Limitation Under Section 468 Cr.P.C. Cannot Be Ignored — But Section 473 Keeps the Door Open in the Interest of Justice: P&H HC

"High Court Refuses to Quash 304-A FIR Solely on Delay; Trial Court Must First Decide Limitation Plea", In a significant ruling on the interplay between Sections 468 and 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Punjab and Haryana High Court declined to quash an FIR under Section 304-A IPC at the threshold on the ground of limitation.

Justice Surya Partap Singh held that although the challan was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, Section 473 Cr.P.C. empowers the trial Court to take cognizance after expiry of limitation if the delay is properly explained or if it is necessary in the interest of justice. The High Court directed the trial Court to decide the plea of limitation before framing of charge.

The judgment carefully balances the statutory bar under Section 468 Cr.P.C. with the discretionary extension available under Section 473 Cr.P.C., while exercising restraint under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The FIR dated 04.01.2015 was registered at Police Station Kundli, District Sonipat, under Sections 304-A and 34 IPC. The complaint alleged medical negligence during surgery which resulted in the death of the complainant’s brother.

According to the complainant, his brother had been admitted for surgery of a fractured hand. During the operation, anesthesia was allegedly administered negligently, after which the patient lost consciousness and was declared dead while being shifted to another hospital. It was alleged that wrong medicines and negligent treatment by the attending doctors, including the petitioner, caused the death.

The investigation culminated in filing of the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. in October 2019 — more than four and a half years after the incident.

The petitioner approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the FIR on the sole legal ground that cognizance was barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C.

Whether Cognizance Was Barred by Limitation?

The petitioner argued that Section 304-A IPC is punishable with imprisonment up to two years. Under Section 468(2)(c) Cr.P.C., the limitation period for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year but not exceeding three years is three years.

Since the incident occurred on 04.01.2015 and the challan was filed in October 2019, the filing was clearly beyond the statutory limitation period. It was contended that the Magistrate was precluded from taking cognizance and the proceedings deserved to be quashed.

Reliance was placed on earlier decisions of the High Court in Manvir v. State of Haryana and Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana.

The State, however, invoked Section 473 Cr.P.C., which provides an exclusion clause permitting cognizance even after expiry of limitation if the delay is properly explained or if it is necessary in the interest of justice.

Section 468 and Section 473 Cr.P.C.

Justice Surya Partap Singh reproduced Section 468 Cr.P.C., which mandates:

"No Court shall take cognizance of an offence… after the expiry of the period of limitation."

The Court observed that in the present case, the filing of the challan was indeed beyond the prescribed limitation period.

However, the Court immediately turned to Section 473 Cr.P.C., which provides:

"Any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied… that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice."

The State had explained in the final report that delay occurred due to the time taken in obtaining the Medical Board’s opinion regarding the cause of death. The report of the Medical Board was received on 10.05.2019, after which the challan was filed without undue delay.

The High Court noted that the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. itself contained this explanation. However, the trial Court had not yet applied its mind to whether this explanation justified extension of limitation under Section 473 Cr.P.C.

In these circumstances, the Court held: "Since any opinion has not been rendered by the learned trial Court with regard to plea as to whether any ground for condonation of delay in the light of Section 473 Cr.P.C. is made out or not, it is hereby held that at this stage it shall not be appropriate for this Court to record its observations with regard to the above-mentioned plea."

Scope of Inherent Powers Under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The High Court emphasized judicial restraint while exercising inherent jurisdiction. It observed that the question whether delay is properly explained is a matter requiring factual consideration by the trial Court.

The Court held that it would be inappropriate at this stage to render findings on the sufficiency of explanation under Section 473 Cr.P.C. Instead, the proper course was to permit the trial Court to decide the plea of limitation before framing of charge.

The Court further clarified that if any party is aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court on limitation, it would be open to them to approach the appropriate appellate or extraordinary forum.

The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was disposed of with a direction to the trial Court to hear the parties on the plea of limitation under Sections 468 and 473 Cr.P.C. before framing of charge and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law.

The High Court declined to quash the FIR at this stage.This ruling reinforces that while Section 468 Cr.P.C. creates a statutory bar on taking cognizance after expiry of limitation, the bar is not absolute. Section 473 Cr.P.C. acts as a safety valve, enabling courts to extend limitation where delay is properly explained or where justice so demands.

At the same time, the judgment underscores that such discretion must first be exercised by the trial Court after due consideration of the explanation on record. The High Court, in exercise of inherent powers, will not ordinarily pre-empt that determination.

The decision serves as an important reminder that limitation in criminal law is not merely a technicality, but neither is it a rigid barrier when justice requires adjudication on merits.

Date of Decision: 11 February 2026