Facts:

Farid Sattar, the respondent, joined as an Auditor in the Office of the Accountant General (A & E), West Bengal, on 16.2.1982.

Transferred to the Office of the Accountant General (A & E), West Bengal, on 1.11.1985, due to the bifurcation of Audit and Accounts.

Opted for the accounts wing, subsequently promoted to the post of Senior Accountant on 4.12.1987.

Applied for a mutual transfer in December 1990, which was not permissible for Senior Accountants. Advised to apply for a unilateral transfer with reversion to the lower post of Accountant.

Issues:

The pay fixation of the respondent after a unilateral transfer to a lower post, where the terms and conditions explicitly stated a lower pay scale.

Held:

The court ruled in favor of the appellants, emphasizing that the terms and conditions of the unilateral transfer, including the lower pay scale, would prevail.

Referred to Fundamental Rule 22(1)(a)(3) and highlighted that the respondent, by accepting the terms, was to be treated as having gone on transfer on request. Therefore, F.R. 22(1)(a)(3) was deemed applicable.

Stressed that the respondent, by seeking a unilateral transfer under specific terms, should be considered a direct recruit in the lower post, and his pay must be fixed accordingly. The appeal is allowed.

********************

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of Rajendra Singh and Triloki Singh for the murder of Kameshwar Singh. The incident occurred on 4th July 1977, in village Jaidpur Tola Pilui in the district of Saran. The prosecution accused the appellants and others of assaulting the informant party during a dispute over ploughing a field, leading to the murder of Kameshwar Singh.

Issues:

The validity of the prosecution's case, the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, and the liability of Triloki Singh under Section 34 IPC.

Held:

The prosecution's failure to explain a serious injury on accused Rajender does not render the case untrue. Non-explanation of injuries on an accused is not fatal unless it's a grievous injury and the prosecution suppresses the true version of the incident (Para 4-5).

The former statement of Satyanarain recorded by the Magistrate (Exhibit B) was not legally proved, and its use to contradict the witness during trial is not admissible under Section 145 of the Evidence Act (Para 6).

Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC does not apply as the evidence indicates a planned assault by the accused, who armed themselves during the dispute, resulting in the death of Kameshwar Singh (Para 7).

Triloki Singh cannot be held liable under Section 34 IPC, as there is insufficient evidence to establish his shared common intention with Rajender in causing the murder of the deceased (Para 8).

Facts:

The appellants are the widow and minor children of the deceased, George, who died in a motor vehicle accident.

George was riding a scooter, which was hit by a bus driven by Mohanan, owned by N.K. Raju.

The insurer, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., was the second respondent.

Issues:

The quantum of compensation granted by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was reduced by the High Court.

Competence of the appeal filed by the insurer along with the owner of the offending vehicle.

Held:

The only argument in the joint appeal was related to the quantum of compensation granted, which is not a ground available to the insurer for filing the appeal.

The insurer, according to Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, can defend proceedings on limited grounds. If none of these grounds exists, the insurer has no right to file an appeal.

The joint appeal filed by the insurer, along with the owner, was held to be not competent, as there was no ground available to the insurer to defend the claim petition.

The court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the decision of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

The appellants were awarded costs, quantified at Rs. 10,000/-

Facts:

The appellant-tenant claimed the right to purchase land from the respondents-landladies under Section 50(1) of the Tenancy Act.

The appellant argued that, as the landladies were widows, his right to purchase the land was postponed under Section 41(2) until their disability ceased.

The High Court of Bombay, in a previous judgment, held that Section 41(2) would not be applicable to purchases specified under Section 50.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 50(1) and whether Section 41(2) applied to the appellant's claim.

Held:

The Court, after considering the scheme of Sections 41 to 50, emphasized that Section 50 is a distinct provision dealing with the purchase of land by a tenant after the restoration or creation of tenancy post a specified date.

The Court noted that Section 50 does not carve out exceptions for minor landlords, widows, or disabled persons, unlike Section 41.

Mutatis mutandis, as used in Section 50, implies that Sections 41 to 44 apply with necessary changes only to the actual purchase of the land by the tenant, not to the postponement of such purchase.

The Court rejected the argument that Section 41(2) could be applied to delay the purchase indefinitely, emphasizing the one-year time limit specified in Section 50.

The judgment upheld the High Court's decision that Section 41(2) is not applicable to tenancies covered by Section 50.

Facts:

Gurdev Singh, a Granthi, was murdered on November 6, 1989.

Appellants threatened Gurdev Singh earlier to vacate his Granthi position.

On the day of the incident, appellants intercepted Gurdev Singh and his son on a road.

Gurdev Singh was fatally stabbed by one of the appellants.

The appellants were acquitted by the Sessions Judge but later convicted by the High Court.

Issues:

Did the High Court err in setting aside the acquittal?

Was there a valid motive for the murder?

Was the evidence presented sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

Held:

The appellants were tried for the murder of Gurdev Singh. The Sessions Judge acquitted them, but the High Court, upon review, overturned the acquittal, citing trustworthiness of the evidence.

The threat issued to Gurdev Singh earlier, the subsequent interception, and the fatal stabbing indicated a shared intention to harm him due to their desire for the Granthi position.

The trial court's acquittal was deemed manifestly erroneous. The High Court found the evidence trustworthy and sufficient to establish guilt. The lack of motive or planning did not negate the shared intention and the resultant murder.

Facts:

The FIR was registered for offenses under the Indian Penal Code and the West Bengal Sales Tax Act 1994.

The complaint alleged that the respondent engaged in impersonation and forgery to obtain registrations and permits under the Sales Tax Act, defrauding the government of substantial amounts.

The Bureau of Investigation formed under the Sales Tax Act conducted initial investigations and forwarded the complaint to the regular police for further action.

The High Court quashed the FIR, arguing that only the Bureau of Investigation under the Sales Tax Act could conduct the investigation.

Issues:

Whether the investigation of offenses under the Sales Tax Act and the Penal Code, arising from the same transaction, can be conducted by the regular police and not exclusively by the Bureau of Investigation.

Whether the FIR could be quashed on the grounds that the person forwarding the complaint to the police lacked the authority to do so.

Held:

The Court emphasized that there is no provision in the Sales Tax Act inhibiting the powers of the regular police to investigate offenses falling under the Indian Penal Code.

Quashing the FIR solely based on the investigating agency being different was deemed inappropriate. The FIR is the first step in initiating an investigation, and if offenses under the Penal Code are involved, the investigation can be effectively conducted by the police.

The High Court's interpretation would lead to serious consequences, where an accused involved in both Sales Tax Act offenses and other serious offenses would be insulated from investigation.

The impugned order of quashing the FIR was considered to be in error, as it failed to achieve the ends of criminal justice. The decision was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:

Respondent's husband, a railway employee, died in harness.

Respondent received family pension, gratuity, provident fund, and other retirement benefits.

The railways provided compassionate appointment to the respondent.

Respondent received salary as a railway employee and family pension simultaneously until the discovery that she was not entitled to two dearness reliefs.

Issues:

Whether the respondent, now an employee and a pensioner, is entitled to dearness relief on family pension despite receiving a compassionate appointment in the railways.

Held:

The core issue revolves around Rule 21 of the Railways Services (Pension) Rules, 1993, specifically dealing with dearness relief on pension or family pension.

Rule 21(ii) states that a pensioner re-employed under the government shall not be eligible for dearness relief during the period of re-employment.

The Court interprets "re-employed" broadly, including the first regular appointment in the service.

The rationale is that a pensioner cannot draw two dearness reliefs simultaneously - on salary and pension.

The respondent, as a widow, was given employment in the railways on compassionate grounds, technically in substitution of her husband.

Since she is a pensioner receiving family pension, Rule 21 applies, and she is not entitled to two dearness reliefs.

The Court supports the denial of dearness relief on the family pension as legally justified.

The recovery of excess pension paid to the respondent between 26.1.87 to 25.1.94 is deemed unjustified on legal and equitable grounds.

The judgment and order under appeal are set aside, and the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellants, legal heirs of the landlord, seek eviction of the first respondent (tenant) under Clause (1) of Section 13(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The respondents, sons of the tenant, had built a house, and the dispute centers around whether this constitutes suitable alternative accommodation.

Issues:

Whether the sons, as landlords, can evict the aged mother (tenant) based on the construction of an alternative residence. The court also considers the moral obligation of the sons to provide for their mother.

Held:

The court emphasizes the legal distinction between moral obligations and enforceable legal duties. While morally obliged to care for the aged mother, the sons are not legally obligated to provide her residence in the newly built house.

The court interprets the term 'acquired vacant possession' as the acquisition of a legally enforceable right to reside in a suitable accommodation, which the mother lacks in the house built by her sons.

Despite the sons' moral obligation to care for the mother, the court asserts that this obligation cannot be enlarged into a legal duty to provide her residence in the house along with their families.

The court concludes that the requirements of Clause (1) of Section 13(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, are not satisfied, and the High Court's judgment, which denied eviction, is legally sound.

The appeal is dismissed without costs.

Facts:

The case involves four accused persons charged with offenses under Sections 302/34, 498A, and 201 of the IPC, as well as Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The primary allegation is the murder of the deceased Porkodi due to strangulation in her in-law's house, with additional charges related to cruelty and dowry demands.

Issues:

The validity of the conviction under Section 498-A (cruelty) and Section 302 (murder) against the accused. The court also examines the role of each accused, scrutinizing the evidence provided by prosecution witnesses.

Held:

Acquittal of Accused No. 2 (Balasubramaniam): The court scrutinizes the evidence against Accused No. 2 (Balasubramaniam), emphasizing the lack of direct evidence linking him to the crime. The court upholds the Sessions Judge's order of acquittal, stating that the charge of murder was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction under Section 201 IPC is set aside.

Conviction of Accused No. 1 and 3: The court affirms the conviction of Accused Nos. 1 and 3 under Sections 302/34, 498A, and 201 IPC. The court relies on the testimony of prosecution witnesses, including PWs 3 and 4, and rejects the argument that the subsequent version is an exaggeration. The acquittal of Accused No. 3 is not accepted.

Acquittal of Accused No. 4 (Asokan) and Conviction under Section 498-A: The court upholds the High Court's decision to overturn the acquittal of Accused No. 4 (Asokan) under Section 498A IPC. Evidence, including statements from PW7 about dowry demands, supports the conviction.

Cruelty under Section 498-A - Throwing Coffee: The court clarifies that the act of throwing coffee by the accused at the deceased, as the only evidence of ill-treatment, does not amount to cruelty or harassment under Section 498-A.

Benefit of Doubt to Accused No. 2 (Balasubramaniam) - Section 302: The court reiterates that the evidence fails to establish the presence of Accused No. 2 inside the house during the strangulation, leading to the benefit of doubt and acquittal under Section 302.

Inquest Report and Non-Disclosure by Witness - Section 174: The court dismisses the argument that non-disclosure of the assailant's name by a witness during the inquest report should not lead to disbelief of the witness's testimony.

****************************************************