Facts:

The Veterinary Council of India (VCI) and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) were in dispute over the authority to conduct an All India Common Entrance Examination for 15% of seats in Veterinary Colleges.

VCI had been established under the Indian Veterinary Council Act, 1984, with the mandate to regulate veterinary practice and education.

ICAR was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, with the objective of promoting and coordinating agricultural and animal husbandry education and research.

Issues:

The primary issue was which organization, VCI or ICAR, had the authority to conduct the All India Common Entrance Examination for filling 15% of seats in Veterinary Colleges.

The interpretation of the Indian Veterinary Council Act, 1984, and related regulations was central to resolving this issue.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that VCI had the authority and obligation to conduct the All India Common Entrance Examination for filling 15% of seats in Veterinary Colleges, as per the Indian Veterinary Council Act, 1984.

The Court cited the case of Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P. and Others to emphasize that admission norms have a direct impact on education standards, and the authority to regulate education standards includes the power to regulate admissions.

VCI's regulation, particularly Clause (8) of Regulation 5, was deemed valid and essential for maintaining educational standards.

The judgments of other High Courts supporting VCI's authority to conduct the examination were upheld.

Decision: The appeals filed by VCI were allowed, affirming VCI's authority to conduct the All India Common Entrance Examination.

Candidates selected by VCI were permitted to continue their studies without impediment.

Facts:

The case involves a landlord-tenant dispute over three shops in Erode, Tamil Nadu. The landlord, the appellant, claimed rent increases and sought eviction for demolition and reconstruction. The tenants disputed the rent increase and denied the landlord's title, asserting he was only a co-owner.

Issues:

Whether the tenants committed willful default in paying rent and whether their denial of the landlord's title was bona fide.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the tenants did not commit willful default in paying rent as the landlord had previously accepted rent payments. Furthermore, the tenants' denial of the landlord's title was not bona fide since they were unaware of a release deed, and their conduct did not renounce their status as tenants. Therefore, the High Court's decision to set aside the eviction order was upheld.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed without costs.

Facts:

The goods in question were initially released to the appellant upon their application and the execution of a bond.

Issues:

Whether a redemption fine could be imposed by the customs authorities after the goods had been released to the appellant.

Held:

The court held that the mere release of goods to the appellant on the execution of a bond does not prevent the customs authorities from imposing a redemption fine if irregularities or violations of customs regulations are subsequently discovered.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent belonged to the Nuniya community, declared as a Scheduled Caste in West Bengal but not in Bihar.

The respondent had resided in District Howrah, West Bengal, for over 30 years before the UPSC examination, which led to his appointment to Indian Administrative and Allied Services as a Scheduled Caste candidate.

The Union of India contested the respondent's claim, arguing that his birthplace and education in Bihar should make him a resident of Bihar, disqualifying him for reservation benefits in West Bengal.

Issues:

The primary issue was the interpretation of the term "ordinarily resident" in the context of reservation for Scheduled Castes.

The secondary issue was whether the respondent qualified as a resident of West Bengal for the purpose of reservation.

Held:

The term "ordinarily resident" implies an intention to stay at a place for a considerably long time and does not include short-term or casual stays.

The respondent's parents had been residing in District Howrah, West Bengal, for over 30 years, establishing their status as ordinary residents of West Bengal.

The respondent's temporary stay in Bihar for education did not affect his parents' status, and they could be considered "ordinarily resident" in West Bengal.

Therefore, the Scheduled Caste certificate issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Howrah, was valid, and the respondent was rightly appointed as a Scheduled Caste candidate in West Bengal.

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal, confirming the respondent's eligibility as a Scheduled Caste candidate in West Bengal, and dismissed the appeal.

Writ Petition - Grant of LPG Distributorship – Challenge of Approval – Civil Appeal – Supreme Court finds that writ court improperly entertained writ petition against LPG distributorship approval granted to appellant – Initially, both appellant and respondent No. 1 were eligible for distributorship, with appellant eventually granted the right after a draw of lots – Respondent No. 1's subsequent challenge on grounds that the land offered was encumbered held unjustified after appellant provided suitable alternate land – Supreme Court upholds Single Judge's dismissal of writ petition on grounds of delay and lack of locus standi – Impugned appellate court order set aside, and Single Judge's order restored. [Paras 1-15]

Writ Petitions – Delay and Latches – Consideration by Supreme Court – Court emphasizes that delay defeats equity, holding that inordinate delay without a satisfactory explanation is a valid ground for dismissal of writ petitions – Supreme Court observes that writ courts should exercise discretion judicially, not permitting revival of a lapsed cause of action due to indolent litigants – The Court reiterates established legal principles disfavoring delayed petitions, stressing the importance of prompt legal action and the potential injustice caused by unnecessary delays. [Paras 9-14]

Judicial Discretion in Writ Proceedings – Doctrine of Delay and Latches – Supreme Court discusses the discretionary nature of writ courts under Article 226, highlighting that delay and latches can preclude relief – Case references include Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu, emphasizing the judicial responsibility to dismiss delayed actions to maintain the integrity and efficacy of legal proceedings – Supreme Court supports judicial discretion based on specific case circumstances without a fixed formula. [Paras 10-14]

Civil Appeal – Breach of Provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 – Challenge against the High Court's dismissal of appeal regarding the sale transaction and eviction order – Remand for fresh consideration on facts and law. [Para 2, 17]

Property Law – Partition and Sale of Ancestral Agricultural Land – Dispute over legality of sale transaction under the Act of 1947 – Controversy over partition and demarcation of land, and its classification as irrigated or dry land. [Para 4, 5, 12, 15]

Procedural Fairness – Lack of Proper Hearing in Original and Revisional Authorities – Absence of opportunity for appellant to present case on merits – Remand for fresh consideration with opportunities for both parties to adduce evidence. [Para 14, 17]

Legal Address – Discrepancy in Appellant's Address in Official Records – Impact on the service of notice and filing of revisions – Issue of impersonation in filing first revision. [Para 10, 14]

Administrative Law – Revisional Authority's Application of Res Judicata Principle – Challenge of its applicability in the context of previous orders and the need for a full hearing on merits. [Para 8, 14]

Judicial Review – High Court's Overlooking of Relevant Facts – Failure to consider executed sale agreement and its implications on the partition and demarcation of land – Requirement for detailed examination of evidence and legal issues. [Para 15, 16]

Decision – Setting aside of High Court's and authorities' orders – Restoration of case to original authority for fresh consideration – Directive for expeditious and reasoned decision within six months. [Para 17]

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Belated inclusion of claim – Appellant’s claim related to an arbitral award dated 01.08.2016, which was in appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act – An agreement entered into on 02.08.2006 for the development of land into a residential group housing complex – Alleged misconduct by the Corporate Debtor in advertising the project under its own name led to arbitration proceedings initiated on 02.05.2011 – Award in favor of the appellant on 01.08.2016, directing the Corporate Debtor to apply for the transfer of licenses – Corporate Debtor filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act on 26.09.2016 – Concurrent execution proceedings initiated by the appellant adjourned sine die due to the pendency of the Section 34 proceedings – Section 34 proceedings culminated in the award being upheld with modifications on 25.04.2019 – CIRP initiated against the Corporate Debtor in respect of three real estate projects on 27.03.2019 – Resolution plan approved by the COC on 11.07.2020 – Appellant’s claim of Rs.35,67,05,337 against the Corporate Debtor rejected as belated by respondent no.1 – Appellant filed an application under Section 60(5) of the IBC – Adjudicating Authority granted relief to the appellant, allowing consideration of their claim – NCLAT disagreed with the Adjudicating Authority’s view – Appellant’s contentions regarding the claim’s contingent nature, timeline under Section 12 of the IBC, and lack of awareness about the CIRP – Respondent No.1’s efforts to collate claims and the potential consequences of reopening claims after plan approval – Appeal dismissed. [Para 1-23]

Constitutional law - Governor's power to invite Chief Minister - Objective material for calling floor test - Held, the Governor must have objective material before concluding that the Chief Minister has lost the confidence of the House and calling for a floor test. [Para 166]

Constitutional law - Governor's power to invite Chief Minister - Restoration of status quo ante - Resignation of Chief Minister - Held, the Court cannot quash a voluntary resignation, and the status quo ante cannot be restored if the Chief Minister has resigned before the floor test. [Para 194]

Constitutional law - Governor's power to invite Chief Minister - Authority to recognize factions within a political party - Role of Election Commission - Held, the Governor's authority is not exceeded by inviting a faction as long as the party has returned the highest number of candidates, and the Election Commission is the appropriate authority to determine the factions within a political party. [Para 204]

Constitution of India - Article 164(1B) - Disqualification of Minister - Pending disqualification petition - Applicability - Held, Article 164(1B) does not bar the appointment of a member as a Minister if a disqualification petition is pending adjudication before the Speaker. [Para 199]

Constitution of India - Article 164(1B) - Disqualification of Minister - Triggering of disqualification - Speaker's verdict - Held, Article 164(1B) is triggered only when the Speaker returns a verdict finding that the member has breached Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule. [Para 200]

Constitution of India - Article 164(1B) - Disqualification of Minister - Disqualification related to date of act - Effect of subsequent acts - Held, subsequent acts or events do not have an exculpatory effect on the disqualification if the prohibited act has already been committed. [Para 202]

Constitution of India - Tenth Schedule - Disqualification of members - Procedure and jurisdiction of Speaker and Election Commission - Role of Court - Larger Bench reference - Held, the correctness of the decision in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 is referred to a larger Bench of seven judges. [Para 206(a)]

Decision It cannot ordinarily adjudicate petitions for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule in the first instance, and the Speaker must decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period. [Para 206(b)]

 MLA has the right to participate in the proceedings of the House regardless of the pendency of disqualification petitions, and the validity of the proceedings is not subject to the outcome of the disqualification petitions. [Para 206(c)]

The political party, and not the legislature party, appoints the Whip and the Leader of the party in the House. The Speaker should recognize the Whip and the Leader authorized by the Shiv Sena political party based on the party constitution. [Para 206(d)]

Speaker and the Election Commission of India (ECI) have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate on the petitions under the Tenth Schedule and Paragraph 15 of the Symbols Order, respectively. [Para 206(e)]

The effect of the deletion of Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule is that the defense of 'split' is no longer available to members facing disqualification proceedings. The Speaker should determine the political party for adjudicating disqualification petitions when factions claim to be the same party. [Para 206(f)]

Governor was not justified in calling for a floor test as there was no objective material indicating that the Chief Minister had lost the confidence of the House. However, the status quo ante could not be restored as the Chief Minister had already resigned. [Para 206(h)]

Governor was justified in inviting Mr. Eknath Shinde to form the government based on the support extended by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) MLAs and independent candidates. [Para 206(i)]

Constitution of India - Tenth Schedule - Disqualification of members - Jurisdiction of Court to adjudicate disqualification petitions - Speaker's role - Held, the Court cannot ordinarily adjudicate petitions for disqualification in the first instance, and the Speaker must decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period. [Para 206(b)]

Constitution of India - Tenth Schedule - Disqualification of members - Right of MLA to participate in House proceedings - Pendency of disqualification petitions - Validity of proceedings - Held, an MLA has the right to participate in the House proceedings regardless of the pendency of disqualification petitions, and the validity of the proceedings is not subject to the outcome of the disqualification petitions. [Para 206(c)]

Facts:

The dispute arises from the reorganization Scheme, which led to the re-description of the post of Telephone Operators as RTOs. The new post carried a higher pay scale and required specialized training. The reorganization introduced an element of selection criteria, including a minimum of 5 years of service. The question was whether the appellants, who were Telephone Operators seeking deployment as RTOs, were entitled to the benefits of the ACP Scheme.

Issues:

• Whether the consequence of the reorganization Scheme amounts to a promotion rather than a mere re-description of the post.
• Whether the appellants are entitled to the benefits of the ACP Scheme considering the eligibility criteria and specialized training for the RTO post.

Held:

The reorganization resulted in not only a re-description but also a much higher pay scale and specialized training, making it a promotion. The higher pay scale was not available to all employees who met the eligibility conditions without undergoing a selection process.

The ACP Scheme aims to address genuine stagnation and hardship faced by employees due to lack of promotional avenues. Considering the triple criteria of minimum 5 years of service, specialized training, and higher financial emoluments, the appellants are not entitled to the benefits of the ACP Scheme.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the benefits of the ACP Scheme do not apply to the appellants. The High Court was right in interfering with the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal.