Facts:

The appellant, Raghbir Singh, challenges the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC for the fatal shooting of Arjun Singh. The incident arose from a land dispute resulting in a fight between the parties. Eye-witnesses, Nasib Singh (PW-1) and Banarsi (PW-2), testified to the events leading to Arjun Singh's death.

Issues:

Credibility of eye-witness accounts.

Cause of Arjun Singh's death – bullet injury or other factors.

Delay in lodging FIR.

Enhancement of fine without recorded reasons.

Held:

Credibility of eye-witness accounts: The Trial Court and the High Court upheld the credibility of PW-1 and PW-2, finding their testimony consistent and reliable. The appellant's plea of alibi was rejected due to inconsistencies in supporting evidence.

Cause of Arjun Singh's death: Medical evidence established a direct link between the bullet injury and complications leading to Arjun Singh's death. The appellant's attempt to attribute death to other factors was deemed unsustainable.

Delay in lodging FIR: Both courts accepted the rushing of the victim to the hospital as a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the FIR, dismissing it as not fatal.

Enhancement of fine without recorded reasons: The High Court's enhancement of the fine without providing reasons was deemed impermissible. The fine was restored to the original amount imposed by the Trial Court.

Facts:

The respondent, a Divisional Engineer, faced serious allegations of financial misconduct.

An FIR was registered, and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) initiated an investigation.

The respondent was suspended but later reinstated. The investigation continued, seeking sanction for prosecution.

Issues:

The Sealed Cover Procedure and the application of its clauses, particularly considering the deletion of Clause (iv) and subsequent clarifications.

Held:

The Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) adopted the Sealed Cover Procedure, keeping the respondent's case in abeyance due to the ongoing investigation.

The Tribunal directed the opening of the sealed cover, but the appellants contested this based on the existence of other conditions specified in Clause (iii) of the Sealed Cover Procedure.

The Government's clarification on 31.7.1991 specified that cases falling under Clause (iv) would be opened, but those under Clauses (i) to (iii) would remain sealed.

The appellants argued that, as per Clause (iii), since the Minister accorded approval for prosecution on 9.7.1991, the recommendations must remain sealed.

The Court considered Paragraph 7 of the Sealed Cover Procedure, which applied if circumstances arose after DPC recommendations but before actual promotion.

Since the respondent was not actually promoted and formal sanction for prosecution was granted, Paragraph 7 applied, and recommendations had to remain sealed until exoneration.

Decision: The Tribunal's direction to open the sealed cover was set aside. The Court upheld the Sealed Cover Procedure, applying Paragraph 7, and ruled in favor of the appellants.

Facts:

Custodian notified R-2, a share broker, under Section 3(2) of the Special Court Act.

Appellant, a bank, asked to hand over shares or obtain a court order after R-2's admission of liability.

Appellant claimed title to shares worth Rs. 145 crores received from R-2 and filed a suit for a declaration.

Issues:

Validity of the pledge created by R-2 in favor of the appellant.

Appellant's right to retain and dispose of pledged shares in light of its claimed loss.

Treatment of bonus shares, dividend, and interest accrued on pledged shares.

Held:

Special Court required independent evidence of the appellant's loss, which was proven to be Rs. 280 crores.

Appellant entitled to retain and dispose of the pledged shares and debentures, given the suffered loss.

Bonus shares, interest, and dividend formed part of the pledged security; appellant could retain them until redemption.

Custodian's claim for the appellant to hand over bonus shares, dividend, and interest rejected.

Appellant entitled to sell original shares, rights shares, and bonus shares and retain accrued dividend and interest.

Facts:

The respondent-assessee, involved in the generation and supply of electricity, had two undertakings in Allahabad and Lucknow.

The government, under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, acquired both undertakings for the Electricity Board, paying compensation.

The compensation was partially accepted by the assessee under protest, and a dispute arose regarding the final determination of the compensation.

Issues:

Whether Section 41(2) of the Income Tax Act is applicable to the addition of the sum in the assessment year 1965-66, given the pending determination of the compensation price.

Held:

The High Court held that Section 41(2) doesn't apply until the price is finally ascertained. As the price wasn't determined, the Revenue couldn't assess the assessee under Section 41(2). The Revenue appealed.

The Court reviewed Section 41(2), emphasizing that it applies when the moneys payable become due. The compensation received represents income accrued for the acquisition of assets.

The Court considered the wide scope of 'moneys payable' as per the Explanation, including compensation moneys. Dispute or pending proceedings for additional compensation do not negate the taxability of the received amount.

Citing Sections 1 and 4 of Section 41, the Court emphasized that business income is taxable in the year of receipt unless otherwise provided. Sub-sections (1) and (4) also support taxing income when received.

Addressing the argument that compensation isn't taxable until finally determined, the Court referred to various High Court decisions. Pendency of litigation doesn't impact the taxability of accrued income.

The Court rejected the argument that balancing charge should be taxed when compensation is finally determined. Ad hoc payment, even if disputed, constitutes income for the relevant year.

Referring to precedent cases, the Court affirmed that balancing charge becomes taxable when moneys payable become due, i.e., when ascertained, not necessarily upon final determination after disputes.

The Court concluded that the Tribunal erred in holding the addition under Section 41(2) was not justified. The compensation, even if ad hoc, was taxable as business income in the year of receipt.

None

Facts:

The dispute arose when the Canteen Employees' Union claimed that canteen employees, ostensibly employed by Local Implementation Committees, were actually employees of the State Bank of India (SBI). The bank provided canteen facilities as amenities through subsidies, but asserted no statutory or contractual obligation to run these canteens.

Issues:

Whether canteen employees could be considered employees of the State Bank.

The nature of the bank's obligation, if any, to provide canteen facilities.

Held:

The Court held that employees of canteens run by Local Implementation Committees, as per the SBI Welfare Scheme, wouldn't be considered employees of the bank. The bank had no statutory or contractual obligation to run such canteens. The scheme only provided for subsidies, not employment.

The bank had no obligation, statutory or otherwise, to run the canteens. It provided subsidies, and any additional costs were to be borne by the staff of the specific branch. The bank neither employed nor supervised canteen workers, and their appointments were not governed by bank rules.

Canteens run by Local Implementation Committees were non-statutory and non-recognized. The bank had no control over their appointments, and there was no contractual obligation beyond a specific settlement.

Even if the privilege to provide canteen facilities existed, the bank wasn't obligated to run the canteens itself. The decision to provide facilities was a policy matter for the bank, not the canteen employees.

Facts:

A young bride named Selvi committed suicide.

The police filed a challan against the husband and his mother for offenses under IPC Sections 304B and 498A.

Selvi's father was dissatisfied with the challan, moved the High Court u/s 482 of CrPC, seeking directions.

Issues:

Whether the investigating officer can be directed by the High Court to consult the Public Prosecutor and submit a fresh charge-sheet?

Legality of the order directing the investigating officer to seek the opinion of the Public Prosecutor.

Held:

The investigating officer is not legally obliged to take the opinion of a Public Prosecutor or any authority, except the superior police officer in rank, during the investigation (Para 11).

The Public Prosecutor is appointed for conducting proceedings in the court and is not involved in the investigation. Involving the Public Prosecutor in the investigation is deemed unjudicious (Para 13).

The court emphasizes that the final step in the investigation, i.e., forming an opinion on whether there is a case to place the accused on trial, is the responsibility of the officer in charge of the police station (Para 15).

The High Court committed an illegality by directing the investigating officer to take back the final report and file a fresh report based on the opinion of the Public Prosecutor. This order is set aside (Para 20).

Facts:

Appellant applied for voluntary retirement on 18.10.1995.

Management accepted the voluntary retirement offer on 30.7.1997.

The management, in their letter, mentioned a provision for retention of quarter under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme.

The appellant continued in service until 26.9.1997.

Appellant submitted a letter on 7.8.1997, followed by another on 24.9.1997, withdrawing the voluntary retirement letter.

The withdrawal was not acknowledged by the respondent-management.

Issues:

Whether a person can withdraw the option for voluntary retirement after its acceptance but before it becomes effective?

Held:

The withdrawal of the option for voluntary retirement is allowed before the "effective date," as established by precedents (Balram Gupta Vs. Union of India, J.N. Srivastava Vs. Union of India, Power Finance Corporation Ltd. Vs. Pramod Kumar Bhatia).

Decision: The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, directing the appellant to continue in service with all consequential benefits. No order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellants, Ajaib Singh and Sapinder Singh, were separately convicted under Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possession of poppy husks. The question at hand was whether poppy husks fell within the definition of "poppy straw" as per the NDPS Act.

Issues:

Whether poppy husk constitutes "poppy straw" under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.

Interpretation of relevant sections and definitions in the NDPS Act.

Held:

The term "poppy straw" as defined in Section 2(18) of the NDPS Act includes all parts (except the seeds) of the opium poppy, even if no juice has been extracted.

The argument that "poppy husk" is non-narcotic and not covered by the NDPS Act was rejected.

The court emphasized that for an offense under Section 15, it is not necessary for poppy straw to have been used or made into opium.

The definition of "husk" in Webster's Dictionary and the commentaries on the NDPS Act supported the conclusion that poppy husk is part of the plant Papaver and falls within the definition of "poppy straw."

The Appeals were dismissed, affirming the convictions under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.

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