Facts:

The case revolves around a disputed property originally owned by Tulsi Bala, partly purchased in the name of Urmila Dassi.

After Tulsi Bala's death, Urmila Dassi became the sole heiress.

Probodh Chandra Ghosh purchased the property from Anil Mani Dassi, a co-sharer in the property.

Legal disputes ensued regarding the property's ownership.

Urmila Dassi claimed ownership based on her mother's stridhan.

Urmila Dassi obtained possession of the property through a court decree during the appeal.

The dispute escalated to the Supreme Court, and Urmila Dassi's SLP was dismissed on August 7, 1987.

On April 17, 1986, Probodh Chandra Ghosh filed an application under Section 144 of CPC for the restoration of possession.

On March 4, 1988, this application was allowed, with three months given to Urmila Dassi to restore possession.

On May 19, 1988, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of right to recover property) Ordinance 1988 came into force.

On July 20, 1988, a writ for the restoration of possession was issued under Order 21, Rule 35 of CPC.

On July 30, 1988, possession was delivered to Probodh Chandra Ghosh.

Urmila Dassi challenged the delivery of possession under the Benami Transactions Act.

Issues:

Whether Section 4 of the Benami Transactions Act is retrospective and whether it applies to execution proceedings arising from Section 144 CPC, initiated by the transferee from the heiress against the benamidar.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Section 4 of the Benami Transactions Act is not retrospective.

Section 4 applies to claims, actions, or suits filed after the Act came into force.

Probodh Chandra Ghosh filed an application under Section 144 CPC on April 17, 1986, which was before the Act came into force. Therefore, Section 4 did not bar it.

An order under Order 21, Rule 35 CPC (restoring possession) is an act of the court and not an action or claim by the appellant.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

REFERRED CASES:

R. Rajagopal Reddy and Others (deceased by legal representatives) Vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan (deceased by legal representatives), AIR 1996 SC 238(1) : (1995) 1 CTC 568 : (1995) 213 ITR 340 : (1995) 2 JT 667 : (1995) 1 SCALE 692 : (1995) 2 SCC 630

Facts:

The Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka, representing 18 District Presidents of various Bar Associations in Karnataka, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. They sought a writ of mandamus to the Union of India, requesting the establishment of a permanent bench of the Karnataka High Court "at any suitable place in northern Karnataka." The petitioner argued that such a bench was necessary due to the long distances litigants had to travel to reach the High Court in Bangalore, which was costly and time-consuming. They also pointed out that several other Indian states had established benches of their High Courts away from the principal seat.

The petitioner admitted that a Committee of five Judges had been constituted by the Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court to study the proposal for a bench and that this Committee had submitted a report in June 2000, disfavoring the establishment of a separate bench.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner, the Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka, had the standing to maintain the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Whether there were valid grounds for establishing a permanent bench of the Karnataka High Court in northern Karnataka, away from the principal seat in Bangalore.

Held:

The petitioner, the Federation of Bar Associations in Karnataka, did not have the standing to maintain the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. They were not the accredited representatives of the litigants, and litigants cannot claim a fundamental right to have the High Court located within close proximity to their residence.

The establishment of benches of the High Court at different locations is governed by Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, and not directly mandated by Article 214 of the Constitution. The Chief Justice's opinion, formed after consulting with his colleague judges, represents the view of the High Court. In this case, the Committee of Judges constituted by the Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court had submitted a report disfavoring the establishment of a separate bench.

Decisions regarding the establishment of benches should not be based on emotional, sentimental, or parochial considerations. Instead, the High Court, through the Chief Justice and the Committee of Judges, is best suited to decide whether it is necessary and feasible to have a bench away from the principal seat. Dissecting a High Court into different regions based on political or other considerations was considered harmful.

Practical difficulties in having different benches in various regions were highlighted, including the burden on the state exchequer and the potential impairment of the High Court's functional efficiency.

Decision: The writ petition was dismissed as the petitioner failed to establish a valid case for the establishment of a permanent bench of the Karnataka High Court in northern Karnataka, especially when the Committee of Judges had concluded that such an establishment was inadvisable.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 4A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act, specifically addressing major sons' landholding rights in relation to the family's land ceiling limits.

Issues:

Whether a major son can retain excess land if their mother's landholding is below the family's ceiling limit, and whether the reverse interpretation of Section 4A is valid.

Held:

The Division Bench held that the reverse application of Section 4A, where the major son has excess land and the parent's family unit does not, is not supported by the language and intent of the section. The section is intended to benefit the parent (declarant), and any increase in landholding should be in the parent's name if there's a deficiency in the major son's landholding.

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the major son (declarant) could not refuse to surrender his excess land and could not offset it against the deficiency in his mother's landholding.

Facts:

The first respondent filed a suit on March 31, 1999, to recover loans granted to the first appellant. The guarantors, including the second appellant, were impleaded, and the guarantees were sought to be enforced.

A Notice of Motion was taken out in the suit for ad interim relief, which was granted on April 1, 1999.

On April 8, 1999, the first appellant applied to be declared a sick undertaking under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.

On April 9, 1999, it was brought to the notice of the learned single Judge that the reference had been registered. Consequently, the Court Receiver was directed not to take possession pursuant to the ad interim order if not already taken.

On May 3, 1999, it was pointed out that certain properties mentioned in the plaint did not belong to the first defendant but to the guarantors. The argument was made that, considering the language of Section 22 of the said Act, the suit in respect of these properties could not be proceeded with.

Issues:

Whether Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, applies to a suit against the guarantor of a loan or advance granted to the concerned industrial company.

Additionally, the Court considers the interplay between Section 22 and other provisions of the said Act, such as Section 17(3), Section 18(2)(e), and Section 22A.

Held:

The Court held that Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, unequivocally and unambiguously applies to suits for the enforcement of guarantees related to loans or advances granted to industrial companies. The language of Section 22 makes it clear that no such suit can be instituted or continued without the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority under the said Act. The Court rejected the argument that Section 22 only applied to suits against the industrial company itself and not its guarantor.

The Court also emphasized that the scheme provided for in the Act would encompass the repayment of the loan or advance, including the claim on the guarantee. If the industrial company cannot be revived by a scheme, the embargo under Section 22 would cease to operate.

Lastly, the Court noted that Section 22A empowers the Board to direct the industrial company not to dispose of its assets, but it does not explicitly address the guarantor's assets. However, the suit could proceed with the consent of the Board or Appellate Authority, which could be obtained by the claimant on a guarantee.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the validity of a lease created by an unregistered instrument.

The tenant had been in possession of the building and was paying monthly rent.

The lease was intended to last for a period of five years but was unregistered.

Issues:

Whether an unregistered lease instrument could create a valid lease under Indian law.

Whether the tenant was protected under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.

Held:

The absence of registration of the lease document does not necessarily invalidate the existence of a lease.

A lease can be created expressly or by implication, and the court should consider the actual relationship between the parties.

Both parties admitted that the tenant had been in possession of the building and was paying rent, establishing a lessor-lessee relationship.

Failure to register the document had two consequences: no lease exceeding one year was created, and the instrument became useless for creating the lease.

The presumption that a lease not exceeding one year was created by the conduct of the parties remained unrebutted.

The tenant was a lessee of the building, and the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, applied to protect the tenant from eviction.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside.The suit filed by the landlord was dismissed without prejudice to the landlord's right to seek eviction through the Rent Control Court under the provisions of the Rent Act.

Facts:

An agreement was entered into in 1981 between the contractor and the Kerala State Electricity Board for the construction of a dam. Subsequent agreements, extensions, and deviations were made in relation to the work.

The Government of Kerala issued a notification in 1983, revising minimum wages for workers employed in certain works, including the one in question. The contractor claimed to have paid the revised minimum wages to employees and sought reimbursement from the Board.

The Board stopped making payments for labor escalation from January 1985, citing a government notification that, in their view, did not apply to dam construction.

The dispute over the applicability of the 1983 notification was referred to an Industrial Tribunal, which, in 1993, ruled in favor of the contractor, stating that the revised minimum wages notification applied to the work.

The contractor claimed to have paid a substantial sum as enhanced minimum wages to the workers, which was treated as advances pending the resolution of the dispute.

The Board constituted a committee to investigate the payments made by the contractor, which reported that while the muster roll indicated payment of minimum wages, the authenticity of these payments could not be certified without additional documents.

The Board ordered the recovery of advances from the contractor in 1994, leading to a writ petition by the contractor in the High Court.

In the midst of these legal proceedings, the Board terminated the contract with the contractor in 1997.

Issues:

Whether the writ petition filed by the contractor was maintainable, considering that it involved disputes related to contract interpretation and implementation?

Whether the contractor had sufficiently proved the actual payment of enhanced wages to the workers, as claimed?

Held:

The Supreme Court first questioned the maintainability of the writ petition, suggesting that disputes related to contract interpretation and implementation should not typically be addressed through writ petitions but through civil courts or other appropriate forums.

Despite this, the Supreme Court decided not to dismiss the writ petition due to the peculiar circumstances and examined the contractor's second contention, which focused on whether the contractor had proved the actual payment of enhanced wages to the workers.

The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the High Court's decision to direct the Board to pay the contractor but reduced the rate of interest from 18% to 9% per annum.

Facts:

The appeals involve a pharmaceutical company (formerly known as Eskayef Pharmaceuticals, now SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (India) Ltd.) and the Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka-II Bangalore. The main issues revolve around deductions under the Income Tax Act and the nature of expenditure related to the distribution of physician's samples by the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the liability to pay surtax is an admissible deduction in computing the total income.

Whether the expenditure incurred on the distribution of physician's samples by the pharmaceutical company qualifies as advertisement expenditure and is subject to the restrictions of Section 37(3A) of the Income Tax Act or is exempt as expenditure incurred exclusively for business purposes.

Held:

In this judgment, the Court addressed the first issue by referring to a previous decision in the appellant's case, concluding that the liability to pay surtax is not an admissible deduction in computing the total income.

Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the distribution of physician's samples by the pharmaceutical company to the medical profession constitutes a form of publicity and sales promotion aimed at persuading doctors to prescribe these drugs. Consequently, the expenditure incurred on such samples should fall under the scope of Section 37(3A) of the Income Tax Act and be subject to limitations on deductibility.

The Court emphasized that there was no evidence presented to support the company's claim that the distribution of samples was primarily for obtaining feedback from medical practitioners regarding the efficacy of the drugs.

Facts:

The first appellant was a member of Dalamal Tower Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. and held 5 shares with distinctive numbers.

The first appellant transferred these 5 shares to appellants 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 for a consideration of Rs. 9,46,900 through an instrument of transfer.

The instrument of transfer stated that the transferor had the right to occupy specific office premises in Dalamal Tower, and for consideration, the transferor was transferring the shares to the transferees.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of shares in a cooperative society is subject to levy of stamp duty under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958.

Whether the State Legislature has the legislative competence to levy stamp duty on the transfer of shares.

Held:

The question of whether a transfer of shares in a cooperative society is subject to levy of stamp duty on the basis that it is a conveyance has already been answered by a previous judgment (Veena Hasmukh Jain and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others). The previous judgment held that such agreements to transfer shares in a cooperative society would be covered by Article 25 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, and stamp duty would be leviable as if it is a conveyance. These agreements are, in effect, agreements to sell immovable property, and thus, they must be deemed to be conveyances. Therefore, question (a) is answered by the previous judgment.

Since it is held that the instrument of transfer is not an instrument of transfer of shares but a conveyance, question (b) regarding the legislative competence of the State no longer survives. The stamp duty is levied on the basis that the agreement is a conveyance, and there is no dispute that the State Government has legislative competence to levy stamp duty on a conveyance of property.

Facts:

Appellant Motilal Jain entered into a contract with the respondent, Ambika Prasad Ram, to purchase immovable property.

The contract specified a consideration and required the execution of a registered sale deed within five months.

Appellant alleged that respondent was evading payment of the balance consideration and execution of the sale deed.

Appellant sent notices to the respondent through his advocate.

Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the contract and alternatively claimed damages.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the suit was justifiable.

Whether the plaintiff (appellant) demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform.

Whether the alternative claim for damages disentitled the plaintiff from specific performance.

Held:

The High Court incorrectly noted the delay, which was not substantial, and did not warrant denying specific performance. Delay beyond the limitation period or other equitable considerations were not applicable in this case.

The pleading of readiness and willingness need not follow specific wording and should be determined based on the entirety of facts and circumstances. In this case, the plaint averments indicated the plaintiff's readiness and willingness to fulfill the contract.

The alternative claim for damages did not disentitle the plaintiff from specific performance. The plaintiff was entitled to both remedies.