Facts:

Allegations of corruption against public servants in Madhya Pradesh.

Investigations initiated under Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

High Court quashed investigations citing non-compliance with Section 17 of the Act.

Issues:

Validity of investigations under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Interpretation and application of Section 17 of the Act.

Held:

Court emphasizes the importance of fair and lawful investigations into criminal offenses.

Quoting State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, the Court highlights that a defect or illegality in investigation does not directly affect the competence or procedure of cognizance or trial.

Referring to H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh vs. The State of Delhi, the Court asserts that a defect in investigation should not nullify the cognizance or trial unless it results in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court distinguishes the present case from the precedent (State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal), indicating that the Superintendent of Police in this instance demonstrated awareness and applied his mind before authorizing the investigation.

Disagrees with the High Court's finding that the Superintendent of Police's order was mechanical, holding that the order, even if in a proforma, indicated sufficient application of mind.

Allows the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and directs the Trial Court to proceed with the trial according to law.

Facts:

Respondent sued for the recovery of excess demurrage charged by the Railway.

Trial Court decreed in favor of the respondent.

First additional district judge set aside the decree.

High Court declared a Goods Tariff Rule as ultra vires the Railways Act, 1890.

Issues:

Absence of pleading on the validity of the Goods Tariff Rule.

High Court's jurisdiction to decide the vires of the rule not pleaded in the original case.

Held:

The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by considering the validity of the Goods Tariff Rule not pleaded in the original case.

Settlement law dictates that a question outside the pleadings or not forming part of the issues cannot be decided by the court.

The scope of the suit was limited, and the High Court's declaration of the rule as ultra vires went beyond the pleadings.

The trial court's distinction between "general siding" and "private siding" upheld – demurrage charges applicable only to wagons not unloaded within prescribed free time for private sidings.

The appeal is partly allowed – High Court's decision on the rule set aside, but the trial court's decree affirmed. No costs ordered.

Facts:

Cochin International Airport Ltd. (CIAL) invited offers from various companies for ground handling services at the new Cochin Airport.

Several companies, including Air India and Cambatta Aviation Ltd., submitted proposals.

A committee evaluated the offers and recommended Cambatta for the contract.

However, CIAL decided to have a detailed discussion with Air India before making a final decision.

Cambatta protested this decision, and CIAL allowed Air India to revise its offer.

Eventually, CIAL awarded the contract to Air India.

Cambatta challenged this decision in the Kerala High Court, alleging bias, favoritism, and violation of principles of natural justice.

Issues:

Whether CIAL acted fairly and reasonably in its decision-making process for awarding the ground handling services contract.

Whether there was any undue influence exerted by Air India or the Ministry of Civil Aviation in CIAL's decision.

Held:

The Supreme Court reiterated that the award of a contract is essentially a commercial transaction and that price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. Public bodies must adhere to their own norms and procedures but are not bound by the highest or lowest offer.

The Court found that CIAL acted fairly and bona fide in the financial and overall interest of CIAL. There was no evidence of undue influence, arbitrariness, or mala fides in CIAL's decision-making process.

The Court held that CIAL's decision to award the contract to Air India was not arbitrary, illegal, or opposed to the principles of natural justice.

The appeals by Air India and CIAL were allowed, and the judgment of the Kerala High Court was set aside.

Facts:

The Board introduced amendments to its regulations, specifically Regulations 66(a) and 66(b), to address mass copying in examinations.

The Chairman of the Board canceled an entire examination session in 1993 due to mass copying and violations of the examination's integrity.

Candidates who took the exams challenged this decision in the High Court, which allowed the cases and issued directions regarding the handling of such matters.

Issues:

Does the notification dated January 27, 1993, violate Article 14 of the Indian Constitution?

Are the powers granted to the Chairman by the notification arbitrary in nature?

Does the notification provide for a different agency as a repository of power, violating the scheme of the Act?

Is the notification dated January 27, 1993, vague?

What are the contours of rules of natural justice in cases of mass copying?

Does the notification dated January 27, 1993, suffer from an infirmity regarding the source of information on mass copying?

Is the notification dated January 27, 1993, invalid, and to what extent? Is the notification dated June 29, 1993, also invalid?

What are the findings of the Court?

Held:

The High Court's judgment, which quashed the notifications issued by the Board, was held to be unsustainable and was set aside by the Supreme Court. The Court found that both the Board and its Chairman had the authority to issue the notifications and take action against mass copying.

The Court emphasized that the Board, as an expert body, is entrusted with maintaining high standards of education and ensuring the proper conduct of examinations. Decisions made by such expert bodies should be respected by the judiciary.

In cases of mass copying, the examination authorities are not required to conduct detailed quasi-judicial inquiries before withholding results or canceling exams. They are expected to take necessary action to maintain academic standards and discipline.

The Board's notifications were deemed relevant and not arbitrary or discriminatory. The High Court's intervention and its attempt to dictate how the Board should handle such matters were considered erroneous.

The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and it was made clear that actions already taken by the authorities in accordance with the High Court's judgment regarding any candidate or group of candidates should not be disturbed based on that judgment.

Facts:

In this case, a foreign national (H), a Bangladeshi citizen, was gang-raped by multiple individuals, including railway employees, at a railway station and a rented flat. A petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by a practicing advocate on behalf of the victim, seeking compensation and other reliefs.

Issues:

Whether compensation could be awarded in a writ petition under Article 226 for a rape offense involving railway employees.

Whether the victim, being a foreign national, was entitled to constitutional rights and relief under public law.

The extent of vicarious liability of the government for acts of its employees in commercial activities.

The concept of locus standi in public interest litigation.

Held:

The court held that public law remedies can be available even in cases involving public functionaries and the violation of fundamental rights, regardless of the availability of private law remedies (Bodhisatwa v. Ms. Subdhra Chakroborty; Common Cause v. Union of India).

The victim, despite being a foreign national, was entitled to constitutional rights, especially the right to life and dignity, under Article 21 of the Constitution and international human rights principles (Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

The government could be vicariously liable for acts of its employees, even in cases involving commercial activities, as railway operations were considered commercial activities (Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P.).

The argument that liability under the law of torts arises only when the act complained of was performed in the course of official duty was deemed invalid (Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P.).

The court affirmed that the concept of locus standi in public interest litigation allows individuals to file petitions in public interest, even if they are not directly connected to the victim (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India).

The appeal having no merit is dismissed.

Facts:

The first appellant is a practicing advocate, and the second appellant is his wife, who worked as the Matron of a Girls' Hostel run by the Social Welfare Department.

A complaint was filed by Kumari G. Swetha, a resident of the hostel, alleging that the first appellant had attempted to outrage her modesty on a specific date.

The police filed a charge-sheet directly before the Sessions Court, designated as the Special Court for offenses under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, within the territorial limits of the district.

The charge-sheet included charges under the Act as well as the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The police later revised the charge-sheet, removing one of the IPC charges.

Issues:

Whether the Special Court, designated under the Act, had the authority to take cognizance of offenses without the case being committed to it by a magistrate.

The secondary issue related to the procedure followed in filing the charge-sheet directly before the Special Court.

Held:

The Court established as a "Special Court" under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is essentially a Court of Session. Its designation as a Special Court does not change its character or powers as a Court of Session.

The trial in such a Special Court can only be conducted in accordance with the procedures outlined in Chapter XVIII of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which pertains to "Trial before a Court of Session."

Section 193 of the CrPC prohibits all Courts of Session from taking cognizance of any offense as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a magistrate.

The Special Court, even though designated as such under the Act, cannot take cognizance of offenses under the Act directly, without the case being committed to it by a magistrate. Neither the CrPC nor the Act provides otherwise.

Sections 4(2) and 5 of the CrPC, which deal with the application of the Code to offenses under other laws, do not negate the requirement of committal to a Special Court under the Act.

The judgment disapproves of a contrary view taken by the Kerala High Court and emphasizes that, in the absence of specific provisions in the Act, the CrPC's provisions, including Section 193, apply.

The High Court's order setting aside the proceedings initiated by the Special Court under the Act is affirmed. However, the direction given by the High Court regarding framing charges is not supported. The Special Court is to decide the appropriate action after hearing both sides and is free to pass appropriate orders, including considering pleas for discharge.

Facts:

In this case, the accused obtained a loan from the complainant company. They issued two cheques for the repayment of the loan, but these cheques were returned dishonored. Subsequently, the accused requested more time for repayment, issued two more cheques, which were also dishonored. The complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the accused. Later, a complaint was filed under Sections 406 and 420 IPC, alleging fraudulent conduct by the accused.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent proceedings under Sections 406 and 420 IPC against the accused are maintainable, considering the pending complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act?

Whether the filing of a separate First Information Report (FIR) for IPC offenses is an abuse of process of law?

Held:

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the prosecution of the appellants under Sections 406/420 IPC in Criminal Case No. 674/97 was quashed. The Court held that the complainant's attempt to involve all members of the accused's family, including the parents, in the criminal case without regard to their actual role or participation in the alleged offenses was an abuse of process. Since a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was already pending against the accused, prosecuting them under Sections 406/420 IPC was unjustified.

The appellants would face consequences if the offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is proven against them. Therefore, there was no occasion for the complainant to prosecute them under Sections 406/420 IPC.

The prosecution against the appellants under Sections 406/420 IPC amounted to an abuse of the process of law and was quashed.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves the inheritance of Bhumidhari land by Smt. Kaushalya Devi, a female Hindu landholder who inherited the property from her father. After her marriage, she became the wife of the appellant, Mool Chand. Smt. Kaushalya Devi passed away in 1953, leading to a legal dispute regarding the devolution of her property. The central question was whether her property would be governed by Section 172(2)(a)(i) or Section 172(2)(a)(ii) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, based on her personal law and the nature of her property rights.

Issues:

What was the nature of Smt. Kaushalya Devi's property rights under her personal law?

Which provision of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, would govern the inheritance of her Bhumidhari land?

Held:

The Court, after examining the relevant provisions and legal principles, held as follows:

Smt. Kaushalya Devi, as a female inheriting property from a male, typically held limited estate rights under customary Hindu law. Her rights to the property were akin to a life estate, as per customary Hindu law, unless the case fell under the Bombay School, which was not applicable in this instance.

Since Smt. Kaushalya Devi had passed away before the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 came into force, the conversion of her limited estate into an absolute estate, as provided in Section 14 of the Act, did not apply to her case. Consequently, the nature of her property rights was that of a limited estate under her personal law.

The Court found that Section 172(2)(a)(i) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, applied in this scenario. This provision dictated that the inheritance of the property would be determined based on her personal law, and since she had limited estate rights, the property would devolve according to Section 171.

Under Section 171, the husband was not considered an heir, and therefore, the property would not pass to the husband upon her death. Instead, the property would devolve as per Section 175 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, which stipulated that in the case of a female Bhumidhar who left no heirs, the property would pass by survivorship.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. It was determined that, in this case, the property of Smt. Kaushalya Devi would not pass to her husband but would devolve to the co-tenure holders by survivorship under the relevant provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Facts:

K.P. Madhavankutty, an employee of The Nedungadi Bank Ltd., was dismissed from service in 1972 due to allegations of misappropriation of funds and falsifying bank records.

Madhavankutty admitted his guilt during disciplinary proceedings and appealed to the Bank's Board of Directors for leniency. His appeal was dismissed in 1973.

In 1980, Madhavankutty claimed discrimination, arguing that two other employees in similar situations were reinstated by the Bank.

Madhavankutty filed an application under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act with the State Government in 1979 but was directed to the Central Government for jurisdiction.

The Assistant Labour Commissioner of the Central Government, in 1981, concluded that there was no scope for formal proceedings due to the delay.

Legal proceedings ensued, including writ petitions in the High Court, ultimately leading to a reference being made by the Central Government questioning Madhavankutty's dismissal.

Issues:

Whether the Central Government's exercise of power under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, made after a substantial delay and in the absence of a current industrial dispute, is valid.

Whether the reference in question is based on a stale dispute.

Held:

The Central Government's power under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. It emphasizes that there must be a rational basis for the Central Government's exercise of power and that a stale dispute cannot be the subject of reference under Section 10. The Court opines that the reference disrupted settled matters and was not in line with the purpose of maintaining industrial peace.

The Court allows the appeal, sets aside the Division Bench's judgment, and restores the judgment of the learned single Judge. No costs are awarded.