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by sayum
27 June 2026 5:46 AM
"There is no infraction in deferring the meeting before it has commenced. The bar under Section 24(2)(h) of the Act against adjournment applies only once the proceedings of the meeting have actually begun," Orissa High Court has clarified that the statutory prohibition against adjourning a no-confidence motion meeting under the Orissa Grama Panchayats Act, 1964, does not prevent authorities from rescheduling or postponing a meeting before it has officially commenced.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice V. Narasingh, in its judgment, observed that there is a fundamental legal distinction between the 'postponement' of a meeting and its 'adjournment,' holding that Section 24(2)(h) of the Act only restricts the latter.
The court made these observations while dismissing a writ petition filed by a Sarpanch who challenged the rescheduling of a no-confidence motion meeting. The bench noted that if a meeting is deferred for unavoidable reasons before it starts, it does not constitute a "procedural infraction" that would vitiate the democratic process of testing the confidence of the house.
The Petitioner, Padmini Naik, the Sarpanch of Kantipal Gram Panchayat, challenged a notice dated December 3, 2025, which fixed December 19, 2025, as the date for a no-confidence motion meeting against her. The meeting was originally intended to be held on an earlier date but was rescheduled by the Sub-Collector, Anandpur.
The Petitioner assailed the notice on three primary grounds: that the signatures of two requisitionists were forged, that she was not properly served with the notice, and that the authorities lacked the power to shift the meeting date from the one originally scheduled, citing a violation of Section 24(2)(h) of the Orissa Grama Panchayats Act, 1964.
The primary question before the court was whether the rescheduling of a no-confidence motion meeting prior to its commencement amounts to an illegal "adjournment" prohibited under Section 24(2)(h) of the Act. The court was also called upon to determine if a challenge regarding forged signatures could be re-agitated after a coordinate bench had already dismissed a previous petition on the same ground.
Court Rejects Plea Of Forged Signatures Citing Finality Of Earlier Orders
The court first addressed the Petitioner's claim that the signatures of two ward members were obtained through fraud. Justice Narasingh noted that this specific contention had already been "set at rest" by a coordinate bench in a previous writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 34408 of 2025), which had attained finality.
Furthermore, the court observed that the two members in question had appeared independently as opposite parties in the present case and supported the requisition for the no-confidence motion. The bench held that the Petitioner’s attempt to revive this argument was a "desperate attempt" to retain power despite losing the confidence of the representative body.
Bald Assertion Of Non-Receipt Of Notice Held Insufficient
Regarding the allegation of non-service of notice, the Court found that there was nothing on record to substantiate the Petitioner’s "bald assertion." The bench pointed out that the records showed the notice was endorsed to the Gram Panchayat office with clear directions for service on all concerned.
"The assertion of non-receipt of notice by the Petitioner is not acceptable and is to be treated as a figment of the Petitioner’s imagination to somehow invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on an alleged infraction of procedure."
Distinction Between 'Adjournment' and 'Postponement'
The core of the judgment focused on the interpretation of Section 24(2)(h) of the Act, 1964, which states that "no such meeting shall stand adjourned to a subsequent date." The Petitioner argued that this provision strictly mandates that a meeting must be held only on the date initially notified and cannot be shifted.
The Court, however, relied on the ratio in Govinda Chandra Pradhan v. S.D.O. and Rushinath Rout v. State of Orissa to explain that "adjournment" refers to the suspension of a proceeding that has already begun. If the presiding officer has not yet taken the chair and the meeting hasn't started, the act of shifting the date is a "postponement," which is within the statutory power of the authorities.
Statutory Power To Fix Dates Includes Power To Reschedule
Citing Section 22 of the Odisha General Clauses Act, the Court observed that the power to fix a date for a meeting inherently includes the power to reschedule it for valid administrative reasons. The bench noted that the Sub-Collector had deferred the meeting for "unavoidable reasons" before it commenced.
"Once there is commencement of proceeding by presiding over the meeting, the stage of convening the meeting is closed and the stage of conducting the business is reached. Section 24(2)(h) has no application where the meeting was not at all held on the original date."
The court emphasized that the purpose of the statute is to ensure that once the house meets to decide a motion of no-confidence, the process is not delayed by tactical adjournments. However, this does not fetter the administrative authority's power to fix a viable date for the meeting to happen in the first place.
The High Court concluded that there was no merit in the writ petition as the rescheduling of the meeting did not violate the Orissa Grama Panchayats Act. The bench vacated the interim order that had previously restrained the publication of the results and dismissed the petition, stating that the Petitioner could not use procedural technicalities to avoid a democratic floor test.
Date of Decision: 19 June 2026