Facts:

Appellant operated as a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) for the manufacture of viscose staple fibre.

Appellant sought permission to debond its unit, i.e., withdraw from the 100% EOU Scheme.

The Ministry of Commerce agreed in principle to allow debonding, subject to certain conditions.

Dispute arose on the rate at which duty should be levied on finished goods upon debonding.

Issues:

Contention regarding the applicable duty rate – under the main Section 3(1) or the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

Interpretation of the expression "allowed to be sold in India" in the proviso to Section 3(1).

Held:

The bone of contention revolved around the interpretation of "allowed to be sold in India" in the proviso to Section 3(1). Appellant argued for cumulative satisfaction of two conditions, while the Revenue contended for a broader interpretation.

The Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the Revenue, applying the proviso to Section 3(1).

The Court, upon review, disagreed with the Tribunal's interpretation, emphasizing that debonding and permission to sell in India are distinct actions governed by different authorities.

The Court highlighted that the Board of Approvals (BOA) does not concern itself with the disposal of closing stock after debonding; the permission to sell in India is determined by the Development Commissioner, distinct from the BOA.

The Court emphasized that the expression "allowed to be sold in India" in the proviso applies specifically to sales made up to 25% by 100% EOU in DTA, subject to Development Commissioner's permission.

The Court rejected the Revenue's argument that debonding itself grants permission to sell in India, clarifying that the conditions for selling 25% of production by EOU and selling finished stock by a debonded 100% EOU are different.

The Court referred to Rule 9-A(1)(ii) of the Central Excise Rules, highlighting that duty is chargeable at the rate on the date of removal of the goods, not from the date of manufacture.

The Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, restoring the Collector of Central Excise's decision in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

The respondent, initially acquitted but later convicted, claimed remission for the period spent on bail during the legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the period during which the respondent was on bail should be considered for remission.

Held:

Interpretation of Sections 432 and 389 of CrPC: Remission can only be granted with reference to an operative punishment. If there is no operative punishment, there is no need for remission. Parole and bail have distinct legal implications.

Distinction Between Parole and Bail: Parole is a temporary release from custody without suspending the sentence, whereas bail involves the release of an accused during trial, with the sentence being suspended.

Previous High Court Decisions: High Court decisions allowing remission for the period of bail were deemed erroneous. The court clarified that benefits intended for parole or furlough cannot be extended to those on bail.

Illustrations: Using examples, the court demonstrated the absurdity of allowing remission for the entire period a person is on bail, potentially rendering the criminal justice system a mockery.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the part of the judgment directing remission for the period the respondent was on bail is set aside.

Facts:

Bechan, a sirdar of agricultural land, filed an application under Section 134 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, paid an amount equal to 10 times the land revenue, and sought a declaration as a bhumidar. Before the order could be passed, Bechan sold the land to the appellants. Bechan passed away, and subsequently, his widow sold the same land to the respondents. The dispute arose over the timing of Bechan's acquisition of bhumidari rights.

Issues:

Whether the rights acquired by the appellants relate back to the date of deposit of the land revenue or only from the date of the official order under Section 137.

Held:

Section 134 explicitly states that upon the application and payment of 10 times the land revenue, the sirdar is entitled to a declaration, with the rights acquired from the date of deposit. This eliminates uncertainty by fixing the date as the one when the amount is deposited.( Para 7)

Sub-section (2) of Section 137, post-amendment in 1962, aligns with Section 134, indicating that the certificate must relate back and be effective from the date of deposit mentioned in Section 134(1).( Para 8)

The decisions running counter to this interpretation, including Banshidhar Vs. Smt. Dhirjadbari, Mobin Khan v. Chunnu Khan, and Raghunandan Singh v. Yashwant Singh, are deemed incorrect. The certificate issued under Section 137 recognizes the position as of the date of application and payment, with retrospective effect.( Para 9)

Analogy drawn to Order 22 Rule 6, C.P.C., supports the doctrine of relation back in Sections 134 and 137.( Para 10)

The lower appellate court's interpretation is upheld, and the High Court's decision is set aside. The suit filed by the appellants is decreed.( Para 11)

Facts:

Respondent No. 3, a State Government employee, retired on 30th September 1993.

The premises in question were requisitioned under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948.

Order of requisition dated 17th April 1958 was set aside, but respondent No. 3 continued in possession.

Appellant and respondent No. 4 are co-owners of the property, subject to a pending partition suit.

Appellant challenged the order of requisition, seeking restoration of possession in the High Court of Bombay.

Issues:

Does respondent No. 3 have the right to continue possession after retirement and the order of requisition being set aside?

Held:

The High Court set aside the order of requisition but declined the restoration of possession to the appellant.

The amendments under Maharashtra Act No. XVI of 1997 were enacted to protect allottees of requisitioned premises.

Section 5(1-A) and Section 15-B define 'Government allottee' and provide for deemed tenancy.

The amendments aim to provide statutory protection to Government allottees facing eviction due to requisitioned premises.

Respondent No. 3 retired before the amendments came into effect, and he cannot be deemed a 'Government allottee.'

The Court directs respondent No. 3 to restore possession to the appellant and respondent No. 4 within three months.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and respondent No. 3 is directed to vacate and hand over possession to the appellant and respondent No. 4 within three months.

Facts:

The appellant submitted a list of 267 witnesses for the defense during the trial. The trial Court and later the High Court were involved in a process of pruning down this extensive list to ensure a more expeditious trial.

Issues:

The right of the accused to examine a large number of witnesses and the court's power to limit the list for the sake of preventing delay.

Held:

The court clarified that an accused does not have an absolute right to examine any number of witnesses, and the court has the power to prune down the list if it deems it necessary to avoid procrastination.

The legislative intent behind Section 22 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was to ensure the expeditious trial of corruption cases. The court emphasized the need for a more accelerated pace in such cases due to the gravity of corruption issues.

The court affirmed that the purpose of submitting a list of witnesses before the accused enters the defense is to allow the court to peruse and, if necessary, shortlist witnesses. The court can disallow the entire list if it suspects an intention to delay proceedings.

The trial Court and High Court were within their legal limits to prune down the extensive list of defense witnesses. However, after the appellant completes presenting evidence, there is an opportunity to convince the trial Court of the necessity to examine more witnesses in the interest of justice.

Facts:

Mayurakshi Cotton Mills purchased by the State of West Bengal in 1990 during liquidation proceedings.

Notice of lockout issued on August 5, 1992, due to unspecified reasons.

Writ petition filed challenging the lockout, later withdrawn due to a settlement on February 27, 1993.

High Court raised concerns about the settlement's legality, especially regarding the termination of workers' services.

Issues:

Validity of the lockout and subsequent settlement.

Compliance with Section 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Whether the settlement infringes upon the workers' rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Division Bench set aside the High Court's order, emphasizing the need for a factual background in assessing the fairness of the settlement.

The court acknowledged the financial difficulties faced by the mill and suggested that the High Court's decision lacked consideration for practical challenges.

Directed a reference to an Industrial Tribunal for a comprehensive examination of all issues related to employment, non-employment, the validity of the settlement, and other associated matters.

The Tribunal instructed to commence adjudication promptly and conclude within six months.

Facts:

The appellant, under a 'Production Incentive Scheme,' pays production incentives to its workers, which it contends are not 'wages' under the Employees' State Insurance Act. The respondent, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, disagrees and issues a demand for contributions towards the Employees' State Insurance Fund. The appellant challenges this demand before the Employees' Insurance Court, which initially rules in favor of the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the production incentive payments made by the appellant to its workers qualify as 'wages' under the Employees' State Insurance Act.

Additionally, the frequency of payments, being quarterly, becomes a crucial factor in determining compliance with the Act.

Held:

The Employees' Insurance Court initially held that the production incentive payments did not qualify as 'wages' as defined in the Act. It reasoned that the payments were made quarterly and did not fall under the relevant sections of the definition. However, the High Court overturned this decision, asserting that the production incentive was calculated monthly but deliberately postponed to a quarterly schedule to avoid contributions under the Act. The Supreme Court, in its analysis, distinguishes this case from precedent, emphasizing that neither the contractual nature of the payment nor the conditions for Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act are met.

Decision: The Supreme Court allows the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and reinstating that of the Employees' Insurance Court. It clarifies that, based on the facts of the case, the production incentive payments do not fall within the definition of 'wages' as per Section 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act.

Facts:

Female workers on the muster roll of the petitioner corporation sought maternity benefits. The Industrial Tribunal deemed them equal to regular employees and entitled to similar benefits. The High Court, in a writ petition, and subsequent LPA dismissed by the corporation.

Issues:

Applicability of Maternity Benefit Act to the corporation.

Eligibility of female workers on the muster roll for maternity benefits.

Held:

The Maternity Benefit Act aligns with the Directive Principles of State Policy. It does not limit benefits to regular employees but extends to all women employees, irrespective of their employment nature.

A just social order necessitates providing legally due facilities to women. The Act aims to support working women during pregnancy and motherhood.

Municipal Corporations and Boards are deemed "industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act. Workers on the muster roll are considered "workmen," making the dispute an industrial one.

Decision: The benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act shall be provided to female (muster roll) employees working with the appellant corporation on daily wages. The corporation is directed to approach the State and Central Government for necessary Notifications under Section 2(1) of the Act.

Facts:

An incident involving cross-firing occurred on September 23, 1989, outside the Court of Munsif, Sadul Shahar, leading to the death of Sukhmander Singh and injuries to others. Two groups, Group-1 and Group-2, were involved. The judgment pertains to two criminal appeals arising from the same incident, heard separately by the High Court.

Issues:

Legality of the High Court's judgment, which did not hear the two appeals together and allegedly adopted the trial court's reasoning without considering the evidence.

Sentencing issues, particularly the reduction of imprisonment for one of the accused, Amarjit Singh.

Held:

The High Court's judgment was deemed illegal due to its failure to hear the related appeals together and its lack of consideration for the evidence. The High Court's disposal of the appeal in a brief manner, adopting the trial court's reasoning, was criticized for being sloppy. The High Court was expected to apply its mind to the facts of the case, determine the aggressor, and consider the right of private defense.

While the acquittal of Jagsir Singh was not interfered with, the judgment pointed out that the incident was serious and occurred in a court complex. The High Court's interference with the sentence of imprisonment for Amarjit Singh was deemed inappropriate. Although the imprisonment sentence was not altered, the fine imposed on Amarjit Singh was enhanced to Rs. 25,000, payable to the legal representatives of the deceased.

The judgment expressed anguish at the way the High Court handled the criminal appeal, noting that it led to a miscarriage of justice.