Facts:

The case involves appellants 1, 2, 3, and 4 accused of conspiring to murder Sohan Singh. The prosecution presented circumstantial evidence, including illicit relationships, threats, motive, and the events surrounding the murder. Appellants 1, 2, and 4 were convicted, while appellant 3 had insufficient evidence against him.

Issues:

Establishing a conspiracy to murder Sohan Singh based on circumstantial evidence. The court also had to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of the evidence presented against each appellant.

Held:

The court affirmed the convictions of appellants 1, 2, and 4 based on a comprehensive examination of the evidence. The court emphasized the importance of the illicit relationship, motive, threats, and the actions of appellant No. 4 during the Ramleela program. Recovery of blood-stained items and the false answer provided by appellant No. 4 further strengthened the case, leading to the conclusion that a conspiracy to murder Sohan Singh had been established beyond a reasonable doubt.( Paragraph 1-9)

The court dismissed the argument that the witnesses' testimony was unreliable, endorsing the lower courts' findings. It stressed the significance of false answers by the accused, particularly appellant No. 4 denying her departure from the Ramleela program. These false statements were deemed crucial links in completing the chain of circumstances.( Paragraph 10-16)

The court acknowledged the contradictions in the evidence of a witness against appellant No. 3. It held that the contradictions rendered the evidence unreliable, leading to the setting aside of appellant No. 3's conviction due to the lack of credible proof linking him to the conspiracy or murder.( Paragraph 17-19)

The court directed the immediate surrender of appellants 1, 2, and 4, dismissing their appeal against the convictions. Appellant No. 3, Uttam Chand, was acquitted, and the court ordered his immediate release unless required in another case.( Paragraph 20-22)

Facts:

Respondents recruited through UPSC as Assistant Executive Engineers, and appellants as Assistant Engineers.

Both groups later promoted on an ad hoc basis and subsequently regularized as Executive Engineers.

Dispute arose regarding the treatment of ad hoc service for seniority purposes.

Recruitment rules, including amendments in 1984, and delays in promotions, were central to the case.

Issues:

Whether ad hoc service of appellants should be counted towards seniority, considering the rules, promotions, and delays in regular promotions.

Held:

The court analyzed the recruitment rules, emphasizing promotions from Assistant Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers.

Ad hoc promotions were deemed temporary and subject to specific conditions for counting towards seniority.

The court considered the delay in regular promotions and the amendment in 1984, noting that the seniority of existing officers would be adjusted.

Conclusions: Ad hoc service must meet specific criteria to be counted for seniority. The Tribunal's decision, denying the counting of ad hoc service, was affirmed.

FACTS:

The appellants, legal heirs of Ouseph Joseph, contested the calculation of exemption under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Ouseph Joseph claimed exemption for a rubber plantation and ancillary land, and the Taluk Land Board mistakenly granted excess exemption.

ISSUES:

The correctness of the exemption calculation by the Taluk Land Board, considering the total land area, rubber plantation, and ancillary land.

HELD:

The court observed that the rubber plantation was only 95 acres, with approximately 3 acres as ancillary land. An additional 24.30 acres were dry land and ineligible for exemption. The Taluk Land Board mistakenly granted exemption for an area of approximately 24 acres, exceeding the entitlement. The court acknowledged the excess exemption but decided not to interfere due to the absence of a Revision filed by the Government.( Para 6)

The court affirmed the correctness of the High Court's decision, stating that the judgment required no interference. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were directed to surrender an area of 16.95 acres, as ordered by the High Court.( Para 7)

**************************************

Facts:

The case originated from disputes among the riparian states of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra regarding the allocation and utilization of water from the Krishna River Basin. The Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal issued reports in 1973 and 1976, outlining Scheme A for mass allocation and Scheme B for percentage-based allocation in surplus and deficit years. However, Andhra Pradesh opposed the constitution of the Krishna Valley Authority (KVA) for implementing Scheme B.

Issues:

Whether Scheme B was a decision of the Tribunal and enforceable.

The maintainability of suits under Article 131 concerning water disputes.

The validity of Karnataka's construction of the Almatti Dam and the height it could be raised.

Concerns raised by Maharashtra about potential submergence of land due to dam construction.

Held:

The Court, after careful consideration, held that Scheme B, formulated by the Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal, was not a decision in itself. It was not binding or enforceable under Section 6 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956. The Tribunal's decision primarily rested on Scheme A, and Scheme B was only an advisory aspect for consideration.

The Tribunal's decision, as per Section 5(2) of the Act, was conclusive and binding on the states involved. However, Scheme B was not an integral part of this conclusive decision. The Court clarified that while the Tribunal's decision was final and binding, Scheme B was not mandated to be enforced, and its implementation was subject to the discretion of the concerned states.

While Scheme B was not enforceable, the Court recognized its relevance for future water allocations. The states were not obligated to follow Scheme B but could consider it as a valuable reference for equitable distribution in the interest of all riparian states.

The Court determined that suits under Article 131 were maintainable in the context of water disputes. It emphasized that such suits did not amount to initiating a fresh water dispute under Section 2(c) of the Act. Therefore, the maintainability of the suits was upheld.

The Court rejected the argument that the suits were premature. It held that the availability of a review after a specified date did not render the suits premature. The suits were deemed valid, and the Court proceeded to address the substantive issues raised by the parties.

The Court clarified that the discretion for approving projects of the lowest riparian state rested with the Central Government. This ensured that the utilization of water resources was equitable and balanced, preventing any undue advantage to one state over the others.

The Court, while refraining from granting a mandatory injunction against Karnataka for dam construction, clarified that the Tribunal's decision did not impose project-wise restrictions on water usage. The states were expected to adhere to the overall allocations determined by the Tribunal, but specific projects were not individually restricted.

Regarding the Almatti Dam, the Court allowed Karnataka to raise its height to 519.6 meters, subject to obtaining necessary clearances. The Court emphasized that the Central Government was not obligated to seek concurrence from other states for approving such projects, as long as the overall allocations determined by the Tribunal were maintained.

The Court addressed concerns raised by Maharashtra about potential submergence due to dam construction. It held that such concerns amounted to a separate water dispute and could not be entertained under Article 131. The Court suggested that such issues should be resolved through the appropriate mechanisms provided by the Inter-State Water Disputes Act.

Finally, the Court clarified that the Tribunal's decision was not a decree or judgment. The order for a partial decree did not render the entire report binding. The Tribunal's decision remained a conclusive and binding aspect, and any partial decrees were to be considered in that context.

Facts:

The landlord sought eviction of the tenant under Section 21(1)(a), (h), and (p) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, alleging non-payment of rent and the bona fide requirement of the premises. The Munsif dismissed the application, but the Revisional Court set aside the finding on the acquisition of alternative premises under Section 21(1)(p). The High Court, following a precedent, dismissed the revision, considering non-heritability of non-residential tenancies.

Issues:

Whether tenancy for non-residential purposes is heritable under the Karnataka Rent Control Act.

Whether acquiring vacant possession of a building by a partnership firm, of which the tenant is a partner, triggers eviction under Section 21(1)(p).

Held:

The tenancy for non-residential purposes is heritable under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, following the precedent set by the Constitution Bench in Gian Devi Anand Vs. Jeevan Kumar and Others.

Acquiring vacant possession by a partnership firm, even if the tenant is a partner, does not make the tenant liable for eviction under Section 21(1)(p).

Decision: The order of eviction was quashed, and the application for eviction was dismissed. No order as to costs.

REFERRED CASES:

Gian Devi Anand Vs. Jeevan Kumar and Others, AIR 1985 SC 796 : (1985) 1 SCALE 724 : (1985) 2 SCC 683 : (1985) 1 SCR 1 Supp

Wardington Lyngdoh and others Vs. The Collector, Mawkyrwat, AIR 1995 SC 2340 : (1996) 1 CTC 71 : (1995) 3 SCALE 702 : (1995) 4 SCC 428 : (1995) 3 SCR 354

Venkatesh Thimmaiah Gurjalkar Vs. S.S. Hawaldar, (1997) 8 JT 528 : (1997) 6 SCALE 487 : (1997) 11 SCC 628 : (1997) 4 SCR 497 Supp : (1997) 2 UJ 800

Facts:

Kunal Nanda, an Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) in CRPF, joined CBI on deputation in 1991.

The borrowing department (CBI) expressed interest in his permanent absorption in 1994.

Deputation extended with mutual consent, and the appellant was recommended for absorption as a Sub-Inspector.

Discrepancy arose regarding educational qualifications, and the appellant's misrepresentation was noted.

The appellant, not being a graduate, failed to meet the necessary criteria for absorption.

Appellant repatriated to CRPF in 1999, challenged this in the Central Administrative Tribunal, which ruled against him.

High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, leading to the current appeal.

Issues:

Validity of the appellant's claim for absorption despite misrepresentation.

Whether the appellant's repatriation was justified.

Held:

Deputationists have no inherent right to claim absorption without statutory rules or orders supporting their case.

The appellant's misrepresentation of educational qualifications discredits his claim for absorption.

The appellant's repatriation was justified as per the governing rules, and there was no differential treatment.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed with no merit. No costs awarded.

Facts:

Om Parkash Sharma (Appellant) seeks summoning of documents to prove impartiality in his duties while working as DIG, CBI.

Application under Section 91, CrPC, rejected by Trial Court and upheld by the Delhi High Court.

Documents intended to demonstrate no favoritism to Jain Brothers and alleged malafides by CBI.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court's rejection of the application under Section 91, CrPC, was justified.

The relevance and desirability of the documents at the pre-trial stage.

Held:

The Trial Court and High Court judiciously considered the nature, relevance, and necessity of the documents.

The court's discretion in summoning documents under Section 91, CrPC, depends on the stage of proceedings and the need to establish a prima facie case.

The standard of proof at the pre-trial stage differs from the final stage.

Court must exercise discretion judiciously; interference only if the court acts unreasonably.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed as the Trial Court and High Court reasonably exercised discretion in rejecting the appellant's claim under Section 91, CrPC.

FACTS:

The plaintiff-Bank filed a suit against the defendants (appellants herein) in O.S. No. 93 of 1987.

Obtained a preliminary decree on 31.12.87 for a sum of Rs. 70,087.75.

The decree holder was required to file an application for passing a final decree by 31.12.91.

Actual application filed on 27.7.94 for passing a final decree, along with an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking the condonation of delay of 714 days.

Insolvency Petition filed by judgment-debtors in I.P. No. 6/87, dismissed on 20.11.92.

ISSUES:

Condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act.

Sufficient cause for condonation.

Applicability of Order 34 Rule 5, CPC.

HELD:

Special leave granted.

The High Court's condonation of delay was not sustained due to a serious omission in considering the appellants' contention that the Bank's lawyer was appearing in Court regularly during the delay period.

The proceedings were remitted to the High Court with a direction to restore the revision on its file.

The High Court to consider the appellants' contention with reference to the appearance in Court of the Legal Advisor and the Advocate of the Bank in other cases.

The High Court to decide the issue afresh and pass appropriate orders on merit.

The appeal is allowed.