Facts:

The respondent, a General Manager, received a show-cause notice/charge sheet without proper documentary support.

Documents proving the charges were not made available to the respondent, and inspection was denied despite repeated requests.

The Inquiry Officer failed to set a date, time, or place for a proper hearing.

The Inquiry Officer submitted a report based on the charge sheet and relevant records without appointing a Presenting Officer.

The respondent was deprived of a fair hearing, and no defense witnesses were allowed. Cross-examination of officers was denied.

The Managing Director directed the respondent to produce his defense but denied permission to summon defense witnesses on the hearing date.

An order terminating the respondent's service was issued on the same day as the hearing.

Issues:

Whether there was bias and malice in the actions of the Managing Director, leading to an unfair departmental proceeding and termination.

Whether there was a violation of the doctrine of natural justice in the proceedings.

Held:

Bias and Malice: The Supreme Court found evidence of bias on the part of the Managing Director. The Managing Director initiated charges, appointed the Inquiry Officer, and communicated the termination order on the same day. This sequence of events indicated prejudice and bias, rendering the proceedings unfair.

Doctrine of Natural Justice: The Court emphasized the importance of complying with the doctrine of natural justice in administrative proceedings. The entire chain of events suggested a personal clash and a procedure that deviated from the law. Compliance with the doctrine depended on the facts and circumstances of each case. Judicial review was available, even in departmental proceedings, when findings were based on no evidence or were wholly perverse or legally untenable

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside the termination order due to bias, malice, and non-compliance with the doctrine of natural justice. It affirmed the importance of judicial review in administrative actions, even in departmental proceedings, where fairness and justice were at stake. The Appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Abdul Wahab Ansari, was a public servant directed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to remove encroachments.

On July 17, 1993, while attempting to remove encroachments, a mob attacked with weapons, and the appellant ordered the police to open fire, resulting in a death and injuries.

A complaint was filed against the appellant under various sections of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether Section 197 of the CrPC, which requires prior sanction for prosecution of public servants, is applicable to the appellant's case.

At what stage an accused can raise the plea of lack of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC.

Held:

The Court clarified that an accused can raise the plea of lack of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC immediately after cognizance is taken and the process is issued, without waiting for the framing of charges.

The Court considered whether the appellant's actions were in the discharge of his official duty. It found that the appellant had been directed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to be present with a police force to remove encroachments. When he ordered the opening of fire to control the mob, it was in the exercise of his duty. Therefore, Section 197(1) of the CrPC applied.

The Court emphasized that the question of whether Section 197 of the CrPC applies to a case depends on whether the actions of a public servant were taken in the discharge of their official duty.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant.

Facts:

The case involves a property dispute concerning a three-storied building located in Calcutta-14, referred to as the "suit property." Ownership of the suit property had passed through various family members via sales and transfers. The key issue was whether the appellant, Gautam Paul, qualified as a member of the family under Section 4 of the Partition Act.

Issues:

Determination of the ownership and history of transfers related to the suit property.

Whether the appellant could be considered a member of the family under Section 4 of the Partition Act.

The requirement for a transferee to sue for partition before invoking Section 4.

Interpretation and application of Section 4 in this case.

Held:

The Court held that the sale to the appellant was not a sale to an outsider or a stranger to the family, as the appellant was not a member of the undivided family that owned the dwelling house. Merely being related by blood through a common ancestor did not make him a member of the family within the meaning of Section 4.( Para 22)

The Court further held that for Section 4 to apply, the transferee must initiate proceedings or make a claim to partition by actively seeking the actual division and possession of the share. A mere assertion of having a share without demanding separation and possession would not trigger Section 4.( Para 23)

The Court noted a conflict of opinions among various High Courts but aligned with the view that an outsider must actively seek partition and possession to invoke Section 4, as accepting the contrary view would nullify the express provisions of the section.( Para 24)

The Court cited a previous case (Babu Lal v. Habinoor Khan) that emphasized the necessity for the transferee to sue for partition or claim partition in execution proceedings before Section 4 could be exercised.( Para 25)

Consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the decree of the Trial Court dated 27th August 1992 was restored, except that the application under Section 4 was dismissed as premature. Respondents 1 and 2 were given the liberty to apply for a final decree of partition. The Court clarified that if the appellant applied for partition and possession of his share, respondents 1 and 2 or any other co-sharers could still invoke Section 4 of the Partition Act.( Para 26)

Facts:

The appellant and his brother Bishanlal Ahuja were partners in a firm known as "3-Aces," engaged in the restaurant business.

An agreement was entered into between the appellant and his brother, stating that the appellant would retire from the partnership before a certain date.

Pursuant to the agreement, a deed of dissolution of the partnership was executed.

Subsequently, the Gift Tax Officer valued the appellant's share in the partnership assets and deducted an amount paid to the appellant by his brother.

The Commissioner of Gift Tax confirmed the assessment, and the appellant appealed to the Tribunal, which ruled in favor of the appellant.

The High Court, on a reference from the Tribunal, held that the distribution of assets among the partners upon dissolution of the firm amounted to a gift for the purpose of the Gift Tax Act.

Issues:

Whether the distribution of assets among the partners on the dissolution of the firm, even though unequal, constitutes a "transfer of property" and a "gift" under the Gift Tax Act, 1958.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the distribution of assets among partners upon the dissolution of a firm, even if unequal, does not amount to a "transfer of property" and "gift" under the Gift Tax Act, 1958. The key points of the decision are as follows:

The court relied on the decision in CGT v. N.S. Getti Chettiar, which established that in a Hindu Joint Family, unequal distribution of assets among coparceners upon partition does not constitute a transfer or gift.

The court emphasized that a partner in a firm does not have an exclusive or specific right in any particular asset of the firm until the dissolution and distribution of assets occur.

The court clarified that a transaction involving the distribution of assets among partners upon dissolution is merely an adjustment of rights and does not involve a transfer of property as defined in the Gift Tax Act.

The court rejected the reliance on other cases, such as CGT v. Chhotalal Mohanlal, M.K. Kuppuraj, and Commissioner of Gift-tax, Bombay City-II v. Premji Trikamji Jobanputra, which involved different factual scenarios.

The court distinguished between the definitions and contexts of "transfer of property" in the Gift Tax Act and the Estate Duty Act, emphasizing that the two statutes serve different purposes.

Facts:

The petitioner, Makineni Venkata Sujatha, is the daughter of the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent filed a declaration under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act, 1973. The critical date for determining the ceiling on agricultural land holdings was January 1, 1975. The petitioner, being a minor as of that date, was included in her father's family unit. It was determined that her father's family unit had excess land that needed to be surrendered. The petitioner claimed that, based on Section 29A of the Hindu Succession Act, she should be treated as a coparcener and have equal rights as a son. Additionally, she relied on Section 4A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act to assert her entitlement to a share as a major son.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner, as a daughter, could claim rights similar to a son under Section 29A of the Hindu Succession Act.

Whether Section 4A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act entitled the petitioner to an increased share in her father's holdings.

Held:

The Court held that Section 29A of the Hindu Succession Act did not affect the excess land holdings of the father as of January 1, 1975. The petitioner, being a minor on that date, gained rights under Section 29A only from September 5, 1985. Thus, her rights did not impact the excess land computed for her father's family unit as of January 1, 1975.

The Court also determined that Section 4A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act, introduced in 1977, did not apply to major daughters. As the petitioner was a minor daughter on January 1, 1975, her father's family unit did not receive any additional entitlement under Section 4A.

Facts:

The dispute arises from a construction contract with a contract value of Rs. 3,39,88,000.

The contract included a 'variation' clause allowing changes in the extent of work up to 25% of the contract price.

The key issue was how the 25% variation limit should be calculated, either based on net overall increase (additions minus deletions) or total variations exceeding 25% of the contract price.

Disputes between the parties, including delays and changes in work, led to arbitration.

The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the contractor, who claimed higher rates based on the total variations exceeding 25% of the contract price.

The appellant challenged the award, primarily arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction.

Issues:

Interpretation of the '+/-25%' escalation clause.

Whether the arbitrator's award was within his jurisdiction.

The validity of the contractor's claim for higher rates based on the 'escalation' clause.

Held:

The court held that the interpretation of the '+/-25%' escalation clause should consider both additions and deletions in the work, and it was reasonable to determine if the total variations (both plus and minus) exceeded 25% of the contract price.

The court found that the arbitrator's award of 50% of the escalation claim was not illegal, as it fell within the arbitrator's jurisdiction and was based on factual circumstances and recommendations from departmental officers.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the arbitrator's award, and any interim orders were vacated.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the arbitrator's award was upheld, affirming the interpretation of the '+/-25%' escalation clause and the award of 50% of the escalation claim.

Facts:

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of Section 9(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. They argued that the levy of royalty on minerals is not a tax, and the Parliament lacks the power under Entry 54 of List I to enact such a law. They contended that this encroaches upon the State Legislature's authority to levy tax on mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II. Some appellants suggested referring the matter to a larger Bench based on a previous three-judge Bench decision. Additionally, they argued that Section 9(3) violates the provisions of Articles 268, 269, and 270 of the Constitution.

Issues:

The constitutional validity of Section 9(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, regarding the levy of royalty on minerals.

Whether Parliament has the authority under Entry 54 of List I to enact such a law, affecting the State Legislature's power under Entry 50 of List II.

Whether Section 9(3) violates Articles 268, 269, and 270 of the Constitution.

Held:

The appeals should not be referred to a larger Bench. Royalty on minerals is considered a tax, and the power of the State Legislature under Entry 50 in List II to impose taxes on minerals is outside its competence due to Sections 9 and 9(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.

The validity of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 has been upheld under Article 265. The tax levied on minerals under Section 9(3) of the Act is due to valid legislation by Parliament under Entry 54 of List I, and it does not violate fundamental rights.

The Central Government alone has the power to legislate on the regulation of Mines and Mineral Development under Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.

The doctrine of pith and substance of legislation applies, and as long as legislation is within permissible limits in substance, there is no issue with legislative competency. Entry 50 of List II must be read subject to the provisions of the Act of 1957, covering the field under Entry 50.

Facts:

The case involves six accused individuals, including a former Chief Minister of Karnataka (Mr. Bangrappa) and his Private Secretary (Mr. Suri Babu).

Charges under various sections of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, were filed against these accused.

The trial court initially found sufficient evidence to frame charges against all the accused.

The accused challenged this decision in the High Court through Criminal Revision Petitions.

The High Court, in a common order, discharged two of the accused individuals and directed the case to proceed against the remaining accused.

The CBI appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, raising various grounds to challenge the High Court's order.

During the Supreme Court proceedings, the discharged accused individuals decided to withdraw their revision petitions filed before the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should reach a finding on the contentious issues raised in the appeal.

The implications of the withdrawn revision petitions by the discharged accused individuals.

Held:

In light of the withdrawal of the revision petitions by the discharged accused individuals, the Supreme Court did not delve into the specific contentions or grounds raised in the appeals challenging the High Court's order.

As a result of the withdrawal, the High Court's order discharging the accused individuals was erased .

The trial court was directed to frame charges against the respondents (accused individuals) along with the other accused and proceed with the trial expeditiously.

Appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

Respondent accepted the final bill for a construction project without objection.

Later, the respondent claimed additional works and requested arbitration under Clause 25 of the agreement.

Arbitration proceedings took place, with both parties participating.

The arbitrator issued an award.

Issues:

Did an arbitrable dispute exist, given that the respondent had accepted the final bill without protest?

Can the objection regarding the absence of an arbitrable dispute be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court?

Held:

The existence of a dispute is a condition precedent for appointing an arbitrator under Clause 25.

The respondent accepted the final bill without protest.

The objection raised by the Union of India regarding the absence of an arbitrable dispute could not be entirely rejected.

For claim item No. 2, the arbitrable dispute did not exist, and the award for that claim was set aside.

The objection regarding the absence of an arbitrable dispute could not be raised for other claim items.

Decision:

The appeal was partially allowed, setting aside the award for claim item No. 2 while affirming the rest of the award amount.

REFERRED CASES:

P.K. Ramaiah and Company Vs. Chairman and Managing Director, National Thermal Power Corpn., (1994) 1 SCALE 1 : (1994) 3 SCC 126 Supp