Facts:

The appellant had insured Truck No. CIT-7928 on 8-11-1991. The insurance policy was issued but later canceled by the insurer on the grounds that the premium payment cheque bounced. The truck met with an accident on the same day as the issuance of the policy, resulting in fatalities. The dependents of the deceased filed claims, which the appellant contested, citing the policy's cancellation.

Issues:

Does the subsequent cancellation of the insurance policy, based on the dishonor of the premium payment cheque, affect the rights of third parties involved in the accident?

Is the contract of insurance rendered invalid due to non-payment of premium?

Held:

The court examined the relevant legal provisions, including Section 146, Section 147(5), and Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The judgment clarified that the cancellation of the insurance policy due to the dishonor of the premium payment cheque does not impact the rights of third parties. The court emphasized that the rights of the third party are established at the time of the accident, and subsequent cancellation of the policy does not negate these rights. The insurer remains liable to compensate the third party despite policy cancellation for non-payment of premium.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit challenging the validity of an order and sale deed, seeking possession of the property, and claiming damages for wrongful use and occupation. The order, executed under Section 27(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, was declared unconstitutional. The plaintiff contended that the documents were void ab initio.

Issues:

Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 58 or Article 65.

Validity of the order and sale deed under Section 27(1) of the Urban Land Act.

Equitable considerations regarding possession and sale consideration.

Held:

The High Court held that the suit, primarily for possession based on title, was governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, as the order and sale deed were void ab initio.

The order under Section 27(1) was declared invalid, making the sale deed a nullity. No separate declaration was necessary.

Equitable considerations favored the plaintiff as the sale was compelled by an illegal order, and the plaintiff suffered prejudice and loss.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decree for possession and damages in favor of the plaintiff.

Facts:

Late Chet Singh, the original landowner, filed a suit against Sohan Singh, who was cultivating the land. A compromise was reached, declaring Chet Singh as the 'Khudkasht Kashatkar' of the disputed land. Chet Singh mortgaged the land, and upon his demise, the appellants, his legal heirs, sought possession from the mortgagee, Charan Singh, under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The lower authorities decreed the suit, but the High Court, in a writ petition, set aside the orders.

Issues:

Whether the appellants qualify as 'khatedar tenants' of the disputed land.

If so, whether their rights were extinguished under Section 12 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.

Held:

The court examined the relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Zamindari and Biswedari Abolition Act, emphasizing that a Zamindar must be in actual possession of Khudkasht land on the date of vesting to claim khatedari rights. Referring to the precedent in Budha Vs. Amilal, the court held that the mere recording of land as Khudkasht is insufficient; actual possession is a prerequisite. Since the appellants were not in possession on the date of vesting, they were not entitled to khatedari rights. Consequently, the High Court's dismissal of the suit was upheld.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

The petitioner, a Scientist at the Centre for DNA Finger Printing and Diagnostics, Hyderabad, filed a complaint alleging that he was induced into marriage with a woman from a lower caste. The respondents were accused of misrepresenting the woman's caste, leading to the marriage.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the complaint (F.I.R.) after the charge-sheet had been submitted, and whether the interpretation of Section 415, IPC, by the High Court was accurate.

Held:

The petitioner's awareness of bio-diversity at the Cellular and Molecular level was emphasized by the court, stating that caste has no role in the field of Human Biotechnology.

The court expressed concern about the rise in matrimonial disputes and discouraged litigation, encouraging parties to settle disputes amicably.

The High Court's interpretation of Section 415, IPC, was found to be incorrect. The second part of Section 415 does not necessarily relate to property but involves intentional inducement causing harm in various aspects.

Considering the facts of the case, the court declined interference under Article 136 of the Constitution and dismissed the petition as without merit.

FACTS:

The appellant, V.P. Ahuja, was appointed as Chief Executive in the Establishment of Punjab Co-operative Cotton Marketing and Spinning Mills Federation Limited.

His appointment included a probation period of two years, during which the management had the right to terminate his services without notice.

The appellant's services were terminated on 2-12-1998, citing failure in the performance of duties administratively and technically.

ISSUES:

Whether the termination of services during the probation period without inquiry and without affording an opportunity is legal.

Whether a probationer is entitled to protection from arbitrary termination similar to a temporary employee.

HELD:

The court held that stigmatic termination during probation without inquiry and without affording any opportunity is illegal.

It was emphasized that a probationer, like a temporary employee, is entitled to certain protections from arbitrary termination of services.

The court rejected the argument that, being on probation, the appellant had no right to the post, stating that a probationer's services cannot be terminated arbitrarily or in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice.

Referring to a recent decision (Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satvendra Nath Bose National center for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Others), the court reiterated that a probationer is entitled to protection, and the order terminating services should not be stigmatic without proper inquiry.

REFERRED CASES:

Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satvendra Nath Bose National center for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Others, AIR 1999 SC 983 : (1999) 81 FLR 687 : (1999) 1 JT 396 : (1999) 1 SCALE 421 : (1999) 3 SCC 60 : (1999) SCC(L&S) 596 : (1999) 1 SCR 532 : (1999) AIRSCW 605 : (1999) 2 Supreme 34

Facts:

The case revolves around a bund known as 'thadaya varamba' situated in survey No. 183/4. The plaintiffs claim exclusive ownership, alleging trespass by the first defendant. Disputes arose over the bund's status and possession, leading to legal proceedings.

Issues:

Correctness of the description and boundaries in the plaint schedule.

Whether 'B' schedule property is part of the common bund mentioned in the plaint.

Verification of the alleged trespass.

Held:

The trial Court found the description in the plaint schedule to be correct. It concluded that 'B' schedule is part of the common bund in survey No. 183/4, and there was a trespass. The defendant was directed to reinstate the trespassed portion.

The first appellate Court, however, reversed this decision, citing adverse possession by the defendant and the plaintiffs' delayed suit. The High Court, taking a proactive stance, recognized a de facto division of the bund by the defendant and declared exclusive titles to respective portions to prevent future disputes.

Facts:

The suit for arrears of rent, ejectment, and damages against the appellant was decreed ex-parte on 10-3-1983.

The application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed by the Trial Judge on 14-5-1985.

Revision petition No. 73 of 1985 filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court on 23rd September 1999.

The appellant, an Assistant Engineer, and his counsel failed to appear due to genuine reasons - the appellant was sick and out of town, and the counsel's nephew had died in a road accident on the date of the hearing.

Issues:

Whether there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the appellant in the trial court when the ex-parte proceedings were initiated.

Whether the technical approach adopted by the courts was justified in this case.

Held:

Under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C., an ex parte decree can be set aside if the defendant shows 'sufficient cause' for non-appearance.

'Sufficient cause' must be liberally construed, and the courts have wide discretion to decide based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

The unrealistic and technical approach adopted by the courts prolonged the litigation unnecessarily for about 17 years.

The absence of the appellant and his counsel was due to genuine and unavoidable circumstances, and even if the appellant was found negligent, costs could have compensated the other side.

The Court sets aside the ex parte judgment and decree, directing the trial court to afford the appellant an opportunity to prove his case within a reasonable time.

Costs of Rs. 5,000/- are awarded to the other side.

FACTS:

The appellant, Rohini Prasad, contested a civil suit for possession of agricultural land and mesne profits filed by the respondent, Kasturchand. The High Court overturned the findings of the lower courts, declaring that Rohini Prasad did not acquire Bhumiswami rights under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959.

ISSUES:

Validity of the lease for agricultural land.

Interpretation of Section 168 of the Code regarding the duration of leases.

Rohini Prasad's claim to Bhumiswami rights.

Jurisdiction of the Civil Court in land possession disputes.

HELD:

The High Court found a misreading of evidence by the first Appellate Court, leading to a miscarriage of justice. It intervened to correct the error.

Rohini Prasad's claim of the lease being extended for the year 1976-77 was deemed incorrect. The High Court held that the lease had not been renewed.

The High Court affirmed the decree of the trial Court, directing Rohini Prasad to hand over vacant possession to Kasturchand.

The jurisdiction of the Civil Court in determining questions of title was upheld. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had consistently ruled that title disputes were within the province of the Civil Court.

REFERRED CASES:

Ramgopal Kanhaiyalal Vs. Chetu Batte, AIR 1976 MP 160 : (1976) JLJ 278 : (1976) 21 MPLJ 325

Facts:

The suit filed in 1963 by the All India Shia Conference and others against the Andhra Pradesh Wakf Board.

Plaintiffs sought a declaration that certain institutions were wrongly classified as Sunni Wakfs instead of Shia Wakfs.

The Wakf Board contested the allegations.

Issues:

Whether the institutions were Shia Wakfs.

Impact of classification on Shia community's interests.

Validity of notices under Section 56 of the Muslim Wakfs Act.

Misjoinder of causes of action.

Limitation of the suit.

Held:

The trial court declared in favor of the plaintiffs, classifying the institutions as Shia Wakfs. The High Court affirmed this decision.

The High Court's declaration was vague and general, lacking evidence for each institution.

The court observed a need for further evidence to determine the nature of each institution—Shia or Sunni Wakf.

The case remanded to the High Court for fresh decision after receiving additional evidence.

High Court directed to pass an order under Order 41, Rule 28 C.P.C., instructing District Judges to receive additional evidence.

Decision: The appeal allowed, and the matter remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision after gathering additional evidence.