Facts:

The dispute centered around land measuring 2 Kanals 12 Marias, classified as "gair mumkin toba" or pond land, in village Khokhar, Punjab. Respondent No. 2 claimed ownership through an auction in 1959. Appellant, inducted as a tenant in 1978, contended the land was evacuee property. The appellant was growing sugarcane on the land.

Issues:

Discrepancy in the auctioned land's classification (gair mumkin bhatta) and the appellant's possession (gair mumkin toba).

Validity of the corrigendum issued in 1985, including the land in the possession of the appellant.

Adequacy of the appellant's locus standi in light of canceled auction proceedings.

Held:

The auctioned land's classification discrepancy and possession were crucial. The appellant was in possession since 1978, and respondent No. 2's objections emerged only in 1982, after a lapse of 23 years. The authorities erred in applying Rule 90, which addresses clerical or arithmetic errors, not disputes of possession.

The corrigendum issued in 1985 lacked a factual basis and was deemed arbitrary. The Chief Settlement Commissioner's oversight of the appellant's possession rights was noted.

The cancellation of the auction without notifying the appellant and denying a fair hearing was deemed unjust. The appellant had locus standi, and his rights were adversely affected.

Facts:

The petitioner was appointed as a temporary Munsif in 1981, confirmed in 1985, and later promoted to a Civil Judge in 1993.

A review in 1998 allowed the petitioner to remain in service until the age of 58.

A subsequent decision, invoking Rule 71(A1), mandated the petitioner's retirement at the age of 58.

Issues:

Whether Rule 71(A1) is valid and in compliance with previous judgments, specifically addressing the extension of the retirement age for judicial officers.

Held:

The court upholds the validity of Rule 71(A1) as it aligns with the intention of raising the tone and morale of judicial services.

The judgment emphasizes the need for periodic evaluation to retain officers with potential for continued useful service.

The court clarifies that the extension to the age of 60 is not automatic but subject to the High Court's positive recommendation based on a comprehensive assessment.

The decision dismisses the petition, asserting that without a specific rule, judicial officers have no inherent right to continue beyond the age of 58.

Facts:

The petitioners, engaged in providing credit to the public, challenged the constitutionality of Section 45-S, alleging that it prohibited them from accepting public deposits for their business. They argued that this restriction adversely affected various sectors with seasonal financial needs.

Issues:

Constitutionality of Section 45-S concerning the acceptance of public deposits by non-banking institutions.

Violation of Articles 19(1)(g), 19(6), and 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court held that Section 45-S does not restrict unincorporated bodies from conducting their financial business but specifically prohibits utilizing public deposits. There is no unrestricted fundamental right to accept deposits from the public. The court emphasized the need for prudence in managing public funds, especially considering the risks posed by unincorporated bodies.

The court highlighted that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had considered various committee reports before amending Section 45-S in 1997. The question of restricting financial activities by unincorporated bodies is a matter of economic policy, and the court should defer to the expertise of expert bodies in such cases.

Even if the restrictions amounted to a total prohibition, the court justified it in the public interest, citing the uncontrolled growth of unincorporated bodies accepting deposits. The prohibition on partnership firms engaging in such business is considered a reasonable restriction.

The court emphasized the importance of not interfering with economic legislation unless it is manifestly unjust or glaringly unconstitutional. It stated that the presumption is in favor of the constitutional validity of legislation, and judicial discretion should consider overwhelming public interest.

Facts:

The Government of Bihar granted a license for the supply of electric energy to M/s. Octavices Steel & Co. Ltd. in 1924, later transferred to the 1st Respondent.

The license had a term of 50 years, ending on February 5, 1974.

Appellant served notice under Section 6(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, calling for the sale of the undertaking on the license expiration.

Ordinances and an Amendment Act were passed in 1974, amending Sections 6 and 7A of the Indian Electricity Act.

Issues:

Validity of the amended Sections 6 and 7A concerning the purchase of electric undertakings.

Constitutional validity of the amendments challenged on the grounds of violating Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(2).

Whether the amendments had a reasonable and direct nexus to the principles under Article 39(b) of the Constitution.

Nature of the acquisition: whether it was for material resources or a chose-in-action.

Held:

The acquisition was part of the policy of nationalization of electric companies by the Union of India.

Constitutional Bench upheld the validity of the Act/Ordinance, stating it had nexus with the principles in Article 39(b) and was protected by Article 31(c).

The Act was not a piece of colorable legislation; it aimed at nationalization of the undertaking and was eligible for protection under Article 31(c).

The financial costs of the nationalization scheme were integral and inseparable, and economic considerations for nationalization were not justiciable.

The rights to compensation did not crystallize upon giving the notice; licensee's rights were affected only when the undertaking was actually taken over.

Facts:

The assessee claimed depreciation at 15% on a theater building, asserting it as 'plant.' The Assessing Officer allowed depreciation at 5%. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) approved the claim, later confirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether a theater building can be considered 'plant' for depreciation purposes under the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The court held that a building used for hotel or cinema business cannot be categorized as 'plant.' Section 32 of the Income Tax Act provides distinct rates for depreciation on buildings and machinery/plant. The legislative intent is clear in treating buildings separately. The word 'plant' under Section 43(3) does not include buildings.

Referring to dictionary meanings is unnecessary, and considering a building designed for specific business purposes as 'plant' contradicts legislative intent. The Income Tax Rules prescribe depreciation rates for buildings separately, reinforcing the distinction.

Buildings for hotel businesses are shelters, not tools or apparatus for conducting business. Even applying functional tests, buildings do not meet the criteria for being considered 'plant.'

Rejecting the argument that 'plant' and 'building' are not mutually exclusive, the court emphasized that granting depreciation on buildings intended for hotel or cinema business is inconsistent with the legislative framework.

It is challenging to differentiate between specially designed and converted buildings for the same business. Depreciation aims to represent the true picture of business income, and the legislature didn't intend to grant such benefits to typically more durable buildings.

Considering all industries require buildings, design and construction tailored to specific needs don't qualify a building as 'plant.' Accepting the argument would blur the legislative distinction between 'building' and 'machinery' or 'plant.'

Facts:

Ghaziabad Development Authority announced schemes for allotment of developed plots. Claimants alleged unreasonable delays and failures in scheme implementation. Various forums found the Authority at fault and directed refund of amounts paid by claimants.

Issues:

Compensation for mental agony.

Awarding interest in the absence of a contractual obligation.

Determination of the appropriate interest rate.

Held:

Compensation for mental agony was held improper in ordinary commercial contracts.

Interest on equitable grounds can be awarded; in this case, 12% per annum was deemed just and proper.

The brochure's provision on non-liability for interest applies only when claimants are responsible for circumstances leading to a refund.

All the appeals and contempt petitions stand disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

Appellant (landlady) owns property at Masjid Moth, New Delhi, including an open plot of land (suit plot).

Respondent (tenant) constructed an unauthorized latrine on the suit plot.

Parties settled the dispute earlier with a compromise where respondent became the tenant of the suit plot.

Landlady terminated the tenancy and filed a suit for possession, contested by the tenant on the ground that the suit plot is "premises" under the Delhi Rent Control Act.

Issues:

Whether the suit plot is "premises" within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

Held:

The term "premises" implies the subject matter of tenancy where there is a landlord-tenant relationship and an agreed-upon rent.

If an open plot with a structure was let out, it falls within the meaning of "premises."

In this case, the latrine on the suit plot was constructed by the tenant without authorization.

The compromise clearly mentions the letting out of the open plot of land measuring 9' x 7', and the agreed rent was for the plot, not the structure.

The structure (latrine) belongs to the tenant, and the landlady has no right or interest in it.

The suit plot does not fall within the definition of "premises" under the Delhi Act.

Section 50 of the Delhi Act, ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, is not applicable in this case.

The suit for possession is maintainable, and the appellant's claim is upheld.

Facts:

A complaint was filed by a Deputy Superintendent of Police against two other police officers.

The appellants raised objections, including the lack of sanction and the bar of limitation under Section 161 of the Bombay Police Act.

The Metropolitan Magistrate issued process, and appellants sought discharge based on the absence of sanction.

Issues:

Whether the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate was interlocutory, and if so, could it be challenged in revision?

Whether the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 161 of the Bombay Police Act?

Was sanction required under Section 197 of the CrPC?

Held:

The order of the Metropolitan Magistrate was not interlocutory as it determined crucial issues, and revision was maintainable.

The complaint was barred by limitation under Section 161 of the Bombay Police Act.

The Court did not delve into the issue of sanction under Section 197 as the complaint was already barred by limitation.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside. The Sessions Judge's order, dismissing the complaint, was restored.

FACTS:

The case involves a Judgment dated December 13, 1996, which was placed before the court for the determination of the pollution fine against M/s. Span Motel. The main case resulted in various directions, including quashing approvals and leases, restoration of the area, and compensation for environmental damage.

ISSUES:

The imposition of pollution fines on M/s. Span Motel without following the prescribed legal procedure under environmental laws.

HELD:

The Court withdrew the notice for pollution fine, emphasizing the necessity of a fair trial and finding a person guilty before imposing such fines.

Recognizing pollution as a civil wrong, the court upheld the need for damages (compensation) for environmental restoration and compensation to those affected.

Despite withdrawing the pollution fine notice, the Court directed a fresh notice for exemplary damages to be issued to M/s. Span Motel, aiming to act as a deterrent for future environmental violations.

The judgment emphasized the plenary power of the court under Article 142 but clarified that it cannot be used to ignore substantive statutory provisions.

The Court directed the exemplary damages issue to be heard during the quantification of damages under the main judgment.

DECISION: The notice for pollution fine against M/s. Span Motel was withdrawn, and a new notice for exemplary damages was directed to be issued. The question of exemplary damages would be heard during the quantification of damages under the main judgment.

REFERRED CASES:

Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1996 SC 2715 : (1996) 7 JT 375 : (1997) 2 SCALE 3 : (1996) 4 SCALE 44 : (1995) 5 SCALE 592 : (1996) 5 SCC 647 : (1996) 5 SCR 241 Supp

In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged contemner), AIR 1995 SC 2348 : (1995) CriLJ 3994 : (1995) 2 JT 587 : (1995) 6 SCALE 619 : (1995) 3 SCALE 1 : (1995) 2 SCALE 201 : (1995) 2 SCALE 200 : (1995) 2 SCC 584 : (1995) 2 SCR 638 : (1995) 2 UJ 93

Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India and Another, AIR 1998 SC 1895 : (1998) 3 JT 184 : (1998) 2 SCALE 745 : (1998) 4 SCC 409 : (1998) 2 SCR 795 : (1998) AIRSCW 1706 : (1998) 4 Supreme 251

M.S. Ahlawat Vs. State of Haryana and Another, AIR 2000 SC 168 : (2000) CriLJ 388 : (1999) 4 Crimes 297 : (1999) 8 JT 530 : (1999) 6 SCALE 648 : (2000) 1 SCC 278 : (1999) AIRSCW 4255 : (1999) 9 Supreme 21

Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1996 SC 1446 : (1996) 2 JT 196 : (1998) 5 SCALE 5 : (1997) 6 SCALE 17 : (1997) 1 SCALE 21 : (1996) 5 SCALE 412 : (1996) 4 SCALE 36 : (1996) 3 SCALE 579 : (1996) 3 SCC 212 : (1996) 2 SCR 503