Appeal against dismissal of suit to avoid compromise decree – O.32 R.7 CPC and O.6 R.4 CPC – Compromise decree in 1924 partition suit challenged for coercion/undue influence and want of proper sanction – Held: Trial court then had Order 32 Rule 7 in view and granted permission noting benefit to minors – subsequent “approval” need not precede negotiations; omission would at most render it voidable at minor’s option, not a nullity – Unfairness alone cannot upset a decree absent fraud/negligence of guardian – Present suit dismissed; partition issues to be agitated in the earlier pending suit [Paras 14-26, 23, 25, 39].

Order 32 Rule 7 – Court’s sanction for minors – Form and timing – Entry recording that permission is granted because compromise is for minors’ benefit suffices – No rigid form required; judge’s satisfaction apparent from orders dated 17–18 Nov 1924 – Sanction need not be obtained before negotiations commence; absence of sanction renders compromise voidable, not void – Allahabad FB distinguished; Patna view (requiring pre-negotiation sanction) disapproved [Paras 14-23].

Decrees based on compromise – Can a minor set aside a partition merely for unfairness? – No – A decree (consent or otherwise) binds the minor properly represented unless fraud or negligence of next friend/guardian ad litem is shown – Rule permitting avoidance for mere unfairness applies to partitions not effected by decree [Paras 24-26].

Pleadings – Fraud, undue influence, coercion – Particulars mandatory – Allegations must be specifically and separately pleaded with full particulars; general averments insufficient – Order 6 Rule 4 CPC applied – Here, coercion/undue influence not separately pleaded; particulars lacking [Paras 27-33].

Evidence – Coercion/undue influence not proved – Only one witness suggested any threat; not corroborated – Multiple contemporaneous factors negate compulsion: engagement of two pleaders, rejection of first draft, reading over and assent, repeated reliance on compromise by plaintiff’s father in later suits, long delay without challenge including after adversary’s death – No proof of inequality in values at time of compromise [Paras 34-36].

Partition relief – Proper forum – Though some properties admittedly remained undivided, determination to be pursued in the previously instituted partition suit between the same parties – Present declaratory suit dismissed without prejudice to pursuing partition there [Paras 37-39].

Decision – Appeal dismissed with costs – Dismissal without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to seek partition of properties alleged to be omitted from the 1924 decree in the pending suit [Para 39].

Civil Law - Lease - Holding Over – Section 116 TPA – Acceptance of Rent Before Expiry Not Sufficient – No Assent to Continued Possession – Lease ended by efflux of time; rent for 1937–38 was paid and accepted nearly a year before expiry and both sides proceeded on footing of expiry on 23 February 1938 – Section 116 requires acceptance of rent or other assent after determination and as equivalent to assent to continued possession – No such assent here; at most, parties impliedly extended term to 31 March 1938 to align with financial year – No notice under Section 106 necessary; ejectment decree upheld [Paras 14–21].

Construction of Lease Clauses – Forfeiture/Retention – Clause 11 (Part I) applies only to premature termination for breach; inapplicable on normal expiry – Clause 1 (Part III) governs expiry by efflux: lessee may keep bricks etc. for 3 months; “bricks and other materials” left thereafter vest absolutely in lessor – “Other materials” means building materials (e.g., bricks, tiles), not engines, trucks, kilns, tramway lines, plant or machinery – Decree modified accordingly; removal time for machinery etc. granted [Para 22, 24].

Injunction – Title to Materials Vested – Permanent injunction restraining removal of bricks and other (building) materials proper once title vested in lessor; authorities distinguishing cases where plaintiff lacked possession/title inapplicable [Para 23].

Decision – Appeal substantially dismissed with costs – Clarified that only building materials (bricks, tiles and similar articles manufactured on site) vest in respondent; appellants allowed three months from date of decree to remove boilers, engines, trucks, kilns, railway and tram lines, etc. [Para 24].

Criminal writ - Preventive Detention – Article 19(1)(a) vs Article 22 – Detention Held Valid – Petitioners contended that detention for making speeches affecting public order infringed their right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) and was therefore unconstitutional – Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle laid down in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras that a law relating to preventive detention is to be tested under Articles 21 and 22, not Article 19 – Held: Detention under valid law not open to challenge on the ground that it incidentally restricts Article 19 rights – No inconsistency found between earlier decisions in Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan cases and Gopalan [Paras 5–6].

Preventive Detention – Grounds of Detention – Article 22(5) – Grounds Not Vague – Petitioners argued that the grounds communicated were too vague and lacked particulars of the allegedly prejudicial speeches – Supreme Court held that time, place, and general nature of speeches (inciting Hindu-Muslim disaffection) were communicated and sufficient for representation – Held: Grounds were not vague and requirements of Article 22(5) were met – Suggestion that offending passages must always be included was rejected [Paras 7–10].

Preventive Detention – Duration of Detention – Validity of Indefinite Order – Petitioners contended that orders were invalid as they did not specify period of detention – Supreme Court reiterated that Section 12 of the Preventive Detention Act limits maximum detention to one year – Held: Detention order not invalid for want of specific period – Such orders are not indefinite in nature due to statutory maximum [Para 11].

Preventive Detention – Allegations of Malice – Burden of Proof on Detenu – Petitioners alleged political motive behind detention to stifle opposition to ruling party – Supreme Court held that allegations of mala fide conduct must be clearly proved – District Magistrate denied mala fides and affirmed detention was for public order – Held: Petitioners failed to discharge burden of proof regarding mala fide action [Para 12].

Preventive Detention – Dissenting Opinions – Orders Held Invalid by Minority – Justice Mahajan and Justice Bose dissented – Held: Grounds lacked sufficient particulars for effective representation – Failure to provide substance of offending speeches rendered right under Article 22(5) illusory – Detention held illegal – Suggested standard: Offending words or substance must be disclosed where feasible, especially in political speech cases [Mahajan J.: Paras 18–21; Bose J.: Paras 22–33].

Decision – Majority Upholds Detention – Writ Petitions Dismissed – The majority of the Supreme Court upheld the detention orders as valid under the Preventive Detention Act – Held: Grounds communicated were adequate and detention lawful – Petitions under Article 32 dismissed [Paras 13, 17].

Civil Writ - Public Employment – Communal Reservation – Article 16 of the Constitution – Communal G.O. Declared Void – The petitioner, a qualified Brahmin advocate, was denied selection for the post of District Munsif under a communal reservation scheme that allocated posts to specific castes and communities – The Court held that while Article 16(4) allows reservation for backward classes, the reservation of posts for Muslims, Christians, Non-Brahmin Hindus and Brahmins who are not identified as backward classes is unconstitutional – Held: The Communal G.O. is inconsistent with Article 16(1) and (2) and is hence void [Paras 3-4].

Equality – Caste and Religious Discrimination – Reservation not Based on Backwardness – The Court emphasized that Article 16(4) cannot be used to reserve posts for caste or religious groups unless they are shown to be backward classes inadequately represented – Held: The petitioner’s exclusion based solely on caste was discriminatory and violated his fundamental rights under Article 16(1) and (2) [Para 4].

Relief – Prospective Application – Appointments Already Made Not Cancelled – The Court took note that many candidates had already taken charge and declined to cancel their appointments – However, it directed the petitioner’s application to be considered afresh on merit, disregarding the unconstitutional communal rotation – Held: Petitioner’s application to be decided without reference to communal G.O. – Costs awarded to petitioner [Para 5].

Civil Writ - Admissions Policy – Community Quotas – Articles 29(2), 15(1), 13 – Communal G.O. Struck Down – Petitions under Article 226 assailed the Madras Government’s communal proportions for college admissions – Held: Article 29(2) guarantees an individual citizen’s right not to be denied admission to State-maintained/aided institutions on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language – The Communal G.O. denies admission solely on such grounds and is void under Article 13 – Appeals dismissed [Paras 8–15].

Fundamental Rights vs. Directive Principles – Articles 29(2), 46, 37, 32 – Directive Principles Cannot Override Fundamental Rights – State’s reliance on Article 46 (promotion of weaker sections/Scheduled Castes & Tribes) rejected – Part IV principles, though fundamental in governance, are non-justiciable (Art. 37) and must conform to Part III; they cannot abridge enforceable Fundamental Rights vindicable under Article 32/226 [Para 10].

Art. 16(4) vs. Education Admissions – Constitutional Design – Presence of explicit enabling clause for reservation in public employment (Art. 16(4)) and its omission in Art. 29(2) is significant – Constitution did not contemplate communal considerations in admissions to State institutions; Art. 29(2) controls – Comparison underscores invalidity of the Communal G.O. in education [Para 12].

Merit and “Grounds Only” Test – Application to Facts – Where candidates (e.g., Srinivasan) had higher marks yet were excluded from seats reserved for other communities, denial rests only on caste/religion – Such exclusion infringes Art. 29(2) notwithstanding internal caps for particular communities [Paras 13–14].

Maintainability – Non-application Caveat – One petitioner had not actually applied; Court proceeded in the peculiar circumstances (seat kept pending), but cautioned this should not be taken as approval for future non-applicant petitions under Art. 29(2) [Para 6].

Decision – Communal G.O. declared inconsistent with Art. 29(2) and void under Art. 13 – High Court’s writs affirmed – State’s appeals dismissed with costs [Paras 15–16].

Labour Law - Industrial Tribunal – Constitution and Jurisdiction – Sections 7 and 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act – Award Held Without Jurisdiction – Where one member of the Tribunal was deputed elsewhere and became unavailable – Government failed to either reconstitute the Tribunal or issue a fresh notification under Section 7 – Held: Two remaining members could not legally function as the Tribunal – Interim awards passed during this period are void – Rule 12 (then in force) requiring party consent further indicated the need for proper constitution – Awards made and signed only by two members during that period lacked jurisdiction [Paras 4–10, 15, 18].

Tribunal Member Resuming Duties – Need for Fresh Appointment – Section 8 and Rule 5 – Resumption without Notification Invalid – Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, having ceased to be available, could not resume his seat without a formal reappointment – No new notification was issued under Section 7 – Held: Tribunal of three ceased to exist and resumption by the third member without reappointment was invalid – Final award signed by all three members after such irregularity was also without jurisdiction [Paras 13–14].

Quorum and Composition – No Provision in Section 7 for Reduced Bench – Unlike Sections 5 and 6 which allow functioning with quorum, Section 7 requires joint functioning of all members – Absence of express provision for reduced bench implies that all members must sit and hear together – Functioning with only two members without proper reconstitution was not permitted [Paras 5, 8, 54–55].

Notification Requirement – Rule 5 of 1949 Rules – Proper Constitution Demands Notification – Original Tribunal was constituted via notification naming all three members – Any change in number or composition of members required fresh notification – Government’s internal intention to allow two members to proceed without such notification had no legal effect – Held: The two-member body was not a legally constituted Tribunal [Paras 6–7, 63–64].

Final Award and Joint Hearing – Section 15 and 16 – Joint Hearing and Deliberation Required – All members must hear the matter before signing the award – Mr. Aiyar did not participate in the entire hearing and hence could not validly sign – Signature was not surplusage – Full award held invalid due to this fundamental procedural defect [Paras 13–14, 16].

Government Discretion under Section 8 – Not Absolute – Action Must Be Formal – Although Government had discretion not to fill a vacancy, it could not keep that decision in abeyance – No implied right to allow remaining members to proceed in absence of notification – Section 8 does not confer authority to act without proper reconstitution – All such proceedings held void [Paras 7–10, 17, 53–56].

Decision – Tribunal Not Properly Constituted – Awards Void – Supreme Court held that due to lack of proper reconstitution under Section 7 and irregular resumption of duties by Mr. Aiyar without appointment, all interim and final awards passed by the Tribunal were without jurisdiction and hence void [Paras 18, 65].

Cognizance of Offence – Stage of Taking Cognizance – Section 190 CrPC – Distinction between police investigation and initiation of proceedings – Held: Cognizance is taken when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind for proceeding under Chapter XV CrPC, not when issuing warrants during investigation – Magistrate in present case took cognizance only on 25th March 1949 when issuing notice under Section 190 CrPC [Paras 3-7, 10-11].

Issuance of Warrant – Section 3, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 – Offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC deemed cognizable – Police required order of Magistrate for arrest during investigation – Such warrant does not amount to cognizance under Section 190 CrPC – Cognizance arises only after judicial proceedings commence [Paras 5-7].

Sanction for Prosecution – Section 197 CrPC and Section 6 Prevention of Corruption Act – No court shall take cognizance against a public servant without sanction – In present case, sanction of Provincial and Central Governments obtained prior to 25th March 1949 – Magistrate took cognizance only thereafter – Proceedings held valid – Argument that sanction was necessary at arrest stage rejected [Paras 7, 11].

Interpretation of Case Law – Observations in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty ILR 37 Cal 412 distinguished – Court approved reasoning in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal 437, that judicial application of mind for investigation purposes (e.g. Section 156(3) CrPC) does not amount to cognizance [Paras 8-10].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Cognizance taken only after valid sanction – Prosecution lawful and not vitiated [Para 12].

Article 32 Writs – Special Tribunal Convictions – Finality and Maintainability – Sections 417, 430 CrPC – Part III enforcement via habeas corpus/certiorari/prohibition – Where convictions and sentences have been affirmed by the competent appellate court prior to 26/01/1950, the principle of finality applies – Supreme Court will not, in Article 32, re-open or indirectly set aside such judgments; detention is “according to procedure established by law” – Certiorari/prohibition inappropriate against a court not then subordinate; habeas corpus does not lie to impeach final appellate affirmation save in exceptional cases – Petitions dismissed [Paras 23, 25–33, 35].

Jurisdiction of Special Tribunal – Transfer/Allocation by Civil Administrator – Identification of cases by charge-sheet numbers – Reference to charge-sheet numbers sufficient to particularize cases; however, no specific written order traced for charge-sheet No. 14(2) dated 20/07/1949 affecting Case No. 17 – Prima facie irregularity noted but no relief granted in Article 32 in view of appellate finality; executive clemency invited to consider peculiar facts of A- Elladu [Paras 21–22, 34].

Fair Trial – Right to Counsel – Section 340 CrPC (Hyderabad §271) – Non-assignment of counsel in capital cases – Desirability vs. legal necessity – No universal rule that absence of counsel per se vitiates trial; appellate/revisional court may interfere if lack of legal aid renders trial unfair – On facts, opportunities existed; some accused declined counsel even before High Court; nonetheless, Court emphasizes tribunals should proactively assign counsel in capital cases [Paras 14–20].

Misjoinder of Charges – Section 234 CrPC – Multiple offences including murder/rioting and carrying unlicensed firearms – Distinction between want of jurisdiction and illegality/irregularity – Even assuming procedural defect, it does not render trial coram non judice; corrective remedy lies in appeal/revision; appellate court having affirmed, writ relief unavailable under Article 32 – Subramania Iyer distinguished; later Privy Council decisions noted [Para 4].

Mode of Execution of Death Sentence – Hyderabad CPC §§311 & Form 29; Special Tribunal Regulations (amendment 30/10/1949) – Retrospective operation – Provision specifying execution “by hanging” applies to unexecuted sentences and governs present case; in any event, High Court could impose death by hanging under amended Regulation; contention rejected [Paras 5–8].

Approval/Confirmation (“Manzuri”) vs. “Tashih” – Hyderabad CPC §§20, 302, 307–309 – Regulatory substitution (tausiq/confirmation) and vesting in Military Governor – “Manzuri” not confined to monarch; context denotes confirmation – Regulatory scheme simplified and replaced prior approval/ratification channels; contention that Nizam’s personal assent indispensable rejected [Paras 9–13].

Habeas Corpus – Scope where conviction affirmed on appeal – English authorities reviewed – Limited room to go behind convictions on affidavits; even if trial-court jurisdictional defect arguendo assumed, appellate affirmation by competent court is not a nullity – Finality principle reiterated; no retrospective operation of Constitution to unsettle pre-26/01/1950 final judgments [Paras 26–33].

Decision – All six petitions (Article 32 and connected SLPs) dismissed – No relief under Article 32; observations inviting executive consideration for A– Elladu (Case No. 17) noted [Paras 34–35].

Execution—Scaling down—Order 21 Rule 2 CPC—Section 47 CPC—Sections 7, 8, 14, 19, Agriculturists’ Relief Act—Appeal Allowed—Decree against agriculturist co-debtors can be scaled down without benefiting non-agriculturist co-debtor—Executing court cannot, under guise of interpretation, rewrite decree or record full satisfaction on payments referable only to scaled-down liability of agriculturists—High Court’s contrary approach set aside [Paras 1–3, 6–8, 10–12].

Executing Court’s Limits – Interpretation vs. Alteration – Section 47 CPC – Held: Execution court’s duty is to enforce the decree as drawn; it may construe but cannot make a new decree by treating satisfaction against agriculturists as discharge of the entire mortgage vis-à-vis a non-agriculturist whose liability stands intact under the appellate decree [Paras 7–8, 12].

Agriculturists’ Relief Act – Beneficiaries and Splitting of Debt – Sections 7, 8, 14, 19 – Statutory scheme permits scaling down “notwithstanding any…decree of court,” but relief is confined to “agriculturists”; where some debtors are agriculturists and others are not, the decree can validly be split—reduced as to agriculturists and kept intact as to non-agriculturists—consistent with Section 14 indicating separability within Hindu family debts [Paras 9–11].

Indivisibility of Mortgage Decree – Exceptions – Transfer of Property principles vs. Special Statute – General rule of unity and indivisibility yields where integrity is disrupted or a special statute (Relief Act) intervenes—here the appellate decree itself, and subsequent execution settlements, proceed on split liabilities; non-agriculturist D1 cannot invoke “indivisibility” to ride on agriculturists’ scaling down [Paras 9–12].

Purchaser Cases Distinguished – Relief to Non-Agriculturist Purchasers is Incidental to Purchase, Not Applicable to Co-Debtor – Decisions granting a non-agriculturist purchaser the incidental benefit of a scaled-down burden do not apply where the claimant is himself a mortgagor/judgment-debtor; here no purchaser of equity of redemption—benefit cannot be claimed indirectly by a non-agriculturist co-debtor [Paras 11–12].

Form of Decree and Execution Arrangements – Reading Decree as a Whole – Although decree could have more clearly confined discharge to agriculturists’ shares upon their payment, its plain implication, reinforced by execution-stage settlements and releases, is a split security and debt; full satisfaction could not be entered on payments referable to agriculturists alone [Paras 11–12].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s order set aside; District Judge’s order restored; no order as to costs [Para 12].