Criminal Trial – Conviction for Uncharged Offence – Sections 236–237 CrPC – Section 326 IPC – Conviction Upheld – Accused charged under Section 307 IPC but evidence established an offence under Section 326 IPC – Held: Where facts could have justified framing alternative charges under Sections 307 and 326 IPC, Section 237 CrPC authorises conviction for the offence proved though not charged – Conviction under Section 326 IPC proper [Paras 3-5].

Practice and Procedure – Section 237 CrPC Explained – Privy Council Applied – Begu v. The King Emperor affirmed the principle that a conviction can be entered for an offence disclosed by evidence even without a specific charge, if an alternative charge could have been framed under Section 236 – Procedure held proper [Para 5].

Non-Examination of Witnesses – Adverse Inference – Jury Properly Directed – No Failure of Justice – Absence of certain neighbours or search-witness did not vitiate the trial – Sessions Judge expressly directed jury they could draw an adverse inference if they deemed fit – Existing evidence, if believed, was sufficient to sustain conviction [Para 7].

Charge to Jury – Judicial Comment on Defence – No Prejudice – Sessions Judge’s strong remarks about an unsubstantiated defence were coupled with clear caution that the jury must decide independently – On the record the defence story was rightly rejected [Paras 8-9].

Accused’s Examination – Section 342 CrPC – Test is Prejudice – Examination Adequate in a Simple Case – Accused must show material prejudice from any deficiency – None pleaded in appellate grounds nor shown on record – Three focused questions covered the case sufficiently – No miscarriage of justice [Para 10].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – Conviction under Section 326 IPC and three years’ rigorous imprisonment affirmed – Enhancement rule discharged [Paras 2, 6, 11-12].

Succession to the impartible Bodinaickanur Zamindari - Impartible Zamindari – Overall Succession Dispute – Mitakshara & Primogeniture – All Appeals Dismissed – Estate held to retain joint family character; widow’s claim to zamindari rejected; third branch (Rajaya) entitled to succeed by lineal primogeniture; Boothipuram held separate/self-acquired of Kandasami devolving on widow; pannai lands/buildings upheld as strīdhanam of Kamuluammal; release of 1934 vitiated by fraud – Final result: all appeals fail and are dismissed with costs [Paras 3, 19-21, 22-25, 32-41, 45-47].

Impartible Estate – Whether converted into separate property by 1890 arrangement – Not proved – Documents (Exs. P-17, P-18) and contemporaneous statements show only postponement of Kandasami’s possession during widow’s life; no intention to change character from joint family impartible estate; widow’s plea that zamindari became separate property of Kandasami/Kamaraja II rejected [Paras 25-26, 32, 36, 38-40].

Partition vs. Alienation in Impartible Estate – Power to alienate does not imply power to partition – Holder’s alienation power cannot be used to infer a power to divide or disrupt impartible character – Argument that Kandasami effected division by allotments rejected [Para 37].

Test for Disruption/Renunciation – Clear intention by junior members to surrender expectancy required – Mere allotments for maintenance or arrangements for possession do not suffice – On facts, no renunciation of survivorship by junior branches; zamindari remained joint family property for purposes of succession [Paras 32-36].

Boothipuram Village – Character and Devolution – Separate/self-acquired property of Kandasami under family arrangement – Taken out of zamindari by common consent and given absolutely; devolved on his son as separate property; widow (Chinnathayi) entitled as heir to husband – Trial Court view reversed, High Court affirmed, Supreme Court concurs [Paras 22-23].

Pannai Lands & Buildings – Strīdhanam of Kamuluammal – Devolution on grand-daughters; 1934 release in favour of Kamaraja II vitiated by fraud – Pannai lands ceased to be part of joint family estate; possession to widow (Chinnathayi) as strīdhanam heir; contrary claim of zamindar rejected [Para 21].

Effect of Release by Junior Branch (Ex. P-17) – No extinguishment of survivorship rights – General words construed in context; release confined to then-present claims (recognition of Kandasami as next heir) and not future contingent survivorship – Valid relinquishment must be in favour of head/all branches; here release in favour of widow, a non-coparcener – Claim of fourth branch (Kulasekara) fails; third branch (Rajaya) succeeds [Paras 41-45].

Decision – Appeals Dismissed – Claims of widow to zamindari and of fourth branch negatived; decree in favour of third branch (Rajaya) to zamindari maintained; Boothipuram to widow; pannai lands/buildings to strīdhanam heirs; all appeals dismissed with costs [Paras 45-47].

Tenancy – Lease by Receiver – Section 106, Transfer of Property Act – Monthly tenancy inferred – Defendant’s father originally held land under Prodhan’s patta (1913) – Kabuliyat executed in 1924 before Receiver was inoperative – Rent payments in 1925 and 1926 accepted by Receiver on behalf of estate created fresh tenancy – Held: tenancy from month to month arose, not annual lease – Notice to quit valid – Plaintiff entitled to possession [Paras 3, 12-16].

Prodhan’s Patta and Kabuliyat – Invalidity – Prodhan had no authority to settle zamindari land; patta void – Kabuliyat of 1924 ineffective as lease under Section 107, Transfer of Property Act – Covenant for perpetual renewal vague and beyond Receiver’s authority – No permanent tenancy created; adverse possession claim rejected [Paras 4-5, 8-9].

Mode of Rent Payment – Annual rent vs. monthly tenancy – Annual rent payment alone does not alter legal character of tenancy – Section 106 lays down rule of construction; tenancy for building purposes presumed monthly – Mere annual expression of rent does not create annual tenancy without registered lease – Law will not substitute an invalid contract with another arrangement [Paras 13-15].

Res Judicata and Consistency – Earlier litigation (1937 suit) already determined tenancy to be month-to-month under Section 106 – Defendant’s later admissions confirm this – No case made that annual rent implied one-year tenancy – Consistent judicial findings binding [Para 16].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Plaintiff’s right to possession upheld – Defendant held monthly tenant since 1924 – Proper notice to quit validly terminated tenancy – Costs awarded to plaintiff [Paras 16-17].

Illegitimate Sons – Right to Maintenance – Mitakshara Law – Recognition of Status – Held entitled – Under Mitakshara law, illegitimate sons of a regenerate class father are entitled to maintenance throughout their lives in recognition of their status as family members, even though excluded from inheritance – The doctrine of “compassionate allowance” is inappropriate, the true position being entitlement to maintenance as of right [Paras 2-3].

Quantum of Maintenance – Factors to be considered – Income of family properties, past support, and earning capacity of claimants – Trial Court fixed Rs. 100 per mensem – High Court enhanced to Rs. 200 – Supreme Court held High Court erred by considering post-death change of circumstances and ignoring losses in business and earning capacity of plaintiffs – Proper rate fixed at Rs. 125 per mensem for each plaintiff [Paras 4-6].

Decision – Appeal No. 26 partly allowed – High Court decree modified to grant Rs. 125 per mensem maintenance to each plaintiff – Appeal No. 27 dismissed – No costs in Supreme Court, but proportionate costs to plaintiffs in courts below [Para 7].

Appeal against Conviction for Murder – Article 134 Constitution – CrPC Sections 208, 209, 287, 342 – Evidence Act Section 1 – Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt – Two brothers convicted of murdering Shiv Singh – One (Bheru) consistently admitted firing; the appellant (Hate) consistently denied complicity – Supreme Court held that the prosecution evidence did not dispel reasonable doubt when tested against the defence version and supporting circumstances – Conviction set aside and appellant acquitted [Paras 1-3, 6-7, 26-27].

Accused’s Statements under CrPC – Evidentiary Value – Must be Treated as Evidence – Statements recorded under Sections 208, 209 and 342 CrPC are substantive material to be “received in evidence and treated as evidence” – Courts must consider exculpatory portions with the same weight as inculpatory ones – Owing to presumption of innocence, a reasonable defence consistent with probabilities must be accepted unless the prosecution proves it false beyond reasonable doubt – Fundamental approach ignored by courts below [Para 8].

Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony – Non-Recovery of Projectiles – Inability to Exclude Defence – Doctor opined that three anterior gunshot wounds could have been caused by a single discharge – Failure to recover shot/pellets deprived the court of crucial differentiation between the double-barrel breech-loader and the muzzle-loader – Medical evidence did not negate the defence that only one person (Bheru) fired both shots [Paras 3-4, 10].

Recovery and Condition of Weapons – Corroboration of Defence Version – Double-barrel gun (Art. D) found buried; muzzle-loader (Art. E) found openly displayed – Seizure memo and witness (P.W. 13) indicated only one gun was loaded, consistent with defence that the double-barrel had been discharged twice and the muzzle-loader remained unused – Investigative lapse in not examining barrels for fouling noted – These circumstances lend credence to defence [Paras 11-15].

Eye-Witness Credibility – Inconsistencies and Attempts to Align with Physical Exhibits – Key eye-witnesses inverted who held which weapon and invented an assault with a broken gun-butt inconsistent with lack of head injury and with which gun was broken – Their accounts conflicted with the committal-stage case and with distances/movements shown on the sketch map – Such vacillation undermines reliability against the appellant [Paras 17-23].

Circumstantial Conduct Evidence – Second Shot Not Seen by Prosecution Witnesses – Several witnesses heard two shots but none saw the second despite being within sight; this fits quick successive discharges from a double-barrel gun and undermines the version that there was a time gap allowing observation between shots – Supports defence narrative [Para 24].

Use of Abscondence – Duty to Put to Accused under Section 342 CrPC – Courts below relied on abscondence but this incriminating circumstance was never put to the accused – It is imperative to put each material fact to the accused and afford an opportunity to explain; failure vitiates reliance on that circumstance [Para 25].

Standard of Proof – Reasonable Doubt Where Defence is Reasonable and Probable – When an accused offers a reasonable, probable defence supported by some prosecution evidence, the burden on the prosecution is heavier; where its case is weak and vacillating, benefit of doubt must follow – Departure from this rule corrected on appeal [Para 26].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Conviction and death sentence of appellant set aside – Appellant to be released forthwith [Para 27].

Contract – Suit for damages for breach of contract - Frustration – Sections 32 and 56, Contract Act – Appeal Allowed – Settlement required delivery of 61 bales by a date certain, with language that goods would be delivered “as soon as they are prepared” and “as soon as they are supplied to us by the said Mill” – Held: words regulate manner and time of performance and describe goods, they do not make supply by the mill a condition precedent – Performance not contingent under Section 32, nor rendered impossible under Section 56 – High Court’s contrary view erroneous – Trial court decree for damages restored [Paras 2, 5-10, 12-15].

Construction of Commercial Contracts – “As and when supplied by the mill” – Not a Contingency but a Mode of Performance – Privy Council in Harnandrai v. Pragdas applied – Converting timing/installation language into an “if and when” condition precedent rewrites the contract – Parties did not contemplate non-supply altogether; reference to mills is descriptive and procedural – Commercial parties can bind themselves to procure goods at all events, it being a matter of price and market expectations [Paras 6-9].

Frustration/Impossibility – Burden and Admissions – Defendant’s own admission that 61 bales had not been sold to others when notice was received shows capacity to perform – Mill practice (orders placed and fulfilled against order book) required proof that an order was placed and yet not supplied – No such proof offered – Mere surmise that supply within time might not be possible is insufficient – Non-performance attributable to promisor’s default defeats plea of frustration [Paras 10-12, 14].

Statutory Framework – Primacy of Sections 32 and 56 – Courts must look primarily to the Contract Act – Section 32 governs contingent contracts; Section 56 voids agreements impossible in themselves and contracts that become impossible/unlawful after formation – No “absolving power” outside statute; implied term as to continued state of things arises only where contract and surrounding circumstances compel that inference – Not attracted on facts [Paras 5, 12-13].

Precedents – British Movietone and Tamplin – Scope – Viscount Simon (approving Earl Loreburn in Tamplin): court may infer foundational implied condition only where parties must have so proceeded; otherwise no discharge – Applied to reject frustration here where mills continued and goods could be procured or had not been otherwise appropriated [Paras 12-13].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court set aside – Trial court decree restored – Appellant entitled to costs throughout [Paras 15-16].

Civil Writ - Article 226 – Interim Relief as Sole Relief – Not Permissible – The Orissa High Court declined to decide parties’ rights yet granted interim directions maintaining possession to bridge the Section 80 CPC notice period – Held: Article 226 cannot be used to grant interim relief as the only and final relief; interim orders can be made only in aid of, and ancillary to, a main relief upon adjudication of rights – Language of Article 226 does not permit such action [Paras 6-7].

Foundation of Writ Jurisdiction – Existence of Right – The existence and determination of a legal right is the foundation for issuing writs/directions under Article 226 (“for the enforcement of… rights… and for any other purpose” must be read contextually) – Where the Court expressly refrains from deciding rights, writ relief cannot be granted [Para 6].

Finality of High Court’s Order – Interim Directions Disposed the Petitions – Though time-limited, the High Court’s order finally disposed of the petitions; hence appeals were maintainable – The characterization of relief as “interim” does not detract from its final nature when no other adjudication is made or kept pending [Para 6].

Section 80 CPC – No Bypass via Article 226 – Directions were issued merely to circumvent the 60-day notice requirement; such use is outside the scope of Article 226 – Proper course would have been to determine rights and, pending such determination, maintain status quo if warranted [Para 7].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s orders dated 2 August 1951 (and related stay order) set aside – Writ petitions dismissed; respondents to pay costs of the appeals [Paras 5, 8].

Mortgage Suit – Attestation Defect – Limitation for Personal Decree – Section 20, Limitation Act; Order 7 Rule 6 & Order 41 Rule 33 CPC – Appeal Allowed – Suit Dismissed – Plaintiffs sued on a simple mortgage; trial court refused sale for defective attestation but granted personal money decree; High Court upheld money decree while holding attestation good yet declined mortgage relief for want of cross-objection – Held: (i) bond not duly attested and cannot rank as a mortgage; (ii) personal remedy time-barred as Section 20 requires written acknowledgment of part-payments existing prior to suit; later admissions in written statement do not cure limitation; (iii) question of granting mortgage decree under Order 41 Rule 33 does not arise – Appeal allowed; suit dismissed; parties to bear own costs [Paras 2-5, 7-12, 14-16].

Limitation – Section 20 (Part-Payment) – What Extends Time – Payment must occur within limitation and be proved only by acknowledgment “in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by,” the payer – The acknowledgment may be made after expiry of the original period, but it must exist before the suit is filed; oral proof excluded; written statement admissions filed after institution cannot be relied upon to revive a time-barred claim – Order 7 Rule 6 requires the plaintiff to plead grounds of exemption existing at the date of suit – Held, personal decree barred [Paras 7-12].

Amendment of Pleadings – Relation Back – Amended averments form part of original plaint, but cannot introduce post-suit events to save limitation – No acknowledgment in writing prior to filing was pleaded or proved; Section 20 not attracted [Paras 10-12].

Mortgage – Attestation – Invalid When Witnesses Sign Before Execution – Evidence showed witnesses attested at the mortgagee’s village when the deed was written (8 April 1927), but executants signed later at Katihar on registration date (12 April 1927); attestation thus not contemporaneous with execution – Bond cannot be treated as a mortgage [Paras 14-15].

Appellate Powers – Order 41 Rule 33 CPC – When Not Invoked – In absence of valid attestation, no mortgage decree could be passed; therefore, the plea to grant mortgage relief under Order 41 Rule 33 despite no cross-objection does not arise [Paras 13, 15].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgments and decrees of courts below set aside – Plaintiffs’ suit dismissed – Each party to bear own costs in all courts [Para 16].

Land Revenue – Government Resolution of 1865 – Invalid Grant but Long Possession – Effect – Government gave land to Municipality for market free of rent; no formal grant executed as required by statute – Municipality built Crawford Market at large expense and remained in possession over 70 years without paying assessment – Held: possession under colour of invalid grant matured into title by limitation; title included incident of rent-free holding for market purpose – Immunity from assessment became inseparable incident of title; constituted a “right in limitation” under Section 8, Bombay Act II of 1876 [Paras 2-3, 10-11].

Section 8, Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876 – “Specific Limit” Includes Nil – High Court correctly held and Supreme Court affirmed that total exemption from assessment falls within “specific limit” preserved – Section 8 protects both partial limitation and total exemption [Paras 11, 13].

Rent vs. Land Revenue – Distinction Not Open – Contention that “rent” in Resolution did not include “land revenue” rejected – Not raised in pleadings or issues; correspondence showed both parties understood “rent” as including land revenue – Government estopped from raising new plea [Para 12].

Estoppel and Equity – Section 115 Evidence Act – Representation by Government that land was rent-free, acted upon by Municipality, could not be repudiated after decades – Equity requires Government not to resile from assurance; otherwise it would amount to legal fraud – Courts bound to enforce honesty and good faith against State action [Paras 29-31].

Adverse Possession – Effect on Title and Assessment – By over 60 years’ uninterrupted possession under invalid grant, Municipality perfected title to land but adverse possession cannot extinguish Crown’s prerogative right to assess land revenue – However, right to hold rent-free arose as incident of prescribed title, not by extinguishment of prerogative [Paras 21-23, Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. concurring].

Judicial Opinions – Majority (Das J., C.J. Kania, Bose J., Aiyar J.) held appeal to fail – Minority (Patanjali Sastri J.) dissented, holding no exemption right was established and appeal should succeed [Paras 14-24].

Decision – Appeal dismissed by majority – High Court decree upheld – Respondent Corporation entitled to hold Crawford Market site perpetually rent-free for market purposes – Costs awarded against Collector [Para 13, 33].