Facts:

The trial against four accused had progressed substantially with the examination of 54 witnesses. The Metropolitan Magistrate ordered the addition of two more accused at a later stage, leading to the potential re-commencement of the entire trial. The appellants challenged this decision.

Issues:

The validity of invoking Section 319 after the cross-examination of a significant number of witnesses.

The discretion of the court in adding new accused.

Consideration of evidence and its sufficiency in justifying the addition of the appellants.

Whether the circumstances warranted a de novo trial.

Held:

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of Section 319, cautioning against its casual use. Reasonable satisfaction from existing evidence is required to add new accused.

The court noted that suspicion alone is insufficient, and there must be a reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court expressed concern about wasting extensive evidence already collected and emphasized the need for judicious exercise of the court's power.

The order of the Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 319 was set aside, directing the trial to proceed with the existing accused.

Facts:

The appellant obtained a preliminary decree in a mortgage suit.

The decree specified payment terms, including four equal installments.

Defendants failed to make any payments, including the first installment due on March 31, 1969.

The appellant, invoking relevant provisions, sought a final decree for the sale of the mortgaged property.

The application for a final decree was dismissed on grounds of being time-barred.

Issues:

Whether the application for a final decree is time-barred.

The interpretation of Section 34 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1960, in relation to the statute of limitations.

Held:

The right to apply for a final decree accrued on the date of the first default (March 31, 1969).

The period of limitation starts from the date the right to apply accrues, independent of the date of notice to the defendant.

The notice under Section 34 sent by the appellant was based on all defaults; no default was stated as waived or condoned.

Citing Nalini Kanto Bhattacharjee Vs. Mohan Chand Biswas, the court affirmed that the application for a final decree was time-barred.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

Facts:

The Madhya Pradesh Cattle (Control) Act, 1978, was enforced within the municipal limits of Jabalpur. In an earlier Public Interest Litigation (PIL), dairy owners were directed to shift their dairies to villages 'L' and 'G,' exempted from the Act. A subsequent PIL raised concerns about contamination of drinking water due to cow dung and waste. The Central Pollution Control Board recommended a bio-gas plant.

Issues:

Validity of the Notification dated 19.03.1999 excluding villages 'L' and 'G' from the "excepted villages" list.

Legality of establishing dairies in villages 'L' and 'G' in proximity to the main water pipeline.

Whether the petitioners have the right to challenge the Notification.

Held:

The municipal corporation's duty is to supply pure drinking water to citizens. The Act prohibits establishing dairies causing public nuisance. However, the petitioners had already invested in setting up a Gobar Gas Plant as directed by the court.

The validity of the Resolution and Gazette Notification cannot be adjudicated in this proceeding. Petitioners should initiate appropriate proceedings to challenge the Notification, providing a foundation for the challenge.

Due to the Notification, dairies in villages 'L' and 'G' cannot continue. Challenge to the Notification's validity should be pursued through proper proceedings.

Petitioners can challenge the Notification within three months. The interim order from this Court continues for an additional three months and two weeks.

Municipal Corporation must pay the petitioner for the Bio Gas Plant expenditure incurred during the proceedings, deducting any government subsidy. The benefits indicated by the High Court apply if the challenge to the Notification is rejected.

Final Result : Dismissed

Facts:

Property: Double storied building at Old Taluk Cutchery Road, Bangalore.

Agreement: Between M/s Vidyavati Kapoor Trust and M/s Rajatha Trust on 28-11-1990 for Rs. 1,55,00,000.

Pre-emptive Purchase: Initiated by the Appropriate Authority due to alleged undervaluation with an intent to evade tax.

Judicial History: Writ petitions filed, dismissed by Karnataka High Court, appealed to Supreme Court. Civil Appeal No. 3849 of 1991 allowed on 13-3-1996, relying on C.B. Gautam's case.

Issues:

Validity of the pre-emptive purchase under Section 269UE.

Sale of the property by the Central Government.

Challenges to the order of the Appropriate Authority.

Held:

The Constitution Bench in C.B. Gautam's case upheld the validity of provisions in Chapter XX C of the Income Tax Act.

The property had vested in the Central Government after the order of the Appropriate Authority. The order setting aside the judgment did not direct de novo proceedings.

No serious illegality or infirmity found in the order of the Appropriate Authority. Central Government had complied with the necessary procedures.

The property did not revest in the transferor. The contention that the order of the Appropriate Authority set aside by the court resulted in revesting was rejected.

The Central Government's failure to tender or deposit the full consideration did not stand, as the full amount was received by the transferor, and possession was delivered.

Facts:

In 1981, the Government of Gujarat declared a part of the forest area as a "Wild Life Sanctuary," covering 765.79 Sq. K.M.

The notification was cancelled in 1993, and a reduced area of 94.87 Sq. K.M. was declared as the "Chinkara Wild Life Sanctuary."

Petitioner challenged both notifications, and the High Court quashed them, reviving the 1981 notification.

State Government proposed a further reduction in sanctuary area for economic development, passed a resolution, and issued a notification in 1995.

Petitioner challenged again, leading to the current Supreme Court case.

Issues:

Legality of reducing the sanctuary area for economic development.

Consideration of ecological impact and economic development needs.

Held:

The State Legislature's decision, after due deliberation, is not to be invalidated unless substantial reasons exist.

The court directs a comprehensive study of the ecological impact, environmental aspects, and effects of limited mining over five years.

Permits restricted and controlled exploitation of mineral wealth, subject to court orders.

State Government to constitute an expert Committee for a comprehensive study, submit reports, and monitor pollution.

Restrains the State Government from allowing mining or cement plants within 10 kms of the old sanctuary area without court orders.

Facts:

Pursuant to the liberalization of the electricity sector in India, MOUs and Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) were entered into between the State Government, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (MPEB), and independent power producers (IPPs). The agreements aimed at establishing power projects and selling generated electricity to MPEB.

Issues:

MPEB's decision to prioritize projects offering the least tariff, impacting ongoing negotiations and agreements with IPPs.

IPPs sought escrow coverage, and a writ petition was filed to compel the respondents to grant such facility.

Held:

The court clarified that contracts under Sections 43 and 43A of the Electricity Act are statutory only to the extent that they involve the determination of tariff and other statutory requirements. Escrow accounts and agreements are not statutory obligations.

The court emphasized that MOUs and PPAs, while concluded contracts, did not confer legal rights on IPPs regarding escrow agreements. The execution of such agreements depended on mutual agreement between the parties.

The court acknowledged the amendments to the notifications under Section 43-A of the Electricity Act. While prospective, these amendments were relevant for MPEB in negotiating better terms with IPPs.

The court justified MPEB's decision to prioritize projects based on least tariff, considering it a rational criterion in the context of benefiting MPEB and the general public. The court rejected claims of arbitrariness.

The court declined a detailed examination of assumptions made by the Expert Committee regarding project costs, deeming them technical matters. Valid assumptions, not fanciful or arbitrary, justified the decision based on them.

Facts:

Dacoity and murder occurred in the house of the informant, Bhupendra Mohan Singh, on 9th June 1985.

The informant witnessed the incident from a neighbor's house and identified several accused.

Villagers arrived at the scene, leading to a shootout with some dacoits. One villager died, and another was injured.

The police recorded the informant's statement, leading to the registration of the case against seven named accused and unidentified associates.

Issues:

Credibility of witness testimonies.

Reliability of the identification of accused individuals.

Doubts about the source of light and the manner of identification of evidence.

Held:

The court found doubts in the credibility of witness testimonies, especially regarding the involvement of some accused.

The identification of accused individuals was deemed untrustworthy, and doubts were raised about the source of light and the manner of identification of evidence.

The doubts led to the benefit of the doubt being given to the accused, resulting in their acquittal.

Facts:

Original plaintiff Suram Singh, a co-owner, filed a pre-emption suit in 1941 against the sale of an undivided share by another co-owner, Bassia.

The suit was decreed in 1942, with a specified pre-emption amount, duly deposited by Suram Singh.

A subsequent suit was filed by Suram Singh against successors of the vendees, seeking a declaration of ownership and an injunction against interference.

Issues:

Dispute over ownership and possession arising from the sale of an undivided share.

Defendants claimed adverse possession; plaintiff contested based on the pre-emption decree.

Held:

The High Court concluded that the pre-emption amount deposited in 1942 vested title in the plaintiff, despite no physical possession change.

No finding of partition; joint possession of the land by co-sharers; no actual possession required post-pre-emption decree.

Rule 14(1) of Order 20, CPC, emphasized that the title of the decree-holder accrued from the date of payment under the pre-emption decree.

Infirmity in the decision of the High Court not found; the appeal was dismissed with parties bearing their own costs.

Facts:

Sushil Sharma filed a writ petition seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus for the custody of his two minor children, Neil and Monica, alleging that they were in the illegal custody of Sarita Sharma, his estranged wife.

Sarita Sharma, in response, claimed that she had lawful custody of the children and had brought them to India with the knowledge of Sushil.

The divorce proceedings had been initiated in the U.S.A., and a decree was passed by the American Court granting sole custody of the children to Sushil Sharma.

Issues:

Whether the custody of the children became illegal due to Sarita's removal of them from the U.S.A. in violation of the American Court's order.

Whether the decree of divorce and custody granted by the American Court should override considerations of the welfare of the minor children.

Held:

The judgment emphasizes that the fact of Sarita removing the children from the U.S.A. does not entirely guide the decision, and the welfare of the children must be paramount. The court questions the husband's ability to care for the children, considering factors such as alcohol consumption.

The High Court is criticized for not thoroughly considering the welfare of the children and allowing the Habeas Corpus writ petition without a full inquiry. The court suggests that the respondent initiates appropriate proceedings for a thorough inquiry into the best interest of the children.

The appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside, and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed.