Service Law – Pension Entitlement – Interpretation of Retirement Benefit Schemes – University Employees’ Rights – The appellant was appointed as a Junior Scientist cum Assistant Professor in 1987 and, as per the Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976, was required to opt for the Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) scheme if he did not wish to be covered under the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme – The appellant never opted for CPF – Held: Under Chapter 16 of the University Statutes, non-exercise of the CPF option automatically entitled the appellant to the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme – High Court’s dismissal of the appellant’s claim was erroneous [Paras 9-12].

Office Order Implementation – Automatic Inclusion in Pension Scheme Upon Non-Exercise of CPF Option – The University’s Office Order dated 21.02.2008 clearly stipulated that employees who did not opt for CPF within one month would automatically be included in the pension scheme – The appellant did not exercise the option, yet the University failed to include him in the pension scheme – Held: The University's failure to include the appellant in the pension scheme violated its own statutory provisions [Paras 6-7].

Precedents from the High Court – Similarly Placed Employees Granted Pension – The Patna High Court had previously ruled in multiple cases, including Arjun Kumar v. State of Bihar & Ors. (CWJC 2041/2012), that non-exercise of the CPF option must result in automatic entitlement to pension – The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s refusal to grant the appellant similar relief was arbitrary and contrary to established precedent [Paras 11-12].

Appeal Allowed – Direction for Pension Grant Within Four Months – The Supreme Court directed that the appellant be granted retiral benefits under the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme, with necessary adjustments for any CPF benefits received – Computation and disbursement were ordered within four months [Para 13].
 

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheques – Legally Enforceable Debt – Lease Agreement – The appellant issued four post-dated cheques amounting to ₹9,00,000/- as security deposit refund under a lease agreement – Upon dishonour, the respondent filed criminal complaints – The Trial Court convicted the appellant but awarded only ₹3,00,000/- as compensation – The appellate Court and the High Court upheld the conviction and enhanced the compensation to ₹9,00,000/- – Held: A security cheque cannot be treated as a legally enforceable debt if the underlying contractual obligation remains unfulfilled – The respondent retained possession of the rented premises for five years without paying rent, which justified deductions from the security deposit – Conviction upheld, but compensation reduced to ₹3,00,000/- as awarded by the Trial Court [Paras 16-22].

Criminal Law – Revisional Powers of High Court – Enhancement of Compensation – Whether Justified – The High Court enhanced the compensation from ₹3,00,000/- to ₹9,00,000/- without considering the appellant’s counterclaims regarding unpaid rent – Held: Compensation enhancement must be based on established liability – The High Court erred in ignoring the findings of the Trial Court regarding deductions from the security deposit – The appellate Court and High Court orders were set aside, and the Trial Court’s judgment was restored [Paras 23-26].

Landlord-Tenant Dispute – Security Deposit Refund – Impact on Cheque Dishonour Cases – The appellant had filed a separate eviction suit against the respondent, which was decreed in his favour – The respondent was evicted through execution proceedings – Held: The respondent’s continued possession without rent payment affected the refund obligation – The appellant was entitled to adjust dues before refunding the deposit – The prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act could not override contractual claims under tenancy laws [Paras 17-21].

Appeal Partly Allowed – Conviction Maintained – Compensation Restored to ₹3,00,000/- – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act but restored the Trial Court’s compensation order of ₹3,00,000/- – Excess amount deposited pursuant to the High Court’s order to be reimbursed to the appellant – Compliance to be ensured within two months [Paras 26-27].

Decision: The appeal was partly allowed. The appellant’s conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act was upheld, but the enhancement of compensation to ₹9,00,000/- was set aside. The Trial Court’s order awarding ₹3,00,000/- as compensation was restored. Any excess amount deposited shall be reimbursed to the appellant. The Trial Court was directed to ensure compliance within two months.

Constitutional Law - Disability Rights – Judicial Service – Visually Impaired Candidates – Petitions challenging exclusion of visually impaired candidates from judicial service – Issue raised regarding the validity of Rules excluding such candidates and absence of reasonable accommodation – Supreme Court emphasizes equality doctrine under Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution and the RPwD Act, 2016 – Highlighted that disability discrimination should be recognized as a fundamental right violation – The RPwD Act termed a ‘super-statute’ providing quasi-constitutional protections [Paras 31-36].

International Obligations – United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) – Cited as binding and affirming principles of non-discrimination, accessibility, reasonable accommodation, and participation in justice – Highlighted India's commitment under Articles 5, 9, 13, and 27 of the UNCRPD – Affirmed that disability-based discrimination contravenes India’s international obligations [Paras 37-38].

RPwD Act, 2016 – Rights, Definitions & Obligations – The Act defines discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and benchmark disabilities – Provisions mandate equality, non-discrimination, inclusive education, reservation, and reasonable accommodation in employment and public services – Statutory obligation on State and establishments to promote accessibility and inclusive participation [Paras 39].

Judicial Precedents – Reasonable Accommodation – Case law including Union of India v. National Federation of Blind, Jeeja Ghosh, Vikash Kumar, and others reaffirming the principle of reasonable accommodation – Judicial recognition that employment and participation of PwDs require adaptation of rules and practices – Exclusion based solely on disability without assessing capabilities after reasonable accommodation violates fundamental rights [Paras 40].

Reasonable Accommodation – Principle Explained – The concept is to create enabling conditions tailored to individual disabilities – Recognized as an enforceable right to ensure effective participation of PwDs in society and employment – Exclusion without reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination and is inconsistent with the RPwD Act and international law [Paras 41-42].

Indirect Discrimination – Rule 7 Challenge – Rules prescribing three-year practice or 70% marks in the first attempt for judicial service aspirants held as indirectly discriminatory – Although facially neutral, these conditions disproportionately impact PwD candidates – Applied principle of indirect discrimination as developed in Indian and international jurisprudence – Rule struck down to the extent it applies such conditions to PwDs [Paras 43-46].

Relaxation of Marks – Permissibility – Recognized that relaxation of cut-off marks for PwDs is permissible – Affirmed that PwDs deserve similar relaxation benefits as SC/ST candidates – Relied on precedents like Indra Sawhney, Aryan Raj, Anamol Bhandari – Directed framing of separate cut-offs for PwDs during selection stages to ensure substantive equality [Paras 47-63].

Separate Cut-Off and Merit List – Mandate – Directed that PwD candidates must have separate cut-off marks and merit lists at every stage of judicial selection – Non-declaration of such cut-offs defeats reservation purpose and violates RPwD Act – Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules interpreted to mandate such separate cut-offs [Paras 63.3].

No Distinction Between PwD and PwBD – Clarified that rights under RPwD Act apply equally to all PwDs, including those below the benchmark threshold – Denial of rights based on benchmark distinction is impermissible [Para 64].

Global Examples – Judicial Service by Visually Impaired Professionals – Cited several successful judges and lawyers globally who have excelled despite visual impairments – Reinforces that visual disability is no bar to judicial competence [Paras 65-66].

Conclusion and Directions – Visually impaired candidates are eligible to participate in judicial service – Rule 6A and Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules struck down insofar as they exclude or indirectly discriminate against PwDs – Directed authorities to relax marks for PwDs and maintain separate cut-offs – Directed expeditious completion of selection process within three months [Paras 67-69].
 

Criminal Law – Quashing – Rape - False Promise of Marriage – Long-Term Consensual Relationship – FIR Quashed – The appellant and the complainant were in an intimate relationship for over 16 years – The complainant alleged that the appellant had engaged in sexual intercourse with her under a false promise of marriage – However, she continued the relationship despite knowing about his marriage to another woman – Supreme Court held that a prolonged relationship spanning 16 years, where both parties were consenting adults, cannot be termed as rape merely because the relationship eventually soured – Held: Criminal proceedings quashed as continuation of trial would amount to an abuse of process of law [Paras 22-25, 37-38].

Consent in Intimate Relationships – Distinction Between Rape and Consensual Sex – The complainant, an educated woman with professional qualifications, continued to engage in a relationship with the appellant for over a decade – She willingly traveled to meet him multiple times and maintained physical relations – Supreme Court reiterated that when a woman, fully aware of the consequences, engages in a voluntary relationship for an extended period, it cannot later be claimed that the consent was vitiated due to misconception of fact – Held: No case of rape is made out as there was no coercion, threat, or deceit in the initial stages of the relationship [Paras 24-30].

Delay in Filing FIR – Questionable Credibility – Malafide Intent Suspected – The complainant filed an FIR in 2022, nearly 16 years after the alleged first incident of rape in 2006 – She remained silent and continued the relationship without lodging any complaint until the appellant married another woman in 2022 – Supreme Court held that such a long delay in filing the FIR casts doubt on the authenticity of the allegations – Held: Delay of 16 years weakens the prosecution case and indicates that the FIR was filed due to personal grievances rather than any real criminal offence [Paras 31-33].

Legal Principles Governing False Promise of Marriage – Protection Against Misuse – Supreme Court referred to precedents emphasizing that a promise of marriage must be false from the inception to vitiate consent – In this case, there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant never intended to marry the complainant – The complainant herself admitted to portraying herself as the appellant’s wife in multiple instances – Held: False promise of marriage cannot be inferred when the relationship is prolonged, consensual, and both parties voluntarily continued engagement [Paras 26-29].

Decision: Appeal Allowed – FIR No. 269 of 2022 and All Criminal Proceedings Against the Appellant Quashed – High Court Order Set Aside.

Bail - Dowry Death – Grant of Bail – Stringent Scrutiny Required – Bail of In-Laws Cancelled – The appellant, brother of the deceased, challenged the bail granted by the High Court to four accused persons (the deceased’s in-laws) – The deceased had allegedly been harassed for dowry, with demands escalating from a motorcycle to a car – The post-mortem report confirmed multiple ante-mortem injuries and strangulation, ruling out suicide – The trial court had denied bail considering the gravity of the offence, but the High Court granted bail citing lack of prior criminal history and gender considerations – Supreme Court held that in cases of dowry deaths, courts must adopt stricter scrutiny in bail matters, particularly when forensic evidence indicates foul play – Bail of the mother-in-law and father-in-law cancelled, as they played a primary role in harassment and dowry demands [Paras 7-13].

Judicial Approach in Dowry Death Cases – High Court’s Mechanical Bail Grant Criticized – Supreme Court expressed concern over the High Court’s superficial approach in granting bail, stating that courts must reflect heightened vigilance in such cases – It emphasized that judicial orders in dowry death cases carry a broader social message and should deter systemic crimes against women – Held: Granting bail mechanically in serious offences like dowry death undermines the deterrent effect of the law and erodes public confidence in the justice system [Paras 15-16].

Cancellation of Bail – Role of Accused Considered – Limited Leniency for Sisters-in-Law – The Supreme Court distinguished between the roles of the accused – The father-in-law and mother-in-law were found to have played an active role in the dowry harassment and thus their bail was cancelled – However, the accused sisters-in-law were granted the benefit of doubt due to their relatively minor role, educational background, and personal circumstances – Held: The High Court’s order granting bail to the sisters-in-law upheld, subject to strict compliance with bail conditions [Paras 14, 18].

Impact of Strangulation and Ante-Mortem Injuries – Importance of Medical Evidence – The post-mortem report documented ligature marks and severe physical trauma on the deceased’s body – Supreme Court held that such evidence is a crucial factor in assessing culpability in dowry death cases – Courts must be cautious in granting bail when medical evidence strongly suggests homicide rather than suicide – Held: The presence of significant ante-mortem injuries justified a stricter approach in bail considerations [Paras 6-7].

Decision: Appeals Allowed in Part – Bail of Accused No. 2 (Father-in-Law) and Accused No. 3 (Mother-in-Law) Cancelled – Bail of Accused No. 4 and Accused No. 5 (Sisters-in-Law) Upheld with Conditions – Trial to be Expedited.

Criminal Law – Appeal Against Conviction - Forgery and Fabrication – Lack of Primary Evidence – Conviction Set Aside – The appellant was convicted on the basis of allegations that he prepared the postal cover in which a forged marksheet was transmitted – The trial court relied on the testimony of a handwriting expert (PW-18) to establish the appellant’s involvement – Supreme Court noted that the original postal cover was never produced or exhibited as primary evidence – Held: Without proving the existence of the primary document, reliance on expert testimony alone was insufficient to sustain conviction – Appellant acquitted [Paras 13-15].

Handwriting Expert Evidence – Corroboration Required – Testimony Not Sufficient to Convict – The Supreme Court reiterated that while expert testimony is admissible under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, it must be corroborated by other substantive evidence – In this case, the expert’s reasoning sheet was not brought on record, and he did not identify the disputed document conclusively – Held: In the absence of supporting evidence, reliance solely on expert opinion was erroneous, rendering the conviction unsustainable [Paras 8-12].

Criminal Trial – Burden of Proof – Prosecution Failed to Establish Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt – The prosecution failed to prove that the postal cover, which allegedly contained the forged marksheet, was linked to the appellant – Supreme Court held that in criminal trials, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and any failure to prove material facts must result in acquittal – Held: The trial court, appellate court, and High Court erred in convicting the appellant without substantive evidence beyond expert opinion [Paras 15-16].

Decision: Appeal Allowed – Conviction Set Aside – Appellant Acquitted of All Charges – Trial Court, Appellate Court, and High Court Judgments Quashed.

Criminal Law – Conviction for Grievous Hurt – High Court’s Conviction under Section 326 IPC Modified to Section 325 IPC - The appellants were convicted under Section 307 IPC by the Sessions Court—High Court altered the conviction to Section 326 IPC but retained imprisonment—Supreme Court found doubt regarding whether the weapons used (bamboo sticks and wooden logs) were "dangerous weapons" under Section 326 IPC—Held: The evidence warranted conviction under Section 325 IPC (grievous hurt) instead—Decision: Conviction modified from Section 326 IPC to Section 325 IPC [Paras 7-11].

Sentencing – Reduction of Punishment – Period Already Undergone Considered Sufficient - The incident occurred in 1994—Appellants had already spent six months in custody and had no other criminal record—Held: Sentencing them to further imprisonment after decades would not serve justice—Decision: Sentence reduced to period already undergone, with fine imposed [Paras 12-13].

Penalty for Default – Additional Imprisonment in Case of Non-Payment of Fine - Supreme Court directed the appellants to deposit the fine within one month—Held: Failure to pay would result in an additional imprisonment of one year minus the period already served [Para 14].

Matrimonial Law - Divorce – Amicable Settlement – Invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution – Decree of Divorce by Mutual Consent - The Family Court granted divorce to the respondent-husband on the ground of cruelty—The High Court upheld the decree—During the appeal before the Supreme Court, the parties opted for mediation and reached a Final Settlement Agreement—Held: Since the parties had been living separately since 2013 and had resolved their disputes amicably, the Supreme Court invoked Article 142 to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent—Decision: Divorce granted under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act; previous findings on cruelty set aside [Paras 9-14].

Child Custody and Maintenance – ₹2.11 Crores Settlement for Minor Child – Visitation Rights Granted - The parties agreed on financial terms for the minor child's maintenance—The respondent-husband paid ₹2.11 crores to the appellant-wife—Visitation rights were established, allowing the father periodic access to the child, including overnight visits—Held: The agreed settlement for maintenance and visitation was binding on both parties—Decision: Settlement upheld; visitation rights enforced as per agreement [Paras 10-18].

Quashing of Criminal and Civil Cases – Parties Barred from Future Litigation – No Further Claims - As part of the settlement, both parties agreed to withdraw all pending cases, including FIRs and domestic violence proceedings—Held: All pending litigation, including FIR No. 364/2022 under Section 498A IPC, were quashed—Decision: No future claims shall be entertained; all legal disputes between the parties stand resolved [Paras 15-18].

Limitation Law - Condonation of Delay – No Sufficient Cause – High Court’s Order Set Aside - The respondents sought to set aside an ex-parte decree after a delay of 1312 days, citing misplaced case files and delayed handover by counsel – The Supreme Court held that no reasonable explanation was provided for the delay, especially since the legal heirs of the defendant were aware of the decree when they appeared in execution proceedings – Held: The High Court erred in condoning the delay without sufficient cause, and the Trial Court rightly rejected the application [Paras 6-10].

Ex-Parte Decree – Absence of Due Diligence – Application to Set Aside Decree Rejected - The first defendant, though appearing in the suit, failed to file a written statement and later passed away – His legal heirs contested execution proceedings but did not immediately seek to set aside the decree – The Supreme Court emphasized that a litigant must act diligently – Held: The attempt to set aside the decree after prolonged inaction was an afterthought and could not be entertained [Paras 8-12].

Equitable Jurisdiction – Delay Must Be Non-Deliberate – No Exceptional Hardship Proven - The respondents claimed the suit was collusive and the sale consideration inadequate – The Court found that such contentions were raised belatedly and lacked merit – Held: The law favors diligent litigants, and mere allegations of hardship do not justify setting aside a decree after an unexplained delay [Paras 10-11].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s Order Set Aside – Trial Court’s Order Restored - The Supreme Court found that the application to set aside the ex-parte decree was an afterthought and that the High Court’s reasoning was flawed – Held: The order of the High Court condoning the delay is set aside, and the Trial Court’s order rejecting the application for condonation of delay is restored [Para 12].