Facts:

Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition in the Karnataka High Court challenging land allotments made by the BDA to a cooperative society, as well as some land transfers made by the allottees.

The respondents included ex-legislators and ex-ministers who were members of the cooperative society.

The High Court issued several directions related to land allotments and transfers.

Issues:

The Supreme Court was tasked with reviewing the legality of land allotments made to the cooperative society.

The Court also had to determine the legality of land transfers made by some allottees.

Held:

The Court found that the High Court had exceeded the scope of the original writ petition by issuing extensive directions related to land allotments.

It examined the legality of land allotments made to the cooperative society and found them valid under Section 38-B of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.

The Court addressed the issue of land transfers, emphasizing that the permission granted for transferring the land in 1994 and 1995 was illegal.

It pointed out that after the amendment of Rule 14 in 1998, regularisation of the alienations could take place by the purchaser paying a specified amount.

The Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the BDA to provide an opportunity to the purchasers of the land in question to regularise their transfers by paying the specified amount. (Paragraph 14)

Facts:

The Government of Madhya Pradesh issued a notification under Section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, providing for sales tax exemption for certain dealers who met specific requirements.

The respondent, Madhya Bharat Papers Ltd., a new industrial unit engaged in paper manufacturing, operated in a backward tribal area of District Bilaspur, Madhya Pradesh.

The Directorate of Industries issued a certificate of eligibility to the respondent, certifying their eligibility for sales tax exemption.

Issues:

Whether the respondent, who was registered under Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Central Sales Tax Act, was eligible for the sales tax exemption provided in the government notification, or if registration under Sub-section (1) was necessary.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the language of the notification was clear and unambiguous. It required the dealer to be registered under both the State and Central Acts but did not specify whether the registration under the Central Act should be under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 7.

The certificate of registration was obtained by the respondent even though they were not initially liable to pay tax under the Central Act. Their liability to pay tax arose only after they commenced production and business.

Therefore, the respondent met the requirements of the notification, and the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

Mohammed Idris Ali filed an election petition challenging the election of Mustafa Shahidul Islam as a member of the Assam Legislative Assembly. The petitioner later sought to withdraw the election petition, and the withdrawal was allowed after publication in the Official Gazette and newspapers. The appellant, Mohammed Abubakkar Siddique, filed applications for substitution, which were dismissed by the High Court as being barred by limitation.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the appellant's substitution applications on the ground of limitation was correct, considering the procedural requirements under Section 110 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Held:

The High Court erred in calculating the period of limitation for filing substitution applications, as it incorrectly used the date of publication in an English daily newspaper (Assam Tribune) instead of the date of publication in the Official Gazette. Section 110(3)(b) of the Act mandates that the notice of withdrawal must be published in the Official Gazette and may also be published in other manners specified by the High Court. The 14-day period for applying to be substituted as a petitioner should be counted from the date of publication in the Official Gazette. Consequently, the appellant's applications were filed within the statutory timeframe. Therefore, the High Court's order dismissing the substitution applications was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for further proceedings, treating the substitution applications as filed within the prescribed period of limitation.

Decision: The appeal succeeded, and it was allowed. However, no order was issued regarding costs for this appeal.

Facts:

The case involved an application for grant of exemption under Section 20(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The State of Andhra Pradesh contended that such an application for exemption was not maintainable once the excess land had been declared and vested in the state under Section 10 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether an application for exemption under Section 20(1)(b) is maintainable after the excess land has been declared and vested in the state under Section 10.

Interpretation of the term "to hold" as defined in Section 2(1) of the Act in the context of Sections 20(1)(a) and 20(1)(b).

Held:

The court disagreed with the State's contention. It explained that the scheme of the Act required a detailed computation of land ownership and statutory deductions based on individual cases. The Act's provisions made it challenging for a person to definitively know whether they held excess land or the extent of that excess at the time of filing a declaration.

The court emphasized that it was only after the excess land was determined under Section 10, following the various provisions of the Act, that a person could accurately know the extent of their excess land and consider seeking exemption.

The court held that the definition of "to hold" in Section 2(1) could not be applied in the context of Section 20(1)(a) or Section 20(1)(b). If the State's argument were accepted, it would frustrate the entire purpose of Section 20. The court reasoned that a person couldn't apply for exemption before the excess was determined because they wouldn't know the actual excess, and after the excess was determined, they couldn't apply because they wouldn't be "holding" the excess land.

In essence, the court rejected the State's argument and upheld the view that an application for exemption under Section 20 could be maintained even if filed after an order of vesting of excess land had been passed under Section 10.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the specific performance of an agreement regarding a property transfer. The defendant-appellants are subsequent purchasers of the property.

Respondent No. 2 entered into an agreement on June 26, 1977, with the first respondent to transfer his life interest in the property in question.

On December 29, 1979, respondent No. 2 transferred the rights to the defendant-appellants for a consideration of Rs. 4,40 lakhs.

Plaintiff-respondent No. 1 initiated a suit for specific performance, which was initially decreed by the trial court and later affirmed by the Madras High Court.

Issues:

Whether the lengthy delay in delivering the judgment by the High Court warrants setting aside the judgment.

Whether the arguments raised at the bar have been properly reflected or appreciated in the judgment.

Held:

The court acknowledged the five-year delay in delivering the judgment and the concerns raised by the appellants regarding the proper reflection and appreciation of their arguments. The court decided not to express an opinion on the merits of the case at this stage but recognized that such delays can create doubts in the minds of the parties. Consequently, the court set aside the judgment under appeal without expressing any opinion on the case's merits. The matter was remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits. The High Court was requested to expedite the proceedings, aiming for a decision within six months.

The court addressed the issue of possession during the pendency of the case. Respondent No. 1, as the lawful owner based on the decree, was allowed to continue in possession. An agreement was made that during the appeal in the High Court, respondent No. 1 would refrain from creating third-party rights in the property and would deposit the rent/income received from the property in the High Court, subject to the High Court's decision.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case pertains to a dispute involving a shop-cum-office located in Sector 17-C, Chandigarh. The respondent was the landlady, and the appellant was the tenant of the property. The respondent initiated a civil suit for the eviction of the appellant and the recovery of rent arrears in 1982. The central issue was whether the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 applied to the building at the time the suit was filed. The contention primarily revolved around the date from which the 5-year exemption under the Act should be calculated.

Issues:

Whether the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was applicable to the building in question at the time of filing the suit?

Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit?

Held:

The trial court initially dismissed the suit, concluding that the 5-year exemption period under the Act should be calculated from the date of the electric connection, making the suit time-barred. The first appellate court disagreed and remanded the case for further consideration. The High Court upheld the first appellate court's view, asserting that the exemption period should be calculated from the date of sewerage connection and dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court, in its judgment, relied on a previous decision in "Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh and Others Vs. Central Government and Others." The Court held that the exemption under the Act applied only to buildings that met specific conditions on or after January 31, 1973. Since the building in question had received an electric connection before that date, it was not eligible for the exemption. Consequently, the civil court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The appeal was allowed, and the judgments of the first appellate court and the High Court were set aside. The trial court's judgment, which held the suit was not maintainable, was confirmed. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

Dev Samaj Girls Senior Secondary School in Chandigarh is a private educational institution that received recognition and grant-in-aid from the Chandigarh Administration.

The school initially offered education up to class 10 but later expanded to include 11th and 12th classes in Humanities and Commerce.

Respondents 1 to 12 are lecturers at the school, and they sought equal pay with their counterparts in other aided schools in Chandigarh.

The appellants (Chandigarh Administration) argued that the permission to expand to higher secondary classes was conditional and did not include grant-in-aid for additional staff.

The High Court ruled in favor of the respondents, directing the appellants to pay the same salary as teachers in other privately managed government-aided schools in Chandigarh.

Issues:

Whether the respondents are entitled to salary parity with teachers in other aided schools in Chandigarh.

Whether the appellants' argument regarding the financial burden is valid.

Held:

The respondents are entitled to salary parity with teachers in other aided schools in Chandigarh. The principle of equal pay for equal work was emphasized, and the court cited previous cases where it had intervened to ensure such parity.

The appellants' argument regarding the financial burden was rejected. The court stated that the state administration cannot shirk its responsibility of providing quality education due to a lack of resources. The sharing of the financial burden will be in accordance with the Grant-in-aid Scheme applicable to the school.

Facts:

In Civil Appeal No. 7717 of 1994, a seniority list was issued under the Maharashtra Sales Tax Inspectors Recruitment Rules, 1971, for Sales Tax Inspectors (STIs) from direct recruits and promotees in the ratio of 60:40 as far as practicable.

Two direct recruits challenged this seniority list before the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT), resulting in the list being quashed.

An SLP filed by promotees against this decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court, making the SAT judgment final.

A fresh seniority list was issued on 28.12.1992 and finalized on 29.10.1993. The promotees challenged this list before SAT, which dismissed the application on grounds of res judicata and constructive res judicata.

In Civil Appeal No. 6316 of 1997, the dispute concerned the seniority of STIs promoted from the Revenue Department and Sales Tax Department, with the post of STI being a selection post.

The High Court quashed the provisional seniority list, which included absorbed employees from the Revenue Department.

Issues:

Applicability of the principle of res judicata/constructive res judicata in the first case.

Seniority determination between direct recruits and promotees in the second case.

Suit filed in representative capacity and its impact on res judicata.

Held:

The expression "as far as practicable" in Rule 2 of the Maharashtra Sales Tax Inspectors Recruitment Rules, 1971, had already been construed by SAT in a previous application, making the contention of the promotees on res judicata invalid.

SAT's finding was not per incuriam and operated as res judicata.

The plea regarding the Rules not permitting carry forward of vacancies was barred by constructive res judicata.

A certificate dated 21.2.1992, not produced in the earlier case, could not be used in the present proceedings due to constructive res judicata.

SAT rightly dismissed the application on grounds of res judicata and constructive res judicata. Directions issued by SAT on merits were non est.

Absorbed employees from the Revenue Department were entitled to the benefit of service in their parent department but not to claim seniority over those already promoted.

The High Court rightly quashed the provisional seniority list.

Facts:

The appellant, Smt. G. Kaushalya Devi, was a tenant.

The respondent, Ghanshyamdas, filed an eviction petition against the appellant under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent, and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, citing reasons including willful default in rent payment and bona fide requirement for personal occupation for conducting business.

During the proceedings, the ground of securing alternative accommodation was not pursued.

The Rent Controller ruled in favor of eviction on both grounds.

The appellate authority affirmed the Rent Controller's findings.

The appellant filed a revision in the High Court under Section 22 of the Act.

The High Court, in its judgment, found no willful default in rent payment but agreed with the eviction on the ground of the landlord's bona fide requirement for personal occupation.

Issues:

Whether the eviction of the appellant based on the landlord's bona fide requirement for personal occupation was legally justified.

Whether the landlord's existing occupancy of another non-residential premises in the same city precluded him from seeking eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.

Held:

The appellant argued that the respondent-landlord's occupation of another non-residential premises in the same city for conducting business made him ineligible to seek eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.

The judgment referred to a similar provision in the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951, and the precedent of M. Padmanabha Setty Vs. K.P. Papiah Setty to interpret the phrase "entitled to possession" in the context of a landlord's right to seek eviction.

It was determined that the landlord's right to seek eviction was not restricted by the fact that he already occupied another non-residential premises.

The High Court's finding that the respondent required the suit premises for personal occupation for conducting business was upheld.

The appellant's contention that another shop had been purchased by the respondent's mother with a loan from the respondent was rejected by the High Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and granted the appellant time until October 31, 2000, to vacate the suit premises, provided she filed a usual undertaking within four weeks from the date of the judgment.