Facts:

Respondents filed a partition suit for Plot No. 64/1/A and other properties, which was decreed in 1969.

The Collector, under Section 54 of CPC, was referred the matter for partition since one property was assessed to land revenue.

The Appellant challenged the Collector's order under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.

Deputy Secretary allowed the revision but was later challenged by the Respondents in a civil suit.

The civil suit was decreed, and subsequent appeals were dismissed, leading to a second appeal.

Issues:

Whether the order passed by the Collector is challengeable under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, and if so, what is the proper procedure for such challenge?

Held:

The contention is that the Collector, being a Revenue Officer, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the State Government under Sections 203 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.

Reliance is placed on the decision in Paygonda Survgonda Patil's case, emphasizing that the Collector is a revenue officer, and decisions/orders by the Collector can be appealed under Section 203, even if not related to land revenue matters.

The court disagrees with the Mysore High Court's view and holds that there is a substantial question of law involved.

The second appeal is remanded to the High Court for a fresh disposal on its merits after notice to the parties.

Facts:

Sohan Lal Sachdev, deceased, represented by Mrs. Hirinder Sachdev, was the landlord of premises at 49, Golf Links, New Delhi.

The first floor and Barsati floor were let out to Sachdeva Guest House for running a guest house.

New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) demanded electricity and water charges at 'non-domestic rates' from 1-10-1981, arguing that the usage for running a guest house is 'commercial.'

Issues:

Whether the use of premises for running a guest house can be termed as 'domestic use' for the purpose of electricity charges by NDMC?

Whether NDMC is competent to charge electricity consumption on non-domestic rates?

Held:

The Trial Judge initially held that running a guest house cannot be termed as a 'commercial user' but allowed NDMC to charge non-domestic rates.

On appeal, the Senior Civil Judge and the first Appellate Court agreed with the Trial Judge, upholding NDMC's right to charge non-domestic rates.

The High Court, however, reversed the decisions, stating that the use of the premises for running a guest house without kitchen facilities is for 'residential purposes,' and NDMC cannot charge based on commercial use.

The Supreme Court, analyzing Section 23 of the Electricity Act, determined that the user of the premises by the owner is relevant, not the purpose for which the guest uses electricity.

The Court concluded that the use of the premises for a guest house is for 'commercial purpose,' allowing NDMC to charge electricity rates applicable to commercial use.

Facts:

Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, imposes a ceiling limit on landholding.

Moosakutty Haji declared his lands, and the Taluk Land Board determined the excess land, directing him to surrender it.

Appellants claimed that certain lands were erroneously recorded under Moosakutty Haji's possession, presenting Certificates of Purchase granted to tenants under Section 72K.

Issues:

Validity and conclusiveness of Certificates of Purchase in the face of Taluk Land Board's determination of excess land.

Interpretation of Section 72K and the evidentiary value of Certificates of Purchase.

Held:

The Court emphasizes that Section 4 of the Evidence Act defines "conclusive proof," barring evidence to contradict or vary it.

Conclusive proof can only be challenged on grounds of fraud or collusion; no such allegations were made in this case.

Refers to Chettian Veetil Ammad case, stating that a Certificate of Purchase must be treated as conclusive proof, and its evidentiary value cannot be disregarded unless inaccurate on its face or procured fraudulently.

Criticizes the High Court for not considering the legal implications of Section 72K and placing an unwarranted burden on the appellants to prove the validity and correctness of Certificates of Purchase.

The Taluk Land Board should have given due weight to the Certificates of Purchase, and the burden was incorrectly placed on the appellants to substantiate their validity.

Appeals allowed, upholding the appellants' claims regarding the lands in question.

Facts:

On 30-06-1997, a massacre occurred in a village in Madurai District, resulting in the death of six individuals from a Scheduled Caste community.

Thirty-four persons were arrested in connection with the incident, and many were subsequently granted bail by orders of the Madras High Court.

Advocates filed petitions before the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court seeking the cancellation of bail, but the Division Bench found them not maintainable.

Issues:

Whether advocates, who were not parties to the case, could file representations for the cancellation of bail and whether such petitions could be entertained by the High Court.

Held:

The Division Bench questioned the maintainability of the petitions filed by advocates, emphasizing the availability of statutory remedies for aggrieved parties.

The Judges expressed concern about the potential flood of similar petitions, leading to delays in genuine cases.

The Division Bench closed the suo motu proceedings initiated by the Chief Justice, citing the improper use of such petitions and the availability of statutory remedies.

Facts:

Appellant and Krishnanendu tried for the murders of Subhash Chandra Pal, his wife, father, and mother.

Appellant convicted under Sections 302 read with 120-B and 201 IPC; Krishnanendu convicted under Sections 302 read with 109 IPC.

Both sentenced to death.

Issues:

Challenge to the conviction and sentence by the Appellant.

Compliance with Section 306(4) CrPC regarding the approver's examination.

Held:

Compliance with Section 306(4) CrPC: The contention that the approver (Sudipa) should have been examined in an open court in the presence of the accused is rejected. The phrase 'examination of a witness' does not necessitate cross-examination at that stage. The purpose is to provide an opportunity for the accused to challenge the approver's evidence during the trial.

Contradictions and Improvements in Sudipa's Evidence: Minor contradictions were noted, but the Courts deemed them natural given the extensive timeline of events. Sudipa's detailed testimony during the trial was considered consistent and reliable.

Death Sentence Justification: The High Court's reasoning for imposing the death sentence was based on the perceived avarice and calculated cruelty in the murders. However, the unexpected killings of Sudipa's father and grandparents were seen as acts of confusion and fright.

Decision: The death sentence for the appellant is reduced to life imprisonment. The Court emphasizes that given the circumstances, the death penalty is not warranted.

Facts:

The State Government, exercising powers under Section 432, issued circulars for the remission of sentences. This circular granted special remission to prisoners in jail and remission to convicts on parole or furlough, excluding those convicted of rape or dowry death. The respondents included individuals on bail and one convicted under Section 376 IPC.

Issues:

Whether respondents on bail are entitled to remission under the circular?

Whether a person convicted under Section 376 IPC is entitled to remission under the circular?

Held:

Entitlement of Respondents on Bail: The circular specifically applies to prisoners undergoing sentence, including those on parole or furlough. Respondents on bail do not fall within the ambit of the circular. The court cannot create another category not entitled under Section 432 of the Code.

Entitlement of Respondent Convicted under Section 376 IPC: The circular, authorized under the law, outlines limitations and exclusions. A person convicted under Section 376 IPC is not entitled to remission under this circular. The decision to grant remission must be well-informed, reasonable, and fair.

Facts:

The respondents were tried for offenses under Sections 302, 380, 457, 120-B read with Section 34 IPC.

Acquittal by the Additional Sessions Judge, later appealed by the State in the High Court.

High Court's dismissal of the appeal due to non-compliance with mandatory directions in Section 306 Cr.P.C.

Issues:

Validity of trial and committal proceedings, particularly the examination of the approver.

Interpretation of Section 306(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Held:

The purpose of Section 306 is to obtain evidence during investigation, inquiry, or trial.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate can tender pardon at any stage of the investigation or trial.

Conditions for tendering pardon include a full and true disclosure of circumstances within the approver's knowledge.

A person accepting pardon is examined, and if the case is committed for trial to the Court of Sessions, Section 307 empowers the Sessions Court to tender pardon.

High Court's interpretation that approver's statement must be recorded before filing the challan is not supported by the text of Section 306.

Examination of the approver can occur before or after submission of the charge sheet, and summoning the accused for cross-examination is not mandatory.

Section 465 Cr.P.C. comes into operation, and the trial is not vitiated if objections could and should have been raised earlier.

The mandatory language of "shall" in Section 306(4)(a) does not automatically vitiate the trial if not strictly adhered to.

Decision: The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the appeal is allowed. The case is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with the law.

REFERRED CASES:

Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. State of Bihar with Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1994 SC 2420 : (1994) CriLJ 3271 : (1994) 4 JT 309 : (1994) 3 SCALE 197 : (1995) 1 SCC 80 Supp : (1995) 1 SCC 80 : (1994) 1 SCR 483 Supp : (1994) 2 UJ 782

Sanjay Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1978 SC 514 : (1978) CriLJ 642 : (1978) 2 SCC 39 : (1978) SCC(Cri) 172 : (1978) 2 SCR 861 : (1978) 10 UJ 379

A. Deivendran Vs. State of T.N., AIR 1998 SC 2821 : (1998) CriLJ 814 : (1997) 8 JT 619 : (1997) 6 SCALE 516 : (1997) 11 SCC 720 : (1997) 4 SCR 591 Supp : (1998) AIRSCW 285 : (1997) 9 Supreme 237

In Re : Chief Judicial magistrate, (1988) CriLJ 812

Kalu Khoda and Others Vs. The State, AIR 1962 Guj 283 : (1962) 3 GLR 654

Uravakonda Vijayaraj Paul Vs. The State and Others, (1986) CriLJ 2104

Facts:

The dispute arose during consolidation proceedings regarding certain plots. A predecessor-in-interest, 'D,' claimed Sirdari rights based on a lease executed in his favor under Section 191 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The appellants contested, arguing that the plots never vested in the State.

Issues:

The primary issues revolved around the vesting of land, specifically whether the land appurtenant to the Staff Quarter of the Sugar Mill vested in the State and subsequently in the Gaon Sabha. The legality of the lease executed by Gaon Sabha was also in question.

Held:

Vesting of Property: The Notification under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act excludes well, trees, buildings, or building sites, along with appurtenant land, from vesting in the State. Easement rights under Section 7 continue for the person enjoying them before the vesting.

1.2. Section 117 of the Act outlines the conditions for the vesting of land in the Gaon Sabha. The property initially vested in the State under Section 4 can subsequently vest in the Gaon Sabha through a notification under Section 117. Thus, it must first vest in the State before transferring to the Gaon Sabha.

1.3. The land in dispute, being the land appurtenant to the Sugar Mill's Staff Quarter, was held not to have vested in the State. The Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) confirmed its status as appurtenant to the Sugar Mill. As a result, the Gaon Sabha lacked jurisdiction to lease the plots to the respondent.

Jurisdiction of Consolidation Authorities: The jurisdiction of Consolidation Authorities was not affected as the lease by Gaon Sabha was void from inception due to the absence of vested rights.

Facts:

The respondent imported copper scrap for use as raw material in the manufacture of copper oxychloride.

Exemption from additional customs duty (countervailing duty or CVD) was sought under Customs Notification No. 35/81 CE dated 1-3-1981.

Duty was paid at the time of clearance, and a refund application was later filed by the respondent.

The Assistant Collector rejected the refund claim, leading to a writ petition filed by the respondent in the Bombay High Court.

Issues:

Whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable to raw material imported and consumed in the manufacturing process.

Held:

The High Court accepted the respondent's contention that the exemption notification provided complete exemption from excise duty on copper for use in the manufacture of chemicals.

The High Court held that the question of unjust enrichment does not arise in cases of captive consumption of imported raw material.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court, emphasizing that the principle of unjust enrichment is applicable to imported raw material consumed in the manufacture of a final product.

Section 27 of the Customs Act was discussed, highlighting that the burden of proof lies on the person claiming the refund to show that the incidence of duty has not been passed on to the buyer.

The Court clarified that even in cases of captive consumption, the principle of unjust enrichment applies, and the importer must demonstrate that the duty incidence has not been passed on to any other person.

The Court allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and held that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable in the case of imported raw material used for captive consumption.