Facts:

Sir Adamji Peerbhoy established a trust in 1883 A.D. for the Dawoodi Bohra Community.

The trust property included a plot of land at Queens Road, Bombay, which was later used for charitable purposes, including the construction of a mosque and a building.

The trust faced challenges and requisitions over the years, leading to the establishment of Saifee Hospital Trust in 1973.

Disputes arose regarding the restricted nature of the trust in the 21st century and its alignment with constitutional principles.

Issues:

Whether the charitable trust founded by Sir Adamji Peerbhoy needed a change of object under the Cy-pres doctrine to make it secular.

The constitutional mandate of secularism and its impact on the original trust established in the 19th century.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the Cy-pres doctrine, emphasizing the need to preserve the donor's charitable intention as much as possible.

The Court considered the historical context and the establishment of Saifee Hospital Trust, leading to the litigation.

Agreed minutes of the order were presented, confirming the City Civil Court's orders with modifications.

Specific directions were given regarding the reservation of beds in the proposed Saifee Hospital for the Dawoodi Bohra Community.

Conditions were set for the construction and maintenance of the Sanatorium Wing, ensuring it remains a comfortable place for the Musafirs.

The use of the land for the Saifee Hospital and the Sanatorium was addressed, with specific conditions regarding gates and entrances.

Directions were given for the renewal of the lease, with conditions to be followed by the lessee and sub-lessee.

Facts:

The appellants claimed Sirdari rights over plots in three villages, disputed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The recorded tenure-holder, Jethu, was considered to have died a civil death, leading to the question of property vesting in the Gaon Sabha.

Issues:

Validity of the Deputy Director's decision to vest property in the Gaon Sabha.

Applicability of Section 11-C in consolidation proceedings.

Nature of Escheat and its application in the absence of heirs.

Held:

The Deputy Director's decision to vest the property in the Gaon Sabha was justified based on the principle of Escheat. Section 11-C mandated recording in the Gaon Sabha's name even without their objection during consolidation proceedings.

Clarification that Section 11-C applies irrespective of whether the property originally belonged to the Gaon Sabha or a tenure-holder. Escheat is affirmed as a valid principle, reverting property to the State in the absence of heirs.

Section 48 grants wide powers to the Deputy Director to examine the regularity and correctness of proceedings. Reopening the case for scrutiny was justified, especially when entries were found fictitious or in violation of statutory provisions.

The appeal is dismissed without costs due to a lack of merit.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of the 46th Constitutional Amendment related to the definition of 'sale' and 'works contract.'

The Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., issued a Circular opining that the job done by photographers amounts to a "works contract" post the constitutional amendment.

The Assessing Officer re-assessed the turnover of the assessees based on the Circular, leading to demand notices.

Issues:

Whether the work done by photographers, including taking photographs, developing, and printing films, falls under the category of a 'works contract' for the purpose of sales tax.

Held:

The High Court, relying on a previous judgment, held that to the extent of the photo paper used, there is a transfer of property in goods, making it a "works contract."

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, stating that the occupation of a photographer is essentially one of skill and labor, and there is no primary intention to transfer goods in the contract.

The Court emphasized that the 46th Amendment allows states to levy sales tax on goods and materials used in works contracts but does not empower microscopic division of contracts involving incidental materials.

The Court held that unless there is a primary intention to sell and purchase goods in a works contract, the state cannot impose sales tax.

Given that the work done by photographers is more in the nature of a service contract, the stand taken by the respondent-state cannot be sustained.

The appeals were allowed, and the assessment orders and demand notices were quashed.

Facts:

Appellant issued a cheque to Respondent No. I.

Cheque returned with "insufficient funds" remark.

Respondent No. I issued a notice of demand within 15 days, claiming the cheque amount and additional charges.

Appellant failed to meet the demand.

Complaint filed by Respondent No. I before the Metropolitan Magistrate.

Issues:

Magistrate deemed the notice invalid, as the demanded amount exceeded the cheque amount.

High Court allowed the revision, setting aside the Magistrate's order.

Held:

The notice specified the "said amount" (cheque amount) clearly. Additional amounts claimed were severable; if the cheque amount was paid, criminal liability under S.138 would be absolved.. The notice, when read as a whole, met the legal requirement for demand on the "said amount." Specific claims towards interest, costs, etc., were considered severable and did not invalidate the notice. An omnibus demand without specifying the due amount might render the notice invalid.

Decision: Dismissing the appeal, the Court held that the notice was valid as the "said amount" was clearly stated, and additional claims were severable.

Facts:

The appellant, an auto-rickshaw driver, was intercepted while transporting gunny bags containing Charas. The search was based on prior information, but the searching officer failed to record it in writing and send a copy to his superior. The appellant admitted the recovery, but disputed knowledge of the contraband.

Issues:

Compliance with procedural requirements under Sections 42 and 50 of the NDPS Act.

Presumption of culpable mental state under Section 35.

Burden of proof on the accused to show lack of knowledge.

Held:

Compliance with Procedural Requirements: Non-compliance with Section 42 rendered the action of the searching officer suspect. While it may not vitiate the trial, it causes prejudice to the accused.

Presumption of Culpable Mental State: The burden of proof under Section 35 lies with the accused. The appellant's burden can be discharged by relying on materials in prosecution evidence, eliciting answers through cross-examination, or adducing other evidence. Non-recording of vital information and other circumstances favored the appellant, rebutting the presumption.

Burden of Proof: The accused successfully discharged the burden of proof, showing a lack of knowledge about the contraband. Rebutting the presumption under Section 35, the appellant is not liable for the charged offenses.

Facts:

The appellant, a landholder, contested the classification of their land as private forest under the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975. An initial order by the Deputy Collector favored the appellant, citing water-logging and the timing of the notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act, 1927. The Revenue Tribunal, Maharashtra, on appeal by the State, overturned the decision and remanded the matter for further inquiry.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Act, 1975.

Whether the notice under Section 35(3) served before the Act's commencement suffices for land classification.

The exclusion of 2 hectares under Section 2(f)(iii) in the absence of a final notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act, 1927.

Held:

The Deputy Collector's decision, emphasizing the necessity of notice service before the Act's commencement, was overturned by the Revenue Tribunal. The Court concluded that Section 2(f)(iii) doesn't mandate the same procedural steps as Section 35(1) of the Forest Act, 1927. The legislature's intent was to exclude 2 hectares from vesting when notice under Section 35(3) was issued before the Act's commencement.

Decision: The Court modified the order, directing the Deputy Collector to specify the 2 hectares of land the appellant could retain. Any excess land would be subject to relevant land ceiling laws. The appeal was disposed of with this modification.

Facts:

The appellant, a subsidiary of Kolhapur Sugar Mills Ltd., was issued a fresh license for sugar manufacture. After a claim, the excise authorities allowed a rebate of excise duty. Subsequently, a notice was issued under Rule 10A, asking the appellant to show cause why the erroneously allowed rebate should not be recovered. On August 6, 1977, Rules 10 and 10A were omitted, and a new Rule 10 was introduced without a savings clause.

Issues:

Whether the proceedings for the recovery of the rebate of excise duty can continue after the deletion of the rule under which it was initiated.

Held:

The proceedings lapsed after August 6, 1977, and any order passed thereafter is considered non-existent.

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 is not applicable to the omission of a Rule; it applies to the repeal of an Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act.

The absence of a savings clause means that pending proceedings would lapse on the deletion of the rule under which they were initiated.

Decision: The court held that the proceedings for the recovery of the rebate of excise duty wrongly allowed could not continue after the deletion of the rule under which they were initiated.

Facts:

Second respondent hired trucks to transport broken rice.

Appellant paid freight as instructed by carriers and consignor.

Consignment lost; second respondent claimed Rs. 93,925.55, settled at Rs. 64,137 by insurance.

Second respondent executed Letter of Subrogation and Special Power of Attorney in favor of the first respondent.

First respondent filed a complaint under Consumer Protection Act against the appellant for the loss of consignment.

Issues:

Whether the first respondent was subrogated or assigned the rights of the second respondent.

Whether the first respondent qualifies as a 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act.

Held:

The Letter of Subrogation included assignment language, granting full power to the first respondent to recover the claim in its own name. This constituted an assignment.

The loss had already occurred; the first respondent, having acquired rights solely for the purpose of recovering compensation, does not qualify as a 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment and order. The complaint is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants are the legal representatives of a subsequent purchaser involved in a suit for specific performance filed by Bachna. Bachna sought specific performance of an earlier agreement to sell a property. She had not initially pleaded readiness and willingness, but later introduced this plea through an amendment.

Issues:

Whether Bachna and her legal representatives were at all material times ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement, as required by Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act.

Held:

The court refers to the judgment in Jugraj Singh's case but disagrees with its interpretation. It emphasizes that Section 16(c) applies to any party seeking specific performance, not limited to the vendor/defendant.

The obligation imposed by Section 16 is on the court not to grant specific performance if the plaintiff fails to prove readiness and willingness. It clarifies that any defendant can contend and establish non-compliance with Section 16(c).

The court holds that the decision in Jugraj Singh's case is erroneous and remands the suit to the trial court to determine whether Bachna and her legal representatives had proven their readiness and willingness.

The appeal is allowed, and the judgments and orders of the lower courts are set aside. The suit is remanded to the trial court for expeditious decision, within six months.