Criminal Procedure – Cognizance of Offences Against Public Justice – Section 195 CrPC – Appellant, a Patwari, made a false report to Tehsildar alleging assault and theft by two individuals – Report ultimately found false and prosecution launched under Section 182 IPC – Held: Under Section 195(1)(a), no court can take cognizance of offences under Sections 172 to 188 IPC except upon a written complaint by the concerned public servant – Filing of charge sheet by police without such complaint is a fundamental legal defect – Cognizance taken without jurisdiction [Paras 3–5].

Criminal Law – Section 182 IPC – Offence Complete on False Information – Appellant’s act of making a false report with expectation of action being taken sufficed to constitute the offence – However, such prosecution required statutory compliance with Section 195 CrPC – Absence of written complaint by Tehsildar renders entire proceedings null and void [Paras 4–5].

Statutory Interpretation – Section 195 CrPC – Mandatory Compliance – Mere forwarding of police report or informal communication by Tehsildar not equivalent to “complaint in writing” – Provision held to be mandatory – Procedural irregularity strikes at root of jurisdiction [Para 5].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction under Section 182 IPC and sentence of three months’ imprisonment set aside – Trial held to be without jurisdiction due to absence of complaint as required under Section 195 CrPC – Proceedings quashed ab initio [Paras 6–7].

Criminal Procedure – Dismissal of Appeal for Default – Power to Rehear – Appellate Court cannot dismiss an appeal for default of appearance of the appellant or counsel – Court must either adjourn the case or decide it on merits after perusing the record – Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal after examining the judgment and record and therefore it was a decision on merits – Such order cannot later be reviewed or recalled by the same court [Paras 7–8].

Appellate Jurisdiction – Section 369 read with Section 424 CrPC – Once judgment is signed, appellate court becomes functus officio – It cannot alter, vary, or review its order except to correct clerical errors – Order recalling dismissal and directing rehearing of appeal is ultra vires and without jurisdiction [Paras 7, 11].

Hearing of Appeal – Section 423 CrPC – Words “if he appears” qualify the requirement of hearing appellant or his pleader – If neither appears, the appellate court can dispose of appeal on merits – Notice to appellant’s counsel under Section 422 sufficient; no need for personal notice to appellant [Paras 8–9].

Inherent Powers – Limitation – Inherent powers cannot be exercised to override express statutory prohibition – Sessions Judge had no inherent power to rehear appeal already disposed of by a signed judgment [Para 10].

Jurisdiction – Distinction Between Error and Lack of Jurisdiction – Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the application but not to set aside his previous final judgment – Order recalling earlier decision was wholly without jurisdiction [Para 11].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Order of restoration passed by Sessions Judge ultra vires and void – High Court rightly upheld bar against review under Section 369 CrPC [Paras 12–13].

Constitutional Law – Freedom of Speech – Sedition – Sections 124A & 505 IPC – Validity upheld – Challenge to constitutionality of Sections 124A and 505 IPC on the ground that they violate Article 19(1)(a) – Held: The provisions, when read in light of Article 19(2), are valid – The restrictions imposed are “in the interests of public order” – Section 124A applies only to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder or incitement to violence – Mere disapproval or criticism of government policy, however strongly worded, is not sedition [Paras 35–38].

Sedition – Meaning and Scope – Distinction between “Disaffection” and “Disapprobation” – Disaffection includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity – Lawful criticism with a view to improvement by lawful means not punishable – Incitement to violence or tendency to cause public disorder constitutes the gist of the offence [Paras 36–37].

Public Order – Reasonable Restrictions – Interpretation of Article 19(2) – “In the interests of” broadens the scope of permissible legislative action – A law need not be directly aimed at maintaining public order if it is enacted in its interest – Section 124A falls within this ambit as it prevents incitement to violence and disorder [Paras 33–38].

Interpretation – Constitutional Consistency – Doctrine of Reading Down – Where a statute admits of two constructions, one constitutional and one not, the Court must prefer the former – Section 124A read down to apply only to speech having a tendency to disorder or incitement to violence – Ensures harmony between fundamental rights and public order [Paras 38–39].

Historical Evolution – Sedition in Indian Law – Traces development from British-era enactments and judicial interpretation – Federal Court’s decision in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King Emperor (1942 FCR 38) preferred over Privy Council’s view in Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao (74 I.A. 89) – “Public disorder” held to be the essence of sedition [Paras 25–28].

Application to Facts – Kedar Nath’s Speech – Accused’s speech contained incitement to overthrow the Government by violence and vilification of public officials – Clearly within mischief of Section 124A as interpreted – Conviction upheld [Paras 42–43].

Section 505 IPC – Validity – Each clause of Section 505 concerns statements likely to induce offences against the State or public tranquility – Such restrictions are reasonable under Article 19(2) [Para 41].

Decision: Section 124A IPC and Section 505 IPC upheld as constitutionally valid – Appeal of Kedar Nath Singh (Crl. A. No. 169/1957) dismissed – Connected appeals (Nos. 124–126 of 1958) remanded to the High Court for disposal in light of this interpretation [Paras 42–44].

Arbitration – Decree on Modified Award – Scope under Arbitration Act, 1940 – After an award was filed in court under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, the parties entered into a compromise modifying the award's terms – Court passed a decree incorporating the modified terms – Held: Even though the Arbitration Act limits the court’s power to modify an award under Section 15, the parties are not barred from settling their disputes differently, and the court is not precluded from incorporating such a lawful compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC into the decree – Such a decree is not a nullity and can be executed [Paras 20-31].

Compromise – Validity of Compromise Modifying Arbitration Award – Court can record a compromise reached after filing of the award and incorporate it into the decree – Power to do so flows from combined reading of Section 41 of the Arbitration Act and Section 141 CPC – No requirement that all alterations to an award must be confined to Section 15 of the Arbitration Act, provided the parties mutually consent [Paras 26, 31].

Execution – Objection to Executability of Decree – Objection by Judgment-Debtor that decree was void as it was based on a modified award and not the original – Rejected – Decree was passed with consent, modifying only the mode of payment and adjusting agreed income tax liability, not altering substance of the award – Execution allowed [Paras 13-14, 32].

Procedural Law – Scope of Section 41 of Arbitration Act – Section 41 read with Order 23 Rule 3 CPC permits a court to record a compromise even in arbitration proceedings after the award is filed – Agreement modifying the award may form part of the operative decree or be appended in a schedule – Executability depends on inclusion in the operative portion [Paras 30-31].

Practice and Procedure – Late Argument Before Supreme Court – Objection as to maintainability of decree on the ground that compromise could not be recorded post-award not raised before courts below – SC entertained and decided the issue to resolve conflicting views across High Courts [Paras 20-21].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Decree passed on compromise modifying award held valid and executable – No bar under Arbitration Act to such compromise – Appellant to pay costs.

Constitutional Law – Article 20(3) – Right against self-incrimination – Scope and applicability – Specimen handwriting, thumb impressions, fingerprints and other physical identifiers taken during investigation – Whether amounts to compelled testimony – Held: "To be a witness" under Article 20(3) does not include giving of thumb impressions, palm impressions, footprints, or specimen handwriting – Such acts do not involve imparting personal knowledge of facts and hence not protected under Article 20(3) [Paras 11-13, 36-39]

Compulsion – Meaning of "Compelled" in Article 20(3) – Mere police custody or questioning by police does not amount to compulsion – Compulsion implies duress or coercion in the form of threat, violence, inducement, or physical constraint – Voluntary actions during custody without coercion are not protected by Article 20(3) [Paras 16-18, 41]

Self-Incrimination – Nature of Evidence – Testimonial vs Physical Evidence – Distinction drawn between 'personal testimony' and mechanical acts like writing samples or fingerprinting – Evidence such as signature or handwriting is not self-incriminatory per se, as it does not by itself establish guilt – Only statements conveying personal knowledge that have a tendency to incriminate fall within the bar of Article 20(3) [Paras 12-13, 36-37]

Evidence Act – Section 27 – Discovery based on accused's statement while in custody – Whether hit by Article 20(3) – Held: Section 27 is constitutionally valid – Information leading to discovery is admissible unless obtained through compulsion – Voluntary disclosure during custody not barred by Article 20(3) [Paras 14, 40]

Criminal Procedure – Police Custody – Presumption of Compulsion – Rejected – No presumption of compulsion merely because statement was made while in custody – Burden on accused to show actual compulsion or coercion in facts of the case [Paras 1-2, 17-18]

Interpretation of "Accused" – Person must be formally accused at the time of making statement to invoke Article 20(3) – Protection not available to statements made before such formal accusation [Paras 15, 43]

Judicial Precedent – Clarification and Restriction of M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra – Supreme Court clarifies that “furnishing evidence” under Article 20(3) does not extend to non-testimonial physical acts – Earlier interpretation in M.P. Sharma holding that ‘to be a witness’ includes all modes of furnishing evidence held to be too broadly stated and partly overruled [Paras 10-13, 35]

Decision: Reference answered – Article 20(3) does not bar obtaining handwriting, fingerprints or other physical identifiers from an accused – Section 27 of the Evidence Act not unconstitutional – Appeals to be heard on merits [Para 19]

Constitutional Law – Article 14 – Equality before Law – Discretion under Section 19 of Slum Areas Act – Challenge on ground of unguided and arbitrary power – Held: Though Section 19(3) does not expressly lay down guidelines, its operation is controlled by the object and purpose of the Act as reflected in the Preamble and operative provisions – Sufficient legislative guidance exists – Discretion is not unguided or discriminatory – Act valid [Paras 18–24]

Delegated Legislation – Validity of Delegation under Section 19(3) – Allegation of excessive delegation – Held: Legislative policy and objectives clearly indicated – Detailed criteria not necessary – Delegation upheld – No abdication of essential legislative function [Paras 24–25]

Fundamental Rights – Article 19(1)(f) – Right to Property – Restriction on execution of eviction decrees – Reasonableness – Held: Restriction imposed by Section 19 is temporary and justified by public interest – Prevention of slum displacement without alternate accommodation is a legitimate legislative objective – Test of reasonableness satisfied – Not violative of Article 19(1)(f) [Paras 26–29]

Rent Control – Section 13 and Section 15 of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act – Right of re-entry by tenant if premises vacated for reconstruction – Refusal of tenant to vacate nullifies such right – Section 19 of Slum Act comes into play after decree is passed – Both statutes operate harmoniously [Paras 3–7, 32]

Doctrine of Harmonious Construction – Conflict between Rent Control Act and Slum Areas Act – Both contain non obstante clauses – Held: Slum Areas Act is a special legislation applicable to declared slum areas – Applies in addition to Rent Control Act – Section 19 overrides to extent of inconsistency [Paras 31–32]

Administrative Law – Quasi-Judicial Function – Competent Authority under Section 19(3) – Bound to follow principles of natural justice and procedure – Decisions subject to appeal under Section 20 – Held: Sufficient safeguards exist against arbitrary exercise of discretion [Paras 22, 29]

Social Welfare Legislation – Protection of Slum Dwellers – Prevention of Eviction Without Rehabilitation – Held: Law must be responsive to post-partition urban housing crisis and influx of population – Temporary curbs on landlord’s rights are constitutionally valid in broader interest of public welfare and orderly redevelopment [Paras 27–29]

Decision: Section 19 of the Slum Areas Act upheld – Not violative of Articles 14 or 19(1)(f) – Writ petition dismissed – No costs awarded [Paras 33–34]

Constitutional Law – Article 14 – Discretionary Power – Section 19 of the Slum Areas Act – Validity of Legislative Guidance – Challenge to Section 19(3) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 on ground that it vests arbitrary power in competent authority to permit or refuse execution of eviction decrees – Held: Provision constitutionally valid – Guidance to competent authority found in policy and purpose of Act as disclosed by its preamble and operative provisions – Object is improvement and clearance of slums and protection of tenants until alternate accommodation becomes available – Discretion is canalised, not arbitrary – Does not offend Article 14 [Paras 18–23].

Delegated Legislation – Excessive Delegation – Discretionary Power – Legislative Policy and Purpose – Power under Section 19(3) not excessive delegation – Legislature has indicated clear policy to prevent eviction of slum dwellers until relocation – Absence of detailed criteria does not vitiate law – Discretion limited by legislative intent and subject to appellate review under Section 20 – No abdication of legislative function [Paras 24–25].

Fundamental Rights – Right to Property – Reasonable Restrictions – Article 19(1)(f) and (5) – Restriction on landlord’s right to obtain possession of property is reasonable and in public interest – Protection to slum dwellers promotes social welfare and prevents creation of new slums – Restriction temporary and proportionate, though duration indefinite – Indefiniteness not fatal – Reasonableness judged in context of post-partition housing crisis and social necessity – Restriction within permissible limits under Article 19(5) [Paras 26–29].

Statutory Interpretation – Conflict between Rent Control Act and Slum Areas Act – Effect of Non Obstante Clauses – Sections 38 of Rent Control Act and 39 of Slum Areas Act both contain non obstante clauses – Special provisions of the Slum Areas Act prevail – Section 19 applies to decrees obtained under Rent Control Act and operates in addition thereto – Both enactments harmoniously construed [Paras 31–32].

Judicial Review – Scope under Article 32 – Court confined to constitutionality of impugned section, not to correctness of administrative orders – Orders of competent authority consistent with legislative policy – Section 19 not ultra vires Constitution [Paras 11, 23].

Decision: Petitions dismissed – Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 upheld as constitutionally valid – No order as to costs [Paras 33–34].

Criminal Conspiracy – Misappropriation of Military Stores – Army Officer Convicted – Accused No. 1, Major E.G. Barsay, conspired with others to smuggle military stores from Dehu Vehicle Depot for illegal sale – Scheme meticulously planned during superior’s leave – Appellant arranged staff transfers, vehicle assignments, and dummy paperwork to facilitate theft – Held: Conspiracy established beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction under Section 120B IPC and Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act upheld [Paras 2-8, 54-79].

Army Law – Concurrent Jurisdiction – Court-Martial vs. Criminal Court – Objection raised that only court-martial could try accused under Army Act – Rejected – Held: Army Act Sections 125-127 envisage concurrent jurisdiction – No action taken by commanding officer under Section 125 – Special Judge under Criminal Law (Amendment) Act had valid jurisdiction – Section 7 of the 1952 Act overrides Army Act for listed offences [Paras 17-27, 36-37].

Procedural Law – Validity of Sanction – Sanction under Section 6(1)(a) Prevention of Corruption Act issued in name of Central Government and signed by Deputy Secretary – Held: Complies with Article 77(1) of Constitution – Valid sanction established through oral and documentary evidence [Paras 38-44].

Investigation – Objection to Legality under Section 5A – Investigating officer authorized by Inspector General of Police, Delhi Special Police Establishment – Technical failure to record reasons for bypassing magistrate’s approval – Held: Investigation irregular but not illegal – No prejudice caused – Conviction not vitiated [Paras 45-47].

Criminal Procedure – Framing of Charges – Conspiracy Charges Involving Public and Private Persons – Valid – Non-public servants may be charged for abetment under Section 109 IPC read with Prevention of Corruption Act – Conviction under Section 5(2) upheld despite omission of Section 34 IPC – No prejudice caused to accused [Paras 50-53].

Witness Testimony – Credibility of Trap Witness – Lawrence acted as decoy and gave detailed account of conspiracy – Courts treated him as interested but not tainted witness – His testimony corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence – Held: Sufficient to sustain conviction of accused No. 1 [Paras 61-79].

Appeal by State – Acquittal of Accused Nos. 2 and 3 – Evidence against them insufficiently corroborated – High Court’s findings accepted – No interference warranted under Article 136 of Constitution [Paras 80-81].

Decision: Appeal by Accused No. 1 dismissed – Conviction and sentence confirmed – Appeal by State against acquittal of Accused Nos. 2 and 3 also dismissed.

Income Tax – Reference under Section 66 – Scope of Jurisdiction – High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 66 is confined to questions of law arising out of the Tribunal's order – Such questions must have been raised before or dealt with by the Tribunal – Held: A question neither raised before the Tribunal nor dealt with by it cannot be said to arise out of its order and is not entertainable by the High Court [Paras 1, 10, 40].

Taxation – Applicability of Amendment – Section 10(2)(vii), Fourth Proviso – Tribunal applied the Fourth Proviso introduced by the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1946 to tax compensation received for loss of a ship – High Court held proviso not retrospective and not applicable to assessment year 1946-47 since it came into force only on 04/05/1946 – Assessment year commenced on 01/04/1946 – Held: Tribunal erred in applying the amended provision; compensation not taxable [Paras 6, 43, 44].

Interpretation – What Constitutes “Question of Law Arising out of Order” – Supreme Court laid down exhaustive principles on when a question of law can be said to arise out of the Tribunal's order – Held: (1) If raised and dealt with, clearly arises; (2) If raised but not dealt with, deemed to arise; (3) If not raised but dealt with, arises; (4) If neither raised nor dealt with, does not arise even if it can be inferred from facts found [Paras 39, 40].

Income Tax – Capital Receipt vs Revenue Receipt – Compensation for war loss of capital asset (ship) – Exceeds original cost – Whether taxable – Held: Amount of Rs. 9,26,532 would be taxable only if the Fourth Proviso applied – As it was not in force at the start of assessment year 1946-47, the amount remained a capital receipt and could not be taxed [Paras 2, 44, 46].

Reference Jurisdiction – Power of Tribunal and High Court – Scope of s.66(1) and s.66(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 – High Court acts in advisory capacity and cannot enlarge Tribunal’s reference – However, new legal contention within scope of question as framed may be entertained – Held: In present case, High Court correctly entertained argument on applicability of proviso since it was implicit in the question referred [Paras 41, 43, 44].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Assessment held invalid – Compensation received not taxable – High Court judgment upheld.