fresh township plan and obtain Environmental Clearance before further construction – Held: NGT lacked jurisdiction as no substantial question of environmental law under Schedule I of the NGT Act was involved – The Tribunal overstepped its authority by interfering with a Master Plan approved in 2001 and gazetted in 2010 – Order quashed [Paras 10-12].

Auroville Master Plan – Statutory Validity – No Fresh Approval Required – The Master Plan for Auroville was approved by the competent authorities in 2001 and legally notified in 2010 – Tribunal’s direction for a fresh township plan was unwarranted – Held: Once a Master Plan attains statutory status, it cannot be nullified or modified arbitrarily by a judicial forum lacking legislative or administrative authority [Paras 13-14].

Environmental Impact Assessment – Applicability to Auroville Project – No Fresh EC Required – The Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change (MoEF&CC) had clarified that the Auroville Township Project commenced before the EIA Notification, 1994, and thus did not require Environmental Clearance under the 2006 notification – Held: Tribunal’s directive to obtain EC was contrary to the legal position – No new environmental concerns were demonstrated to justify such an order [Paras 14-15].

Precautionary Principle – Misapplication by NGT – No Environmental Violation Established – The Tribunal applied the Precautionary Principle to justify its interference, despite ruling that the disputed land was not a forest under the Forest (Conservation) Act – Held: Precautionary Principle does not grant courts the power to override statutory planning approvals without clear environmental violations – Unsubstantiated concerns cannot override legal frameworks [Paras 16-18].

Final Decision – NGT Order Quashed – Auroville Master Plan Implementation Restored – Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the NGT’s orders – Held that the appellant is free to proceed with the approved Master Plan, including construction of the Crown Road, without further clearance [Paras 19-20].
 

Administrative Law – Auroville Foundation – Power of Governing Board – Validity of Standing Order Upheld – The appellant challenged the High Court's order setting aside Standing Order No. 01/2022, which reconstituted the Auroville Town Development Council – High Court erred in holding that the Residents’ Assembly had a legal right to nominate members to the ATDC – Held: Governing Board, under Sections 11(3), 16, and 17(e) of the A.F. Act, has exclusive authority over the management and implementation of Auroville’s Master Plan – Residents’ Assembly’s role is advisory and does not extend to nominating members to administrative committees – Impugned High Court order set aside [Paras 12-17].

Doctrine of Clean Hands – Suppression of Material Facts – Abuse of Process of Law – The respondent had previously filed Writ Petition No. 22895/2022 challenging the same Office Order dated 01.06.2022, which was dismissed – She filed Writ Petition No. 25882/2022 without disclosing the prior dismissal – Held: Non-disclosure of material facts constitutes abuse of process of law – High Court failed to consider this suppression and should have dismissed the petition on this ground alone [Paras 9-11].

Judicial Review – Limited Scope in Policy Matters – No Judicial Overreach – The High Court wrongly interpreted the A.F. Act and interfered with the validly issued Standing Order – Held: Courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce procedural safeguards not contemplated in law – Governing Board’s power to constitute committees, including ATDC, is well established in the Act and Rules – Judicial interference in administrative decisions must be limited [Paras 16-18].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court Order Set Aside – Costs Imposed – Supreme Court allowed the appeal, upheld the validity of Standing Order No. 01/2022, and imposed costs of ₹50,000 on the respondent for filing a frivolous petition – Costs to be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within two weeks [Para 19].