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by sayum
03 April 2026 7:01 AM
"The petitioner is merely taking a chance and seeking a forceful allotment of a seat, which is impermissible in law and absolutely contrary to the basic tenants of equality..." Calcutta High Court, in a significant ruling dated April 1, 2026, held that a candidate cannot seek a forceful allotment of a seat in an educational course if such an admission would bypass candidates placed higher in the merit list.
A single-judge bench of Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra observed that granting a seat to a lower-ranked candidate, even if their marks marginally improved after a belated examination review, would result in gross injustice to those ranked above him.
The petitioner, Surajit Lahiri, had applied for admission to the LLM Course at the University of Burdwan. He filed a writ petition aggrieved by the denial of admission, claiming that a delayed review of his LLB sixth-semester papers artificially depressed his merit rank. He contended that vacant seats still existed in the course and sought a direction for the allotment of a seat in his favour based on the allegedly unconsidered enhanced marks.
The primary question before the court was whether a candidate could claim admission based on enhanced marks from a belated review application when higher-ranked candidates remained unadmitted on the merit list. The court was also called upon to determine if the University could be held vicariously liable for the delayed review and if vacant seats could be allotted after the closure of the counseling process.
The court first examined the mathematical impact of the petitioner's delayed review marks on his overall ranking. The bench noted that even upon a simple calculation adding the enhanced marks of the sixth semester, the petitioner's Cumulative Grade Point Average (CGPA) would only increase marginally from 6.66 to 6.69. Consequently, his rank would only upgrade from 86 to 82 or 83. The court emphasized that the last admitted candidate in the unreserved category held rank 46, meaning the petitioner remained far outside the zone of consideration.
"Any consideration in favour of the petitioner for allotment of a seat would thereby indicate completely ignoring at least 36 to 37 candidates who would still be ahead of him in the merit list."
Addressing the issue of the delayed review process, the bench observed that the petitioner had applied for the review more than a year after the stipulated timeline had closed. The court firmly rejected the argument that the online payment of the review fee without the University's knowledge constituted an admission by the institution to allow the review out of time. The judge clarified that the primary grievance for non-forwarding of marks within time lay against the college, which was not made a party, and the University could not be faulted.
"Any grievance that the petitioner may have is primarily against the college and cannot be foisted on the University with a vicarious liability."
The court then considered the petitioner's claim regarding the availability of vacant seats. The University had clarified that only two seats remained vacant at the Government Centre of Legal Education merely because successful candidates failed to make the requisite payments. The bench held that since Phase 3 was the final round of counseling and the admission process had closed on December 3, 2025, directing the university to fill the vacancies now would severely disrupt the entire academic schedule.
"Any selection of any candidates subsequent thereto would result in a complete disruption of the process as the same would be selective appointment/allotment."
"The petitioner chose to wait till about February 19, 2026 when the entire counseling process had already come to a closure and the classes for the L.L.M Course had already commenced."
Furthermore, the court highlighted the petitioner's significant laches in approaching the judiciary. Though the University informed him on December 6, 2025, that his review could not be considered, he waited until February 2026 to file the writ petition. Additionally, regarding the petitioner's technical objection under Section 10(7) of the Burdwan University Act, 1981, that the University's affidavit-in-opposition was improperly authorized, the court ruled that such an objection could only be raised by the authorizing respondents themselves.
"Thus, the question of the deponent not being authorized can only be raised by such respondents and not by the petitioner."
The Calcutta High Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition, finding that the petitioner was not within the zone of consideration. The ruling firmly establishes that courts will not intervene to mandate admissions after the closure of counseling, especially when such an order would arbitrarily bypass higher-ranked candidates and disrupt the academic process.
Date of Decision: 01 April 2026