Facts:

The case concerned the allocation of seats for higher education and public employment in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The population was categorized into various groups, including tribals, pre-1942 settlers, post-1942 settlers, settlers with ten years of island education, and merit candidates. The Central Government had established a quota system, and the petitioners belonged to the category of settlers with ten years of island education (category v). An order had reduced their quota from 35% to 20% and increased the combined quota for pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers (category iii and iv) to 50%.

Issues:

Did the reduction of the quota for category v (settlers with ten years of island education) violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution?

Could pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers be allocated 50% of the quota?

Was there any provision for merit candidates in the allocation of seats?

Held:

The Court held that pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers constituted a separate category and were socially and educationally backward, albeit to a lesser degree than tribals. Their history included efforts to make the islands habitable and suffering during the Japanese occupation. They could not be equated with category v, which comprised voluntary migrants with greater social and educational advancement. The Central Government's decision to restore 50% quota for pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers was justified in light of this historical context.

The Court rejected the argument that the larger population of category v should result in a higher percentage of reservation. It stated that no reservation based on population within a particular category could be established. Allocation should consider social and economic backwardness, and the pre-1942 and post-1942 settlers were identified as backward in these aspects.

The Court emphasized that, generally, reserved categories should not exceed 50% of the total quota, with the remainder going to merit candidates. However, the Court found that the present classification and quota did not violate this principle. The impugned order specifically provided that unutilized quota from other categories would be allocated to merit candidates. Adequate provisions were made in favor of merit candidates. Writ petition is dismissed.

Facts:

Narain Lal, a government employee, had two wives, Rameshwari Devi (the first wife) and Yogmaya Devi (the second wife). He had children from both marriages. Narain Lal passed away in 1987, while serving as Managing Director of the Rural Development Authority of Bihar. A dispute arose regarding the entitlement to family pension, death-cum-retirement gratuity, and property rights between his two wives and their respective children. The first wife, Rameshwari Devi, claimed sole entitlement to these benefits, arguing that the second marriage between Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi was invalid.

Issues:

Whether the second marriage between Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi was valid under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Whether children born from the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage were legitimate and entitled to a share of the family pension, death-cum-retirement gratuity, and property of the deceased government employee.

If legitimate, until what age were the minor children from the second marriage entitled to receive family pension.

Held:

The court held that the second marriage between Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi was in contravention of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, making it a void marriage.

Despite the void nature of the second marriage, Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, deems children of void marriages as legitimate. Under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolves firstly on heirs, including the widow and son. In this context, the legitimate sons born from the second marriage were entitled to a share in the family pension, death-cum-retirement gratuity, and property of Narain Lal, along with the first wife's son and property rights.

Family pension would be admissible to the minor children born from the second marriage until they reached the age of majority. Yogmaya Devi, as the second wife, was not entitled to any portion of these benefits.

An inquiry conducted by the State Government to determine the legitimacy of the marriage and the children was valid. Witnesses testified to the existence of the marriage and the legitimacy of the sons, and documentary evidence supported this. The presumption in favor of marriage duly performed between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal was not rebutted.

The court emphasized that disbursement of pension could not wait for a civil court to decide the respective rights of the parties. While the matter could ultimately be resolved by a civil court, the government had the authority to conduct an inquiry and make determinations for the purpose of granting pensionary benefits.

The appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

This appeal was referred to a Full Bench of three Judges due to a conflict in views regarding the nature of Explanation (2) to Section 40(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The central question was whether this Explanation, introduced on April 1, 1985, should be applied prospectively or if it is merely declaratory.

Issues:

The interpretation of Explanation (2) to Section 40(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, specifically whether it had a prospective or declaratory effect.

Held:

In previous cases, the Supreme Court had considered this issue. In Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Allahabad, two Judges concluded that Explanation (2) was declaratory, and this view was upheld by a Bench of three Judges in M/s. Suwalal Anadilal Jain vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar-II, Ranchi. The Full Bench held that these earlier decisions still represented the correct interpretation of the law, meaning that Explanation (2) to Section 40(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, should be considered declaratory.

Decision: The civil appeal was dismissed, and no order was given regarding the costs of the appeal.

Facts:

The case pertains to the aftermath of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy. The petitioner, Krishna Mohan Shukla, raised concerns about the functioning of the Bhopal Gas Relief Tribunal and issues related to medical facilities. The compensation scheme established by the Government of India in 1985 was at the center of the dispute. The petitioner alleged that Deputy Commissioners responsible for compensation had applied arbitrary criteria, and Lok Adalats' decisions were questioned.

Issues:

The alleged arbitrary functioning of the Bhopal Gas Relief Tribunal.

Concerns regarding medical facilities.

The application of the compensation scheme and the role of Deputy Commissioners.

The legitimacy of Lok Adalats' decisions.

Held:

The court recognized the need for fair compensation for claimants and the importance of adhering to the established system for determining compensation through Deputy Commissioners, Additional Commissioners, and the Welfare Commissioner. The court suggested that aggrieved claimants should initially seek judicial review at the High Court level rather than directly approaching the Supreme Court under Article 32 or Article 136.

The court upheld the validity of Lok Adalats' decisions. It clarified that the order of November 7, 1997, allowing review petitions for claimants in Medical Category 'C' and above, was appropriate to address grievances.

The court deferred addressing medical facility issues and directed the petitioner to assist in a related writ petition (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 50 of 1998), where pleadings were complete and orders had been passed.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by the State of Maharashtra against a judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. The High Court held that the police's detention of a luxury bus for carrying passengers in excess of the number allowed by the permit was unauthorized and illegal.

Issues:

Whether carrying passengers beyond the specified limit in a permit constitutes a violation of the permit conditions, and whether such a violation authorizes the police to detain the vehicle under Section 207(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of Section 207(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which grants the police the authority to detain a vehicle if certain conditions are violated. These conditions include contravention of Section 3, Section 4, Section 39, or operating without the required permit under Section 66(1). Additionally, contravention of any permit condition related to the route, area, or purpose of use may also justify detention.

The court emphasized that the language of Section 207(1) must be interpreted as written, and it should not be strained or altered unless there are compelling reasons to do so. The plain meaning of the words used should be followed unless it leads to absurd or unconstitutional results.

The court concluded that the "purpose for which the vehicle may be used" in Section 207(1) refers to situations where a vehicle's use fundamentally deviates from its permitted category (e.g., using a stage carriage as a goods vehicle). Therefore, carrying passengers in excess of the permitted number does not violate the "purpose" and does not authorize detention under this provision.

The court noted that if the legislature had intended to allow detention for any condition of the permit violation, it would not have included the specific reference to the route, area, or purpose. Therefore, the police are only authorized to detain a vehicle when these specific permit conditions are violated.

In light of the above interpretation, the court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the detention of the vehicles for carrying passengers in excess of the specified number was unauthorized and illegal. This appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S SPRINT RPG INDIA LTD., imported seven hard disk drives loaded with software. The customs department argued that customs duty on hard disk drives is levied at 25% under Chapter Heading 84.71, while customs duty on computer software is at 10% under Tariff Heading 85.24. A notification (No. 59/95-Cus.) by the Central Government provided exemptions and rates of duty for various goods, including hard disk drives and computer software. The dispute centered around the classification of the imported items for customs duty purposes.

Issues:

Whether the imported goods should be classified as hard disk drives or computer software for customs duty assessment.

Held:

The Court disagreed with the Tribunal's decision and relied on various definitions and information about hard disk drives and software. It noted that the essential difference between hard disk drives and software is that a hard disk drive is hardware, whereas software is a representation of data stored in the hard disk drive. The Court also considered the price factor, where the value of the computer software was significantly higher than the value of the hard disk drives.

As a result, the Court concluded that the imported goods were essentially computer software loaded on a hard disk drive and should be classified as such under Heading 85.24. The earlier orders of the Commissioner of Customs and the Tribunal were quashed, and the computer software imported by the appellant was to be assessed at a rate of 10% under Heading 85.24. The appeal was allowed without imposing any costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Tamil Nadu Newsprint and Papers Ltd., imported machinery under a specific contract registered with Customs Authorities. They had already enjoyed concessions on basic customs duty and additional duty as per the registered contract. The appellant sought total exemption from payment of Auxiliary Duty under Notification 62/83, arguing that their machinery fell under one of the 19 items specified in the notification due to the GATT agreement.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of total exemption from Auxiliary Duty under Notification 62/83, given that they had previously claimed benefits for the imported machinery under a different tariff heading (84.66).

Held:

The appellant had already obtained benefits for importing the machinery by claiming it was covered by tariff item 84.66. Therefore, it was not permissible for the appellant to later claim that the machinery was covered by tariff item 84.31 to seek total exemption under Notification 62/83.

The attempt by the appellant to claim the benefit under a different tariff item (84.31) was deemed irrelevant and appeared to be a strategy to seek an "unavailable" benefit under Notification 62/83.

Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant, affirming the Division Bench's judgment, though for somewhat different reasons.

FACTS:

The case revolved around a land dispute in village Libaspur, Delhi, leading to a confrontation between two parties. Six individuals were tried for various offenses, including murder, assault, and possession of arms. Two of the accused were acquitted. The trial court found the convicted appellants guilty of the charges and sentenced them to life imprisonment for murder, among other penalties.

ISSUES:

Credibility of prosecution witnesses.

Allegations of delay in recording statements.

Assertion of an alibi by one of the accused.

Non-examination of the Investigating Officer.

Absence of independent witnesses.

HELD:

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentences of the appellants. The Court rejected the appellants' arguments, including challenges to the credibility of prosecution witnesses, allegations of delay in recording statements, and assertions of an alibi.

The Court emphasized that the non-examination of the Investigating Officer did not affect the credibility of the injured witnesses. The fear of reprisals and threats from the accused party explained the reluctance of some witnesses to cooperate fully. Furthermore, the Court noted that the absence of independent witnesses is not a valid ground for rejecting the evidence of injured witnesses when their presence at the scene of the offense was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the Court underscored the importance of completing criminal trials expeditiously to prevent witness tampering and threats.

REFERRED CASES:

Ram Bihari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1998) 4 AD 154 : AIR 1998 SC 1850 : (1998) CriLJ 2515 : (1998) 2 Crimes 254 : (1998) 3 JT 290 : (1998) 3 SCALE 200 : (1998) 4 SCC 517 : (1998) 2 SCR 1097 : (1998) AIRSCW 1647 : (1998) 4 Supreme 178

Karnel Singh Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1995 SC 2472 : (1995) CriLJ 4173 : (1995) 3 Crimes 527 : (1995) 6 JT 437 : (1995) 4 SCALE 752 : (1995) 5 SCC 518 : (1995) 2 SCR 629 Supp : (1995) 2 UJ 646

Paras Yadav and others Vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 644 : (1999) CriLJ 1122 : (1999) 1 JT 25 : (1999) 1 SCALE 26 : (1999) 2 SCC 126 : (1999) 1 SCR 55 : (1999) AIRSCW 296 : (1999) 1 Supreme 2

Dr. Krishna Pal and another Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1996 SC 733 : AIR 1995 SC 733 : (1996) CriLJ 1134 : (1995) 7 SCALE 142 : (1996) 7 SCC 194 : (1995) 6 SCR 21 Supp

State of U.P. Vs. Anil Singh, AIR 1988 SC 1998 : (1989) CriLJ 88 : (1988) 3 Crimes 367 : (1988) 3 JT 491 : (1988) 2 SCALE 436 : (1988) 2 SCR 611 Supp

Ambika Prasad Vs. State, (1997) CriLJ 2853 : (1997) ILR Delhi 609

Facts:

In this case, the appellant, who was the defeated candidate, filed an election petition challenging the election of the respondent, who was declared the winner in the Rajya Sabha election. The appellant alleged that the election of the respondent was tainted by corrupt practices as defined under Sections 123(1)(B)(b) and 100(1)(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The allegations included actions by political figures, appointments to state-owned corporations, and entertainment of MLAs in hotels by the Chief Minister.

Issues:

Whether the election petition complied with the mandatory requirements of Sections 81, 83, and 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, along with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, and Form 25.

Whether the election petition adequately pleaded material facts and material particulars regarding the alleged corrupt practices.

Whether the affidavit in support of the election petition conformed to the prescribed format and substance requirements.

Held:

The court held that the election petition must strictly adhere to the statutory requirements of Sections 81, 83, and 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, along with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, and Form 25. Non-compliance with these provisions could result in the dismissal of the petition.

The court distinguished between "material facts" and "material particulars," emphasizing that the failure to plead material facts could be fatal to the election petition, while the absence of material particulars might be curable through amendments. The petition must provide clear and precise particulars of alleged corrupt practices, including the source of information, knowledge, belief, and consent of the candidate.

The court emphasized that the affidavit accompanying the election petition should meet the prescribed format and substance requirements. It must disclose the source of information, clearly distinguish between knowledge and belief, and specifically allege corrupt practices committed with the candidate's consent and affecting electoral rights.

Decision:In light of the findings, the court concluded that the election petition lacked material facts, material particulars, and proper affidavit in the prescribed form. Therefore, the petition was liable to be rejected, and no trial was necessary.