Civil Law – Auction - Lease Agreement – No Transfer of Ownership Without Execution of Lease – Leasehold Rights Never Created – The agreement to lease dated 17th July 1957 did not create any right, title, or interest in favor of M/s Mehta Constructions until a formal lease deed was executed – Since no lease was executed, M/s Mehta Constructions had no transferrable interest in the plot – Any subsequent transfers, including the auction sale, did not confer ownership or leasehold rights to the respondents [Paras 7-8, 11].

Auction Sale in Liquidation – Property Sold on "As-Is Basis" – No Right to Title or Leasehold Interest – The auction sale in liquidation proceedings conveyed only whatever rights the original lessee had – Since M/s Mehta Constructions never acquired a valid leasehold interest, the auction purchaser (first respondent) could not claim ownership or lessee rights over the plot – The High Court correctly held that the auction sale did not amount to a valid transfer of the property [Paras 12-14].

Nazul Land – Requirement of Government Approval for Transfer – Violation of Rules – The plot in question was Nazul land, which belongs to the Union of India and is managed by the DDA – As per Section 22 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, and Rule 43 of the 1981 Rules, the lessor's prior consent was mandatory for any transfer – Since no such consent was obtained, the transfer was illegal and could not confer any legal rights to the respondents [Paras 5, 11, 14].

Judicial Review – No Interference with High Court Decision – Remedy Available for DDA – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, noting that the auction sale was only for the transfer of whatever rights existed under the lease agreement, which were non-existent – However, the Court clarified that the DDA retains the right to pursue appropriate legal remedies for recovery of possession or unearned income from the respondents if required [Paras 14-16].

Liquidation Proceedings – Conflicting Claims on Sale Proceeds – No Direction for Payment of Unearned Income – The Provisional Liquidator confirmed that substantial amounts from the auction sale were invested in fixed deposits – However, multiple claims exceeding ₹60 crores were pending against the liquidated company – The Supreme Court ruled that it was inappropriate to direct any portion of the available funds to be used for payment of unearned income to DDA, leaving it to the Company Court’s discretion [Paras 9-10, 13].

Decision – Supreme Court Dismisses DDA’s Appeal – No Right to Ownership for Respondents – Remedy Available for DDA – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the first respondent does not acquire ownership or leasehold rights in the said plot – The DDA retains the right to initiate legal action for recovery of possession and unearned income if it so chooses – The first respondent may apply to DDA for regularization of the transaction, subject to legal compliance and payment of necessary dues [Paras 14-16].
 

Criminal Law – Transfer of Criminal Cases – Negotiable Instruments Act – Territorial Jurisdiction for Cheque Dishonour Cases – Complaint Validly Filed in Chandigarh - The petitioner contended that no cause of action arose in Chandigarh and that the complaint should have been filed in Coimbatore—Court held that under Section 142(2)(a) of the NI Act, the jurisdiction to file a complaint vests in the court where the payee’s bank branch is situated—Held: Kotak Mahindra Bank’s collection center in Chandigarh conferred jurisdiction on the courts there—Decision: Transfer petition dismissed; complaint to proceed in Chandigarh [Paras 3, 58-63].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Territorial Jurisdiction – Section 142(2) – Court examined precedents, including Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 9 SCC 129 and Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh (2016) 2 SCC 75 – Section 142(2)(a) clarifies that jurisdiction lies where the cheque is presented for collection at the bank of the payee – Explanation to Section 142(2)(a) deems the cheque to be presented where the payee maintains an account – The enactment of Section 142-A further validates the territorial jurisdiction of courts based on cheque collection location [Paras 14-27, 56-62].

Transfer of Cases – Principles under Section 406 CrPC – Transfer under Section 406 CrPC requires proof of circumstances “expedient for the ends of justice” – Mere inconvenience to the accused in attending proceedings is not a valid ground for transfer – Court must balance various factors, including comparative hardships, risk of influence on witnesses, and public interest – Petitioner’s reliance on convenience and language barrier was insufficient to warrant transfer [Paras 28-35, 47-49, 64-65].

Judicial Precedents – Limited Scope of Transfer in Cheque Bounce Cases – Court relied on Yogesh Upadhaya v. Atlanta Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine SC 170), which affirmed the non obstante clause in Section 142(1) of the N.I. Act does not override Section 406 CrPC – Emphasized that jurisdiction in cheque bounce cases is determined by statutory provisions and cannot be overridden merely based on party preferences – Rajkumar Sabu v. Sabu Trade Pvt. Ltd. (2021 SCC OnLine SC 378) reiterated that overlapping civil and criminal proceedings do not justify transfer – Nahar Singh Yadav v. Union of India (2011) 1 SCC 307 held that transfer should be ordered only in exceptional cases where fair trial is genuinely at risk [Paras 36-46, 50-55].

Decision – Transfer Petition Dismissed – No Grounds for Transfer – Petition dismissed – No substantial grounds made out for transfer under Section 406 CrPC – Held: Chandigarh court has jurisdiction as per Section 142(2)(a) N.I. Act – Petitioner's claim of inconvenience and language barrier not sufficient for transfer – Open to petitioner to seek exemption from personal appearance or attend proceedings virtually [Paras 66-68].
 

Criminal Law - Preventive Detention – Non-Application of Mind – Order Quashed - The detenu was detained under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act for alleged involvement in a gold smuggling syndicate – The detention order cited multiple grounds, including past involvement in smuggling and a previous narcotics conviction – The Supreme Court held that there was a lack of independent application of mind as the detaining authority mechanically included all four grounds under Section 3(1) without distinction – Held: Preventive detention cannot be sustained where the order reflects a blanket approach without analyzing the role of the detenu in each alleged activity separately [Paras 4-8].

Live Link Between Past Offenses and Preventive Detention – No Justification – Detention Unwarranted - The detaining authority cited a narcotics case from over a decade ago to justify the detention order – The Supreme Court found that there was no connection between the old case and the alleged current smuggling activities – Held: The absence of a proximate and live link between past offenses and the preventive detention order renders the detention illegal – A person cannot be detained based on past allegations unless there is a clear and present danger of recurrence [Paras 10-11].

Failure to Consider Bail Conditions – Violation of Constitutional Safeguards – Detention Set Aside - The detenu had been granted bail by the Magistrate with strict conditions aimed at preventing further smuggling activities – The Supreme Court observed that the detaining authority failed to consider whether these bail conditions were sufficient to neutralize the threat posed by the detenu – Held: When a court has already imposed stringent bail conditions, the detaining authority must record specific reasons why such conditions are inadequate to prevent further offenses – The detention order was set aside due to this failure [Paras 14-19].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Detention Order Quashed – Immediate Release Ordered - The Supreme Court found that the detention order suffered from non-application of mind, lack of a live link with past offenses, and failure to consider bail conditions – Held: The detention order is quashed, and the detenu is to be released immediately if still in custody [Para 22].

Power Under Section 319 CrPC – Summoning After Conclusion of Trial – Permissibility and Effect – Whether summoning is valid post-trial – Applicability of Sukhpal Singh Khaira Guidelines – Section 319 CrPC empowers courts to summon additional accused during trial based on evidence recorded – The power must be exercised before conclusion of trial – Held: The summoning order issued 13 years after the original trial’s conclusion is without jurisdiction – However, when a revisional court sets aside the trial court’s rejection of a Section 319 application, the revisional order relates back to the date of the trial court’s order – This ensures that the summoning order is deemed to have been passed before trial completion, thus complying with the ruling in Sukhpal Singh Khaira [Paras 47-54, 83-93].

High Court’s revisional power under Sections 397-401 CrPC – Scope and limitations – Revisional jurisdiction is corrective and not expansive – The High Court in revision set aside the trial court’s rejection of a Section 319 application 11 years after trial conclusion, directing reconsideration – Held: A revisional order must be passed before trial concludes – However, once a revisional court sets aside the rejection of a Section 319 application, it substitutes the original order and relates back to the date of the trial court’s rejection – This ensures the trial court does not become functus officio for reconsidering the application despite trial conclusion [Paras 75-89, 102-105].

Interplay between Section 319 and Revisional Jurisdiction – Legal Consequences – Once trial is concluded, any pending revision against rejection of a Section 319 application ordinarily becomes infructuous – The High Court cannot direct a trial court to summon an accused after the main trial has ended – However, when a revisional court directs reconsideration of a Section 319 application, the order relates back, making the trial court’s reconsideration legally valid – Held: In such cases, newly summoned accused must face a separate trial under Section 319(4) CrPC [Paras 90-96, 101-106].

Opportunity to be heard before summoning – Whether mandatory – The High Court set aside the rejection of the Section 319 application without issuing notice to the proposed accused – Held: At the initial stage of a Section 319 application, a proposed accused has no right of hearing – However, if the application is rejected by the trial court, and later set aside in revision, the proposed accused must be heard before being summoned – Failure to provide an opportunity violates Section 401(2) CrPC and principles of natural justice [Paras 108-114].

Separate Trial for Summoned Accused – Compliance with Section 319(4) CrPC Proceedings Against Summoned Accused – Whether Joint Trial Required – Since the original trial concluded before summoning, the newly summoned accused must face a separate trial – Held: Section 319(4)(a) mandates a fresh trial, including re-examination of witnesses, ensuring no prejudice is caused – A joint trial is not mandatory; a separate trial can be conducted if the original trial has concluded [Paras 96, 105, 115].

High Court’s delay in deciding a revision against a Section 319 rejection – Effect on trial process – The revision petition was pending for 11 years, causing significant procedural complications – Held: Courts must prioritize revisions on Section 319 applications to avoid undue delays in criminal trials – Trial courts should stay proceedings if a Section 319 revision is pending, and High Courts must expedite such revisions to ensure timely justice [Paras 106-107].

Decision: Appeal Dismissed – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s revisional order, setting aside the trial court’s rejection of the Section 319 application and affirming the summoning order issued by the trial court – The trial court is directed to proceed with the separate trial of the newly summoned accused under Section 319(4) CrPC – Courts are advised to expedite revisions under Section 319 to prevent procedural delays.
 

Tenancy Law - Landlord-Tenant Relationship – Concurrent Findings of Fact – High Court’s Reversal Unsustainable - The Trial Court and First Appellate Court had concurrently held that the plaintiff, as the legally adopted son of the original owner, was the landlord and the defendant was a tenant – The defendant’s claims of adverse possession and oral gift were rejected for lack of evidence – The High Court reversed these findings despite no substantial question of law being involved – Held: Findings of fact, particularly regarding tenancy and possession, could not be disturbed in Second Appeal unless they were perverse, which was not the case here – High Court erred in assuming First Appeal jurisdiction and interfering with well-reasoned concurrent findings [Paras 6-10].

Adverse Possession – Mere Long Possession Not Sufficient – No Evidence of Hostile Claim - The defendant claimed ownership of the suit premises through adverse possession and oral gift – The Supreme Court reiterated that mere long possession does not result in adverse possession unless hostile animus is proved – Held: The defendant's possession was permissive in nature, and he failed to establish open, continuous, and hostile possession necessary to claim adverse possession – No valid title could pass through an oral gift in the absence of a registered deed [Paras 3.4-3.6, 10].

Scope of Second Appeal – High Court's Jurisdiction Under Section 100 CPC – Interference Unwarranted - The Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 100 CPC, the High Court can interfere only when a substantial question of law arises – In this case, the High Court framed questions that merely reassessed facts already settled by the lower courts – Held: The High Court's decision to re-evaluate factual findings was legally unsustainable, and the Second Appeal should have been dismissed [Paras 6-7].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s Order Set Aside – Eviction Decree Restored - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and restored the eviction decree – Held: The defendant (tenant) must vacate the premises within three months and clear all arrears, including rent and utilities, within the same period – Non-compliance will result in execution proceedings [Para 12].

Civil Law – Execution of Decree – Delay in Execution – Specific Performance – Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 – Appellants sought execution of decree for specific performance and possession of the suit property – Respondents 1 and 2 obstructed execution, claiming to be cultivating tenants – Executing Court and High Court allowed their objections, holding that no notice was served upon them and they had established possession – Supreme Court held: Execution proceedings cannot be used to reopen issues already decided – Respondents 1 and 2 failed to contest the original suit and subsequent appeals – Their claim of tenancy was made only at the execution stage and was based on a certificate obtained in collusion with vendors after the decree had attained finality – Decree must be executed and possession delivered to appellants within two months [Paras 59-71, 78-79].

Execution Proceedings – Obstruction by Third Parties – Collusion – Respondents 1 and 2 were nephews of the vendors and were impleaded as defendants in the original suit but did not contest it – They obstructed execution only after finality of the decree, claiming tenancy rights – Revenue records were altered in 2008, post-decree, based on a "no objection" from vendors who had lost ownership – Supreme Court found collusion between vendors and respondents to defeat execution – Held: Such obstruction is not bona fide – Executing Court failed to examine the real intent behind the obstruction – High Court’s decision set aside [Paras 60-68].

Section 47 CPC vs. Order XXI Rule 97 CPC – Scope and Interpretation – Supreme Court clarified that an application under Section 47 CPC questioning the execution of a decree is distinct from an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC – Respondents' application under Section 47 should have been treated as an obstruction claim under Order XXI Rule 97 – Held: Obstructionists cannot reopen concluded issues at execution stage – Their objections were a misuse of execution proceedings – Order XXI Rule 97 provides a complete mechanism for dealing with obstructions and should have been applied by the courts below [Paras 51-54].

Possession Rights – Protection under Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 – Respondents claimed to be cultivating tenants, arguing that the decree was a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction of civil courts – Supreme Court rejected this claim, holding that respondents were not registered as cultivating tenants before execution proceedings began – Their retrospective claim of tenancy (from 1974) was based on collusion with vendors who had no title at that stage – The Act cannot protect them when their possession itself was questionable – Executing Court and High Court erred in entertaining such claims at the execution stage [Paras 64-70].

Delay in Execution – Judicial Guidelines – Supreme Court reiterated the directions given in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi (2021) 6 SCC 418 – Ordered all High Courts to collect data on pending execution cases and ensure their disposal within six months – Directed that executing courts must be held accountable for undue delays – High Courts to report compliance to Supreme Court within seven months [Paras 72-77].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court’s and Executing Court’s orders set aside – Executing Court directed to ensure possession is handed over to appellants within two months, with police aid if necessary – High Courts to monitor execution delays and report compliance.
 

Criminal Law – Challenge Registration of FIR - Section 156(3) CrPC – Mandatory Compliance with Section 154(1) and (3) CrPC – Non-Compliance Found – The complainant did not exhaust remedies under Section 154(1) and (3) before invoking Section 156(3) – The requirement of prior applications and averments was not satisfied – Application under Section 156(3) not maintainable [Paras 5-8].

Misuse of Section 156(3) – Affidavit Requirement as Safeguard – Court reiterated that applications under Section 156(3) must be supported by affidavits to prevent casual and vexatious litigation – Priyanka Srivastava and Babu Venkatesh decisions reaffirmed – No affidavit accompanied the complaint in this case [Paras 5-6].

Prior Complaint to Higher Police Officer – Not Equivalent to Section 154(1) or 154(3) Compliance – Forwarding of complaint to Economic Offences Wing was not sufficient compliance with Section 154 – Complainant failed to approach Officer Incharge of Police Station directly or under Section 154(3) – Trial Court and High Court erred in ignoring this mandatory requirement [Paras 7-9].

Binding Precedent Ignored – Trial Court and High Court Failed to Apply Priyanka Srivastava Ratio – Both Courts failed to enforce the mandatory procedural safeguards laid down by Supreme Court for complaints under Section 156(3) CrPC – Orders liable to be quashed [Paras 8-9].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – FIR and Further Proceedings Quashed – The Court set aside the Magistrate’s order directing registration of FIR as well as the High Court’s order dismissing the quashing petition – Liberty reserved to the complainant to take recourse to proper remedies under Section 154 CrPC – Appeal allowed [Paras 9-11].

Election Law – Discrepancy in Vote Counting – Justification for Recount – Appellant, a candidate for ‘Gram Pradhan,’ challenged election results due to inconsistencies in votes cast and counted – Polling booths 43, 44, and 45 recorded 1,194 votes cast as per oral communication from the Presiding Officer, but official Form 46 showed 1,213 votes – Allegation that 19 extra votes were illegally inserted – High Court set aside the order for recount, citing lack of documentary evidence – Supreme Court held that unexplained discrepancies in vote count justify recount to maintain election integrity [Paras 4-7, 14-18].

Electoral Fairness – Missing Election Records – Adverse Inference – Appellant sought official records under the Right to Information Act, 2005 – Assistant Election Officer failed to produce the ‘Matpatra Lekha’ and Presiding Officer’s Diary, citing inability to locate them – Supreme Court held that the missing records raise serious doubts regarding electoral transparency and warrant recounting – Held: Electoral documents must be preserved and made available for scrutiny in case of disputes [Paras 5.3, 16-17].

Legal Framework for Recount – Standards Under Election Law – Court reiterated that recount orders must satisfy two conditions:
(1) Material facts must establish specific irregularities, and
(2) There must be prima facie evidence to justify recounting – Cited precedents where recount was ordered only in cases of concrete discrepancies – Applied these principles to hold that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s recount order was legally sound and High Court erred in interfering [Paras 12-14].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Writ-C No. 35734 of 2022 set aside – Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s order for recounting votes in Booth Nos. 43, 44, and 45 restored – Registrar General of the High Court directed to ensure compliance – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 19-20].
 

Land Acquisition – Belting Method – Improper Application – Belting principle applied by the Reference Court and affirmed by the High Court – Held: Inappropriate in the present case as no evidence proved distinct belts or potential for differential use within the acquired land – The entire land was homogeneous and similar in nature – Belting method discarded [Paras 22-24].

Comparable Sale Instances – Reliance on Pre-Acquisition Sale Deeds – High Court enhanced compensation based on three sale instances prior to the date of notification – Held: The sale deeds were genuine and could be relied upon as the transactions were between willing parties and proximate in time – Adjustment towards development potential considered appropriate [Paras 26-31].

Deduction for Development Charges – Applicability – DDA argued for 50% deduction citing undeveloped nature of land – Held: Deduction reduced to 33.33% as the land was located near developed colonies and urban infrastructure – Supreme Court considered ground realities and likelihood of moderate development expenses [Paras 32-35].

Interest under Section 28 – Delay in Payment – High Court granted interest for delayed payment of enhanced compensation – Held: Properly granted as delay was attributable to the appellant – No interference warranted [Paras 36-38].

Final Compensation – Moderate Enhancement – Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal by reducing deduction from 50% to 33.33%, resulting in modified compensation – The rest of the judgment, including reliance on comparable sale deeds and grant of interest, upheld [Paras 39-40].

Decision – Appeal Partly Allowed – Compensation Recalculated – Supreme Court modified the compensation by reducing the deduction percentage and upheld the grant of interest on enhanced compensation [Para 40].