Facts:

Six writ petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution on behalf of "life convicts" whose prayer for premature release was rejected by the Government of West Bengal. The contention was that despite entitlement under relevant rules, the government rejected their plea on extraneous considerations.

Issues:

Whether life convicts, having completed 20 years of continued detention including remissions earned, are entitled to premature release.

Whether the government, in rejecting the prayer for premature release, adhered to the relevant rules and guidelines.

Held:

Life sentence does not inherently grant a right to premature release. However, if government rules or schemes exist for early release, those must be treated as guidelines for exercising power under Article 161 of the Constitution.

The State Government, as per West Bengal Rules, must consider circumstances, character of the crime, conduct in prison, and the probability of reverting to criminal habits when evaluating premature release requests.

The government's rejection based solely on police objections without considering all relevant points, including conduct-record in jail and socio-economic conditions, is improper.

The orders of the government suffer from infirmities and are quashed.

Authorities are directed to reconsider the cases for premature release of all "life convicts" in accordance with relevant rules and guidelines within one month.

Decision: The writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above.

Facts:

The appellants, represented by Pankaj Mehra and Another, challenged criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act. The companies in question argued that presenting a winding-up petition should exempt them from penal liability.

Issues:

Can a company escape penal liability under Section 138 of the NI Act by presenting a winding-up petition?

Does the mere presentation of a winding-up petition render all dispositions of the company's property void?

Does the issuance of a cheque amount to a disposition of property?

Does the legal enforceability of a debt cease when a winding-up petition is presented?

Held:

The court rejects the argument that the mere presentation of a winding-up petition makes all dispositions of the company's property void. A nuanced approach is needed to consider the practical aspects of business operations during winding-up proceedings.

The court emphasizes that a cheque is essentially an order on the banker and doesn't result in the immediate disposition of property. The drawing of a cheque is considered a step towards disposition but is insufficient to amount to disposition of property.

The court holds that the legal enforceability of a debt is not negated by the mere filing of a winding-up petition. Enforcement of debt due from a company is made subject to the conditions prescribed in the Companies Act.

The court interprets Section 536(2) of the Companies Act, stating that the word "void" does not necessarily mean ab initio void, and the court has the power to order otherwise.

The court discusses the presumption in favor of the holder under Section 139 of the NI Act and clarifies that the drawer's failure to make payment within the stipulated time completes the offense under Section 138, regardless of the reasons for the failure.

The court dismisses the appeals, upholding the decision of the Bombay High Court. The observation regarding Atash Industries (India) Limited's conduct is clarified, stating that it only applies to the writ petition and won't be counted against the company during the trial.

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1 dismissed for disobeying a transfer order.

Complaint filed with the Labour Commissioner.

Appellant claims respondent is not a workman.

Conciliation proceedings held; Joint Labour Commissioner recommends a reference.

State Government refuses the reference, stating respondent is not a workman.

High Court directs the State Government to make a reference.

ISSUES:

Whether respondent No. 1 qualifies as a workman.

Whether the State Government's refusal to make a reference is justified.

HELD:

The power under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. Delay in issuing a demand notice must be considered regarding the existence of an industrial dispute.

Mere issuing of a demand notice does not automatically give rise to an industrial dispute; a stale dispute cannot be referred under Section 10 of the Act.

The State Government has the authority to determine if an employee qualifies as a workman before making a reference under Section 10. The Court cannot closely scrutinize this administrative act.

The State Government rightly considered the salary, duties, and powers of respondent No. 1, determining he was not a workman.

The question of whether an employee is a workman is an administrative matter for the Government; no judicial or quasi-judicial determination is involved.

The decision to make a reference under Section 10 is subjective and administrative; the Court cannot interfere unless irrelevant considerations are involved.

REFERRED CASES:

Sultan Singh Vs. State of Haryana and another, AIR 1996 SC 1007 : AIR 1995 SC 1007 : (1996) 1 CTC 169 : (1996) 73 FLR 955 : (1995) 9 JT 556 : (1996) LabIC 915 : (1996) 1 LLJ 879 : (1996) 1 SCALE 9 : (1996) 2 SCC 66 : (1995) 6 SCR 629 Supp

State of Madras Vs. C.P. Sarathy and Another, AIR 1953 SC 53 : (1953) 1 LLJ 174 : (1953) 4 SCR 334

Prem Kakar Vs. State of Haryana and Another, AIR 1976 SC 1474 : (1976) 3 SCC 433 : (1976) 3 SCR 1010 : (1976) 8 UJ 535

Facts:

Recruitment Rules outline the procedure for appointing officers in civil and criminal courts in a district.

Advisory Committee laid down criteria for short-listing candidates for peon positions, with the fourth criterion being challenged for disqualifying candidates with qualifications higher than the prescribed standard.

Appellants contested the High Court's dismissal of their writ petition seeking the quashing of the peon selection process.

Issues:

Validity of the criteria, especially the fourth criterion, for short-listing candidates for peon positions.

Whether disqualifying candidates with higher qualifications is rational and reasonable.

Compliance with constitutional provisions and Recruitment Rules.

Held:

The court finds the fourth criterion, disqualifying candidates with qualifications higher than Standard VII, unreasonable and not rational.

Emphasizes that higher qualifications should not be a disadvantage and such criteria may amount to another form of reservation.

Highlights the importance of maintaining reasonableness in the ratio between social justice and the need for higher education.

Rejects the argument that candidates with higher education are not interested in peon work, stating that disciplinary action can be taken if duties are not performed.

Rules that the fourth criterion violates the right of candidates with higher qualifications to be considered for the peon position.

Despite setting aside the High Court's judgment, the court does not disturb the appointments of candidates already selected.

Facts:

The Hindu Girls College advertised a post for a Hindi Lecturer.

Appellant and others applied; the Selection Committee recommended the appellant, but the Vice Chancellor disapproved and ordered re-advertisement.

Appellant reapplied without protest and filed a writ challenging the Vice Chancellor's order.

An interim order allowed the selection process but prohibited result declaration.

The Vice Chancellor approved another candidate, not aware of the interim order. The approval was withdrawn later.

Writ petitions by the appellant and the approved candidate were heard together, resulting in the dismissal of the appellant's petition and approval for the other candidate.

Issues:

Appellant's eligibility to challenge the Vice Chancellor's initial order.

Whether the appellant's conduct estopped her from seeking relief.

Held:

The appellant's conduct of reapplying without protest, appearing before the Selection Committee, and not challenging the initial order estopped her from seeking relief.

The High Court's refusal to grant discretionary relief was justified. The writ petition was rightly dismissed. The appeal failed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The father of the respondent had executed a usufructuary mortgage deed in favor of the appellant for Rs. 10,000/- on 25-12-1967.

The property was given on lease for more than 10 years.

Respondents filed an application under the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1979, seeking direction that the usufructuary mortgage had been completely discharged.

Appellant contended that the respondents could not be regarded as debtors under Section 3(3) of the said Act as the rental value of their property was not less than what is required.

Issues:

The interpretation of the expression "not less than Rs. 1200" in Section 3(3) of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1979.

Held:

The primary question is the meaning of the expression "not less than Rs. 1200" in the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1979.

The proviso to Section 3(3) excludes certain categories from being regarded as debtors. Sub-clause (iii) deals with property owners assessed to property or house tax, provided the annual rental value is not less than Rs. 1200.

The High Court erred in concluding that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the proviso even though the annual rental value was Rs. 1200. The expression "not less than Rs. 1200" means the minimum aggregate annual rental value should be at least Rs. 1200.

The Court holds that if the annual rental value of the property owned by a debtor is not less than Rs. 1,200, then he would be covered under Sub-clause (iii) of the proviso to Section 3(3) and would not be deemed a debtor.

The appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the decision of the lower appellate Court is affirmed. No order as to costs.

FACTS:

The appellant, a Chit Fund Private Limited Company, had a dispute with the respondents over non-payment of installments.

The matter was referred to arbitration, but the award was set aside because the reference to arbitration was deemed improper, lacking notice to the respondents.

The appellant filed a civil suit, but it was held to be time-barred.

ISSUES:

Whether the period spent in pursuing the matter before the arbitrator can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

HELD:

The learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the entire period spent before the arbitrator should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

The contention is not accepted. Referring to Section 37(5) of the Arbitration Act, the court emphasizes that the exclusion is applicable from the commencement of arbitration to the date of the court's order.

Section 37(5) and Section 37(3) are to be read together. "Commencement of arbitration," as per Sub-section (5), is defined in Sub-section (3), requiring notice to the other parties. In this case, no notice was issued, making the reference to arbitration improper.

Since the reference to arbitration was held improper in earlier proceedings, the period spent pursuing the remedy before arbitration cannot be excluded. The decision of the High Court is affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed.

REFERRED CASES:

Facts:

The case pertains to the assessment year 1983-84, involving M/S. THE MALABAR INDUSTRIES CO. LTD. (Appellant) and the COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KERALA STATE (Respondent). The appellant, a public limited company, entered into an agreement for the sale of a rubber plantation estate. The purchaser failed to adhere to the payment schedule, leading to an extension with compensation/damages for loss of agricultural income. The Commissioner, after examining records, found the nil assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to revenue.

Issues:

Was the Tribunal justified in holding that there was evidence before the Commissioner that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to revenue?

Was the Tribunal justified in holding that Rs. 3,66,649 was a taxable receipt for the assessment year 1983-84?

Held:

The Commissioner's exercise of jurisdiction under Section 263(1) is warranted when the Assessing Officer's order is both erroneous and prejudicial to revenue. Loss of tax, if due to an erroneous order, is considered prejudicial. The Commissioner correctly invoked Section 263(1) as the income tax Officer's order lacked application of mind and resulted in loss of tax lawfully payable.

The second contention, regarding Rs. 3,66,649 being agricultural income, was rejected. The High Court's finding that the amount was a taxable receipt under 'income from other sources' was upheld. The resolution passed by the appellant was not placed before the Assessing Officer, and there was no material supporting the claim of compensation for loss of agricultural income.

Facts:

The dispute spans over half a century, originating from a 1943 document (Ex. P-1) labeled as "Otti and Kuzhikanam." The appellant claimed redemption of the mortgage, asserting Ex. P-1 was a usufructuary mortgage. The respondent contended that the earlier lease persisted despite Ex. P-1. Trial courts decreed in favor of the appellant, culminating in a final decree for redemption.

Issues:

Whether the rights of the lessee would continue after the redemption of the mortgage. The interpretation of Ex. P-1, the nature of the transaction, and the applicability of Section 12(1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act were key points of contention.

Held:

The trial court's findings, upheld in appeal, had conclusively determined that the respondent was in possession as a mortgagee, not a tenant. The High Court, during execution proceedings, erred in revisiting these settled issues.

Section 12(1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act allows proof that a transaction ostensibly a mortgage is, in substance, a lease. However, this does not permit the court to supersede findings that the earlier lease terminated with the mortgage transaction.

The respondent failed to establish that Ex. P-1 was a lease, not a mortgage. The nomenclature, absence of rent stipulation, and the acknowledgment of a substantial mortgage amount favored the conclusion that it was a mortgage.

The reasoning of the High Court, suggesting the survival of the earlier lease, lacked merit. The parties, by executing Ex. P-1 in 1943, had clearly intended a change from a lease to an "Ottikuzhikanam" arrangement.

The decree-holder was entitled to the fruits of the decree for redemption. The impugned order of the High Court was set aside.