Facts:

The appellant, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, sought to establish a mandi and its office complex. Land acquisition proceedings were initiated for this purpose, and a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued. The landowners challenged the acquisition. Possession of the land was taken urgently under Section 17(1) of the Act. An award was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, followed by a reference under Section 18. The landowners claimed Rs. 10,000 per Bigha as compensation. The Special Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at a different rate, which was subsequently challenged in the reference. The High Court, acting as the first appellate court, increased the compensation. The issues in question were whether the High Court had the authority to exceed the claimed compensation and whether the interest rates applied by the High Court were correct.

Issues:

Whether the High Court could legally award compensation exceeding the amount claimed by the landowners in the reference.

Whether the High Court was correct in awarding interest rates in a case where the original award was made before the 1984 amendment to the Land Acquisition Act.

Held:

The judgment refers to Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, which stipulated that compensation awarded by the court should not exceed the amount claimed by the landowners and should not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. Since the award and reference in this case were concluded before the 1984 amendment, the unamended Section 25 applied. The High Court erred in exceeding the claimed compensation, but the enhancement up to Rs. 10,000 per Bigha (as claimed by the landowners) was deemed valid.

Regarding interest, the 1984 amendment increased the rate from 6% to 9%, but this amendment should only apply to cases where the award and reference were made between specific dates (April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984). Since the award and reference in this case predated these dates, the old interest rate of 6% applied. The High Court's decision to award interest at 9% and 15% was not justified. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, M.S. Jayaraj, successfully bid for the privilege of operating a liquor shop within the "Changanassery Excise Range" in Kerala.

He later applied to the Excise Commissioner for permission to relocate his shop to the nearby "Karukachal" range.

The Excise Commissioner granted the appellant's request to relocate the shop.

A hotelier operating within the Karukachal Panchayat area, holding an FL-3 License, challenged the Excise Commissioner's permission through a writ petition in the Kerala High Court.

The single judge initially dismissed the writ petition, finding that the Excise Commissioner had the authority to grant such permission under Rule 6(2) of the Kerala Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974.

The Division Bench, on appeal, reversed the single judge's decision, holding that the Excise Commissioner lacked the authority to permit the relocation of a liquor shop from one range to another.

Issues:

Whether the Excise Commissioner had the authority under Rule 6(2) to permit the relocation of a liquor shop from one geographical range to another within Kerala.

Whether the hotelier, as a petitioner, had the locus standi to challenge the Excise Commissioner's order.

Held:

The Court concurs with the interpretation placed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court on the scope of the proviso to Rule 6(2) of the Auction Rules. It affirms that the Excise Commissioner lacked the authority to permit the shifting of a foreign liquor shop from one range to a totally different range. Consequently, the order passed by the Excise Commissioner is deemed unauthorized and has been rightly struck down by the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed.

The appellant is directed to apply for a refund of the deposited bid amount, as he was unable to operate the liquor shop due to the unauthorized order passed by the Excise Commissioner. The government is directed to process this refund within one month of the application. The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants challenged a steep increase in license fees imposed by the government under the Andhra Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950. They contended that there was no quid pro quo in the revision of fees, and the fees were unreasonably high and arbitrary.

Issues:

Whether the license fee in question was a regulatory fee or a fee for special services rendered under the Factories Act, 1948 and the Andhra Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950?

Whether the increase in license fees from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 18,00,000 was justified and reasonable, considering the government's expenditure for enforcing the Act and Rules?

Held:

From the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the Andhra Pradesh Factories Rules, 1950, it is evident that the license fee in this case is a regulatory fee and not a fee for special services rendered. No mention of any special service to be provided to the fee payer is found in these provisions. The purpose of the license is to enable the authorities to supervise, regulate, and monitor factory activities for proper enforcement of the provisions. Therefore, the fee is regulatory, and the quid pro quo principle does not apply.

Initially, the increase from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 18,00,000 appeared excessive. However, there was no evidence to justify this fee hike or to establish a correlation between government expenditure for enforcing the Act and the fee increase. When the State Government was questioned about reconsideration, it indicated a decision to revise the fee structure with maximum fees limited to Rs. 2,50,000 per annum for certain factories.

While the government's statement suggested a revision of the fee structure using slab rates, it lacked specific details such as the new fee slabs, effective date, and whether it would be prospective or retrospective. Therefore, the information provided was insufficient to decide the case.

The revision of the license fee introduced by the government order was quashed. The judgment clarified that this decision would have prospective operation only, with no refunds for fees collected under the previous government order.

Facts:

The case pertains to the selection process for the posts of Principals and Headmasters in various regions, including Meerut, under the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982. The selection was conducted through interviews, and candidates were awarded quality points based on their performance in the interviews and other criteria outlined in guidelines provided by the Commission.

Issues:

The constitutionality of Sections 9 and 10 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982.

The validity of the selection process based primarily on interviews.

Allegations of ante-dating of the panel of selected candidates.

Claims for regularization under specific sections of the Act.

Held:

1. Constitutionality of Sections 9 and 10: The Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 9(a) of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982. It found that there was no excessive delegation of essential legislative functions, as the Commission, composed of experts, was authorized to establish guidelines related to recruitment and promotion methods. The Court cited previous legal precedents in support of its decision.

2. Validity of the Selection Process: The Court determined that selecting candidates based solely on interviews was not inherently arbitrary or illegal. It emphasized that the percentage of marks allocated for interviews could vary depending on the specific circumstances of each case. The Court referred to various legal precedents that supported this approach.

3. Allegations of Ante-dating: The Court addressed allegations of ante-dating regarding the panel of selected candidates. It found no conclusive evidence to support this claim and noted that the delay in the panel reaching its destination did not necessarily indicate ante-dating.

4. Claims for Regularization: The Court clarified the conditions under which candidates could be regularized under specific sections of the Act. It left the examination of individual claims for regularization to the Director of Education, with a requirement to review and respond to such claims within a specified timeframe.

Decision: The case decided on September 28, 2000, upheld the constitutionality of Section 9(a) of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982. It also validated the interview-based selection process for Principals and Headmasters, dismissed ante-dating allegations, and clarified conditions for regularization under the Act. Legal precedents supported these decisions.

Facts:

The petitioners had completed teacher training courses in institutes that were recognized at the time of their enrollment but later had their recognition withdrawn.

The petitioners sought the publication of their results and the issuance of diplomas in teacher training.

The primary contention of the petitioners was that they should still be entitled to receive mark sheets and diplomas/certificates even though their institutes were de-recognized after they completed their training.

Issues:

Whether candidates who completed teacher training courses in institutes with initial recognition but later had their recognition withdrawn are entitled to receive mark sheets and diplomas/certificates.

Whether the interest of individuals should take precedence over the larger public interest in maintaining the quality of education and the proper training of teachers.

Held:

The judgment referred to several key points from previous judgments and decisions:

Candidates who had written the examination when their institutes were recognized were only entitled to the publication of their examination results and not to the issuance of mark sheets or diplomas/certificates once their institutes were de-recognized (as established in the P.M. Joseph case).

Proper training in a recognized institute is essential for teacher candidates, and mere passing of the examination is not sufficient.

The interest of individuals cannot take precedence over the larger public interest in ensuring the quality of education and the proper training of teachers.

The petitioners' request for mark sheets and diplomas with endorsements indicating that their institutes were unrecognized was rejected.

Consequently, the petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over whether the petitioner (Sasthidas Malik) had the right to retain certain lands under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.

The petitioner had leased the lands to Scene Screen Pvt. Ltd. for the construction of a cinema hall and shop rooms.

The State of West Bengal contended that the petitioner's interest in the land had vested in the State under the Act.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner had the right to retain the leased lands under Section 6(1)(b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.

Another issue was whether the petitioner's interest in the land had vested in the State.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Section 6(1)(b) of the Act did not require the intermediary to be in "khas possession" of the land.

The section allowed the intermediary to retain lands comprising or appertaining to buildings and structures, whether erected by them or not.

It was emphasized that when a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, the Court cannot interpret it differently from its plain grammatical meaning.

The Division Bench was right in setting aside the judgment of the learned single Judge.

Section 6(1)(b) did not impose a "khas possession" requirement, and the learned single Judge had erred in introducing such a condition.

Facts:

The appellant, Gobind Ram, agreed to sell a property in Lajpat Nagar (IV), New Delhi, to the respondent, Gian Chand, for a consideration of Rs. 16,000/-. An agreement to sell was executed, and Rs. 1,000/- was paid as earnest money.

The respondent filed a suit for specific performance of the contract as the appellant failed to execute the sale deed within the stipulated time.

On October 6, 1976, the suit was decreed, and the respondent deposited the balance consideration of Rs. 15,000/- in the Trial Court.

The High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal and directed the respondent to deposit an additional sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- as a condition for specific performance.

Issues:

Whether the appellant should be granted specific performance or compensation for the contract.

Held:

The Supreme Court reiterated that the grant of a decree for specific performance of a contract is not automatic; it is at the discretion of the Court. The Court must consider whether it is fair, just, and equitable and be guided by the principles of justice, equity, and good conscienc.

The Court should meticulously consider all the facts and circumstances of the case and also take into account the motive behind the litigation.

In this case, the High Court had found that the appellant attempted to avoid the contract due to the significant increase in real estate prices, but the respondent had not taken undue or unfair advantage.

Given these findings, the Supreme Court upheld the respondent's right to a decree for specific performance.

To mitigate the hardship faced by the appellant, the Supreme Court directed the respondent to deposit an additional sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- with the Supreme Court Registry within four months.

This amount was to be paid to the appellant upon the appellant giving possession of the suit property to the respondent within six months from the date of the deposit.

The appellant was also entitled to withdraw the amount already deposited in the Trial Court and the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- kept in interest-bearing fixed deposit in the registry of the High Court.

Decision:

The appeal by the appellant was dismissed. The respondent was granted a decree for specific performance with the conditions mentioned above. Each party was directed to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha (the appellant) filed an application under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

The Collector had passed an order in favor of the appellant, holding that an earlier decree obtained by the respondents against the appellant for injunction on 10-6-75 was collusive and not binding on the Panchayat in the present proceedings.

The respondents challenged this decision through a writ petition in the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the earlier decree was collusive, and if so, whether it was necessary for the appellant to file a separate independent suit to establish its collusive nature before challenging it in the current proceedings.

Another issue related to the applicability of Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act and whether it allowed the challenging of an earlier judgment obtained by fraud or collusion without the need for a separate suit.

Held:

The court held that it is not necessary to file an independent suit as a condition precedent to contend in later proceedings that an earlier judgment was obtained by collusion. This interpretation aligned with Section 44 of the Evidence Act.

The court overruled the Full Bench decision in Jagar Ram's case, which had required the filing of an independent suit to challenge the collusiveness of an earlier judgment. They found that this Full Bench decision was incorrect.

The court emphasized that even if an earlier suit for injunction had an incidental finding on title, it would not be binding in a later suit or proceeding where title was directly in question, unless it was necessary in the earlier suit to decide the question of title for granting or refusing injunction and the relief for injunction was founded or based on the finding on title.

The court set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the writ petition to the High Court for disposal in accordance with their observations.

Facts:

Land acquired by the state government for a railway project.

Surplus land leased to a private party for a slaughterhouse.

Appellants, including heirs of landowners, challenged the lease through a writ petition.

Appellants alleged that the state government failed to follow proper procedures.

Issues:

Whether the state government's action in leasing out surplus land was arbitrary and in violation of Article 14.

Whether the delay in challenging the lease affects the appellants' case.

Whether a new plea of arbitrariness can be raised in the appeal.

Held:

The Court held that the state government's action in executing the lease deed was not unreasonable, illegal, or arbitrary.Non-floating of tenders or not holding public auctions wouldn't necessarily be deemed arbitrary in all cases. Courts should examine the fairness of the decision-making process but not interfere with the ultimate policy decisions of the state government.

The Court emphasized that the burden of showing prima facie evidence of a violation of constitutional mandates lies with the person challenging the government's action.

The delay in approaching the court (almost three years after the lease deed) cast doubt on the appellants' bona fides. Interfering at this stage would adversely affect the business and employment opportunities.

No new plea of arbitrariness was raised in the initial writ petition, and such matters require proper pleadings.