Citizenship Law – Constitutionality of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, which provides for citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam, was challenged for violating various constitutional provisions – It was argued that Parliament lacked legislative competence to modify the citizenship provisions for a specific region like Assam without amending the Constitution – The Supreme Court upheld Parliament’s authority under Article 11 of the Constitution to legislate on matters of citizenship, noting that Articles 6 and 7 govern citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution, while Section 6A addresses later migrants – No conflict was found between Section 6A and Articles 6 and 7 [Paras 29-42].

Citizenship Law – Validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6A, arguing it violated the legislative competence of Parliament under Article 11 of the Constitution, and Articles 14, 29, and 355 – Section 6A provides special provisions for granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam, based on specific cut-off dates – The court upheld the validity of Section 6A, holding that the provision fell within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 11 and did not violate any constitutional provisions, including Article 14, as the classification of Assam and the cut-off date were rational and justified [Paras 12, 42-45, 72-75, 387-391].

Citizenship Law – Validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6A, arguing it violated the legislative competence of Parliament under Article 11 of the Constitution, and Articles 14, 29, and 355 – Section 6A provides special provisions for granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam, based on specific cut-off dates – The majority upheld the validity of Section 6A, holding that the provision fell within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 11 and did not violate any constitutional provisions, including Article 14, as the classification of Assam and the cut-off date were rational and justified – However, Justice J.B. Pardiwala dissented, arguing that Section 6A has become unconstitutional due to its "manifest arbitrariness" and temporal unreasonableness [Paras 12, 42-45, 72-75, 207-219].

Legislative Competence – Article 11 of the Constitution – Parliament's power to legislate on matters related to citizenship – Petitioners argued that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act altered the cut-off dates prescribed by Articles 6 and 7, thus requiring a constitutional amendment rather than parliamentary legislation – The majority held that Section 6A does not amend Articles 6 and 7, as those provisions only pertain to citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution, whereas Section 6A deals with post-Partition migration – Article 11 empowers Parliament to enact laws on citizenship beyond the scope of Articles 6 and 7, as Section 6A addresses a different time frame and context – In dissent, Justice Pardiwala argued that Section 6A's framework is flawed for lacking a clear temporal limit for its application [Paras 13, 29-31, 32-42, 208].

Article 14 – Equality before Law – Petitioners argued that Section 6A violates Article 14 by adopting arbitrary cut-off dates and singling out Assam – The majority held that the classification of Assam as a separate entity is based on the unique impact of migration in the region and the significant cultural, economic, and political challenges faced by the state due to the influx of migrants from Bangladesh – The cut-off date of March 25, 1971, was rational, linked to historical events, and had a reasonable nexus with the objective of regulating migration – However, Justice Pardiwala, in dissent, held that Section 6A has become arbitrary over time, especially due to the burden of detection being placed solely on the state, and the provision has led to continued illegal immigration [Paras 43-75, 207-215].

Cultural Identity – Article 29(1) – Petitioners argued that Section 6A infringes on the cultural identity of Assamese people by granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh – The majority found no violation of Article 29(1), stating that the provision balances the protection of Assamese cultural identity with humanitarian considerations for migrants – Justice Pardiwala also disagreed with the majority's stance, stating that Section 6A, lacking procedural safeguards like those in Articles 6 and 7, undermines Assamese identity through unchecked migration [Paras 387, 212].

External Aggression – Article 355 – Petitioners contended that undocumented immigration constitutes 'external aggression' under Article 355 and that Section 6A fails to curb such immigration – The majority rejected this argument, stating that the provision is in line with the legislative intent to regularize certain classes of migrants and is not in conflict with the State's duty under Article 355 to protect against external aggression – Justice Pardiwala, in dissent, emphasized that Section 6A's failure to stop illegal immigration into Assam is evidence of its ineffectiveness in addressing the concerns of external aggression [Paras 12(c), 387, 211].

Decision: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act upheld by the majority, but declared unconstitutional by dissenting opinion – The majority held that Section 6A is constitutionally valid and does not violate any provisions of the Constitution, including Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, or 355 – However, Justice Pardiwala's dissenting opinion argued that Section 6A suffers from temporal unreasonableness and has become unconstitutional due to its failure to curb illegal immigration effectively – The dissent also emphasized that Section 6A's flawed framework places an undue burden on the state and undermines Assamese cultural identity – Directions were issued for improved enforcement and monitoring of immigration laws post-1971 [Paras 387-393, 217-219].

Criminal Law – Murder Conviction – Appeal against death sentence – Appellant accused of killing his wife, daughter, and mother, and attacking a neighbor – Trial court sentenced the appellant to death based on circumstantial evidence, including recovery of the murder weapon (hammer) and blood-stained clothes – High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence – Supreme Court examined the reliability of witness testimonies and the circumstantial evidence, finding inconsistencies and weak evidence – Held: Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction and death sentence set aside [Paras 1-28].

Witness Testimony – Credibility of Injured Witness – P.W. 12 (neighbor) was injured during the incident and identified the appellant as the attacker – However, his statement was recorded after a six-day delay, raising doubts about its reliability – The court found no explanation for the delay, and other witnesses failed to corroborate his testimony – Supreme Court held that P.W. 12’s testimony was insufficient to sustain a conviction, given the inconsistencies and lack of corroboration from neighbors [Paras 8-17].

Circumstantial Evidence – Recovery of Hammer and Clothes – The murder weapon, a hammer, was recovered from a canal based on the appellant's disclosure – However, the hammer had been submerged for three days, making it improbable for bloodstains to remain – Blood-stained clothes were found in an open area accessible to others, raising the possibility of tampering – The Supreme Court found these recoveries unreliable and insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 25-26].

Motive – Appellant’s Alleged Affair – The prosecution claimed that the appellant killed his family to marry another woman – The Supreme Court held that motive alone, without strong corroborative evidence, cannot justify a conviction, particularly in a case resting on circumstantial evidence [Para 27].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and death sentence under Sections 302, 307, and 201 IPC quashed – Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released if not wanted in any other case [Paras 28-29].

Taxation Law - Royalty vs. Tax – Distinction between Royalty and Tax – The appellants argued that the demand was not a tax but a royalty agreed to between the parties for the right to display advertisements. The Supreme Court held that royalty and tax are distinct concepts; royalty is a payment for the privilege to use land or property, whereas a tax is a sovereign imposition. The court reiterated that the demand by the Patna Municipal Corporation was not a tax but royalty agreed upon for advertising rights [Paras 34-42].

Legislative Authority – Absence of Regulations – The respondents challenged the imposition of fees, arguing that no regulations were framed under the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007, to authorize the levy of taxes or fees on advertisements. The court ruled that while regulations under Section 147 are required for the imposition of taxes, the royalty charged in this case was pursuant to an agreement between the parties, not under statutory provisions. Therefore, the absence of regulations did not invalidate the demand [Paras 48-56].

Penalty for Non-Payment – Absence of Statutory Backing – The court found that while the corporation could charge interest on delayed payments as compensation, the imposition of a penalty for non-payment had no statutory backing. The penalty imposed by the corporation was thus quashed, but interest could be charged for late payments [Paras 65-69].

Decision:

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s judgment of the Patna High Court and upheld the imposition of royalty by the Patna Municipal Corporation. However, the penalty for non-payment was quashed, and the corporation was allowed to charge simple interest at 6% per annum on delayed payments.

Taxation Law - Broken Period Interest – Deduction for Securities Held as Stock-in-Trade – Revenue Expenditure – The court held that broken period interest, paid when a bank purchases government securities, should be treated as a revenue expenditure when the securities are held as stock-in-trade. This is because the income from securities is chargeable under Section 28 of the Income Tax Act as business income. Therefore, the interest paid for the broken period should not be capitalized as part of the cost of the securities but should be allowed as a deduction in the profit and loss account [Paras 5-12, 20].

HTM (Held to Maturity) Securities – Treatment as Investment or Stock-in-Trade – Whether broken period interest is deductible depends on how the bank treats HTM securities. If HTM securities are held as investments, the interest will not be deductible as revenue expenditure. However, if they are held as stock-in-trade, the deduction will apply [Paras 35-40].

Application of Previous Decisions – The court ruled that the decision in Vijaya Bank Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax does not apply to cases after the repeal of Sections 18-21 of the Income Tax Act in 1989. This is because interest on securities, when treated as business income, falls under Section 28, not under the previously repealed provisions [Paras 25-30].

Circulars and Guidelines – RBI Circulars of 1998 and 2001, as well as the CBDT Circular No. 4 of 2007, were taken into account, affirming that broken period interest should be treated as revenue expenditure in the case of securities held as stock-in-trade. The court emphasized that the practice of treating such interest as an expense is well-settled [Paras 42-45].

Decision: The court allowed the appeals in favor of the appellant Bank of Rajasthan, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal was restored. The court also dismissed all the other civil appeals brought by the Revenue.

Criminal Law – Bank Fraud – Discharge of Accused – Appeal against the High Court’s decision to discharge the respondent (Accused No. 7) from charges of conspiracy, cheating, and criminal misconduct related to fraudulent credit facilities granted to a company – Allegation of undue haste in sanctioning loans without proper appraisal or clearance by the relevant departments – The High Court held that mere suspicion was insufficient to proceed against the respondent – Supreme Court upheld the discharge, stating no direct evidence implicated the respondent beyond signing a memorandum approved by senior officials – Held: No scope for interference, appeal dismissed [Paras 1-17].

Conspiracy – Participation and Knowledge – Submission by the learned Additional Solicitor General that a conspiracy does not require all conspirators to know every detail, and suspicion alone can suffice for framing charges – However, the Supreme Court found that although the process was expedited, there was no material to show that the respondent actively engaged in fraudulent conduct – The Loan Advisory Committee and senior officers’ involvement minimized the respondent’s role – No direct evidence of pecuniary benefit or improper influence by the respondent – Held: Suspicion alone does not justify framing charges [Paras 5, 18].

Banking Procedure – Loan Sanctioning – Court examined the procedures followed in sanctioning loans, noting the Zonal Office, Credit Department, and Loan Advisory Committee's roles in recommending the loans – The respondent’s role was limited to signing the memorandum, and no evidence showed personal involvement in misconduct – Despite the rapid processing of the loans, this did not amount to criminality – Held: Discharge was appropriate as no criminal intent or participation in the conspiracy could be proven [Paras 16-17 ].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court’s order of discharge upheld – No findings made regarding other accused persons

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's order discharging the respondent was upheld. The court clarified that its findings were limited to the respondent's role and did not affect the trial against the other accused.

FIR Quashing – False Promise of Marriage – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – FIR Quashed – The appellant sought quashing of the FIR registered under Sections 376 and 313 of IPC – High Court dismissed the petition – Supreme Court held: The FIR, even if taken at face value, does not reveal a prima facie case of rape or forced abortion – The appellant and complainant lived together for over five years, which cannot be classified as a relationship arising out of a false promise of marriage – The delay of over five years in filing the complaint further weakens the complainant’s case – FIR quashed under inherent powers of the court to prevent abuse of process [Paras 9-12, 16].

Consensual Relationship – No Misconception of Fact – Section 376 IPC – Alleged rape based on a false promise to marry – Court noted that the relationship lasted several years during which the complainant and the appellant lived as husband and wife – A consensual relationship lasting such a long period negates the claim of rape – No prima facie evidence that consent was vitiated by misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC [Paras 8-10].

Section 313 IPC – Allegation of Forced Abortion – Dropped Post Investigation – After investigation, charges under Section 313 IPC (forced abortion) were omitted as no supporting evidence was found – The lack of medical evidence or statements substantiating the claim of abortion further weakened the complainant's case – No ground to proceed with the allegation of rape under Section 376 IPC [Paras 6, 11].

Delay in Filing Complaint – Impact on Credibility – A significant delay of over five years in lodging the FIR – The court held that such delay, coupled with the consensual nature of the relationship, undermined the credibility of the allegations – FIR quashed as the allegations were inherently improbable [Paras 5, 12, 15].

Decision – The appeal is allowed – FIR No. 28/2018 dated 21.02.2018 registered at Police Station – Nandganj, Ghazipur District of Uttar Pradesh, and all proceedings based on it are quashed – Held: The High Court's refusal to quash the FIR was erroneous, and no prima facie case under Sections 376 and 313 IPC is made out – The appellant is acquitted of all charges [Para 16].

Auction Sale – Cancellation by Bank – Non-Issuance of Sale Certificate – The appellant bank conducted an auction where the respondents were the highest bidders. After the auction was confirmed, the bank failed to issue the sale certificate, citing the respondents’ delay in paying the balance sale consideration. The respondents challenged the cancellation, asserting they were willing to pay the amount but were obstructed by the appellant's actions. The court held that the bank’s unilateral cancellation was not justified, particularly since the bank had delayed accepting the balance amount due to internal reasons, including a complaint to the CBI and an advisory from the ED – Auction upheld, cancellation set aside [Paras 5-12].

Interpretation of Rule 9(4) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 – Time for Payment Not Sacrosanct – The court clarified that Rule 9(4), which provides 15 days to pay the balance sale consideration, is not absolute. The time can be extended by agreement between the parties. In this case, the delay in payment was not the respondents’ fault but due to the bank's failure to accept the balance within the stipulated time. Therefore, Rule 9(4) did not apply to declare the respondents as defaulters [Paras 15-18].

Principles of Natural Justice – Unilateral Cancellation Without Hearing – The cancellation of the auction by the bank was made without notice or an opportunity of hearing, violating the principles of natural justice. Such cancellation was held to be illegal [Para 23].

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court's decision, directing the bank to issue the sale certificate and execute the sale deed in favor of the respondents upon payment of the balance sale amount within four weeks. The cancellation of the auction was declared illegal, and the respondents were entitled to the property.

E-Auction Sale – Issuance of Sale Certificate – Readiness to pay balance auction amount – Respondents were highest bidders in an e-auction and had deposited 25% of the sale price, but the bank refused to accept the balance amount or issue a sale certificate, citing various reasons, including an advisory by the Enforcement Directorate (ED). The High Court held that the refusal was unjustified as there was no directive from CBI or ED against the auction. Held: The bank's refusal to accept the balance amount and issue the sale certificate was unwarranted, and the sale certificate must be issued after receiving the balance auction amount [Paras 4-10].

Rule 9(4), Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 – Extension of Time – The period for depositing the balance auction amount, while prescribed under Rule 9(4), is not sacrosanct and can be extended by mutual agreement in writing. The bank’s refusal and delay in accepting the balance amount implied consent for an extension, and hence no default could be attributed to the respondents under Rule 9(4) [Paras 13-16].

Natural Justice – Unilateral Cancellation – The bank’s cancellation of the auction sale without notice or an opportunity for the respondents to be heard was held to be a violation of natural justice principles. Such unilateral cancellation was deemed illegal [Para 20].

Article 142 – Supreme Court’s Power – Extension of statutory time – The Court clarified that while Article 142 does not override statutory provisions, Rule 9(4) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules permits an extension of time with mutual consent in writing, and hence the bank’s reliance on statutory timelines was misplaced [Paras 21-22].

Auction Sale Validity – High Court’s Order Affirmed – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision directing IDBI Bank to issue the sale certificate and accept the balance sale consideration within four weeks, as no fault was found with the respondents' conduct [Paras 22-23].

Criminal Law – Murder – Death Sentence Commuted to Life Imprisonment Without Remission – The appellant was convicted of strangling his pregnant daughter due to her inter-caste marriage, a crime for which both the Trial Court and High Court imposed the death penalty – The Supreme Court, while affirming the conviction under Sections 302, 316, and 364 IPC, commuted the death sentence to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment without remission – The Court considered mitigating factors, including the appellant’s poor socio-economic background, absence of criminal antecedents, satisfactory prison conduct, and medical conditions, including cognitive impairment due to a stroke suffered in prison [Paras 29-33].

Rarest of Rare Doctrine – Mitigating Circumstances Considered – The Court reiterated the principle that death penalty should be reserved for the “rarest of rare” cases, where the possibility of reformation is absent – In the present case, the Court found that despite the gravity of the crime, there was a potential for reformation, especially given the appellant’s personal circumstances and health conditions, and thus opted for a "middle path" approach, converting the death sentence to a fixed term of 20 years without remission [Paras 24-31].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – The conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC and related charges under Sections 316 and 364 IPC was upheld, but the death penalty was commuted to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment without eligibility for remission [Para 33].