Negotiable Instruments – Presumption of Consideration – Burden of Proof – Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – Rebuttal by Circumstantial Evidence – Held: The statutory presumption under Section 118 that every negotiable instrument or endorsement is made for consideration is rebuttable – The burden initially rests on the plaintiff to prove execution, whereafter the presumption shifts to the defendant – Such presumption may be rebutted not only by direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence and adverse presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act – If the party in possession of relevant documents deliberately withholds them, the court may presume that such evidence would have been unfavourable to him – Such adverse inference can rebut the presumption under Section 118 – Custodian-General rightly held that the endorsement of the promissory note was not supported by consideration [Paras 4–9].

Evidence – Burden of Proof – Section 101, 114 of the Evidence Act – Non-production of Documents – Adverse Inference – Burden of proof initially on plaintiff to establish execution and consideration – Once execution proved, presumption under Section 118 arises, but may be displaced by proof of circumstances showing absence of consideration – Failure to produce account books or examine material witnesses who could prove transaction allows court to presume, under Section 114(g), that such evidence would be adverse to the plaintiff’s case – The Custodian-General’s inference based on withholding of account books and non-examination of partner was justified [Paras 5–8].

Administrative Law – Custodian-General – Powers under Section 40 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act – Scope of Judicial Review – Custodian-General’s findings based on legal principles and proper appreciation of evidence – His conclusion that the endorsement lacked consideration not perverse or erroneous – Supreme Court will not interfere under Article 136 when finding of fact is based on proper application of evidentiary principles [Para 9].

Decision: Appeal dismissed with costs – Endorsement of promissory note held unsupported by consideration – Custodian-General’s order upheld [Para 10].

Mines and Minerals – Scope of Coal Bearing Areas Act – Applicability to Worked or Dormant Mines – Notification under Section 4 – Whether Limited to Virgin Land – Held: Act applies not only to virgin land but also to dormant collieries and previously worked mines not actively operated at the time of notification – Notification under Section 4 is not ultra vires merely because land was worked in the past – Interpretation of “unworked land” in preamble does not restrict the express language of the statute [Paras 1–24]

Statutory Interpretation – Use of Preamble – Role in Construing Statutes – Held: Preamble may aid construction when language is ambiguous, but cannot override clear statutory provisions – Sections 4(1), 4(4), and 5(b) indicate Parliament's intent to include previously worked or dormant mines within ambit of Act [Paras 5–8, 10–13, 24]

Fundamental Rights – Article 19(1)(g) and Reasonable Restrictions – Validity of Temporary Prohibition on Mining Operations – Held: Restriction under Section 5(b) preventing mining for 2–3 years due to prospecting is reasonable and in public interest – Parliament is competent to legislate based on technical requirements of prospecting duration [Paras 25]

Constitutional Law – Article 31(2) – Adequacy of Compensation – Challenge to Act on Ground that Compensation Does Not Cover Mineral Rights – Held: Act provides compensation based on principles laid out in Sections 13 and 14 – Even though value of minerals is excluded under Explanation to Section 13(5), such exclusion cannot be questioned due to Article 31(2) bar on challenging adequacy of compensation [Paras 31–32]

Article 31A(1)(e) – Meaning of “Modification” – Temporary Suspension of Mining Rights – Whether Protected – Held: Temporary deprivation or suspension of mining rights qualifies as “modification” under Article 31A(1)(e) – Petitioners cannot challenge Act for lack of compensation under Article 31(2) where rights are modified by law [Paras 26–28]

Property Law – Severance of Mineral Rights – Contention that Worked Mines Form Separate Tenement – Rejected – Held: No legal severance arises merely due to working of mine by lawful owner/lessee – No requirement for separate compensation for mineral estate where land and minerals held as single tenement [Paras 22–23, 33]

Writ Jurisdiction – Non-Citizen Company’s Rights – East India Coal Co. Ltd. Incorporated in UK – Entitlement under Article 31 – Held: Protection under Article 19 not available to non-citizen companies – But Article 31 protections apply even to foreign incorporated entities [Para 1]

Decision: Act is intra vires – Notification under Section 4 upheld – Petitions dismissed with costs – One hearing fee divided between petitioners [Paras 34–36]

Criminal Law – Sentence of Transportation for Life – Nature and Legal Effect – Petitioner convicted for murder under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to transportation for life – Held: Even before the 1955 amendment, such sentence did not necessarily involve deportation overseas – As per Pandit Kishori Lal v. King Emperor, transportation for life is to be treated as rigorous imprisonment for life and can be served in Indian prisons [Paras 5-6]

Penal Code – Section 53A – Retrospective Effect – After the 1955 amendment to the IPC, sentence of transportation for life is to be treated as rigorous imprisonment for life – Held: Petitioner, though sentenced prior to amendment, must be dealt with under the amended Section 53A as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life [Paras 6-7]

Remission – Scope and Effect – Remissions earned by a life convict under prison rules do not ipso facto entitle the convict to release – Held: Remission of sentence under Section 401 CrPC is within the exclusive domain of the appropriate Government – Even if remissions earned equate to 15 or 20 years of sentence, release requires formal remission order – No automatic substitution of life sentence to fixed term [Paras 8-16]

Prison Rules – Interpretation of Bombay Jail Manual – Rules equating life imprisonment to 15 years for remission calculation held to be only for working out remission benefits – Not to be construed as altering substantive sentence – Release conditional on Government order under Section 401 CrPC [Paras 10-15]

Article 32 – Habeas Corpus – No Right to Release Without Formal Remission – Petitioner’s claim of unlawful detention rejected – Held: Life imprisonment continues unless remitted by appropriate authority – Writ of habeas corpus not maintainable when detention is legal under unremitted sentence [Paras 16-18]

Decision: Petition dismissed – Petitioner continues to be under lawful custody – Remissions earned do not automatically reduce life sentence – Release subject to appropriate Government’s discretion under Section 401 CrPC – No relief under Article 32 [Paras 18-19]

Constitutional Law – Article 19 – Validity of Section 144 CrPC – Wide powers conferred on magistrates under Section 144 CrPC challenged as violative of the fundamental rights to free speech and peaceful assembly – Held: Powers under Section 144 are preventive in nature, meant to deal with urgent situations to maintain public order – Exercise of such power is judicial in nature and subject to revision – Not unconstitutional as it imposes reasonable restrictions within the ambit of Articles 19(2) and 19(3) [Paras 1, 19-22, 34]

Criminal Procedure – Section 144 CrPC – Scope and Nature – Section 144 confers powers on specified magistrates to issue prohibitory orders in urgent situations – Power can be exercised ex parte – Order must be in writing and contain material facts – Duration of order is limited to two months – Held: Section 144 is not arbitrary or unlimited – Contains adequate safeguards including right to challenge, revision, and requirement of judicial reasoning [Paras 7-13, 22-23]

Judicial Review – Adequacy of Remedies – Contention that Section 144 order cannot be fairly challenged since magistrate is “judge of his own cause” rejected – Remedies under Section 144(4), 144(5), and High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435 and 439 CrPC ensure judicial oversight – Held: Safeguards inbuilt in statutory scheme sufficient to withstand challenge of being illusory [Paras 22-23]

Freedom of Speech – Prior Restraint – Use of anticipatory restrictions questioned as unreasonable – Court distinguishes Indian Constitution from U.S. framework – Held: Anticipatory restrictions permissible under Indian Constitution as fundamental rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in public interest – Doctrine of “clear and present danger” from U.S. law not applicable in Indian context [Paras 24-28]

Interpretation – “Provocative Slogans” – Vagueness Challenge – Order under Section 144 prohibiting provocative slogans not vague – Term to be interpreted in context – Held: Order sufficiently specific to avoid invalidation on grounds of vagueness or unreasonableness [Paras 30-33]

Industrial Dispute – Law and Order – Restrictions imposed in industrial unrest situation affecting city-wide peace – Order applicable to general public upheld – Held: Restriction on entire public in affected area justified in circumstances of mass unrest and practical difficulty in segregating individuals [Paras 30-32]

Decision: Petition dismissed – Section 144 CrPC upheld as constitutionally valid – Order passed by District Magistrate found reasonable and within scope of law – No relief granted – Special leave petition against Nagpur High Court judgment also declined [Paras 34-36]

Fundamental Rights – Protection against State Action – Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) – Petition under Article 32 against private bank – Not Maintainable – The petitioner alleged violation of his fundamental rights to property due to sale of his shares by the Central Bank of India Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act – Held: Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) are directed against State action and not wrongful acts of private individuals – Violation of property rights by private persons is remediable only under ordinary law – Petition dismissed [Paras 3-4, 7-8].

Interpretation of Article 19(1)(f) – Scope – Article 19 confers freedoms against unlawful restrictions by the State – It does not protect citizens from acts of private parties – Wrongful deprivation of property by individuals not within its purview [Para 3].

Interpretation of Article 31(1) – Clause (1) read with “save by authority of law” – Prohibition is against unauthorised governmental action – Not intended to apply to private individuals – Absence of word “State” does not widen its scope to private disputes – Restoration of Section 299(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 into Article 31(1) does not alter its scope [Paras 4-7].

Legislative Entries – Seventh Schedule – Argument that deprivation of property is beyond legislative competence rejected – Legislative power exists under general entries to enact laws authorising deprivation of property – Article 31(1) presupposes legislative authority for such action [Para 6].

Decision – Petition under Article 32 misconceived – Dismissed without costs [Paras 8-9].

Appeal against Acquittal – Section 417 CrPC – Scope of Appellate Powers – Presumption of Innocence Reinforced – The Sessions Judge acquitted the accused after detailed analysis of evidence, finding prosecution witnesses unreliable and defence of private right plausible – The High Court reversed the acquittal in a summary manner without displacing trial court’s reasoning – Held: In appeals against acquittal, the presumption of innocence stands reinforced, and trial court’s findings can be reversed only on substantial and compelling grounds – High Court erred in convicting the appellants [Paras 5, 13-14].

Prosecution Evidence – Fabricated Injuries – Credibility of Witnesses Doubtful – Evidence relating to Deva Sukh’s injuries found to be fabricated to counter the plea of private defence – Absence of his name in FIR, dying declarations, and initial witness statements created grave doubt – Once reliance is placed on fabricated evidence, prosecution case becomes highly suspicious [Paras 6-10].

Right of Private Defence – Possession over Land – Both Parties Prepared for Clash – Evidence showed that Ratan Singh’s men attempted to forcibly take possession of the disputed land despite Amin delivering possession to Surajpal Singh – Strong indications that appellants’ party was attacked first – Use of force by appellants fell within right of private defence – Prosecution version not trustworthy [Paras 11-12].

Decision – High Court’s conviction set aside – Appeal allowed – Appellants acquitted of all charges [Paras 15-16].

Criminal Trial – Joinder/Misjoinder of Charges – Sections 233, 234(1) & 235 CrPC – Appeal Dismissed – Appellant argued that trial was vitiated by misjoinder as he was effectively tried for four offences though only three charges framed – Held: The second charge (firing one shot at two persons) constituted a single “offence” as it arose from one act of firing – No illegality in trying the three charges together within the exceptions to Section 233 – Conviction and death sentence under Section 302 IPC affirmed [Paras 6-8, 10-11].

Meaning of “Offence” – Single Act Causing Multiple Effects – One Offence – Where only one bullet was fired, the “act” punishable constitutes one offence and cannot be artificially split into two attempts merely because two persons were aimed at or endangered – Courts should avoid a narrow or artificial approach to multiplication of offences from a single act [Para 8].

Section 234(1) CrPC – Multiple Offences of Same Kind within 12 Months – Applicability – Even assuming resort to Section 234(1), the total charges tried did not exceed three, since the “second charge” was one offence notwithstanding two named victims – Hence joinder proper and trial not vitiated [Paras 6-8].

Section 235(1) CrPC – Same Transaction – Clarification – Though argument in High Court invoked “same transaction,” Supreme Court determined the issue on Section 234(1) and the definition of “offence,” rendering the same-transaction inquiry unnecessary on the facts [Para 6].

Precedents – Single Offence from Single Act – Followed – Theft of several bullocks at the same time treated as one offence; misappropriation of several account books as one offence; attempt to cheat a group by one representation as one offence; one false statement implicating two persons as one offence; firing several times at two constables treated as one offence – Principles applied to hold single act of firing here is one offence [Para 8].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Conviction under Section 302 IPC and death sentence maintained; acquittals on Section 307 charges by the Sessions Judge unaffected – No merit in other grounds [Paras 5, 9-11].

Mortgage – Contribution vs Subrogation – Sections 82 & 92 TPA; Section 43 Contract Act; Order 34 Rule 2(1) CPC – Appeal partly allowed with remand – Co-mortgagor redeeming the decree by sale of his separate property claimed personal contribution in equal thirds under Section 43 – Held: Contribution arising out of a mortgage is governed by the special law in the Transfer of Property Act – Section 82 (ratable contribution out of the mortgaged properties) and Section 92 (subrogation) apply – Section 43 of the Contract Act (general law) is excluded absent a “contract to the contrary” – Relief to be moulded as a mortgage decree under Order 34 based on subrogation, not as a personal decree [Paras 31-44, 55-57, 61].

Special Law Prevails over General – Section 82 TPA excludes Section 43 Contract Act – Where the right to contribution stems from a mortgage, the statutory mortgage code (TPA read with CPC) governs – Parties may vary by contract to the contrary, but in its absence, courts cannot import extrinsic equitable or contractual principles to modify Section 82 [Paras 41-44].

Equitable Apportionment by “Benefit Derived” Rejected – Statutory Scheme Controls – Though apportioning by benefits received may seem fair, equitable doctrines cannot override the statute – Privy Council and High Court authorities affirm that mortgage rights (including redemption and contribution) are statutory in India [Paras 39-40].

Alleged Inter Se Agreement Not Proved – Burden and Evidence – Defendants’ plea of a prior oral agreement to apportion liability by benefits failed – Only testimony was of an interested defendant; contemplated writing and registration not executed; key witness (co-defendant Naku) withheld; draft not signed – On probabilities and evidentiary shortcomings, no “contract to the contrary” established [Paras 46-53].

Form of Relief – Subrogation and Mortgage Decree – Though plaint claimed personal money decree, pleadings and prayers (declaration of charge and Order 34 decree) substantively invoke subrogation – Court may grant appropriate mortgage relief notwithstanding inartistic drafting, absent prejudice – Decree to declare sums due (Order 34 Rule 2) and proceed to sale/redemption as per Section 82 allocations [Paras 55-57, 61].

Remand – Computation and Moulding of Decree – Case remanded to ascertain (i) sums paid in satisfaction of the 12 June 1936 mortgage, (ii) interest at contract rate up to decree, (iii) values of mortgaged properties at the date of the mortgage – Liability of each defendant to be computed separately under Section 82; capped at Rs. 40,253-11-10 plus interest against each, with usual mortgage decree for sale and rights of redemption – Costs to abide final result; parties to bear own costs in Supreme Court [Paras 58-63].

Decision – Case remanded – Directions issued for enquiry and for drawing up mortgage decree on subrogation basis under Sections 82 and 92 TPA; appeal otherwise disposed of with no personal decree against defendants [Paras 58-63].

Hindu Succession – Stridhan of Unmarried Woman – Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 – Act Inapplicable to Female Propositus – Appeal Dismissed – Dispute over succession to Bhimabai’s estate; rival claims by sister’s sons (plaintiffs) and paternal uncle’s son by adoption (defendant no. 4) – Held: Even assuming the estate was non-watan and constituted Bhimabai’s stridhan, succession is governed by general Mitakshara rules for a maiden’s property; Act II of 1929 applies only to succession to the separate property of a Hindu male and cannot be invoked for a female’s stridhan – Paternal uncle’s son ranks higher than sister’s sons; defendant no. 4 preferred; appeal dismissed [Paras 5-7, 8].

Scope of Act II of 1929 – Textual Limits – Section 1(2) confines operation to Mitakshara succession “in respect only of the property of males” not held in coparcenary and not disposed by will – The four additional heirs (son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, sister, sister’s son) are statutory heirs only in that limited context – They cannot be interposed to alter the order of heirs to a female’s stridhan [Para 6].

Method of Determining Heirs to a Maiden’s Stridhan – Father’s Sapindas by Propinquity – Under Mitakshara (and Mayukha in Bombay) on failure of uterine brothers, mother and father, succession goes to the father’s sapindas, then mother’s, by propinquity – On that footing, a paternal uncle’s son precedes a sister’s son; the 1929 Act cannot be used indirectly to reorder the father’s heirs for this purpose [Paras 6-7].

Watan Character and Resumption – Issue Not Decided – Although arguments addressed on whether Government “resumption” (1923 resolution) destroyed the watan character, the Court found it unnecessary to decide, as defendant no. 4 prevailed even on the assumption that the estate was non-watan and Bhimabai’s absolute stridhan [Para 5].

Decision – Plaintiffs not nearest heirs; defendant no. 4 has preferential right – Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs inter se; Court of Wards to have costs out of estate as between attorney and client; orders of courts below as to costs to stand [Para 8].