Facts:

In Regular Suit No. 201 of 1928, the plaintiffs contested the legal appointment of the father of the appellant as sajjadanashin and alleged mismanagement of trust funds. The District Court held the wakf as private, emphasizing the sajjadanashin's ability to use income for family maintenance. Subsequent proceedings under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, saw conflicting decisions on the nature of the wakf.

Issues:

Whether the wakf was private or public, with collateral disputes emerging regarding res judicata based on previous judgments.

Held:

The court established that an issue is 'directly and substantially' in a prior litigation if it is necessary for deciding the principal issue. Estoppel by judgment does not extend to collateral matters unless incidentally or necessarily adjudicated upon.

The judgment from Regular Suit No. 201 of 1928 did not operate as res judicata, given the subsequent changes in the definition of public trusts under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

Decisions rendered by the Assistant Charity Commissioner were superseded by later judgments of the High Court, emphasizing that an earlier decision loses its binding force if a subsequent decision decides to the contrary.

Decision: The appeal against the rejection of the plea of res judicata was dismissed, affirming the findings that the wakf in question was a public trust.

Facts:

The appeal arises from arbitration proceedings, where the Arbitrator granted escalation charges despite the absence of an escalation clause in the agreement. The dispute also involves the award of pendente lite interest and interest for the pre-reference period.

Issues:

Could the Arbitrator have granted an award for escalation in favor of the contractor?

Could the Arbitrator have awarded pendente lite interest in favor of the contractor?

Could the Arbitrator have granted interest for the pre-reference period?

Held:

The Arbitrator's award for escalation charges is deemed unsustainable and erroneous, as the arbitration agreement contained no escalation clause. Without such a clause, the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to make such an award.

Regarding pendente lite interest, it is conceded that the Arbitrator had the power to grant it when the agreement didn't prohibit it. This aligns with the precedent set in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C. Roy. The challenge against this award fails.

For interest for the pre-reference period, considering the prolonged proceedings, the court suggests the respondent execute the decree upon furnishing a bank guarantee. The guarantee should include an undertaking that, in the event of an adverse decision by the Constitution Bench, the state can encash the bank guarantee.

Decision: The appeal is disposed of. The impugned judgment and decree stand modified. No costs are awarded.

FACTS:

The appellant, M/S. Modern Insulators Ltd., held an insurance policy with The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. for a factory manufacturing high tension insulators. After damage to the equipment, a dispute arose regarding coverage under the insurance policy. The State Commission ruled in favor of the appellant.

ISSUES:

Adequacy of communication of exclusion clause to the appellant.

Admissibility of a new plea in appeal regarding the violation of insurance policy terms and conditions.

HELD:

The court found that the exclusion clause was not communicated to the appellant, rendering the insurance company unable to claim its benefits. The obligation of good faith applies to both parties in an insurance contract.

The National Commission's decision to allow a new plea in appeal was criticized. Parties cannot introduce new facts in an appeal.

DECISION: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the National Commission's judgment, and restoring the State Commission's judgment. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Facts:

Appellant sought relief after alleged contempt by respondents following an undertaking in a civil writ petition.

Court issued a notice to show cause why contempt proceedings should not be initiated against the respondents.

High Court dropped the proceedings as barred by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

Issues:

Whether the notice to show cause amounted to the initiation of contempt proceedings?

Whether Section 20's limitation applied to the given circumstances?

Held:

The term "initiate any proceedings for contempt" involves a conscious application of the court's mind to the facts and material, forming an opinion that a prima facie case for contempt exists. Initiation occurs when the court decides to take action and begins a proceeding for contempt. The issuance of a notice to show cause is an essential step in the initiation process. Section 20 imposes a limitation on the court's jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings, emphasizing the need for a timely initiation.

Decision: The order dropping proceedings based on the view that mere issuance of a notice did not constitute initiation was erroneous. The proceedings were, in fact, initiated on 6-1-1988 when the court applied its mind and directed the issuance of notices to show cause. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The proceedings were restored to the file of the High Court for further consideration.

FACTS:

The respondent imported a consignment of Green Beans (Pulses) and claimed clearance free of duty based on an exemption notification.

The notification was amended, leading to a dispute over the applicability of customs duty.

The High Court of Bombay allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent, setting aside the amendment to the notification.

ISSUES:

Whether the notification, amending the exemption, was effectively published.

The applicability of customs duty under the amended notification.

HELD:

The Judges referred to conflicting decisions in previous cases and emphasized the importance of publication in the Official Gazette for the effectiveness of a notification.

The Court relied on the decision in M/s. Pankaj Jain Agencies and held that once a notification is published in the Official Gazette, it comes into operation.

The Judges rejected the contrary view in Collector of Central Excise Vs. New Tobacco Co. Etc. Etc., emphasizing that reasonable publication is sufficient, and individual service to every member of the public is not required.

DECISION: The appeal is allowed. The High Court's judgment is set aside, and the respondent is held liable to pay customs duty at the rate of 25% under the amended notification.

REFERRED CASES:

I.T.C. Limited Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, (1996) 6 AD 702 : (1996) 86 ELT 477 : (1996) 8 JT 97 : (1996) 6 SCALE 239 : (1996) 5 SCC 538 : (1996) 5 SCR 214 Supp

B.K. Srinivasan and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1059 : (1987) 1 JT 180 : (1987) 1 SCALE 142 : (1987) 1 SCC 658 : (1987) 1 SCR 1054 : (1987) 1 UJ 657

Collector of Central Excise Vs. New Tobacco Co. Etc. Etc., (1998) 1 AD 301 : AIR 1998 SC 668 : (1998) 97 ELT 388 : (1998) 1 JT 66 : (1998) 1 SCALE 58 : (1998) 8 SCC 250 : (1998) 1 SCR 63 : (1998) 109 STC 376 : (1998) AIRSCW 319 : (1998) 1 Supreme 189

Harla Vs. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1951 SC 467 : (1952) 1 SCR 110

M/s. Pankaj Jain Agencies Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1995 SC 360 : (1994) ECR 28 : (1994) 72 ELT 805 : (1994) 5 JT 64 : (1994) 3 SCALE 316 : (1994) 5 SCC 198 : (1994) 1 SCR 602 Supp

State of Maharashtra Vs. Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722 : (1965) 35 CompCas 557 : (1965) 1 SCR 123

Nathulal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 43 : (1966) CriLJ 71

Union of India and others Vs. Apar Private Ltd. and Others, AIR 1999 SC 2515 : (1999) 65 ECC 727 : (1999) ECR 63 : (1999) 112 ELT 3 : (1999) 5 JT 161 : (1999) 4 SCALE 313 : (1999) 6 SCC 117 : (1999) 3 SCR 1056 : (2000) 1 UJ 233 : (1999) AIRSCW 2676 : (1999) 6 Supreme 348

Garware Nylons Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Pune, AIR 1999 SC 844 : (1998) 77 ECR 682 : (1998) 100 ELT 321 : (1998) 8 SCC 282 : (1998) AIRSCW 3928

Apar Private Ltd. and others Vs. Union of India and others, (1986) 1 BomCR 196 : (1986) 88 BOMLR 355 : (1985) 6 ECC 241 : (1988) 19 ECR 514 : (1985) 22 ELT 644

Facts:

Dispute on whether Section 206C applies to payments for liquor trade licenses, which grant the right to trade but not the right to specific goods.

Issues:

Does payment for a liquor trade license, granting business rights but not specific goods, make the licensee a 'buyer' under Section 206C?

Held:

Section 206C applies when payment grants the right to specific goods. Liquor trade licenses don't automatically grant this right.

The court rejects reliance on Section 206C(11) explanation, emphasizing a 'buyer' must gain the right to specific goods.

High Court observations not aligned with this interpretation are not strictly correct. Licenses for liquor trade don't attract Section 206C.

Decision: Special Leave Petition dismissed. Licenses for liquor trade don't fall under Section 206C.

Facts:

The appellant, Kadiyala Rama Rao, is a stranger auction purchaser of a house property sold in court on 31st July 1978.

The property was sold in pursuance of a mortgage deed dated 4.6.1975 in C.S. No. 1245 of 1973 in the court of District Munsif, Rajamundhry, Andhra Pradesh.

The respondents filed an application to set aside the auction sale on 26th August 1978, which was rejected by the District Munsif on 31st August 1978.

The sale was confirmed on 31st July 1978, and the appellant took possession on 9th November 1978.

Issues:

The respondents filed a Revision Petition before the High Court under Section 115 of CPC, challenging the sale on the ground of salability, irregularities, and fraud.

The Revision Petition was allowed on 4th April 1980, and the appellant filed a Review Petition which was dismissed on 22nd December 1980.

The validity of the court sale and the jurisdiction of the court to set it aside under Order 21 Rule 90.

Held:

The provisions of Order 21 Rule 90 allow setting aside a sale based on material irregularity or fraud. The court emphasizes the need for substantial injury to the applicant due to such irregularity or fraud.

The Revision Petition was allowed on 24.4.1980, long after the completion of the sale, indicating a misconception of facts by the Learned Single Judge.

The Judgment-Debtor had no locus standi to challenge the sale on the ground of salability, as Order 21 Rule 90 specifically addresses material irregularity or fraud.

The Andhra Pradesh and Madras Amendment to Order 21 Rule 90 is considered, allowing the court to call upon the applicant to furnish security or deposit money to avoid the sale.

The Revision Petition was framed correctly, and the court holds that a revision application is maintainable against an order not appealable either before the subordinate court or the High Court.

The order of the Learned Single Judge is set aside, and the order of the Executing Court dated 31.8.78 confirming the sale is upheld.

No further orders are issued regarding possession, and no costs are awarded.

The Appeal is Allowed.

Facts:

The Legislative Assembly of Himachal Pradesh enacted the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, to consolidate and amend laws related to land holdings.

Sub-section (1) of Section 26 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act.

The State Government framed the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973, in exercise of the delegated power.

Rule 3 defined areas subservient to tea plantation, including a proviso restricting the transfer of such land.

An amendment to Rule 3, via notification dated 4-4-1986, and a circular in 1990 imposed further restrictions on the transfer of land subservient to tea plantation.

Issues:

Whether the Act applies to land subservient to tea estates.

The constitutional validity of the amendment and circular restricting the transfer of such subservient land.

Held:

The Act does not apply to land subservient to tea estates, as explicitly stated in Section 5(g), which excludes tea estates from the Act.

The amendment imposing restrictions on the transfer of subservient land is ultra vires the rule-making power conferred by the Act. Delegated legislation must conform exactly to the powers granted, and the amendment goes beyond the legislative intent.

The prohibition on the transfer of subservient land does not serve the purpose of the Act, as such land is already excluded from the Act's provisions.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the judgment of the High Court. The proviso inserted into Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973, by the notification dated 4-4-1986, and the circular order dated 21-8-90, are declared invalid and struck down as ultra vires the powers of the H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972. No order as to costs.

Facts:

The temple was founded in 1891 by P. Venkata Varada Doss.

An inquiry was initiated in 1934 regarding the nature of the temple, and it was declared an 'Excepted Temple' in 1935.

D. Venkatarangaiah, the brother-in-law of the founder, was nominated as the successor, and the temple's affairs were managed by him.

Venkatarangaiah executed a Will in 1941, appointing a Board of Five Trustees to administer the temple.

A legal dispute arose in 1972 regarding the hereditary nature of trusteeship.

Issues:

Whether the persons nominated as trustees after the commencement of the 1951 Act can be considered 'hereditary trustees' under the applicable acts.

The effect of the order dated 4-10-1935 and the Will of Venkatarangaiah on the trusteeship.

Held:

The court examined the definition of 'hereditary trustee' under the 1927 Act, 1951 Act, and 1959 Act.

The order dated 4-10-1935 declared the temple an 'Excepted Temple' under the 1927 Act during Venkatarangaiah's trusteeship.

Trustees nominated after the 1951 Act by the Board were not considered 'hereditary trustees' under the 1951 and 1959 Acts.

The court emphasized that any rights created under the 1927 Act by the Board did not continue after the 1951 Act.

The appellant, nominated as a trustee after 1951, was not a 'hereditary trustee.'

The court dismissed the appeal, confirming that trustees nominated after 1951 were not 'hereditary trustees.'