Sect. 25 NDPS | Mere Ownership Cannot Fasten NDPS Liability – ‘Knowingly Permits’ Must Be Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt: MP High Court

“The Sine Qua Non for Section 25 Is Knowledge – Ownership Alone Is Not Enough”, In a crucial pronouncement reinforcing the strict evidentiary threshold under the NDPS Act, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that mere ownership or execution of an agreement regarding a vehicle does not attract criminal liability under Section 25 of the NDPS Act unless “knowing permission” is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Justice Gajendra Singh set aside the conviction of the appellant, who had been sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 25 read with Section 15(c) of the NDPS Act for allegedly permitting transportation of 2560 kg of poppy straw. The Court ruled that the prosecution failed to establish foundational facts necessary to invoke the presumption under Section 35 of the Act, and consequently acquitted the appellant.

The ruling significantly clarifies the contours of vicarious liability of vehicle owners under narcotics law.

The prosecution case stemmed from an incident dated 25.09.2003, when police intercepted Truck No. MP-09-K-6330 on the Mahu–Neemuch Highway within the jurisdiction of Police Station Namli, Ratlam. Upon search, 64 bags containing 2560 kg of poppy straw were recovered. The driver, Omprakash, was arrested and later convicted under Section 15(c) of the NDPS Act.

Initially, investigation disclosed the involvement of Munawwar Khan, the registered owner of the truck. However, the present appellant, Nilesh Kumar Jain, was not named in the first round of investigation. His involvement surfaced only in 2006, after an application was filed by the wife of Munawwar Khan, leading to further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC and a supplementary charge-sheet.

The trial court convicted the appellant on the premise that the truck had been sold to him through an agreement dated 08.08.2003 and that he was in possession and control of the vehicle at the time of seizure.

“Section 25 Creates Vicarious Liability – But Knowledge Pervades the Provision”

The High Court reproduced Section 25 of the NDPS Act and emphasized that it punishes an owner or person in control of a conveyance only when he “knowingly permits” its use for commission of an offence.

The Court observed that knowledge is not a mere formality but the very foundation of liability under Section 25. Relying on Bhola Singh v. State of Punjab (2011) 11 SCC 653, the Court reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding:

“We see that Section 25 of the Act would not be applicable… as there is no evidence to indicate that Bhola Singh… had either knowingly permitted the use of the vehicle for any improper purpose. The sine qua non for the applicability of Section 25 of the Act is thus not made out.”

The High Court also referred to Harbhajan Singh v. State of Haryana (2023 INSC 424), where the Supreme Court underscored that “ownership alone does not suffice for criminal liability unless there is clear evidence of ownership, knowledge and consent.”

Applying these principles, the Court found that the appellant was neither present at the spot nor arrested from the scene. He was not the registered owner, and significantly, his name was not disclosed by the driver in his initial statements. The Court noted that the allegations against him emerged only later through subsequent proceedings.

“Foundational Facts Must Be Proved Before Section 35 Presumption Is Invoked”

The prosecution had relied upon Section 35 of the NDPS Act to raise a presumption of culpable mental state. However, the Court clarified that such presumption arises only after the prosecution proves foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt.

Quoting Bhola Singh and referring to Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, the Court emphasized that reverse burden provisions impose a “heavy burden” on the accused and therefore must be preceded by strict proof from the prosecution.

The Court held:

“...merely on the strength of (Ex.P-3), the foundational facts to raise the presumptions under Section 35 of the NDPS Act, 1985 are not proved. Hence, the presumptions under Section 35 are not attracted.”

The Court found that the agreement dated 08.08.2003 (Ex.P-3), allegedly evidencing sale of the truck to the appellant, did not conclusively establish transfer of possession or control.

“Evidence Does Not Fall Within the Category of Incontrovertible Proof of Control”

A significant aspect of the defence was the production of credit memos showing that diesel was filled in the truck on 27.08.2003 and 07.09.2003 by Munawwar Khan, the registered owner. These memos bore his signatures.

The Court noted that although Munawwar attempted to retract or evade his earlier admission, his initial acknowledgment weakened the prosecution case that possession had passed to the appellant.

The Court observed:

“...the evidence on record does not fall within the category of incontrovertible evidence regarding actual possession or control of the vehicle with the present appellant.”

The Court further found that testimony of Kaushalyabai, mother of the driver, who claimed that the appellant had asked her son to drive the truck, was recorded after four and a half years of the incident. Her silence at the time of her son’s arrest rendered her testimony doubtful.

Conviction Based on Surmises Cannot Stand

Justice Gajendra Singh concluded that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellant had “knowingly permitted” the use of the vehicle for transportation of contraband. The essential ingredients of Section 25 were not made out, and the presumption under Section 35 could not be invoked in absence of proof of possession and control.

Accordingly, the conviction and sentence dated 30.11.2022 were set aside, and the appellant was directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

The judgment reaffirms that Section 25 of the NDPS Act is not triggered by mere ownership or execution of an agreement. The prosecution must prove conscious knowledge and permission with cogent evidence. The Court’s insistence that “knowledge pervades the provision of law” ensures that vicarious liability under narcotics law does not become mechanical or presumptive.

By insisting that “foundational facts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt before Section 35 can be invoked,” the High Court has strengthened safeguards against unwarranted extension of criminal liability under stringent narcotics legislation.

Date of Decision: 13/02/2026